CWE-639
Weakness AllowedAuthorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
It is likely that an attacker would have to be an authenticated user in the system. However, the authorization process would not properly check the data access operation to ensure that the authenticated user performing the operation has sufficient entitlements to perform the requested data access, hence bypassing any other authorization checks present in the system.
For example, attackers can look at places where user specific data is retrieved (e.g. search screens) and determine whether the key for the item being looked up is controllable externally. The key may be a hidden field in the HTML form field, might be passed as a URL parameter or as an unencrypted cookie variable, then in each of these cases it will be possible to tamper with the key value.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Retrieval of a user record occurs in the system based on some key value that is under user control. The key would typically identify a user-related record stored in the system and would be used to lookup that record for presentation to the user.
One manifestation of this weakness is when a system uses sequential or otherwise easily-guessable session IDs that would allow one user to easily switch to another user's session and read/modify their data.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Maintenance
As of CWE 4.20, the relationship between IDOR and BOLA needs to be investigated more closely, including research into how these terms are used in the industry. The CWE team suspects that IDOR can be a part of BOLA, but BOLA expands on the weakness inherent to IDOR in that it is not only about objects that are being directly referenced.
Content history
Suggested corrections to use of IDOR versus BOLA
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Type
updated Description
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Common_Consequences
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Description, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
updated Mapping_Notes
updated Observed_Examples
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Alternate_Terms, Maintenance_Notes, References
updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Time_of_Introduction
5775 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-XRVM-RXHF-GWGP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-13 15:34 – Updated: 2026-08-13 15:34Missing Authorization and Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in the product management component in Roskus Prospero Flow CRM before 5.4.7 allows authenticated users of any company to read the full sensitive data (price, cost, stock, SKU, and barcode) of another company's product and to hijack that product by reassigning its company_id, via the product's numeric identifier, because ProductUpdateController did not extend MainController and therefore required no authentication check on the read endpoint, and ProductRepository::save() retrieved the record via Product::find($data['id']) without constraining the query to the authenticated user's company before overwriting its company_id.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-19734"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T15:19:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization and Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in the product management component in Roskus Prospero Flow CRM before 5.4.7 allows authenticated users of any company to read the full sensitive data (price, cost, stock, SKU, and barcode) of another company\u0027s product and to hijack that product by reassigning its company_id, via the product\u0027s numeric identifier, because `ProductUpdateController` did not extend `MainController` and therefore required no authentication check on the read endpoint, and `ProductRepository::save()` retrieved the record via `Product::find($data[\u0027id\u0027])` without constraining the query to the authenticated user\u0027s company before overwriting its company_id.",
"id": "GHSA-xrvm-rxhf-gwgp",
"modified": "2026-08-13T15:34:42Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T15:34:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19734"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Roskus/prospero-flow-crm/commit/f36c2a115f4c28c82181f1798c01582ae953b932"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Roskus/prospero-flow-crm/releases/tag/v5.5.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://secur0.com/en/cna/cve-list/cve-2026-19734-idor-in-prospero-flow-crm-allows-cross-tenant-product-disclosure-and-hijacking"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-XV2W-7WHJ-CMG3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-15 21:36 – Updated: 2026-10-15 21:36Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ELEXtensions ELEX WooCommerce Advanced Bulk Edit Products, Prices & Attributes elex-bulk-edit-products-prices-attributes-for-woocommerce-basic allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects ELEX WooCommerce Advanced Bulk Edit Products, Prices & Attributes: from n/a through 1.5.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-103083"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-15T19:17:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ELEXtensions ELEX WooCommerce Advanced Bulk Edit Products, Prices \u0026 Attributes elex-bulk-edit-products-prices-attributes-for-woocommerce-basic allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects ELEX WooCommerce Advanced Bulk Edit Products, Prices \u0026 Attributes: from n/a through 1.5.3.",
"id": "GHSA-xv2w-7whj-cmg3",
"modified": "2026-10-15T21:36:01Z",
