CWE-667
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Locking
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly acquire or release a lock on a resource, leading to unexpected resource state changes and behaviors.
693 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GFHP-57F6-M54H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-27 15:30 – Updated: 2024-10-01 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/client: add missing bo locking in show_meminfo()
bo_meminfo() wants to inspect bo state like tt and the ttm resource, however this state can change at any point leading to stuff like NPD and UAF, if the bo lock is not held. Grab the bo lock when calling bo_meminfo(), ensuring we drop any spinlocks first. In the case of object_idr we now also need to hold a ref.
v2 (MattB) - Also add xe_bo_assert_held()
(cherry picked from commit 4f63d712fa104c3ebefcb289d1e733e86d8698c7)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-46866"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-27T13:15:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/xe/client: add missing bo locking in show_meminfo()\n\nbo_meminfo() wants to inspect bo state like tt and the ttm resource,\nhowever this state can change at any point leading to stuff like NPD and\nUAF, if the bo lock is not held. Grab the bo lock when calling\nbo_meminfo(), ensuring we drop any spinlocks first. In the case of\nobject_idr we now also need to hold a ref.\n\nv2 (MattB)\n - Also add xe_bo_assert_held()\n\n(cherry picked from commit 4f63d712fa104c3ebefcb289d1e733e86d8698c7)",
"id": "GHSA-gfhp-57f6-m54h",
"modified": "2024-10-01T18:31:17Z",
"published": "2024-09-27T15:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46866"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94c4aa266111262c96c98f822d1bccc494786fee"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abc8feacacf8fae10eecf6fea7865e8c1fee419c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GFR2-Q5Q8-V55V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-06-28 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
timers/migration: Fix livelock in tmigr_handle_remote_up()
tmigr_handle_remote_cpu() skips timer_expire_remote() when cpu == smp_processor_id(), assuming the local softirq path already handled this CPU's timers.
This assumption is wrong because jiffies can advance after the handling of the CPU's global timers in run_timer_base(BASE_GLOBAL) and before tmigr_handle_remote() evaluates the expiry times.
As a consequence a timer which expires after the CPU local timer wheel advanced and becomes expired in the remote handling is ignored and the callback is never invoked and removed from the timer wheel.
What's worse is that fetch_next_timer_interrupt_remote() keeps reporting it as expired, and the event is re-queued with expires == now on each iteration. The goto-again loop spins indefinitely.
Fix this by calling timer_expire_remote() unconditionally. That's minimal overhead for the common case as __run_timer_base() returns immediately if there is nothing to expire in the local wheel.
[ tglx: Amend change log and add a comment ]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53180"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntimers/migration: Fix livelock in tmigr_handle_remote_up()\n\ntmigr_handle_remote_cpu() skips timer_expire_remote() when cpu ==\nsmp_processor_id(), assuming the local softirq path already handled this\nCPU\u0027s timers.\n\nThis assumption is wrong because jiffies can advance after the handling of\nthe CPU\u0027s global timers in run_timer_base(BASE_GLOBAL) and before\ntmigr_handle_remote() evaluates the expiry times.\n\nAs a consequence a timer which expires after the CPU local timer wheel\nadvanced and becomes expired in the remote handling is ignored and the\ncallback is never invoked and removed from the timer wheel.\n\nWhat\u0027s worse is that fetch_next_timer_interrupt_remote() keeps reporting it\nas expired, and the event is re-queued with expires == now on each\niteration. The goto-again loop spins indefinitely.\n\nFix this by calling timer_expire_remote() unconditionally. That\u0027s minimal\noverhead for the common case as __run_timer_base() returns immediately if\nthere is nothing to expire in the local wheel.\n\n[ tglx: Amend change log and add a comment ]",
"id": "GHSA-gfr2-q5q8-v55v",
"modified": "2026-06-28T09:31:43Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T09:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53180"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07b3b83587fb3012619f4439389b64a955fc7836"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d6c2062b77be09ec15d6bf637b2e2221c4482fc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d338e61ea94052a786aac9f58e9f0d8520afa0fd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d486b4934a8e504376b85cdb3766f306d57aff5b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GGH4-5HVC-554R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-07 18:30 – Updated: 2024-08-08 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fail bpf_timer_cancel when callback is being cancelled
Given a schedule:
timer1 cb timer2 cb
bpf_timer_cancel(timer2); bpf_timer_cancel(timer1);
Both bpf_timer_cancel calls would wait for the other callback to finish executing, introducing a lockup.
