CWE-327
Allowed-with-ReviewUse of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
960 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9CXM-8WWV-F396
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:24 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:54A CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability exists in Easergy Builder (Version 1.4.7.2 and older) which could allow an attacker access to the authorization credentials for a device and gain full access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7514"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-07-23T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability exists in Easergy Builder (Version 1.4.7.2 and older) which could allow an attacker access to the authorization credentials for a device and gain full access.",
"id": "GHSA-9cxm-8wwv-f396",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:54:56Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:24:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7514"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.se.com/ww/en/download/document/SEVD-2020-161-05"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9G95-G4X3-WRVV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:58 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:12On certain Samsung P(9.0) phones, an attacker with physical access can start a TCP Dump capture without the user's knowledge. This feature of the Service Mode application is available after entering the *#9900# check code, but is protected by an OTP password. However, this password is created locally and (due to mishandling of cryptography) can be obtained easily by reversing the password creation logic.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-11341"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-10-09T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "On certain Samsung P(9.0) phones, an attacker with physical access can start a TCP Dump capture without the user\u0027s knowledge. This feature of the Service Mode application is available after entering the *#9900# check code, but is protected by an OTP password. However, this password is created locally and (due to mishandling of cryptography) can be obtained easily by reversing the password creation logic.",
"id": "GHSA-9g95-g4x3-wrvv",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:12:24Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:58:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11341"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drfone.wondershare.com/unlock/samsung-galaxy-secret-code-list.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://twitter.com/fs0c131y/status/1115889065285562368"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9GFP-CMRG-HP24
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-02 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-13 00:00IBM UrbanCode Deploy (UCD) 7.0.5, 7.1.0, 7.1.1, and 7.1.2 uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information. IBM X-Force ID: 218859.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-22327"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-01T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM UrbanCode Deploy (UCD) 7.0.5, 7.1.0, 7.1.1, and 7.1.2 uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information. IBM X-Force ID: 218859.",
"id": "GHSA-9gfp-cmrg-hp24",
"modified": "2022-04-13T00:00:54Z",
"published": "2022-04-02T00:00:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22327"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/218859"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6568551"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9GPH-VG5F-M5QG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:35 – Updated: 2023-11-16 03:30Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability in McAfee Database Security Server and Sensor prior to 4.8.0 in the form of a SHA1 signed certificate that would allow an attacker on the same local network to potentially intercept communication between the Server and Sensors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7339"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-10T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability in McAfee Database Security Server and Sensor prior to 4.8.0 in the form of a SHA1 signed certificate that would allow an attacker on the same local network to potentially intercept communication between the Server and Sensors.",
"id": "GHSA-9gph-vg5f-m5qg",
"modified": "2023-11-16T03:30:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:35:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7339"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content\u0026id=SB10340"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9H3M-VGR9-8WVV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-10 15:31 – Updated: 2026-06-10 15:31During an internal security assessment, a potential vulnerability was discovered in some ThinkPad embedded controller firmware that could allow a privileged local user to perform arbitrary reads or writes to privileged memory regions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-10237"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T15:16:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "During an internal security assessment, a potential vulnerability was discovered in some ThinkPad embedded controller firmware that could allow a privileged local user to perform arbitrary reads or writes to privileged memory regions.",
"id": "GHSA-9h3m-vgr9-8wvv",
"modified": "2026-06-10T15:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-06-10T15:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10237"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/LEN-218282"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9H47-PQCX-HJR4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 20:55 – Updated: 2026-07-07 20:55Am I affected?
Users are affected if all of the following are true:
- Their application uses
better-authat a version below the patched release. - Their application enables
oidcProvider()frombetter-auth/plugins/oidc-providerormcp()frombetter-auth/plugins/mcp(the mcp plugin delegates tooidcProviderand inherits both defaults). - For the algorithm-negotiation impact: relying parties of the application's OIDC server use a JWT verification library that performs algorithm negotiation from the discovery document without pinning to a specific signing algorithm.
- For the PKCE impact: the authorization URL is exposed to any party other than the user agent and the application's OP.
If the application only uses @better-auth/oauth-provider (the canonical replacement) and have not enabled the legacy plugins, it is not affected. The new package's discovery document excludes none and its authorize schema rejects plain at parse time.