"published": "2026-10-15T21:36:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103083"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/elex-bulk-edit-products-prices-attributes-for-woocommerce-basic/vulnerability/wordpress-elex-woocommerce-advanced-bulk-edit-products-prices-attributes-plugin-1-5-3-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XV2W-MRMF-RF3C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-12 15:32 – Updated: 2026-10-12 15:32lamp-cloud through 5.10.1 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that allows authenticated users to obtain storage URLs for other users' files by supplying arbitrary file ids. Attackers can send another user's file ids to the findUrlById handler of FileAnyoneController, which never checks ownership, to retrieve access URLs and read uploaded attachments.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-109166"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-12T13:17:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "lamp-cloud through 5.10.1 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that allows authenticated users to obtain storage URLs for other users\u0027 files by supplying arbitrary file ids. Attackers can send another user\u0027s file ids to the findUrlById handler of FileAnyoneController, which never checks ownership, to retrieve access URLs and read uploaded attachments.",
"id": "GHSA-xv2w-mrmf-rf3c",
"modified": "2026-10-12T15:32:14Z",
"published": "2026-10-12T15:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AnkesKasty/cve-request-poc/blob/a7b6d1423555812d8efa26c91c5d0683164b31e5/lamp-cloud/poc_findUrlById_url.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dromara/lamp-cloud/blob/d61184d7d402023fc3ea63b6bdbd7a1bfdb8ce92/lamp-base/lamp-base-biz/src/main/java/top/tangyh/lamp/file/strategy/FileContext.java#L147-L170"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dromara/lamp-cloud/blob/d61184d7d402023fc3ea63b6bdbd7a1bfdb8ce92/lamp-base/lamp-base-controller/src/main/java/top/tangyh/lamp/file/controller/FileAnyoneController.java#L75-L80"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/lamp-cloud-through-5.10.1-idor-via-anyone-file-findurlbyid"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-XV2W-X5XM-9J74
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-12 18:30 – Updated: 2022-12-15 00:30The Directorist WordPress plugin before 7.4.2.2 suffers from an IDOR vulnerability which an attacker can exploit to change the password of arbitrary users instead of his own.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-3930"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-12T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Directorist WordPress plugin before 7.4.2.2 suffers from an IDOR vulnerability which an attacker can exploit to change the password of arbitrary users instead of his own.",
"id": "GHSA-xv2w-x5xm-9j74",
"modified": "2022-12-15T00:30:16Z",
"published": "2022-12-12T18:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3930"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/8728d02a-51db-4447-a843-0264b6ceb413"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XV75-C298-2V8F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:24 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:55iked in OpenIKED, as used in OpenBSD through 6.7, allows authentication bypass because ca.c has the wrong logic for checking whether a public key matches.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-16088"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-07-28T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "iked in OpenIKED, as used in OpenBSD through 6.7, allows authentication bypass because ca.c has the wrong logic for checking whether a public key matches.",
"id": "GHSA-xv75-c298-2v8f",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:55:20Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:24:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-16088"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/7afb2d41c6d373cf965285840b85c45011357115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/6.7/common/014_iked.patch.sig"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xcllnt/openiked/commits/master"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.openiked.org/security.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XV8M-JW66-QJXM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-30 12:30 – Updated: 2025-10-08 18:30Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in BOLD Workplanner in versions prior to 2.5.25 (4935b438f9b), consisting of a lack of adequate validation of user input, allowing an authenticated user to access to basic contract details using unauthorised internal identifiers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-41093"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-30T11:37:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in BOLD Workplanner in versions prior to 2.5.25 (4935b438f9b), consisting of a lack of adequate validation of user input, allowing an authenticated user to\u00a0access to\u00a0basic contract details using unauthorised internal identifiers.",
"id": "GHSA-xv8m-jw66-qjxm",
"modified": "2025-10-08T18:30:15Z",
"published": "2025-09-30T12:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41093"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/insecure-direct-object-reference-gps-bold-workplanner"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-XVF4-CH4Q-2M24
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 16:37 – Updated: 2026-03-18 21:51Summary
The REST API getUsers endpoint in StudioCMS uses the attacker-controlled rank query parameter to decide whether owner accounts should be filtered from the result set. As a result, an admin token can request rank=owner and receive owner account records, including IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses, even though the adjacent getUser endpoint correctly blocks admins from viewing owner users. This is an authorization inconsistency inside the same user-management surface.
