CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
3465 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QWVG-W866-X6C3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:55 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:50A broken access control vulnerability in HG100 firmware versions up to 4.00.06 allows an attacker in the same local area network to control IoT devices that connect with itself via http://[target]/smarthome/devicecontrol without any authentication.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-11061"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-29T01:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A broken access control vulnerability in HG100 firmware versions up to 4.00.06 allows an attacker in the same local area network to control IoT devices that connect with itself via http://[target]/smarthome/devicecontrol without any authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-qwvg-w866-x6c3",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:50:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:55:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11061"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tim124058/ASUS-SmartHome-Exploit"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tvn.twcert.org.tw/taiwanvn/TVN-201906003"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://surl.twcert.org.tw/5df6x"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QX47-QW9G-58J7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-11-30 00:00 – Updated: 2021-12-01 00:00Wipro Holmes Orchestrator 20.4.1 (20.4.1_02_11_2020) allows remote attackers to download arbitrary files, such as reports containing sensitive information, because authentication is not required for API access to processexecution/DownloadExcelFile/Domain_Credential_Report_Excel, processexecution/DownloadExcelFile/User_Report_Excel, processexecution/DownloadExcelFile/Process_Report_Excel, processexecution/DownloadExcelFile/Infrastructure_Report_Excel, or processexecution/DownloadExcelFile/Resolver_Report_Excel.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38147"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-29T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Wipro Holmes Orchestrator 20.4.1 (20.4.1_02_11_2020) allows remote attackers to download arbitrary files, such as reports containing sensitive information, because authentication is not required for API access to processexecution/DownloadExcelFile/Domain_Credential_Report_Excel, processexecution/DownloadExcelFile/User_Report_Excel, processexecution/DownloadExcelFile/Process_Report_Excel, processexecution/DownloadExcelFile/Infrastructure_Report_Excel, or processexecution/DownloadExcelFile/Resolver_Report_Excel.",
"id": "GHSA-qx47-qw9g-58j7",
"modified": "2021-12-01T00:00:45Z",
"published": "2021-11-30T00:00:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38147"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wipro.com/holmes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/165039/Wipro-Holmes-Orchestrator-20.4.1-Report-Disclosure.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QX4Q-JHFJ-788F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-06 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-14 00:03On all versions 1.3.x (fixed in 1.4.0) NGINX Service Mesh control plane endpoints are exposed to the cluster overlay network. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-27495"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-05T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "On all versions 1.3.x (fixed in 1.4.0) NGINX Service Mesh control plane endpoints are exposed to the cluster overlay network. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated",
"id": "GHSA-qx4q-jhfj-788f",
"modified": "2022-05-14T00:03:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-06T00:00:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27495"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K94093538"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QX5F-GHC2-7G5C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 21:11 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:26Summary
Fides deployments that enable both subject identity verification and duplicate privacy request detection are affected by a vulnerability in which an administrator can approve a privacy request whose identity was never verified. For erasure policies, this can result in unauthorized deletion of a data subject's records across every integration configured in the affected deployment.
A related lower-severity denial-of-service issue, in which an unauthenticated attacker could prevent a legitimate data subject from completing their own privacy requests, is also patched in the fix for this vulnerability.
Am I affected?
This vulnerability only affects deployments that use Fides's privacy request (data subject request) features, also known collectively as "Lethe". Deployments that do not submit, process, or manage privacy requests through Fides are not affected.
Within deployments that do use privacy request features, your deployment is affected if both of the following settings are effectively set to true:
subject_identity_verification_requiredprivacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled
Both settings default to false.
