CWE-862
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewMissing Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Missing
- Behavior-Type: Authorization
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.
A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.
Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic.
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.
Effectiveness: Moderate
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Host Application Interface Scanner
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Terminology
Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
updated References
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples
updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
19900 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-CP3J-M783-3PH5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-09 23:52 – Updated: 2026-09-09 23:52Summary
identrail's GitHub App connection-completion endpoint binds a fully client-supplied installation_id to the caller's workspace without verifying that the installation belongs to, or was installed by, the workspace that initiated the connect flow. identrail then mints a GitHub App installation access token for the supplied installation_id using the app's own JWT, so an authenticated tenant can link any other identrail customer's GitHub App installation into their own workspace and read that victim organization's private repositories.
Affected code (default-on path, no feature flag)
- Route:
internal/api/router.go:3590—POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete.installation_idis read from the JSON body or the attacker-controlledX-GitHub-Installation-IDheader (router.go:3582-3588). - Service:
internal/api/github_connect.go:781CompleteGitHubConnection. Thestatetoken IS rigorously bound to the caller's scope (github_connect.go:818:if stateRecord.TenantID != scope.TenantID || stateRecord.WorkspaceID != project.WorkspaceID || stateRecord.ProjectID != project.ProjectID { ... }), but the only check oninstallation_idisrequest.InstallationID <= 0(:794). The raw client value is persisted as the workspace's connection (:840). - Cross-tenant read primitive:
internal/connectors/github/repositories.go:39ListInstallationRepositories→internal/connectors/github/app.go:170mints a token viaPOST /app/installations/{installationId}/access_tokenssigned with the App JWT, succeeding for any installation where identrail's app is installed.
The feature-flagged V2 path CompleteGitHubConnector (github_connect.go:447, default off) shares the gap and is additionally weaker (matches pending connector by state value alone with no caller-scope re-check); a single fix should cover both.
Intent proof
The code binds state to {TenantID, WorkspaceID, ProjectID} and re-verifies it at completion (:818), demonstrating it understands binding is required. The asymmetry — state bound, installation_id unbound — is the missed check.
Exploitation
- Attacker is any authenticated identrail tenant; they call
StartGitHubConnectionfor their own workspace and receive astate. - Attacker calls the completion route with
{state: <their state>, installation_id: V}where V is a victim org's identrail GitHub App installation id (installation ids are not secret — they appear in post-install redirect URLs, webhook payloads, the org's GitHub App settings, and are enumerable integers). CompleteGitHubConnectionaccepts (state matches attacker scope),ListInstallationRepositories(V)mints a token for V and lists the victim org's private repos, and the connection is persisted under the attacker's workspace.- Attacker now reads the victim org's private repository inventory and can drive posture scans/repo reads via their own workspace.
Impact: cross-tenant disclosure of another customer organization's private GitHub repositories and metadata.