Fix:
- Upgrade to
better-auth@1.6.11or later. - Migrate from the deprecated
oidcProviderandmcpplugins to@better-auth/oauth-providerwhen feasible. - If developers cannot upgrade their applications, see workarounds below.
Summary
The legacy oidcProvider and mcp plugins exhibit two related defects in their OIDC discovery and authorize surfaces.
The discovery document advertises "none" in id_token_signing_alg_values_supported (and, for mcp, in resource_signing_alg_values_supported on the OAuth protected-resource metadata). Any relying party that performs algorithm negotiation from this metadata without pinning to a real signing algorithm may accept unsigned tokens.
PKCE plain is enabled by default. The runtime gate in the authorize handler accepts code_challenge_method=plain under this default, and a missing code_challenge_method parameter is silently downgraded to "plain" before the allowlist check. Discovery advertises code_challenge_methods_supported: ["S256"], contradicting the runtime acceptance of plain. RFC 9700 §2.1.1 (OAuth 2.1) explicitly forbids plain.
Details
The metadata builders unconditionally inject "none" into the alg list. The runtime authorize gate is structured so a buggy client that strips the code_challenge_method parameter still enters the plain code path because the handler rewrites the missing value to "plain" before the allowlist check fires.
@better-auth/oauth-provider (the deprecation target for oidcProvider) is not affected by either defect. The metadata builder uses a JWSAlgorithms type union that structurally excludes "none". The authorize schema is code_challenge_method: z.literal("S256").optional(), which rejects plain at parse time.
Patches
Fixed in better-auth@1.6.11. The legacy oidcProvider and mcp plugins now:
- Drop
"none"fromid_token_signing_alg_values_supported(both plugins) and fromresource_signing_alg_values_supported(mcp). Discovery no longer advertises the unsigned-token option. - Default
allowPlainCodeChallengeMethodtofalse. A request that explicitly passescode_challenge_method=plainis rejected withinvalid_requestunless the integrator opts in. - Reject a
code_challengewithout an accompanyingcode_challenge_methodinstead of silently rewriting the missing value toplain. Clients that sendcode_challengemust also sendcode_challenge_method=S256.
Discovery and runtime behavior align on S256 only by default.
Integrators who must keep plain PKCE for legacy clients can restore the previous shape with oidcProvider({ allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod: true }) (and likewise for mcp). With the opt-in set, a request that omits code_challenge_method is treated as plain again, preserving backwards compatibility while keeping the secure default for everyone else. Both legacy plugins are deprecated long-term; the recommended migration is @better-auth/oauth-provider, which never advertised none or accepted plain PKCE.
Workarounds
If developers cannot upgrade their applications immediately:
- Disable plain PKCE explicitly: set
oidcProvider({ allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod: false })(and the equivalent onmcp). Closes the runtime acceptance ofplaineven though the silent downgrade still rewrites missing methods. - Override the metadata to drop
"none"fromid_token_signing_alg_values_supported. ForoidcProvider, passmetadata: { id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ["RS256"] }. Formcp, set the same onoptions.oidcConfig.metadata. Verify by curling the.well-knownendpoint. - Migrate to
@better-auth/oauth-provider: the package is the deprecation target and is unaffected by both defects.
Impact
- Algorithm-negotiation downgrade: relying parties that read the discovery document without pinning may accept unsigned (
alg: "none") tokens. - Authorization-code interception: PKCE
plaindoes not protect the authorization code if the URL leaks (Referer headers, browser history, screen capture, proxy logs). PKCES256is what protects against that exposure; withplainthe protection is absent. - OAuth 2.1 / RFC 9700 non-conformance: deployments shipping the defaults are non-compliant with current standards.
Credit
Reported by @subhanUmer.