Each setting can be configured in multiple places. If the same setting is configured in more than one place, Fides resolves conflicts in the following precedence order, highest priority first:
- Admin UI / configuration API - stored in the application database and applied at runtime
- Environment variables - read at webserver startup
fides.toml- read at webserver startup- Default value - used if none of the above set the value
To determine whether your deployment is affected, check each setting in every location that applies to your configuration management.
subject_identity_verification_required
fides.toml: under the[execution]section assubject_identity_verification_required = true- Environment variable:
FIDES__EXECUTION__SUBJECT_IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED=true - No Admin UI control - this setting is not exposed through the Admin UI and cannot be set via the configuration API
privacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled
fides.toml: under the[privacy_request_duplicate_detection]section asenabled = true- Environment variable:
FIDES__PRIVACY_REQUEST_DUPLICATE_DETECTION__ENABLED=true - Admin UI: Settings → Privacy requests → Duplicate detection, via the "Enable duplicate detection" toggle. The toggle reflects only values set through the Admin UI or configuration API. A value set via
fides.tomlor environment variable will not appear here.
Details
When duplicate detection classifies a privacy request as a duplicate before its identity has been verified, the administrative interface presents that request with Approve, Deny, and Delete options. An administrator performing routine duplicate request triage may approve such a request without realising the identity was never verified. The request is then processed as if verification had succeeded.
An attacker exploits this by submitting two privacy requests using a target's email address, never completing the OTP verification. The second request is classified as a duplicate and becomes approvable through the administrative interface.
The fix for this vulnerability also patches a lower-severity issue, present in versions 2.82.0 through 2.83.1, in which a legitimate data subject could not complete identity verification on a privacy request that had been classified as a duplicate, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to block that data subject from exercising their privacy rights through the affected deployment.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker who knows a target's email address and can reach the public Privacy Center can cause an erasure privacy request to be approved by an administrator and processed without identity verification. The result is unauthorized deletion of the data subject's records across every integration configured in the affected deployment. Effects may be permanent and may cascade into downstream systems.
Access privacy requests are a less meaningful vector: the resulting access package is delivered to the data subject's registered email address, not to the attacker, so the attacker does not gain the data. The request still represents unauthorized processing.
Patches
The vulnerabilities have been patched in Fides OSS version 2.83.2. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against these threats.
Fides Enterprise (fidesplus) version 2.83.2 contains the same patch.
Workarounds
Disable duplicate detection by setting privacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled to false. This can be changed under Settings → Privacy Requests → Duplicate detection in the Admin UI). This fully mitigates the vulnerability and is the recommended interim workaround for deployments that cannot immediately upgrade.
The "Enable duplicate detection" toggle when it's disabled, under Settings → Privacy requests in the Admin UI.
Administrators of deployments that must retain duplicate detection should deny or delete, rather than approve, any privacy request whose identity has not been verified. This reduces the likelihood of exploitation but relies on administrator vigilance during each triage action.
Severity
This vulnerability has been assigned a severity of MEDIUM.
The rating reflects the fact that exploitation requires an administrator to approve the malicious request. An attacker alone cannot cause a privacy request to be processed. The administrative interface understates the verification state of a duplicate-classified request, which increases the likelihood of inadvertent approval during routine triage, but without administrator user interaction the vulnerability is not exploitable.
The related denial-of-service issue addressed in the same patch is also rated medium-severity in isolation and does not raise the overall severity of this advisory.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ethyca-fides"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.75.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.83.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42303"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-288",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T21:11:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T18:17:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nFides deployments that enable both subject identity verification and duplicate privacy request detection are affected by a vulnerability in which an administrator can approve a privacy request whose identity was never verified. For erasure policies, this can result in unauthorized deletion of a data subject\u0027s records across every integration configured in the affected deployment.\n\nA related lower-severity denial-of-service issue, in which an unauthenticated attacker could prevent a legitimate data subject from completing their own privacy requests, is also patched in the fix for this vulnerability.\n\n### Am I affected?\n\nThis vulnerability only affects deployments that use Fides\u0027s privacy request (data subject request) features, also known collectively as \"Lethe\". Deployments that do not submit, process, or manage privacy requests through Fides are not affected.\n\nWithin deployments that do use privacy request features, your deployment is affected if both of the following settings are effectively set to `true`:\n\n- `subject_identity_verification_required`\n- `privacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled`\n\nBoth settings default to `false`.\n\nEach setting can be configured in multiple places. If the same setting is configured in more than one place, Fides resolves conflicts in the following precedence order, highest priority first:\n\n1. **Admin UI / configuration API** - stored in the application database and applied at runtime\n2. **Environment variables** - read at webserver startup\n3. **`fides.toml`** - read at webserver startup\n4. **Default value** - used if none of the above set the value\n\nTo determine whether your deployment is affected, check each setting in every location that applies to your configuration management.\n\n**`subject_identity_verification_required`**\n\n- `fides.toml`: under the `[execution]` section as `subject_identity_verification_required = true`\n- Environment variable: `FIDES__EXECUTION__SUBJECT_IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED=true`\n- No Admin UI control - this setting is not exposed through the Admin UI and cannot be set via the configuration API\n\n**`privacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled`**\n\n- `fides.toml`: under the `[privacy_request_duplicate_detection]` section as `enabled = true`\n- Environment variable: `FIDES__PRIVACY_REQUEST_DUPLICATE_DETECTION__ENABLED=true`\n- Admin UI: **Settings \u2192 Privacy requests \u2192 Duplicate detection**, via the \"Enable duplicate detection\" toggle. The toggle reflects only values set through the Admin UI or configuration API. A value set via `fides.toml` or environment variable will not appear here.\n\n\u003cfigure\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1392\" height=\"940\" alt=\"GHSA - Duplicate Detection Enabled\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e384f273-ce68-403c-adb2-93536eca5f3a\" /\u003e\n\u003cfigcaption\u003e\n\u003cem\u003e\nThe \"Enable duplicate detection\" toggle when it\u0027s enabled, under Settings \u2192 Privacy requests in the Admin UI.\n\u003c/em\u003e\n\u003c/figcaption\u003e\n\u003c/figure\u003e\n\n### Details\n\nWhen duplicate detection classifies a privacy request as a duplicate before its identity has been verified, the administrative interface presents that request with Approve, Deny, and Delete options. An administrator performing routine duplicate request triage may approve such a request without realising the identity was never verified. The request is then processed as if verification had succeeded.\n\nAn attacker exploits this by submitting two privacy requests using a target\u0027s email address, never completing the OTP verification. The second request is classified as a duplicate and becomes approvable through the administrative interface.\n\nThe fix for this vulnerability also patches a lower-severity issue, present in versions `2.82.0` through `2.83.1`, in which a legitimate data subject could not complete identity verification on a privacy request that had been classified as a duplicate, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to block that data subject from exercising their privacy rights through the affected deployment.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows a target\u0027s email address and can reach the public Privacy Center can cause an erasure privacy request to be approved by an administrator and processed without identity verification. The result is unauthorized deletion of the data subject\u0027s records across every integration configured in the affected deployment. Effects may be permanent and may cascade into downstream systems.\n\nAccess privacy requests are a less meaningful vector: the resulting access package is delivered to the data subject\u0027s registered email address, not to the attacker, so the attacker does not gain the data. The request still represents unauthorized processing.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerabilities have been patched in Fides OSS version `2.83.2`. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against these threats.\n\nFides Enterprise (fidesplus) version `2.83.2` contains the same patch.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDisable duplicate detection by setting `privacy_request_duplicate_detection.enabled` to `false`. This can be changed under **Settings \u2192 Privacy Requests \u2192 Duplicate detection** in the Admin UI). This fully mitigates the vulnerability and is the recommended interim workaround for deployments that cannot immediately upgrade.\n\n\u003cfigure\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1392\" height=\"880\" alt=\"GHSA - Disable Duplicate Detection\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fc0c87a1-7e40-4698-ba9e-e1721f591310\" /\u003e\n\u003cfigcaption\u003e\n\u003cem\u003e\nThe \"Enable duplicate detection\" toggle when it\u0027s disabled, under Settings \u2192 Privacy requests in the Admin UI.\n\u003c/em\u003e\n\u003c/figcaption\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u003c/figure\u003e\n\nAdministrators of deployments that must retain duplicate detection should deny or delete, rather than approve, any privacy request whose identity has not been verified. This reduces the likelihood of exploitation but relies on administrator vigilance during each triage action.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1392\" height=\"1044\" alt=\"GHSA - Admin Approval of Unverified Privacy Request\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b2ad4940-40d3-468b-897e-8cca6ce4707e\" /\u003e\n\u003cfigcaption\u003e\n\u003cem\u003e\nAn administrator\u0027s view when approving an unverified privacy request in the Admin UI.\n\u003c/em\u003e\n\u003c/figcaption\u003e\n\u003c/figure\u003e\n\n### Severity\n\nThis vulnerability has been assigned a severity of **MEDIUM**.\n\nThe rating reflects the fact that exploitation requires an administrator to approve the malicious request. An attacker alone cannot cause a privacy request to be processed. The administrative interface understates the verification state of a duplicate-classified request, which increases the likelihood of inadvertent approval during routine triage, but without administrator user interaction the vulnerability is not exploitable.\n\nThe related denial-of-service issue addressed in the same patch is also rated medium-severity in isolation and does not raise the overall severity of this advisory.\n\n### References\n\n- Fides OSS `2.83.2` release: https://github.com/ethyca/fides/releases/tag/2.83.2\n- Fix for the identity bypass vulnerability: [PR #7972](https://github.com/ethyca/fides/pull/7972), commit [`e7a6527`](https://github.com/ethyca/fides/commit/e7a6527b0f9fdc9887b86a89bb5453e7421882dd)\n- Fix for the related denial-of-service issue: [PR #7971](https://github.com/ethyca/fides/pull/7971), commit [`0e320b2`](https://github.com/ethyca/fides/commit/0e320b20934eb5af3a3d5127dba2691605d7ff37)",
"id": "GHSA-qx5f-ghc2-7g5c",
"modified": "2026-05-13T16:26:42Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T21:11:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/security/advisories/GHSA-qx5f-ghc2-7g5c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42303"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/pull/7971"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/pull/7972"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/commit/0e320b20934eb5af3a3d5127dba2691605d7ff37"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/commit/e7a6527b0f9fdc9887b86a89bb5453e7421882dd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethyca/fides/releases/tag/2.83.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Ethyca Fides has a Privacy Request Identity Verification Bypass Vulnerability via Duplicate Detection"
}
GHSA-QX9J-CV9X-384R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 09:31 – Updated: 2026-07-10 18:32Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling, Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Apache IoTDB. When pipe_air_gap_receiver_enabled=true, the IoTDB AirGap pipe receiver accepts raw TCP connections on port 9780 with no authentication. The readLength method reads an attacker-controlled 32-bit integer from the socket and readData passes it directly to new byte[length] with no upper-bound check. An unauthenticated attacker can cause the JVM to attempt an allocation of up to 2,147,483,647 bytes per connection, exhausting heap memory and crashing or severely degrading the DataNode process.
This issue affects Apache IoTDB: from 1.0.0 before 2.0.10.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.10, which fixes the issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40006"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T08:16:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value, Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling, Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Apache IoTDB.\nWhen pipe_air_gap_receiver_enabled=true, the IoTDB AirGap pipe receiver\naccepts raw TCP connections on port 9780 with no authentication. The\nreadLength method reads an attacker-controlled 32-bit integer from the\nsocket and readData passes it directly to new byte[length] with no\nupper-bound check. An unauthenticated attacker can cause the JVM to attempt\nan allocation of up to 2,147,483,647 bytes per connection, exhausting heap\nmemory and crashing or severely degrading the DataNode process.\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache IoTDB: from 1.0.0 before 2.0.10.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.10, which fixes the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-qx9j-cv9x-384r",
"modified": "2026-07-10T18:32:13Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T09:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40006"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/rfpt7m9fvdrw37r3ow5omp2n914z6zqk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/10/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXJJ-2J7H-CQH2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-19 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-20 18:31An authentication bypass issue was discovered in Dasan Switch DS2924 web based interface, firmware versions 1.01.18 and 1.02.00, allowing attackers to gain escalated privileges via storing crafted cookies in the web browser.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-63206"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-19T18:15:48Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An authentication bypass issue was discovered in Dasan Switch DS2924 web based interface, firmware versions 1.01.18 and 1.02.00, allowing attackers to gain escalated privileges via storing crafted cookies in the web browser.",
"id": "GHSA-qxjj-2j7h-cqh2",
"modified": "2025-11-20T18:31:00Z",
"published": "2025-11-19T18:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-63206"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shiky8/my--cve-vulnerability-research/tree/main/CVE-2025-63206_Dasan%20Switch%20DS2924%20Authentication%20Bypass"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://dasansmc.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXPC-XP35-7G95
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-19 06:31 – Updated: 2025-03-19 06:31Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in the webapi component in Synology Drive Server before 3.0.4-12699, 3.2.1-23280, 3.5.0-26085 and 3.5.1-26102 allows remote attackers to obtain administrator credentials via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50630"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-19T06:15:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in the webapi component in Synology Drive Server before 3.0.4-12699, 3.2.1-23280, 3.5.0-26085 and 3.5.1-26102 allows remote attackers to obtain administrator credentials via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-qxpc-xp35-7g95",
"modified": "2025-03-19T06:31:54Z",
"published": "2025-03-19T06:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50630"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_21"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXVG-H7Q2-HCXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 18:53 – Updated: 2026-06-23 18:53Summary
A multi‑stage chain in motionEye leads to remote code execution. The chain combines:
- Arbitrary file read (LFI) via the picture download endpoint for local motion cameras using absolute paths.
- Pass‑the‑hash admin auth due to accepting request signatures computed with password hashes.
- Unsafe config restore that extracts attacker‑controlled tarballs into
CONF_PATH. - Unauthenticated action execution via
/action/<id>/<action>.
If the normal user password is unset, the chain becomes unauthenticated RCE. If a normal password exists, a normal user can still achieve admin escalation and RCE.
Affected Code (motionEye repo)
1) LFI (absolute path) — picture/<id>/download
Files:
- motioneye/motioneye/handlers/picture.py → download() (local motion camera branch)
- motioneye/motioneye/mediafiles.py → get_media_content()
Issue: get_media_content() only blocks .. and then joins target_dir with path. Absolute paths (e.g. /etc/hosts) bypass the join and are read directly.
2) Pass‑the‑hash admin auth
File: motioneye/motioneye/handlers/base.py → get_current_user()
Issue: The signature check allows signatures computed using the admin password hash (SHA1) as the key. If the hash is leaked (via LFI), admin access can be obtained without the plaintext password.
3) Unsafe restore (tar extraction)
File: motioneye/motioneye/config.py → restore()
Issue: tar zxC CONF_PATH is used on user‑supplied data without sanitizing entries. A crafted tar can drop executable files into CONF_PATH.
4) Unauthenticated action execution
File: motioneye/motioneye/handlers/action.py → post()
Issue: No authentication decorator is present. It executes <action>_<camera_id> found in CONF_PATH with subprocess.Popen.
Exploit Chain (Detailed)
- Create or find a local motion camera id (local motion cameras are required for the vulnerable LFI path).
- LFI via picture download:
- Request:
/picture/<id>/download/<absolute_path> - Example:
/picture/1/download/%2Fetc%2Fhosts - Result: Arbitrary file read.
- Read admin hash from
/etc/motioneye/motion.conf: - Contains
@admin_password <SHA1_HASH>. - Pass‑the‑hash admin:
- Compute signature for
/config/restore?_username=adminusing the hash as key. - Admin access is accepted with hash‑based signatures.
- Restore malicious tar:
- Upload a tar containing
lock_<id>(or any action) as an executable. - File is written into
CONF_PATHby restore. - Trigger unauth action:
- POST
/action/<id>/lock - The server executes the injected file.
Proof of Execution (Observed Output)
In local testing, the injected action created a marker file:
/tmp/meye_rce_ok
Verification command:
docker exec -it motioneye ls -la /tmp | grep meye_rce_ok
Example output:
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 ... /tmp/meye_rce_ok
Preconditions / Requirements
- At least one local motion camera exists (e.g.,
netcam_url,videodevice). picture/<id>/downloadis reachable:- Unauth if
@normal_passwordis empty (default in some installs). - Auth required if normal password is set (attacker needs normal creds).
Impact
- Unauth RCE (normal password unset).
- Authenticated RCE (normal user → admin → RCE).
- Arbitrary file read on server filesystem.
- Full compromise of motionEye process account.
Suggested Fixes
- Block absolute paths in
get_media_content()andget_media_path(). - Remove hash‑based signature acceptance; only accept signatures computed with plaintext passwords.
- Harden restore: reject absolute paths,
.., symlinks, non‑regular files. - Require authentication on
ActionHandler(admin‑only).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "motioneye"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.44.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-269",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-347",
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T18:53:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\nA multi\u2011stage chain in motionEye leads to remote code execution. The chain combines:\n\n1. **Arbitrary file read (LFI)** via the picture download endpoint for **local motion cameras** using absolute paths.\n2. **Pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin auth** due to accepting request signatures computed with password hashes.\n3. **Unsafe config restore** that extracts attacker\u2011controlled tarballs into `CONF_PATH`.\n4. **Unauthenticated action execution** via `/action/\u003cid\u003e/\u003caction\u003e`.\n\nIf the **normal user password is unset**, the chain becomes **unauthenticated RCE**. If a normal password exists, a **normal user** can still achieve **admin escalation and RCE**.\n\n---\n\n## Affected Code (motionEye repo)\n\n### 1) LFI (absolute path) \u2014 `picture/\u003cid\u003e/download`\n**Files:**\n- `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/picture.py` \u2192 `download()` (local motion camera branch)\n- `motioneye/motioneye/mediafiles.py` \u2192 `get_media_content()`\n\n**Issue:** `get_media_content()` only blocks `..` and then joins `target_dir` with `path`. Absolute paths (e.g. `/etc/hosts`) bypass the join and are read directly.\n\n### 2) Pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin auth\n**File:** `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/base.py` \u2192 `get_current_user()`\n\n**Issue:** The signature check allows signatures computed using the **admin password hash** (SHA1) as the key. If the hash is leaked (via LFI), admin access can be obtained without the plaintext password.\n\n### 3) Unsafe restore (tar extraction)\n**File:** `motioneye/motioneye/config.py` \u2192 `restore()`\n\n**Issue:** `tar zxC CONF_PATH` is used on user\u2011supplied data without sanitizing entries. A crafted tar can drop executable files into `CONF_PATH`.\n\n### 4) Unauthenticated action execution\n**File:** `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/action.py` \u2192 `post()`\n\n**Issue:** No authentication decorator is present. It executes `\u003caction\u003e_\u003ccamera_id\u003e` found in `CONF_PATH` with `subprocess.Popen`.\n\n---\n\n## Exploit Chain (Detailed)\n\n1. **Create or find a local motion camera id** (local motion cameras are required for the vulnerable LFI path).\n2. **LFI via picture download**:\n - Request: `/picture/\u003cid\u003e/download/\u003cabsolute_path\u003e`\n - Example: `/picture/1/download/%2Fetc%2Fhosts`\n - Result: Arbitrary file read.\n3. **Read admin hash** from `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`:\n - Contains `@admin_password \u003cSHA1_HASH\u003e`.\n4. **Pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin**:\n - Compute signature for `/config/restore?_username=admin` using the **hash** as key.\n - Admin access is accepted with hash\u2011based signatures.\n5. **Restore malicious tar**:\n - Upload a tar containing `lock_\u003cid\u003e` (or any action) as an executable.\n - File is written into `CONF_PATH` by restore.\n6. **Trigger unauth action**:\n - POST `/action/\u003cid\u003e/lock`\n - The server executes the injected file.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Execution (Observed Output)\nIn local testing, the injected action created a marker file:\n\n```\n/tmp/meye_rce_ok\n```\n\nVerification command:\n```\ndocker exec -it motioneye ls -la /tmp | grep meye_rce_ok\n```\nExample output:\n```\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 ... /tmp/meye_rce_ok\n```\n\n---\n\n## Preconditions / Requirements\n\n- At least **one local motion camera** exists (e.g., `netcam_url`, `videodevice`).\n- `picture/\u003cid\u003e/download` is reachable:\n - **Unauth** if `@normal_password` is empty (default in some installs).\n - **Auth required** if normal password is set (attacker needs normal creds).\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n- **Unauth RCE** (normal password unset).\n- **Authenticated RCE** (normal user \u2192 admin \u2192 RCE).\n- Arbitrary file read on server filesystem.\n- Full compromise of motionEye process account.\n\n---\n\n## Suggested Fixes\n1. **Block absolute paths** in `get_media_content()` and `get_media_path()`.\n2. **Remove hash\u2011based signature acceptance**; only accept signatures computed with plaintext passwords.\n3. **Harden restore**: reject absolute paths, `..`, symlinks, non\u2011regular files.\n4. **Require authentication** on `ActionHandler` (admin\u2011only).",
"id": "GHSA-qxvg-h7q2-hcxh",
"modified": "2026-06-23T18:53:04Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T18:53:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-qxvg-h7q2-hcxh"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "motionEye: LFI \u2192 pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin \u2192 unsafe restore \u2192 unauth action exec (RCE)"
}
GHSA-R24R-7CXR-HMCP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-29 00:30 – Updated: 2022-12-02 00:30The /device/acceptBind end-point for Ourphoto App version 1.4.1 does not require authentication or authorization. The user_token header is not implemented or present on this end-point. An attacker can send a request to bind their account to any users picture frame, then send a POST request to accept their own bind request, without the end-users approval or interaction.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-24190"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-28T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The /device/acceptBind end-point for Ourphoto App version 1.4.1 does not require authentication or authorization. The user_token header is not implemented or present on this end-point. An attacker can send a request to bind their account to any users picture frame, then send a POST request to accept their own bind request, without the end-users approval or interaction.",
"id": "GHSA-r24r-7cxr-hmcp",
"modified": "2022-12-02T00:30:25Z",
"published": "2022-11-29T00:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24190"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.scrawledsecurityblog.com/2022/11/automating-unsolicited-richard-pics.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R277-62XF-9V4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-09 18:30A Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Juniper Networks Security Director Policy Enforcer allows an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to replace legitimate vSRX images with malicious ones.
If a trusted user initiates deployment, Security Director Policy Enforcer will deliver the attacker's uploaded image to VMware NSX instead of a legitimate one.
This issue affects Security Director Policy Enforcer:
- All versions before 23.1R1 Hotpatch v3.
This issue does not affect Junos Space Security Director Insights.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11198"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-09T16:15:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Juniper Networks Security Director Policy Enforcer allows an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to replace legitimate vSRX images with malicious ones.\n\n\n\nIf a trusted user initiates deployment, Security Director Policy Enforcer will deliver the attacker\u0027s uploaded image to VMware NSX instead of a legitimate one.\n\n\n\n\n\nThis issue affects\u00a0Security Director Policy Enforcer:\u00a0\u00a0\n\n\n\n * All versions before 23.1R1 Hotpatch v3.\n\n\nThis issue does not affect Junos Space Security Director Insights.",
"id": "GHSA-r277-62xf-9v4g",
"modified": "2025-10-09T18:30:36Z",
"published": "2025-10-09T18:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11198"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://supportportal.juniper.net/JSA103437"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:U/V:C/RE:M/U:Red",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.