Remediation
Bind installation_id with the same rigor as state: capture it from GitHub's signed post-install redirect (setup_url/callback_url) and pin it to the pending state at start time, and/or after minting verify the installation's account matches the org the initiating workspace is authorized for.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/identrail/identrail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-09T23:52:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nidentrail\u0027s GitHub App connection-completion endpoint binds a fully client-supplied `installation_id` to the caller\u0027s workspace without verifying that the installation belongs to, or was installed by, the workspace that initiated the connect flow. identrail then mints a GitHub App installation access token for the supplied `installation_id` using the app\u0027s own JWT, so an authenticated tenant can link any other identrail customer\u0027s GitHub App installation into their own workspace and read that victim organization\u0027s private repositories.\n\n## Affected code (default-on path, no feature flag)\n\n- Route: `internal/api/router.go:3590` \u2014 `POST /v1/workspaces/:workspace_id/projects/:project_id/github/connect/complete`. `installation_id` is read from the JSON body or the attacker-controlled `X-GitHub-Installation-ID` header (`router.go:3582-3588`).\n- Service: `internal/api/github_connect.go:781` `CompleteGitHubConnection`. The `state` token IS rigorously bound to the caller\u0027s scope (`github_connect.go:818`: `if stateRecord.TenantID != scope.TenantID || stateRecord.WorkspaceID != project.WorkspaceID || stateRecord.ProjectID != project.ProjectID { ... }`), but the only check on `installation_id` is `request.InstallationID \u003c= 0` (`:794`). The raw client value is persisted as the workspace\u0027s connection (`:840`).\n- Cross-tenant read primitive: `internal/connectors/github/repositories.go:39` `ListInstallationRepositories` \u2192 `internal/connectors/github/app.go:170` mints a token via `POST /app/installations/{installationId}/access_tokens` signed with the App JWT, succeeding for any installation where identrail\u0027s app is installed.\n\nThe feature-flagged V2 path `CompleteGitHubConnector` (`github_connect.go:447`, default off) shares the gap and is additionally weaker (matches pending connector by `state` value alone with no caller-scope re-check); a single fix should cover both.\n\n## Intent proof\n\nThe code binds `state` to `{TenantID, WorkspaceID, ProjectID}` and re-verifies it at completion (`:818`), demonstrating it understands binding is required. The asymmetry \u2014 `state` bound, `installation_id` unbound \u2014 is the missed check.\n\n## Exploitation\n\n1. Attacker is any authenticated identrail tenant; they call `StartGitHubConnection` for their own workspace and receive a `state`.\n2. Attacker calls the completion route with `{state: \u003ctheir state\u003e, installation_id: V}` where V is a victim org\u0027s identrail GitHub App installation id (installation ids are not secret \u2014 they appear in post-install redirect URLs, webhook payloads, the org\u0027s GitHub App settings, and are enumerable integers).\n3. `CompleteGitHubConnection` accepts (state matches attacker scope), `ListInstallationRepositories(V)` mints a token for V and lists the victim org\u0027s private repos, and the connection is persisted under the attacker\u0027s workspace.\n4. Attacker now reads the victim org\u0027s private repository inventory and can drive posture scans/repo reads via their own workspace.\n\nImpact: cross-tenant disclosure of another customer organization\u0027s private GitHub repositories and metadata.\n\n## Remediation\n\nBind `installation_id` with the same rigor as `state`: capture it from GitHub\u0027s signed post-install redirect (`setup_url`/`callback_url`) and pin it to the pending state at start time, and/or after minting verify the installation\u0027s `account` matches the org the initiating workspace is authorized for.",
"id": "GHSA-cp3j-m783-3ph5",
"modified": "2026-09-09T23:52:14Z",
"published": "2026-09-09T23:52:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/security/advisories/GHSA-cp3j-m783-3ph5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/commit/835e40517509d6ef5405c27fbf14f579bedff0e7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/identrail/identrail"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/identrail/identrail/releases/tag/v1.0.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Identrail Cross-tenant IDOR: Client-supplied GitHub App installation_id is bound to the caller\u0027s workspace without ownership verification"
}
GHSA-CP5R-XQJR-84GM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-28 00:00 – Updated: 2023-10-27 20:15Jenkins BMC AMI DevX Code Pipeline Operations Plugin 1.0.8 and earlier does not perform permission checks in several HTTP endpoints.
This allows attackers with Overall/Read permission to enumerate hosts and ports of Compuware configurations and credentials IDs of credentials stored in Jenkins. Those credentials IDs can be used as part of an attack to capture the credentials using another vulnerability.