Resources
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "better-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-327",
"CWE-757"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T20:55:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Am I affected?\n\nUsers are affected if all of the following are true:\n\n- Their application uses `better-auth` at a version below the patched release.\n- Their application enables `oidcProvider()` from `better-auth/plugins/oidc-provider` or `mcp()` from `better-auth/plugins/mcp` (the mcp plugin delegates to `oidcProvider` and inherits both defaults).\n- For the algorithm-negotiation impact: relying parties of the application\u0027s OIDC server use a JWT verification library that performs algorithm negotiation from the discovery document without pinning to a specific signing algorithm.\n- For the PKCE impact: the authorization URL is exposed to any party other than the user agent and the application\u0027s OP.\n\nIf the application only uses `@better-auth/oauth-provider` (the canonical replacement) and have not enabled the legacy plugins, it is not affected. The new package\u0027s discovery document excludes `none` and its authorize schema rejects `plain` at parse time.\n\nFix:\n\n1. Upgrade to `better-auth@1.6.11` or later.\n2. Migrate from the deprecated `oidcProvider` and `mcp` plugins to `@better-auth/oauth-provider` when feasible.\n3. If developers cannot upgrade their applications, see workarounds below.\n\n### Summary\n\nThe legacy `oidcProvider` and `mcp` plugins exhibit two related defects in their OIDC discovery and authorize surfaces.\n\nThe discovery document advertises `\"none\"` in `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` (and, for `mcp`, in `resource_signing_alg_values_supported` on the OAuth protected-resource metadata). Any relying party that performs algorithm negotiation from this metadata without pinning to a real signing algorithm may accept unsigned tokens.\n\nPKCE `plain` is enabled by default. The runtime gate in the authorize handler accepts `code_challenge_method=plain` under this default, and a missing `code_challenge_method` parameter is silently downgraded to `\"plain\"` before the allowlist check. Discovery advertises `code_challenge_methods_supported: [\"S256\"]`, contradicting the runtime acceptance of `plain`. RFC 9700 \u00a72.1.1 (OAuth 2.1) explicitly forbids `plain`.\n\n### Details\n\nThe metadata builders unconditionally inject `\"none\"` into the alg list. The runtime authorize gate is structured so a buggy client that strips the `code_challenge_method` parameter still enters the plain code path because the handler rewrites the missing value to `\"plain\"` before the allowlist check fires.\n\n`@better-auth/oauth-provider` (the deprecation target for `oidcProvider`) is not affected by either defect. The metadata builder uses a `JWSAlgorithms` type union that structurally excludes `\"none\"`. The authorize schema is `code_challenge_method: z.literal(\"S256\").optional()`, which rejects `plain` at parse time.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `better-auth@1.6.11`. The legacy `oidcProvider` and `mcp` plugins now:\n\n- Drop `\"none\"` from `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` (both plugins) and from `resource_signing_alg_values_supported` (`mcp`). Discovery no longer advertises the unsigned-token option.\n- Default `allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod` to `false`. A request that explicitly passes `code_challenge_method=plain` is rejected with `invalid_request` unless the integrator opts in.\n- Reject a `code_challenge` without an accompanying `code_challenge_method` instead of silently rewriting the missing value to `plain`. Clients that send `code_challenge` must also send `code_challenge_method=S256`.\n\nDiscovery and runtime behavior align on `S256` only by default.\n\nIntegrators who must keep plain PKCE for legacy clients can restore the previous shape with `oidcProvider({ allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod: true })` (and likewise for `mcp`). With the opt-in set, a request that omits `code_challenge_method` is treated as `plain` again, preserving backwards compatibility while keeping the secure default for everyone else. Both legacy plugins are deprecated long-term; the recommended migration is `@better-auth/oauth-provider`, which never advertised `none` or accepted plain PKCE.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf developers cannot upgrade their applications immediately:\n\n- **Disable plain PKCE explicitly**: set `oidcProvider({ allowPlainCodeChallengeMethod: false })` (and the equivalent on `mcp`). Closes the runtime acceptance of `plain` even though the silent downgrade still rewrites missing methods.\n- **Override the metadata** to drop `\"none\"` from `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported`. For `oidcProvider`, pass `metadata: { id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: [\"RS256\"] }`. For `mcp`, set the same on `options.oidcConfig.metadata`. Verify by curling the `.well-known` endpoint.\n- **Migrate to `@better-auth/oauth-provider`**: the package is the deprecation target and is unaffected by both defects.