Add an atomic_t count named 'cancelling' in bpf_hrtimer. This keeps track of all in-flight cancellation requests for a given BPF timer. Whenever cancelling a BPF timer, we must check if we have outstanding cancellation requests, and if so, we must fail the operation with an error (-EDEADLK) since cancellation is synchronous and waits for the callback to finish executing. This implies that we can enter a deadlock situation involving two or more timer callbacks executing in parallel and attempting to cancel one another.
Note that we avoid incrementing the cancelling counter for the target timer (the one being cancelled) if bpf_timer_cancel is not invoked from a callback, to avoid spurious errors. The whole point of detecting cur->cancelling and returning -EDEADLK is to not enter a busy wait loop (which may or may not lead to a lockup). This does not apply in case the caller is in a non-callback context, the other side can continue to cancel as it sees fit without running into errors.
Background on prior attempts:
Earlier versions of this patch used a bool 'cancelling' bit and used the following pattern under timer->lock to publish cancellation status.
lock(t->lock); t->cancelling = true; mb(); if (cur->cancelling) return -EDEADLK; unlock(t->lock); hrtimer_cancel(t->timer); t->cancelling = false;
The store outside the critical section could overwrite a parallel requests t->cancelling assignment to true, to ensure the parallely executing callback observes its cancellation status.
It would be necessary to clear this cancelling bit once hrtimer_cancel is done, but lack of serialization introduced races. Another option was explored where bpf_timer_start would clear the bit when (re)starting the timer under timer->lock. This would ensure serialized access to the cancelling bit, but may allow it to be cleared before in-flight hrtimer_cancel has finished executing, such that lockups can occur again.
Thus, we choose an atomic counter to keep track of all outstanding cancellation requests and use it to prevent lockups in case callbacks attempt to cancel each other while executing in parallel.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-42239"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-07T16:15:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fail bpf_timer_cancel when callback is being cancelled\n\nGiven a schedule:\n\ntimer1 cb\t\t\ttimer2 cb\n\nbpf_timer_cancel(timer2);\tbpf_timer_cancel(timer1);\n\nBoth bpf_timer_cancel calls would wait for the other callback to finish\nexecuting, introducing a lockup.\n\nAdd an atomic_t count named \u0027cancelling\u0027 in bpf_hrtimer. This keeps\ntrack of all in-flight cancellation requests for a given BPF timer.\nWhenever cancelling a BPF timer, we must check if we have outstanding\ncancellation requests, and if so, we must fail the operation with an\nerror (-EDEADLK) since cancellation is synchronous and waits for the\ncallback to finish executing. This implies that we can enter a deadlock\nsituation involving two or more timer callbacks executing in parallel\nand attempting to cancel one another.\n\nNote that we avoid incrementing the cancelling counter for the target\ntimer (the one being cancelled) if bpf_timer_cancel is not invoked from\na callback, to avoid spurious errors. The whole point of detecting\ncur-\u003ecancelling and returning -EDEADLK is to not enter a busy wait loop\n(which may or may not lead to a lockup). This does not apply in case the\ncaller is in a non-callback context, the other side can continue to\ncancel as it sees fit without running into errors.\n\nBackground on prior attempts:\n\nEarlier versions of this patch used a bool \u0027cancelling\u0027 bit and used the\nfollowing pattern under timer-\u003elock to publish cancellation status.\n\nlock(t-\u003elock);\nt-\u003ecancelling = true;\nmb();\nif (cur-\u003ecancelling)\n\treturn -EDEADLK;\nunlock(t-\u003elock);\nhrtimer_cancel(t-\u003etimer);\nt-\u003ecancelling = false;\n\nThe store outside the critical section could overwrite a parallel\nrequests t-\u003ecancelling assignment to true, to ensure the parallely\nexecuting callback observes its cancellation status.\n\nIt would be necessary to clear this cancelling bit once hrtimer_cancel\nis done, but lack of serialization introduced races. Another option was\nexplored where bpf_timer_start would clear the bit when (re)starting the\ntimer under timer-\u003elock. This would ensure serialized access to the\ncancelling bit, but may allow it to be cleared before in-flight\nhrtimer_cancel has finished executing, such that lockups can occur\nagain.\n\nThus, we choose an atomic counter to keep track of all outstanding\ncancellation requests and use it to prevent lockups in case callbacks\nattempt to cancel each other while executing in parallel.",
"id": "GHSA-ggh4-5hvc-554r",
"modified": "2024-08-08T15:31:29Z",
"published": "2024-08-07T18:30:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42239"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e4e8178a8666c56813bd167b848fca0f4c9af0a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9369830518688ecd5b08ffc08ab3302ce2b5d0f7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4523831f07a267a943f0dde844bf8ead7495f13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GGJ2-V6C6-RGH4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-20 18:30 – Updated: 2026-05-12 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: light: opt3001: fix deadlock due to concurrent flag access
The threaded IRQ function in this driver is reading the flag twice: once to lock a mutex and once to unlock it. Even though the code setting the flag is designed to prevent it, there are subtle cases where the flag could be true at the mutex_lock stage and false at the mutex_unlock stage. This results in the mutex not being unlocked, resulting in a deadlock.
Fix it by making the opt3001_irq() code generally more robust, reading the flag into a variable and using the variable value at both stages.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-37968"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-20T17:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niio: light: opt3001: fix deadlock due to concurrent flag access\n\nThe threaded IRQ function in this driver is reading the flag twice: once to\nlock a mutex and once to unlock it. Even though the code setting the flag\nis designed to prevent it, there are subtle cases where the flag could be\ntrue at the mutex_lock stage and false at the mutex_unlock stage. This\nresults in the mutex not being unlocked, resulting in a deadlock.\n\nFix it by making the opt3001_irq() code generally more robust, reading the\nflag into a variable and using the variable value at both stages.",
"id": "GHSA-ggj2-v6c6-rgh4",
"modified": "2026-05-12T15:30:52Z",
"published": "2025-05-20T18:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37968"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-032379.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d7def97e7eb65865ccc01bbdf4eb9e6bbe8a5b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c95c8f0959d0a72575eabf2ff888f47ed6d8b77"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/748ebd8e61d0bc182c331b8df3887af7285c8a8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ca84f6a22d50bf8b31efe9eb05f9859947266d7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/957e8be112636d9bc692917286e81e54bd87decc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9c56ccb7cddfca754291fb24b108a5350a5fbe9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e791bf216c9e236b34dabf514ec0ede140cca719"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f063a28002e3350088b4577c5640882bf4ea17ea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00007.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GHHC-93HQ-6RQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-07 03:30 – Updated: 2022-12-12 15:30Guests can trigger deadlock in Linux netback driver T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] The patch for XSA-392 introduced another issue which might result in a deadlock when trying to free the SKB of a packet dropped due to the XSA-392 handling (CVE-2022-42328). Additionally when dropping packages for other reasons the same deadlock could occur in case of netpoll being active for the interface the xen-netback driver is connected to (CVE-2022-42329).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-42329"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-07T01:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Guests can trigger deadlock in Linux netback driver T[his CNA information record relates to multiple CVEs; the text explains which aspects/vulnerabilities correspond to which CVE.] The patch for XSA-392 introduced another issue which might result in a deadlock when trying to free the SKB of a packet dropped due to the XSA-392 handling (CVE-2022-42328). Additionally when dropping packages for other reasons the same deadlock could occur in case of netpoll being active for the interface the xen-netback driver is connected to (CVE-2022-42329).",
"id": "GHSA-ghhc-93hq-6rqv",
"modified": "2022-12-12T15:30:31Z",
"published": "2022-12-07T03:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-42329"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/12/msg00031.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/12/msg00034.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-424.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/12/08/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/12/08/3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/12/09/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GHMM-M363-9645
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 18:30 – Updated: 2026-07-14 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvlan: Make the addrs_lock be per port
Make the addrs_lock be per port, not per ipvlan dev.
Initial code seems to be written in the assumption, that any address change must occur under RTNL. But it is not so for the case of IPv6. So
1) Introduce per-port addrs_lock.
2) It was needed to fix places where it was forgotten to take lock (ipvlan_open/ipvlan_close)
This appears to be a very minor problem though. Since it's highly unlikely that ipvlan_add_addr() will be called on 2 CPU simultaneously. But nevertheless, this could cause:
1) False-negative of ipvlan_addr_busy(): one interface iterated through all port->ipvlans + ipvlan->addrs under some ipvlan spinlock, and another added IP under its own lock. Though this is only possible for IPv6, since looks like only ipvlan_addr6_event() can be called without rtnl_lock.
2) Race since ipvlan_ht_addr_add(port) is called under different ipvlan->addrs_lock locks
This should not affect performance, since add/remove IP is a rare situation and spinlock is not taken on fast paths.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23103"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T17:16:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvlan: Make the addrs_lock be per port\n\nMake the addrs_lock be per port, not per ipvlan dev.\n\nInitial code seems to be written in the assumption,\nthat any address change must occur under RTNL.\nBut it is not so for the case of IPv6. So\n\n1) Introduce per-port addrs_lock.\n\n2) It was needed to fix places where it was forgotten\nto take lock (ipvlan_open/ipvlan_close)\n\nThis appears to be a very minor problem though.\nSince it\u0027s highly unlikely that ipvlan_add_addr() will\nbe called on 2 CPU simultaneously. But nevertheless,\nthis could cause:\n\n1) False-negative of ipvlan_addr_busy(): one interface\niterated through all port-\u003eipvlans + ipvlan-\u003eaddrs\nunder some ipvlan spinlock, and another added IP\nunder its own lock. Though this is only possible\nfor IPv6, since looks like only ipvlan_addr6_event() can be\ncalled without rtnl_lock.\n\n2) Race since ipvlan_ht_addr_add(port) is called under\ndifferent ipvlan-\u003eaddrs_lock locks\n\nThis should not affect performance, since add/remove IP\nis a rare situation and spinlock is not taken on fast\npaths.",
"id": "GHSA-ghmm-m363-9645",
"modified": "2026-07-14T15:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-02-04T18:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23103"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04ba6de6eff61238e5397c14ac26a6578c7735a5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f300c10d92c547c3a7d978e1212ff52f18256ed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c149b662cbb202a450e81f938e702ba333864ad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a81e2db096913d7e43aada1c350c1282e76db39"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70feb16e3fbfb10b15de1396557c38e99f1ab8df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88f83e6c9cdb46b8c8ddd0ba01393362963cf589"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3ba32162488283c0a4c5bedd8817aec91748802"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GHRP-FHCH-VVR7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-17 21:30 – Updated: 2025-03-17 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
loop: implement ->free_disk
Ensure that the lo_device which is stored in the gendisk private data is valid until the gendisk is freed. Currently the loop driver uses a lot of effort to make sure a device is not freed when it is still in use, but to to fix a potential deadlock this will be relaxed a bit soon.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-49531"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T07:01:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nloop: implement -\u003efree_disk\n\nEnsure that the lo_device which is stored in the gendisk private\ndata is valid until the gendisk is freed. Currently the loop driver\nuses a lot of effort to make sure a device is not freed when it is\nstill in use, but to to fix a potential deadlock this will be relaxed\na bit soon.",
"id": "GHSA-ghrp-fhch-vvr7",
"modified": "2025-03-17T21:30:33Z",
"published": "2025-03-17T21:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49531"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aadd1443aae7fe8956e3b11157827067f034406a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2c7f56f8b5256d57f9e3fc7794c31361d43bdd9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJ5H-7FQ5-56P5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-16 15:34 – Updated: 2025-11-03 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix potential deadloop in prepare_compress_overwrite()
Jan Prusakowski reported a kernel hang issue as below:
When running xfstests on linux-next kernel (6.14.0-rc3, 6.12) I encountered a problem in generic/475 test where fsstress process gets blocked in __f2fs_write_data_pages() and the test hangs. The options I used are:
MKFS_OPTIONS -- -O compression -O extra_attr -O project_quota -O quota /dev/vdc MOUNT_OPTIONS -- -o acl,user_xattr -o discard,compress_extension=* /dev/vdc /vdc
INFO: task kworker/u8:0:11 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-xfstests-lockdep #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u8:0 state:D stack:0 pid:11 tgid:11 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208160 flags:0x00004000 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0) Call Trace: __schedule+0x309/0x8e0 schedule+0x3a/0x100 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30 __mutex_lock+0x59a/0xdb0 __f2fs_write_data_pages+0x3ac/0x400 do_writepages+0xe8/0x290 __writeback_single_inode+0x5c/0x360 writeback_sb_inodes+0x22f/0x570 wb_writeback+0xb0/0x410 wb_do_writeback+0x47/0x2f0 wb_workfn+0x5a/0x1c0 process_one_work+0x223/0x5b0 worker_thread+0x1d5/0x3c0 kthread+0xfd/0x230 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
The root cause is: once generic/475 starts toload error table to dm device, f2fs_prepare_compress_overwrite() will loop reading compressed cluster pages due to IO error, meanwhile it has held .writepages lock, it can block all other writeback tasks.
Let's fix this issue w/ below changes: - add f2fs_handle_page_eio() in prepare_compress_overwrite() to detect IO error. - detect cp_error earler in f2fs_read_multi_pages().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-22127"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-16T15:16:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: fix potential deadloop in prepare_compress_overwrite()\n\nJan Prusakowski reported a kernel hang issue as below:\n\nWhen running xfstests on linux-next kernel (6.14.0-rc3, 6.12) I\nencountered a problem in generic/475 test where fsstress process\ngets blocked in __f2fs_write_data_pages() and the test hangs.\nThe options I used are:\n\nMKFS_OPTIONS -- -O compression -O extra_attr -O project_quota -O quota /dev/vdc\nMOUNT_OPTIONS -- -o acl,user_xattr -o discard,compress_extension=* /dev/vdc /vdc\n\nINFO: task kworker/u8:0:11 blocked for more than 122 seconds.\n Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-xfstests-lockdep #1\n\"echo 0 \u003e /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs\" disables this message.\ntask:kworker/u8:0 state:D stack:0 pid:11 tgid:11 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208160 flags:0x00004000\nWorkqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0)\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __schedule+0x309/0x8e0\n schedule+0x3a/0x100\n schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30\n __mutex_lock+0x59a/0xdb0\n __f2fs_write_data_pages+0x3ac/0x400\n do_writepages+0xe8/0x290\n __writeback_single_inode+0x5c/0x360\n writeback_sb_inodes+0x22f/0x570\n wb_writeback+0xb0/0x410\n wb_do_writeback+0x47/0x2f0\n wb_workfn+0x5a/0x1c0\n process_one_work+0x223/0x5b0\n worker_thread+0x1d5/0x3c0\n kthread+0xfd/0x230\n ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nThe root cause is: once generic/475 starts toload error table to dm\ndevice, f2fs_prepare_compress_overwrite() will loop reading compressed\ncluster pages due to IO error, meanwhile it has held .writepages lock,\nit can block all other writeback tasks.\n\nLet\u0027s fix this issue w/ below changes:\n- add f2fs_handle_page_eio() in prepare_compress_overwrite() to\ndetect IO error.\n- detect cp_error earler in f2fs_read_multi_pages().",
"id": "GHSA-gj5h-7fq5-56p5",
"modified": "2025-11-03T18:31:15Z",
"published": "2025-04-16T15:34:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22127"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3147ee567dd9004a49826ddeaf0a4b12865d4409"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7215cf8ef54bdc9082dffac4662416d54961e258"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJ8M-4CCW-V82H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-01 06:31 – Updated: 2024-06-03 18:55In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Prevent deadlock while disabling aRFS
When disabling aRFS under the priv->state_lock, any scheduled
aRFS works are canceled using the cancel_work_sync function,
which waits for the work to end if it has already started.
However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will
try to acquire the state_lock which is already acquired.
The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since disabling aRFS deletes the rules.
Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled.
Kernel log:
====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I
ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
but task is already holding lock: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90 arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0 kthread+0xd7/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work));
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by ethtool/386089: #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240 #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]
stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x144/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80 ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 ? ethn ---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27014"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-01T06:15:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: Prevent deadlock while disabling aRFS\n\nWhen disabling aRFS under the `priv-\u003estate_lock`, any scheduled\naRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function,\nwhich waits for the work to end if it has already started.\nHowever, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will\ntry to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired.\n\nThe worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state\nis down, which is not the worker\u0027s responsibility since\ndisabling aRFS deletes the rules.\n\nAdd an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is\nenabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled.\n\nKernel log:\n\n======================================================\nWARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected\n6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I\n------------------------------------------------------\nethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock:\nffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(\u0026rule-\u003earfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0\n\nbut task is already holding lock:\nffff8884a1808cc0 (\u0026priv-\u003estate_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]\n\nwhich lock already depends on the new lock.\n\nthe existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:\n\n-\u003e #1 (\u0026priv-\u003estate_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:\n __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90\n arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core]\n process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0\n worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0\n kthread+0xd7/0x100\n ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20\n\n-\u003e #0 ((work_completion)(\u0026rule-\u003earfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:\n __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80\n lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0\n __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0\n __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0\n arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core]\n ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0\n ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240\n genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120\n genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100\n genl_rcv+0x24/0x40\n netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270\n netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460\n __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60\n __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170\n __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30\n do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e\n\nother info that might help us debug this:\n\n Possible unsafe locking scenario:\n\n CPU0 CPU1\n ---- ----\n lock(\u0026priv-\u003estate_lock);\n lock((work_completion)(\u0026rule-\u003earfs_work));\n lock(\u0026priv-\u003estate_lock);\n lock((work_completion)(\u0026rule-\u003earfs_work));\n\n *** DEADLOCK ***\n\n3 locks held by ethtool/386089:\n #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40\n #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240\n #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (\u0026priv-\u003estate_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]\n\nstack backtrace:\nCPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0\n check_noncircular+0x144/0x160\n __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80\n lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0\n ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0\n ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360\n ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0\n __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0\n ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0\n ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80\n ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0\n ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70\n __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0\n ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70\n arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core]\n ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0\n ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240\n genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120\n genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0\n ? ethn\n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-gj8m-4ccw-v82h",
"modified": "2024-06-03T18:55:52Z",
"published": "2024-05-01T06:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27014"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0080bf99499468030248ebd25dd645e487dcecdc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46efa4d5930cf3c2af8c01f75e0a47e4fc045e3b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48c4bb81df19402d4346032353d0795260255e3b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fef965764cf562f28afb997b626fc7c3cec99693"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/4EZ6PJW7VOZ224TD7N4JZNU6KV32ZJ53"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/DAMSOZXJEPUOXW33WZYWCVAY7Z5S7OOY"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/GCBZZEC7L7KTWWAS2NLJK6SO3IZIL4WW"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GJRX-W6PW-88PH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-07 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-05 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: fix soft lockup in status_resync
status_resync() will calculate 'curr_resync - recovery_active' to show user a progress bar like following:
[============>........] resync = 61.4%
'curr_resync' and 'recovery_active' is updated in md_do_sync(), and status_resync() can read them concurrently, hence it's possible that 'curr_resync - recovery_active' can overflow to a huge number. In this case status_resync() will be stuck in the loop to print a large amount of '=', which will end up soft lockup.
Fix the problem by setting 'resync' to MD_RESYNC_ACTIVE in this case, this way resync in progress will be reported to user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53620"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-07T16:15:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmd: fix soft lockup in status_resync\n\nstatus_resync() will calculate \u0027curr_resync - recovery_active\u0027 to show\nuser a progress bar like following:\n\n[============\u003e........] resync = 61.4%\n\n\u0027curr_resync\u0027 and \u0027recovery_active\u0027 is updated in md_do_sync(), and\nstatus_resync() can read them concurrently, hence it\u0027s possible that\n\u0027curr_resync - recovery_active\u0027 can overflow to a huge number. In this\ncase status_resync() will be stuck in the loop to print a large amount\nof \u0027=\u0027, which will end up soft lockup.\n\nFix the problem by setting \u0027resync\u0027 to MD_RESYNC_ACTIVE in this case,\nthis way resync in progress will be reported to user.",
"id": "GHSA-gjrx-w6pw-88ph",
"modified": "2026-02-05T15:31:08Z",
"published": "2025-10-07T18:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53620"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23309704e90859af2662bedc44101e6d1d2ece7e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6efddf1e32e2a264694766ca485a4f5e04ee82a7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4acb6c3ede88d6b7d33742a09e63cfce5e7fb69"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use industry standard APIs to implement locking mechanism.
CAPEC-25: Forced Deadlock
The adversary triggers and exploits a deadlock condition in the target software to cause a denial of service. A deadlock can occur when two or more competing actions are waiting for each other to finish, and thus neither ever does. Deadlock conditions can be difficult to detect.
CAPEC-26: Leveraging Race Conditions
The adversary targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes access and manipulate the same resource concurrently, and the outcome of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. The adversary can leverage a race condition by "running the race", modifying the resource and modifying the normal execution flow. For instance, a race condition can occur while accessing a file: the adversary can trick the system by replacing the original file with their version and cause the system to read the malicious file.
CAPEC-27: Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links
This attack leverages the use of symbolic links (Symlinks) in order to write to sensitive files. An attacker can create a Symlink link to a target file not otherwise accessible to them. When the privileged program tries to create a temporary file with the same name as the Symlink link, it will actually write to the target file pointed to by the attackers' Symlink link. If the attacker can insert malicious content in the temporary file they will be writing to the sensitive file by using the Symlink. The race occurs because the system checks if the temporary file exists, then creates the file. The attacker would typically create the Symlink during the interval between the check and the creation of the temporary file.