BMC AMI DevX Code Pipeline Operations Plugin 1.0.9 requires the appropriate permissions to enumerate hosts and ports of Compuware configurations and credentials IDs.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.8"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.compuware.jenkins:compuware-ispw-operations"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36898"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-10T21:14:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-27T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Jenkins BMC AMI DevX Code Pipeline Operations Plugin 1.0.8 and earlier does not perform permission checks in several HTTP endpoints.\n\nThis allows attackers with Overall/Read permission to enumerate hosts and ports of Compuware configurations and credentials IDs of credentials stored in Jenkins. Those credentials IDs can be used as part of an attack to capture the credentials using another vulnerability.\n\nBMC AMI DevX Code Pipeline Operations Plugin 1.0.9 requires the appropriate permissions to enumerate hosts and ports of Compuware configurations and credentials IDs.",
"id": "GHSA-cp5r-xqjr-84gm",
"modified": "2023-10-27T20:15:58Z",
"published": "2022-07-28T00:00:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36898"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-07-27/#SECURITY-2628"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/07/27/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jenkins Compuware ISPW Operations Plugin does not perform permission checks in several HTTP endpoints"
}
GHSA-CP68-4943-VR56
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-21 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:33Missing Authorization vulnerability in Realty Workstation Realty Workstation allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs. This issue affects Realty Workstation: from n/a through 1.0.45.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-23477"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-21T18:15:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Realty Workstation Realty Workstation allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs. This issue affects Realty Workstation: from n/a through 1.0.45.",
"id": "GHSA-cp68-4943-vr56",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:33:18Z",
"published": "2025-01-21T18:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23477"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/realty-workstation/vulnerability/wordpress-realty-workstation-plugin-1-0-45-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CP69-4955-VPHQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 06:31 – Updated: 2026-03-18 06:31The Subscriptions for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the wps_sfw_admin_cancel_susbcription() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.2. This is due to the function being hooked to the init action without any authentication or authorization checks, and only performing a non-empty check on the nonce parameter without actually validating it via wp_verify_nonce(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to cancel any active WooCommerce subscription by sending a crafted GET request with an arbitrary nonce value via the wps_subscription_id parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-1926"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T04:17:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Subscriptions for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the `wps_sfw_admin_cancel_susbcription()` function in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.2. This is due to the function being hooked to the `init` action without any authentication or authorization checks, and only performing a non-empty check on the nonce parameter without actually validating it via `wp_verify_nonce()`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to cancel any active WooCommerce subscription by sending a crafted GET request with an arbitrary nonce value via the `wps_subscription_id` parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-cp69-4955-vphq",
"modified": "2026-03-18T06:31:20Z",
"published": "2026-03-18T06:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1926"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/subscriptions-for-woocommerce/tags/1.9.0/admin/class-subscriptions-for-woocommerce-admin.php#L831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/subscriptions-for-woocommerce/tags/1.9.0/includes/class-subscriptions-for-woocommerce.php#L248"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/subscriptions-for-woocommerce/trunk/admin/class-subscriptions-for-woocommerce-admin.php#L831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/subscriptions-for-woocommerce/trunk/includes/class-subscriptions-for-woocommerce.php#L248"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3470887%40subscriptions-for-woocommerce%2Ftrunk\u0026old=3449291%40subscriptions-for-woocommerce%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/eabfdf29-eca9-4e4b-b809-23a83f5a91ac?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CP6F-C9GR-HRHH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-23 12:32 – Updated: 2026-07-23 12:32Subscriber Broken Access Control in WP Booking System < 5.12.8.1 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57367"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-23T12:18:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Subscriber Broken Access Control in WP Booking System \u003c 5.12.8.1 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-cp6f-c9gr-hrhh",
"modified": "2026-07-23T12:32:24Z",
"published": "2026-07-23T12:32:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57367"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/wp-booking-system-premium/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-booking-system-plugin-5-12-8-1-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CP79-9MWR-WR49
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:40 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:40Summary
Ech0 allows any authenticated user to read historical system logs and subscribe to live log streams because the dashboard log endpoints validate only that a JWT is present and valid, but do not require an administrator role or privileged scope.