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Algorithm-negotiation downgrade**: relying parties that read the discovery document without pinning may accept unsigned (`alg: \"none\"`) tokens.\n- **Authorization-code interception**: PKCE `plain` does not protect the authorization code if the URL leaks (Referer headers, browser history, screen capture, proxy logs). PKCE `S256` is what protects against that exposure; with `plain` the protection is absent.\n- **OAuth 2.1 / RFC 9700 non-conformance**: deployments shipping the defaults are non-compliant with current standards.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @subhanUmer.\n\n### Resources\n\n- [CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html)\n- [CWE-757: Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/757.html)\n- [CWE-1188: Insecure Default Initialization of Resource](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1188.html)\n- [RFC 9700 \u00a72.1.1: PKCE](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9700#section-2.1.1)\n- [RFC 9700 \u00a72.1.2: Token Replay Prevention](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9700#section-2.1.2)\n- [RFC 8414 \u00a72: Authorization Server Metadata](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8414#section-2)",
"id": "GHSA-9h47-pqcx-hjr4",
"modified": "2026-07-07T20:55:41Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T20:55:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-9h47-pqcx-hjr4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/releases/tag/v1.6.11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Better Auth has insecure cryptographic defaults in oidcProvider: alg=none advertised and plain PKCE accepted by default"
}
GHSA-9J2H-MCJ7-4233
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-19 18:31 – Updated: 2025-08-19 18:31A flaw has been found in Linksys E5600 1.1.0.26. The affected element is the function verify_gemtek_header of the file checkFw.sh of the component Firmware Handler. Executing manipulation can lead to risky cryptographic algorithm. The attack may be launched remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is described as difficult. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-9146"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-19T16:15:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A flaw has been found in Linksys E5600 1.1.0.26. The affected element is the function verify_gemtek_header of the file checkFw.sh of the component Firmware Handler. Executing manipulation can lead to risky cryptographic algorithm. The attack may be launched remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitability is described as difficult. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-9j2h-mcj7-4233",
"modified": "2025-08-19T18:31:32Z",
"published": "2025-08-19T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9146"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/IOTRes/IOT_Firmware_Update/blob/main/Linksys/E5600.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.320525"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.320525"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.628642"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.linksys.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9J3M-FR7Q-JXFW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-12 19:22 – Updated: 2024-12-18 19:22In the context of using MD5 to generate filenames for cache keys, there are significant collision hazards that need to be considered. MD5, or Message Digest Algorithm 5, is a widely known cryptographic hash function that produces a 128-bit hash value. However, MD5 is no longer considered secure against well-funded opponents due to its vulnerability to collision attacks.
Understanding Collisions
A collision in hashing occurs when two different inputs produce the same hash output. For MD5, this means that it is theoretically possible, and even practical, to find two distinct cache keys that result in the same MD5 hash. This vulnerability has been well-documented and exploited in various security contexts.
Implications for Cache Systems
In a cache system where filenames are derived from the MD5 hash of cache keys, a collision could lead to several critical issues:
Data Integrity Risks: If two different keys collide, they will map to the same filename. This could result in data being overwritten incorrectly, leading to data loss or corruption. Security Vulnerabilities: An attacker could potentially exploit collisions to manipulate cache data. For instance, by crafting a key that collides with another key, an attacker might gain unauthorized access to sensitive cached information or inject malicious data.
Unpredictable Behavior: Collisions can cause the cache system to behave unpredictably, as it may retrieve or store data in unintended files, leading to system instability or incorrect behavior.
Mitigation Strategies
To mitigate these risks, consider the following strategies:
Use a More Secure Hash Function: Replace MD5 with a more secure hash function like SHA-256, which has a significantly lower probability of collisions and is resistant to known attack vectors.