Details
Vulnerable Code Path
File: D:/bugcrowd/studiocms/repo/packages/studiocms/frontend/pages/studiocms_api/_handlers/rest-api/v1/secure.ts, lines 1605-1647
.handle(
'getUsers',
Effect.fn(
function* ({ urlParams: { name, rank, username } }) {
if (!restAPIEnabled) {
return yield* new RestAPIError({ error: 'Endpoint not found' });
}
const [sdk, user] = yield* Effect.all([SDKCore, CurrentRestAPIUser]);
if (user.rank !== 'owner' && user.rank !== 'admin') {
return yield* new RestAPIError({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
}
const allUsers = yield* sdk.GET.users.all();
let data = allUsers.map(...);
if (rank !== 'owner') {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank !== 'owner');
}
if (rank) {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank === rank);
}
return data;
},
The rank variable in if (rank !== 'owner') is the request query parameter, not the caller's privilege level. An admin can therefore pass rank=owner, skip the owner-filtering branch, and then have the second if (rank) branch return only owner accounts.
Adjacent Endpoint Shows Intended Security Boundary
File: D:/bugcrowd/studiocms/repo/packages/studiocms/frontend/pages/studiocms_api/_handlers/rest-api/v1/secure.ts, lines 1650-1710
const existingUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(existingUserRank);
const loggedInUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(user.rank);
if (loggedInUserRankIndex <= existingUserRankIndex) {
return yield* new RestAPIError({
error: 'Unauthorized to view user with higher rank',
});
}
getUser correctly blocks an admin from viewing an owner record. getUsers bypasses that boundary for bulk enumeration.
Sensitive Fields Returned
The getUsers response includes:
idemailnameusernamerank- timestamps and profile URL/avatar fields when present
This is enough to enumerate all owner accounts and target them for phishing, social engineering, or follow-on attacks against out-of-band workflows.
PoC
HTTP PoC
Use any admin-level REST API token:
curl -X GET 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/rest/v1/secure/users?rank=owner' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-api-token>'
Expected behavior:
- owner records should be excluded for admin callers, consistent with getUser
Actual behavior: - the response contains owner user objects, including email addresses and user IDs
Local Validation of the Exact Handler Logic
I validated the filtering logic locally with the same conditions used by getUsers and getUser.
Observed output:
{
"admin_getUsers_rank_owner": [
{
"email": "owner@example.test",
"id": "owner-1",
"name": "Site Owner",
"rank": "owner",
"username": "owner1"
}
],
"admin_getUser_owner": "Unauthorized to view user with higher rank"
}
This demonstrates the authorization mismatch clearly:
- bulk listing with rank=owner exposes owner records
- direct access to a single owner record is denied
Impact
- Owner Account Enumeration: Admin tokens can recover owner user IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses.
- Authorization Boundary Bypass: The REST collection endpoint bypasses the stricter per-record rank check already implemented by
getUser. - Chaining Value: Exposed owner contact data can support phishing, account-targeting, and admin-to-owner pivot attempts in deployments that treat owner identities as higher-trust principals.
Recommended Fix
Apply rank filtering based on the caller's role, not on the request query parameter, and reuse the same privilege rule as getUser.
Example fix:
const loggedInUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(user.rank);
data = data.filter((candidate) => {
const candidateRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(candidate.rank);
return loggedInUserRankIndex > candidateRankIndex;
});
if (rank) {
data = data.filter((candidate) => candidate.rank === rank);
}
At minimum, replace:
if (rank !== 'owner') {
data = data.filter((user) => user.rank !== 'owner');
}
with a check tied to user.rank rather than the query parameter.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "studiocms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32638"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T16:37:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T21:16:26Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe REST API `getUsers` endpoint in StudioCMS uses the attacker-controlled `rank` query parameter to decide whether owner accounts should be filtered from the result set. As a result, an admin token can request `rank=owner` and receive owner account records, including IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses, even though the adjacent `getUser` endpoint correctly blocks admins from viewing owner users. This is an authorization inconsistency inside the same user-management surface.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code Path\n\nFile: `D:/bugcrowd/studiocms/repo/packages/studiocms/frontend/pages/studiocms_api/_handlers/rest-api/v1/secure.ts`, lines 1605-1647\n\n```ts\n.handle(\n \u0027getUsers\u0027,\n Effect.fn(\n function* ({ urlParams: { name, rank, username } }) {\n if (!restAPIEnabled) {\n return yield* new RestAPIError({ error: \u0027Endpoint not found\u0027 });\n }\n const [sdk, user] = yield* Effect.all([SDKCore, CurrentRestAPIUser]);\n\n if (user.rank !== \u0027owner\u0027 \u0026\u0026 user.rank !== \u0027admin\u0027) {\n return yield* new RestAPIError({ error: \u0027Unauthorized\u0027 });\n }\n\n const allUsers = yield* sdk.GET.users.all();\n let data = allUsers.map(...);\n\n if (rank !== \u0027owner\u0027) {\n data = data.filter((user) =\u003e user.rank !== \u0027owner\u0027);\n }\n\n if (rank) {\n data = data.filter((user) =\u003e user.rank === rank);\n }\n\n return data;\n },\n```\n\nThe `rank` variable in `if (rank !== \u0027owner\u0027)` is the request query parameter, not the caller\u0027s privilege level. An admin can therefore pass `rank=owner`, skip the owner-filtering branch, and then have the second `if (rank)` branch return only owner accounts.\n\n### Adjacent Endpoint Shows Intended Security Boundary\n\nFile: `D:/bugcrowd/studiocms/repo/packages/studiocms/frontend/pages/studiocms_api/_handlers/rest-api/v1/secure.ts`, lines 1650-1710\n\n```ts\nconst existingUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(existingUserRank);\nconst loggedInUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(user.rank);\n\nif (loggedInUserRankIndex \u003c= existingUserRankIndex) {\n return yield* new RestAPIError({\n error: \u0027Unauthorized to view user with higher rank\u0027,\n });\n}\n```\n\n`getUser` correctly blocks an admin from viewing an owner record. `getUsers` bypasses that boundary for bulk enumeration.\n\n### Sensitive Fields Returned\n\nThe `getUsers` response includes:\n\n- `id`\n- `email`\n- `name`\n- `username`\n- `rank`\n- timestamps and profile URL/avatar fields when present\n\nThis is enough to enumerate all owner accounts and target them for phishing, social engineering, or follow-on attacks against out-of-band workflows.\n\n## PoC\n\n### HTTP PoC\n\nUse any admin-level REST API token:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X GET \u0027http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/rest/v1/secure/users?rank=owner\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003cadmin-api-token\u003e\u0027\n```\n\nExpected behavior:\n- owner records should be excluded for admin callers, consistent with `getUser`\n\nActual behavior:\n- the response contains owner user objects, including email addresses and user IDs\n\n### Local Validation of the Exact Handler Logic\n\nI validated the filtering logic locally with the same conditions used by `getUsers` and `getUser`.\n\nObserved output:\n\n```json\n{\n \"admin_getUsers_rank_owner\": [\n {\n \"email\": \"owner@example.test\",\n \"id\": \"owner-1\",\n \"name\": \"Site Owner\",\n \"rank\": \"owner\",\n \"username\": \"owner1\"\n }\n ],\n \"admin_getUser_owner\": \"Unauthorized to view user with higher rank\"\n}\n```\n\nThis demonstrates the authorization mismatch clearly:\n- bulk listing with `rank=owner` exposes owner records\n- direct access to a single owner record is denied\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Owner Account Enumeration:** Admin tokens can recover owner user IDs, usernames, display names, and email addresses.\n- **Authorization Boundary Bypass:** The REST collection endpoint bypasses the stricter per-record rank check already implemented by `getUser`.\n- **Chaining Value:** Exposed owner contact data can support phishing, account-targeting, and admin-to-owner pivot attempts in deployments that treat owner identities as higher-trust principals.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply rank filtering based on the caller\u0027s role, not on the request query parameter, and reuse the same privilege rule as `getUser`.\n\nExample fix:\n\n```ts\nconst loggedInUserRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(user.rank);\n\ndata = data.filter((candidate) =\u003e {\n const candidateRankIndex = availablePermissionRanks.indexOf(candidate.rank);\n return loggedInUserRankIndex \u003e candidateRankIndex;\n});\n\nif (rank) {\n data = data.filter((candidate) =\u003e candidate.rank === rank);\n}\n```\n\nAt minimum, replace:\n\n```ts\nif (rank !== \u0027owner\u0027) {\n data = data.filter((user) =\u003e user.rank !== \u0027owner\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nwith a check tied to `user.rank` rather than the query parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-xvf4-ch4q-2m24",
"modified": "2026-03-18T21:51:20Z",
"published": "2026-03-16T16:37:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withstudiocms/studiocms/security/advisories/GHSA-xvf4-ch4q-2m24"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32638"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withstudiocms/studiocms/commit/aebe8bcb3618bb07c6753e3f5c982c1fe6adea64"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/withstudiocms/studiocms"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withstudiocms/studiocms/releases/tag/studiocms@0.4.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "StudioCMS REST getUsers Exposes Owner Account Records to Admin Tokens"
}
GHSA-XVH8-9H96-57R8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-12 15:30 – Updated: 2026-01-27 21:31IDOR vulnerability has been found in Viafirma Inbox v4.5.13 that allows any authenticated user without privileges in the application to list all users, access and modify their data. This allows the user's email addresses to be modified and, subsequently, using the password recovery functionality to access the application by impersonating any user, including those with administrative permissions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-41077"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-12T15:16:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IDOR vulnerability has been found in Viafirma Inbox v4.5.13 that allows any authenticated user without privileges in the application to list all users, access and modify their data. This allows the user\u0027s email addresses to be modified and, subsequently, using the password recovery functionality to access the application by impersonating any user, including those with administrative permissions.",
"id": "GHSA-xvh8-9h96-57r8",
"modified": "2026-01-27T21:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-01-12T15:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-viafirma-products"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-XVP4-PHQJ-CJR3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-20 15:46 – Updated: 2026-05-28 14:19Summary
An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in phpMyFAQ's Admin API allows any authenticated administrator to change the password of any user account, including SuperAdmin accounts (userId=1), without authorization verification. An attacker with a low-privilege admin account can escalate privileges to full SuperAdmin control by simply changing the target user's ID in the API request body.
Details
File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/UserController.php Lines: 232-271 The overwritePassword() method at line 232 accepts PUT requests to /admin/api/user/overwrite-password:
[Route(path: 'user/overwrite-password', name: 'admin.api.user.overwrite-password', methods: ['PUT'])]
public function overwritePassword(Request $request): JsonResponse
{
$this->userHasUserPermission(); // Only checks if user has USER_EDIT permission
$currentUser = CurrentUser::getCurrentUser($this->configuration);
$data = json_decode($request->getContent());
$userId = Filter::filterVar($data->userId, FILTER_VALIDATE_INT); // User-controlled!
$csrfToken = Filter::filterVar($data->csrf, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
$newPassword = Filter::filterVar($data->newPassword, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
$retypedPassword = Filter::filterVar($data->passwordRepeat, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
if (!Token::getInstance($this->session)->verifyToken(page: 'overwrite-password', requestToken: $csrfToken)) {
return $this->json(['error' => ...], Response::HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED);
}
// NO check that $userId belongs to a user the admin should manage
// NO check that target user has lower or equal privileges
// Can overwrite password for ANY user, including SuperAdmin (userId=1)
$currentUser->getUserById((int) $userId, allowBlockedUsers: true);
$authSource->getEncryptionContainer($currentUser->getAuthData(key: 'encType'));
if (hash_equals($newPassword, $retypedPassword)) {
if (!$currentUser->changePassword($newPassword)) {
return $this->json(['error' => ...], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
}
$this->adminLog->log($this->currentUser, AdminLogType::USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD->value . ':' . $userId);
return $this->json(['success' => ...], Response::HTTP_OK);
}
}
Root Causes:
- No verification that the requesting admin has permission to modify the target user's password
- No check that the target user has equal or lower privilege level
- The userId is taken directly from the request body without authorization context
- No multi-factor confirmation for privilege-escalating password changes
PoC
Prerequisites: Authenticated admin session with USER_EDIT permission
Step 1 - Obtain Admin Session: Log in as a low-privilege admin user (or exploit CVE-2026-XXXX-1 to take over any user first).
Step 2 - Extract CSRF Token: CSRF token is embedded in admin pages:
curl -sL -b "PHPSESSID=admin_session" http://target/admin/index.php | grep -oP 'pmf-csrf-token.*?value="\K[^"]+'
Step 3 - Change SuperAdmin Password:
curl -X PUT -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-b "PHPSESSID=admin_session" \
-d '{
"userId": 1,
"csrf": "admin_csrf_token_value",
"newPassword": "NewSuperAdminP@ss123!",
"passwordRepeat": "NewSuperAdminP@ss123!"
}' \
http://target/admin/api/user/overwrite-password
Response: {"success":"The password was successfully changed."}
Step 4 - Account Takeover: Attacker now has SuperAdmin credentials and full control of phpMyFAQ.
Who is Impacted:
- Organizations with multiple admin users where not all should have SuperAdmin access
- Any phpMyFAQ instance where privilege separation is configured
- Multi-tenant environments where users should only manage their own accounts
Attack Complexity: Low - only requires a valid admin session with USER_EDIT permission
Privilege Escalation: Any admin user can become SuperAdmin regardless of their assigned permissions
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "thorsten/phpmyfaq"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35671"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-266",
"CWE-269",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-20T15:46:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in phpMyFAQ\u0027s Admin API allows any authenticated administrator to change the password of any user account, including SuperAdmin accounts (userId=1), without authorization verification. An attacker with a low-privilege admin account can escalate privileges to full SuperAdmin control by simply changing the target user\u0027s ID in the API request body.\n\n### Details\nFile: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/UserController.php\nLines: 232-271\nThe overwritePassword() method at line 232 accepts PUT requests to /admin/api/user/overwrite-password:\n#[Route(path: \u0027user/overwrite-password\u0027, name: \u0027admin.api.user.overwrite-password\u0027, methods: [\u0027PUT\u0027])]\n```php\npublic function overwritePassword(Request $request): JsonResponse\n{\n $this-\u003euserHasUserPermission(); // Only checks if user has USER_EDIT permission\n $currentUser = CurrentUser::getCurrentUser($this-\u003econfiguration);\n $data = json_decode($request-\u003egetContent());\n $userId = Filter::filterVar($data-\u003euserId, FILTER_VALIDATE_INT); // User-controlled!\n $csrfToken = Filter::filterVar($data-\u003ecsrf, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n $newPassword = Filter::filterVar($data-\u003enewPassword, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n $retypedPassword = Filter::filterVar($data-\u003epasswordRepeat, FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n if (!Token::getInstance($this-\u003esession)-\u003everifyToken(page: \u0027overwrite-password\u0027, requestToken: $csrfToken)) {\n return $this-\u003ejson([\u0027error\u0027 =\u003e ...], Response::HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED);\n }\n // NO check that $userId belongs to a user the admin should manage\n // NO check that target user has lower or equal privileges\n // Can overwrite password for ANY user, including SuperAdmin (userId=1)\n $currentUser-\u003egetUserById((int) $userId, allowBlockedUsers: true);\n $authSource-\u003egetEncryptionContainer($currentUser-\u003egetAuthData(key: \u0027encType\u0027));\n if (hash_equals($newPassword, $retypedPassword)) {\n if (!$currentUser-\u003echangePassword($newPassword)) {\n return $this-\u003ejson([\u0027error\u0027 =\u003e ...], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);\n }\n $this-\u003eadminLog-\u003elog($this-\u003ecurrentUser, AdminLogType::USER_CHANGE_PASSWORD-\u003evalue . \u0027:\u0027 . $userId);\n return $this-\u003ejson([\u0027success\u0027 =\u003e ...], Response::HTTP_OK);\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Root Causes:\n1. No verification that the requesting admin has permission to modify the target user\u0027s password\n2. No check that the target user has equal or lower privilege level\n3. The userId is taken directly from the request body without authorization context\n4. No multi-factor confirmation for privilege-escalating password changes\n\n\n### PoC\n\nPrerequisites: Authenticated admin session with USER_EDIT permission\n\nStep 1 - Obtain Admin Session:\nLog in as a low-privilege admin user (or exploit CVE-2026-XXXX-1 to take over any user first).\n\nStep 2 - Extract CSRF Token:\nCSRF token is embedded in admin pages:\n```bash\ncurl -sL -b \"PHPSESSID=admin_session\" http://target/admin/index.php | grep -oP \u0027pmf-csrf-token.*?value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027\n```\n\nStep 3 - Change SuperAdmin Password:\n```bash\ncurl -X PUT -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -b \"PHPSESSID=admin_session\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"userId\": 1,\n \"csrf\": \"admin_csrf_token_value\",\n \"newPassword\": \"NewSuperAdminP@ss123!\",\n \"passwordRepeat\": \"NewSuperAdminP@ss123!\"\n }\u0027 \\\n http://target/admin/api/user/overwrite-password\n```\n\nResponse: {\"success\":\"The password was successfully changed.\"}\n\nStep 4 - Account Takeover:\nAttacker now has SuperAdmin credentials and full control of phpMyFAQ.\n\n### Who is Impacted:\n- Organizations with multiple admin users where not all should have SuperAdmin access\n- Any phpMyFAQ instance where privilege separation is configured\n- Multi-tenant environments where users should only manage their own accounts\n\n#### Attack Complexity: Low - only requires a valid admin session with USER_EDIT permission\n#### Privilege Escalation: Any admin user can become SuperAdmin regardless of their assigned permissions",
"id": "GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3",
"modified": "2026-05-28T14:19:40Z",
"published": "2026-05-20T15:46:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "phpMyFAQ: IDOR Account Takeover "
}
GHSA-XVRF-3569-2X76
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-24 12:30 – Updated: 2025-02-04 18:30Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Metagauss ProfileGrid.This issue affects ProfileGrid : from n/a through 5.7.9.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-32772"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-24T11:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Metagauss ProfileGrid.This issue affects ProfileGrid : from n/a through 5.7.9.",
"id": "GHSA-xvrf-3569-2x76",
"modified": "2025-02-04T18:30:45Z",
"published": "2024-04-24T12:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32772"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/profilegrid-user-profiles-groups-and-communities/wordpress-profilegrid-plugin-5-7-9-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
Mitigation
Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
Mitigation
Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.