Impact
Any valid user session can access GET /api/system/logs and can also connect to the SSE and WebSocket log streaming endpoints. This exposes operational log data to low-privilege users. Depending on deployment and logging practices, the returned logs may include internal file paths, stack traces, admin activity, background job output, internal URLs, and other sensitive operational context. This creates a post-authentication information disclosure primitive that can materially aid follow-on attacks.
Details
The issue is caused by an authorization gap between route registration, handler logic, and the service layer.
internal/router/dashboard.go registers the log endpoints on authenticated router groups, but does not apply any admin-only authorization middleware:
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
// Auth
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs/stream", h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())
}
internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go returns log data directly and the SSE/WS handlers only check whether jwtUtil.ParseToken(token) succeeds:
func (dashboardHandler *DashboardHandler) GetSystemLogs() gin.HandlerFunc {
return res.Execute(func(ctx *gin.Context) res.Response {
logs, err := dashboardHandler.dashboardService.GetSystemLogs(service.SystemLogQuery{
Tail: tail,
Level: ctx.Query("level"),
Keyword: ctx.Query("keyword"),
})
if err != nil {
return res.Response{Err: err}
}
return res.Response{
Data: logs,
Msg: "获取系统日志成功",
}
})
}
internal/service/dashboard/dashboard.go exposes the log backend without adding a compensating admin check:
func (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {
tail := query.Tail
if tail <= 0 {
tail = 200
}
return logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)
}
Affected endpoints:
GET /api/system/logsGET /api/system/logs/stream?token=...GET /ws/system/logs?token=...
Proof of concept
1. Start the app
docker run -d \
--name ech0 \
-p 6277:6277 \
-v /opt/ech0/data:/app/data \
-e JWT_SECRET="Hello Echos" \
sn0wl1n/ech0:latest
2. Initialize an owner account and register a normal user
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/init/owner" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"owner","password":"ownerpass","email":"owner@example.com"}'
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/register" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"winky","password":"winkypass","email":"winky@example.com"}'
3. Log in as the non-admin user and request the system log endpoint
winky_token=$(
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/login" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"winky","password":"winkypass"}' \
| sed -n 's/.*"data":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p'
)
curl -sS "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/system/logs" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $winky_token"
Observed response: the non-admin user receives 200 OK and a JSON response containing entries from app.log
The same missing-authorization pattern also affects:
GET /api/system/logs/stream?token=<non-admin-token>GET /ws/system/logs?token=<non-admin-token>
Recommended fix
Require an explicit admin-only scope on all dashboard log routes and enforce the same requirement in the service layer.
Suggested change in internal/router/dashboard.go:
import (
"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/handler"
"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/middleware"
authModel "github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/model/auth"
)
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
"/system/logs",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs(),
)
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
"/system/logs/stream",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs(),
)
appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET(
"/system/logs",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs(),
)
}
Suggested defense-in-depth change in the service layer:
func (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(ctx context.Context, query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {
if err := s.ensureAdmin(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tail := query.Tail
if tail <= 0 {
tail = 200
}
return logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lin-snow/ech0"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:40:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nEch0 allows any authenticated user to read historical system logs and subscribe to live log streams because the dashboard log endpoints validate only that a JWT is present and valid, but do not require an administrator role or privileged scope.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny valid user session can access `GET /api/system/logs` and can also connect to the SSE and WebSocket log streaming endpoints. This exposes operational log data to low-privilege users. Depending on deployment and logging practices, the returned logs may include internal file paths, stack traces, admin activity, background job output, internal URLs, and other sensitive operational context. This creates a post-authentication information disclosure primitive that can materially aid follow-on attacks.\n\n## Details\n\nThe issue is caused by an authorization gap between route registration, handler logic, and the service layer.\n\n`internal/router/dashboard.go` registers the log endpoints on authenticated router groups, but does not apply any admin-only authorization middleware:\n\n```go\nfunc setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {\n\t// Auth\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs\", h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs/stream\", h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())\n\tappRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs\", h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())\n}\n```\n\n`internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go` returns log data directly and the SSE/WS handlers only check whether `jwtUtil.ParseToken(token)` succeeds:\n\n```go\nfunc (dashboardHandler *DashboardHandler) GetSystemLogs() gin.HandlerFunc {\n\treturn res.Execute(func(ctx *gin.Context) res.Response {\n\t\tlogs, err := dashboardHandler.dashboardService.GetSystemLogs(service.SystemLogQuery{\n\t\t\tTail: tail,\n\t\t\tLevel: ctx.Query(\"level\"),\n\t\t\tKeyword: ctx.Query(\"keyword\"),\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn res.Response{Err: err}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn res.Response{\n\t\t\tData: logs,\n\t\t\tMsg: \"\u83b7\u53d6\u7cfb\u7edf\u65e5\u5fd7\u6210\u529f\",\n\t\t}\n\t})\n}\n```\n\n`internal/service/dashboard/dashboard.go` exposes the log backend without adding a compensating admin check:\n\n```go\nfunc (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {\n\ttail := query.Tail\n\tif tail \u003c= 0 {\n\t\ttail = 200\n\t}\n\treturn logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)\n}\n```\n\nAffected endpoints:\n\n- `GET /api/system/logs`\n- `GET /api/system/logs/stream?token=...`\n- `GET /ws/system/logs?token=...`\n\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n### 1. Start the app\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d \\\n --name ech0 \\\n -p 6277:6277 \\\n -v /opt/ech0/data:/app/data \\\n -e JWT_SECRET=\"Hello Echos\" \\\n sn0wl1n/ech0:latest\n```\n\n### 2. Initialize an owner account and register a normal user\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/init/owner\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"owner\",\"password\":\"ownerpass\",\"email\":\"owner@example.com\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -sS -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/register\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"winky\",\"password\":\"winkypass\",\"email\":\"winky@example.com\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### 3. Log in as the non-admin user and request the system log endpoint\n\n```bash\nwinky_token=$(\n curl -sS -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/login\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"winky\",\"password\":\"winkypass\"}\u0027 \\\n | sed -n \u0027s/.*\"data\":\"\\([^\"]*\\)\".*/\\1/p\u0027\n)\n\ncurl -sS \"http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/system/logs\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $winky_token\"\n```\n\nObserved response: the non-admin user receives 200 OK and a JSON response containing entries from `app.log`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1073\" height=\"183\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f0a836fa-121f-4fb7-a94c-92344d9aedd8\" /\u003e\n\n\nThe same missing-authorization pattern also affects:\n\n- `GET /api/system/logs/stream?token=\u003cnon-admin-token\u003e`\n- `GET /ws/system/logs?token=\u003cnon-admin-token\u003e`\n\n\n## Recommended fix\n\nRequire an explicit admin-only scope on all dashboard log routes and enforce the same requirement in the service layer.\n\nSuggested change in `internal/router/dashboard.go`:\n\n```go\nimport (\n\t\"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/handler\"\n\t\"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/middleware\"\n\tauthModel \"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/model/auth\"\n)\n\nfunc setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\n\t\t\"/system/logs\",\n\t\tmiddleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),\n\t\th.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs(),\n\t)\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\n\t\t\"/system/logs/stream\",\n\t\tmiddleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),\n\t\th.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs(),\n\t)\n\tappRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET(\n\t\t\"/system/logs\",\n\t\tmiddleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),\n\t\th.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs(),\n\t)\n}\n```\n\nSuggested defense-in-depth change in the service layer:\n\n```go\nfunc (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(ctx context.Context, query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {\n\tif err := s.ensureAdmin(ctx); err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, err\n\t}\n\n\ttail := query.Tail\n\tif tail \u003c= 0 {\n\t\ttail = 200\n\t}\n\treturn logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-cp79-9mwr-wr49",
"modified": "2026-04-10T19:40:02Z",
"published": "2026-04-10T19:40:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-cp79-9mwr-wr49"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/releases/tag/v4.3.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ech0: Missing authorization on dashboard log endpoints allows low-privilege users to access sensitive system logs"
}
GHSA-CP7M-84Q4-9J2R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-19 15:32Unauthenticated Broken Access Control in Outranking Plugin Options <= 1.1.3 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73385"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T13:18:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated Broken Access Control in Outranking Plugin Options \u003c= 1.1.3 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-cp7m-84q4-9j2r",
"modified": "2026-08-19T15:32:25Z",
"published": "2026-08-19T15:32:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73385"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/outranking/vulnerability/wordpress-outranking-plugin-options-plugin-1-1-3-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CP84-243Q-M5WP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-02 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:32The Poll Maker – Best WordPress Poll Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the ays_poll_create_author function in all versions up to, and including, 5.1.8. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to extract email addresses by enumerating them one character at a time.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-3601"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-02T17:15:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Poll Maker \u2013 Best WordPress Poll Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the ays_poll_create_author function in all versions up to, and including, 5.1.8. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to extract email addresses by enumerating them one character at a time.",
"id": "GHSA-cp84-243q-m5wp",
"modified": "2026-04-08T21:32:34Z",
"published": "2024-05-02T18:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3601"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3071296%40poll-maker\u0026new=3071296%40poll-maker\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/fc0505a1-c7c4-4cf1-97cd-123a4dddcea3?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CP8X-PVQX-WPCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 00:30 – Updated: 2026-04-10 00:30A Missing Authorization vulnerability in the CLI of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a local user with low privileges to read sensitive information.
A local user with low privileges can execute the CLI command 'show mgd' with specific arguments which will expose sensitive information.
This issue affects
Junos OS: * all versions before 22.4R3-S8, * 23.2 versions before 23.2R2-S6, * 23.4 versions before 23.4R2-S6, * 24.2 versions before 24.2R2-S4, * 24.4 versions before 24.4R2-S1, * 25.2 version before 25.2R1-S2, 25.2R2;
Junos OS Evolved: * all versions before 23.2R2-S6-EVO, * 23.4 version before 23.4R2-S6-EVO, * 24.2 version before 24.2R2-S4-EVO, * 24.4 versions before 24.4R2-S1-EVO, * 25.2 versions before 25.2R2-EVO.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33776"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T22:16:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A Missing Authorization vulnerability in the CLI of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a local user with low privileges to read sensitive information.\n\nA local user with low privileges can execute the CLI command \u0027show mgd\u0027 with specific arguments which will expose sensitive information.\n\nThis issue affects\n\nJunos OS:\n * all versions before 22.4R3-S8,\n * 23.2 versions before 23.2R2-S6,\n * 23.4 versions before 23.4R2-S6,\n * 24.2 versions before 24.2R2-S4,\n * 24.4 versions before 24.4R2-S1,\n * 25.2 version before 25.2R1-S2, 25.2R2;\n\n\n\nJunos OS Evolved:\n * all versions before 23.2R2-S6-EVO,\n * 23.4 version before 23.4R2-S6-EVO,\n * 24.2 version before 24.2R2-S4-EVO,\n * 24.4 versions before 24.4R2-S1-EVO,\n * 25.2 versions before 25.2R2-EVO.",
"id": "GHSA-cp8x-pvqx-wpcc",
"modified": "2026-04-10T00:30:29Z",
"published": "2026-04-10T00:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33776"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.juniper.net/JSA107866"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:X/V:X/RE:M/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-CP9W-HR4Q-PMR4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-04 03:30 – Updated: 2023-12-07 00:30In imsservice, there is a possible way to write permission usage records of an app due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-42672"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-04T01:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In imsservice, there is a possible way to write permission usage records of an app due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed",
"id": "GHSA-cp9w-hr4q-pmr4",
"modified": "2023-12-07T00:30:37Z",
"published": "2023-12-04T03:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-42672"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/1731138365803266049"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.