code at:https://github.com/beego/beego/blob/bb72dc27ac3970e51d38ee52fc3dc1465ae25b9d/client/cache/file.go#L126
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/beego/beego"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.12.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/beego/beego/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-55885"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327",
"CWE-328"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-12T19:22:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-12T20:15:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the context of using MD5 to generate filenames for cache keys, there are significant collision hazards that need to be considered. MD5, or Message Digest Algorithm 5, is a widely known cryptographic hash function that produces a 128-bit hash value. However, MD5 is no longer considered secure against well-funded opponents due to its vulnerability to collision attacks.\n\n### Understanding Collisions\nA collision in hashing occurs when two different inputs produce the same hash output. For MD5, this means that it is theoretically possible, and even practical, to find two distinct cache keys that result in the same MD5 hash. This vulnerability has been well-documented and exploited in various security contexts.\n\n### Implications for Cache Systems\nIn a cache system where filenames are derived from the MD5 hash of cache keys, a collision could lead to several critical issues:\n\nData Integrity Risks: If two different keys collide, they will map to the same filename. This could result in data being overwritten incorrectly, leading to data loss or corruption.\nSecurity Vulnerabilities: An attacker could potentially exploit collisions to manipulate cache data. For instance, by crafting a key that collides with another key, an attacker might gain unauthorized access to sensitive cached information or inject malicious data.\n\nUnpredictable Behavior: Collisions can cause the cache system to behave unpredictably, as it may retrieve or store data in unintended files, leading to system instability or incorrect behavior.\n\n### Mitigation Strategies\nTo mitigate these risks, consider the following strategies:\n\nUse a More Secure Hash Function: Replace MD5 with a more secure hash function like SHA-256, which has a significantly lower probability of collisions and is resistant to known attack vectors.\n\ncode at:https://github.com/beego/beego/blob/bb72dc27ac3970e51d38ee52fc3dc1465ae25b9d/client/cache/file.go#L126",
"id": "GHSA-9j3m-fr7q-jxfw",
"modified": "2024-12-18T19:22:40Z",
"published": "2024-12-12T19:22:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/beego/beego/security/advisories/GHSA-9j3m-fr7q-jxfw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/beego/beego/commit/e7fa4835f71f47ab1d13afd638cebf661800d5a4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/beego/beego"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Beego has Collision Hazards of MD5 in Cache Key Filenames"
}
GHSA-9J9Q-9X39-W892
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-24 21:30 – Updated: 2023-03-29 15:30SanDisk PrivateAccess versions prior to 6.4.9 support insecure TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 protocols which are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks thereby compromising confidentiality and integrity of data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-22812"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-24T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SanDisk PrivateAccess versions prior to 6.4.9 support insecure TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 protocols which are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks thereby compromising confidentiality and integrity of data.",
"id": "GHSA-9j9q-9x39-w892",
"modified": "2023-03-29T15:30:17Z",
"published": "2023-03-24T21:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22812"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.westerndigital.com/support/product-security/wdc-23005-sandisk-privateaccess-software-update"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9JMH-RHGV-38VC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-07 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:50IBM WebSphere Application Server 8.5 and 9.0 could provide weaker than expected security, caused by the improper encoding in a local configuration file. IBM X-Force ID: 258637.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-35890"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-07T03:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM WebSphere Application Server 8.5 and 9.0 could provide weaker than expected security, caused by the improper encoding in a local configuration file. IBM X-Force ID: 258637.",
"id": "GHSA-9jmh-rhgv-38vc",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:50:19Z",
"published": "2023-07-07T03:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7007857"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7007857"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-24
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.
- For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192].
- Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.
- Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]
Mitigation MIT-52
Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.
Mitigation
Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.
Mitigation MIT-25
When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.
CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
CAPEC-459: Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority.
CAPEC-473: Signature Spoof
An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.
CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation
An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.
CAPEC-608: Cryptanalysis of Cellular Encryption
The use of cryptanalytic techniques to derive cryptographic keys or otherwise effectively defeat cellular encryption to reveal traffic content. Some cellular encryption algorithms such as A5/1 and A5/2 (specified for GSM use) are known to be vulnerable to such attacks and commercial tools are available to execute these attacks and decrypt mobile phone conversations in real-time. Newer encryption algorithms in use by UMTS and LTE are stronger and currently believed to be less vulnerable to these types of attacks. Note, however, that an attacker with a Cellular Rogue Base Station can force the use of weak cellular encryption even by newer mobile devices.
CAPEC-614: Rooting SIM Cards
SIM cards are the de facto trust anchor of mobile devices worldwide. The cards protect the mobile identity of subscribers, associate devices with phone numbers, and increasingly store payment credentials, for example in NFC-enabled phones with mobile wallets. This attack leverages over-the-air (OTA) updates deployed via cryptographically-secured SMS messages to deliver executable code to the SIM. By cracking the DES key, an attacker can send properly signed binary SMS messages to a device, which are treated as Java applets and are executed on the SIM. These applets are allowed to send SMS, change voicemail numbers, and query the phone location, among many other predefined functions. These capabilities alone provide plenty of potential for abuse.
CAPEC-97: Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have other goals as well, such as: Total Break (finding the secret key), Global Deduction (finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key), Information Deduction (gaining some information about plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known) and Distinguishing Algorithm (the attacker has the ability to distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits).