Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306

Allowed

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

3483 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-H253-PQ36-GGPJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:48 – Updated: 2022-08-06 00:00
VLAI
Details

The S3 buckets and keys in a secure Apache Ozone Cluster must be inaccessible to anonymous access by default. The current security vulnerability allows access to keys and buckets through a curl command or an unauthenticated HTTP request. This enables unauthorized access to buckets and keys thereby exposing data to anonymous clients or users. This affected Apache Ozone prior to the 1.1.0 release. Improper Authorization vulnerability in COMPONENT of Apache Ozone allows an attacker to IMPACT. This issue affects Apache Ozone Apache Ozone version 1.0.0 and prior versions.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-17517"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-04-27T09:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The S3 buckets and keys in a secure Apache Ozone Cluster must be inaccessible to anonymous access by default. The current security vulnerability allows access to keys and buckets through a curl command or an unauthenticated HTTP request. This enables unauthorized access to buckets and keys thereby exposing data to anonymous clients or users. This affected Apache Ozone prior to the 1.1.0 release. Improper Authorization vulnerability in __COMPONENT__ of Apache Ozone allows an attacker to __IMPACT__. This issue affects Apache Ozone Apache Ozone version 1.0.0 and prior versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-h253-pq36-ggpj",
  "modified": "2022-08-06T00:00:43Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:48:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-17517"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelist/pull/1455"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rdd59a176b32c63f7fc0865428bf9bbc69297fa17f6130c80c25869aa%40%3Cdev.ozone.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rdd59a176b32c63f7fc0865428bf9bbc69297fa17f6130c80c25869aa@%3Cdev.ozone.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/04/27/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H27V-PH7W-M9FP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 16:59 – Updated: 2026-05-06 16:59
VLAI
Summary
Nginx-UI: Unauthenticated First-Run Installer Allows Remote Initial Admin Claim
Details

Summary

An unauthenticated network attacker can claim the initial administrator account on a fresh nginx-ui instance during the first-run setup window. The public /api/install endpoint is reachable without authentication, and the request-encryption flow only protects payload confidentiality in transit; it does not authenticate who is allowed to perform installation. A remote attacker who reaches the service before the legitimate operator can set the admin email, username, and password, causing permanent initial-instance takeover.

Details

The vulnerable route is exposed publicly through the main API router. router/routers.go:61-70 mounts system.InitPublicRouter(root) under /api, and api/system/router.go:16-19 registers both GET /api/install and POST /api/install without AuthRequired().

The install handler only checks whether the instance is already installed and whether more than ten minutes have elapsed since startup. api/system/install.go:26-33 treats the instance as uninstalled when JwtSecret is empty and SkipInstallation is false. api/system/install.go:56-69 rejects requests only if installation has already happened or the ten-minute window has expired.

If those checks pass, the unauthenticated caller controls the initialization flow. api/system/install.go:77-81 generates and saves the JWT secret, node secret, and certificate email from attacker-controlled input, and api/system/install.go:93-97 overwrites user ID 1 with the attacker-chosen username and password hash. internal/kernel/init_user.go:15-22 guarantees that privileged user ID 1 exists ahead of time, so there is always an account to claim.

The public-key bootstrap does not add authentication. api/crypto/router.go:5-9 exposes POST /api/crypto/public_key publicly, api/crypto/crypto.go:12-32 returns a server public key to any caller, internal/crypto/crypto.go:44-61 stores a shared keypair in cache, and internal/middleware/encrypted_params.go:25-50 only decrypts encrypted_params before passing the request to the install handler. No request ID, local-only restriction, bootstrap secret, or prior trust check is enforced.

This was verified locally in an isolated lab instance. A fresh instance returned {"lock":false,"timeout":false}, an unauthenticated POST /api/install returned {"message":"ok"}, the instance then flipped to {"lock":true,"timeout":false}, and the on-disk SQLite database showed user ID 1 renamed to the attacker-controlled username with a non-empty password hash.

PoC

The quickest local verification path is the helper script created during validation:

ATTACKER_EMAIL='attacker@example.com' ATTACKER_USER='attacker' ATTACKER_PASS='Password12345' \
'/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/nginx-ui/output/verify/verify_fresh_install_takeover.sh'

Expected proof points:

[1/6] Fresh-instance status:
{
  "lock": false,
  "timeout": false
}

[3/6] Claiming the initial administrator account...
{
  "message": "ok"
}

[4/6] Verifying install is now locked...
{
  "lock": true,
  "timeout": false
}

[5/6] Verifying the on-disk admin record was overwritten...
{
  "id": 1,
  "name": "attacker",
  "password_len": 60
}

To confirm the final state manually:

sqlite3 '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/nginx-ui/tmp/poc-install-takeover/database.db' \
'select id,name,length(password) from users where id=1;'

Expected output:

1|attacker|60

Manual HTTP reproduction is also straightforward:

  1. Request GET /api/install and confirm lock=false and timeout=false.
  2. Request POST /api/crypto/public_key to obtain the public RSA key.
  3. Encrypt {"email":"attacker@example.com","username":"attacker","password":"Password12345"} with that public key and base64-encode the ciphertext.
  4. Submit the ciphertext to POST /api/install as {"encrypted_params":"..."}.
  5. Re-request GET /api/install and observe that lock=true.
  6. Inspect the backing database and confirm user ID 1 now belongs to the attacker-controlled username.

Impact

This is an authentication bypass / initial admin claim vulnerability affecting fresh, uninitialized instances that are reachable over the network during the installation window. Any attacker able to reach the service before the legitimate operator can permanently take ownership of the first administrator account and thereby seize control of the application. Because nginx-ui is an administrative interface for Nginx and related host-management features, compromise of the initial admin account can lead to unauthorized configuration changes, certificate management abuse, backup manipulation, service disruption, and broader operational takeover of the managed environment.

Remediation

  1. Require a single-use bootstrap secret for installation. Generate the token locally on first start, print it only to the server console or write it to a root-owned local file, and require it on POST /api/install.
  2. Restrict installation endpoints to loopback by default until setup completes. Remote setup should require an explicit opt-in configuration flag, not be enabled automatically on all interfaces.
  3. Make installer claim atomic and explicitly stateful. Persist a dedicated installation state record, consume the bootstrap token exactly once, and refuse concurrent or repeated initialization attempts even within the startup window.
Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.3.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42221"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T16:59:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-04T21:16:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn unauthenticated network attacker can claim the initial administrator account on a fresh `nginx-ui` instance during the first-run setup window. The public `/api/install` endpoint is reachable without authentication, and the request-encryption flow only protects payload confidentiality in transit; it does not authenticate who is allowed to perform installation. A remote attacker who reaches the service before the legitimate operator can set the admin email, username, and password, causing permanent initial-instance takeover.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable route is exposed publicly through the main API router. `router/routers.go:61-70` mounts `system.InitPublicRouter(root)` under `/api`, and `api/system/router.go:16-19` registers both `GET /api/install` and `POST /api/install` without `AuthRequired()`.\n\nThe install handler only checks whether the instance is already installed and whether more than ten minutes have elapsed since startup. `api/system/install.go:26-33` treats the instance as uninstalled when `JwtSecret` is empty and `SkipInstallation` is false. `api/system/install.go:56-69` rejects requests only if installation has already happened or the ten-minute window has expired.\n\nIf those checks pass, the unauthenticated caller controls the initialization flow. `api/system/install.go:77-81` generates and saves the JWT secret, node secret, and certificate email from attacker-controlled input, and `api/system/install.go:93-97` overwrites user ID `1` with the attacker-chosen username and password hash. `internal/kernel/init_user.go:15-22` guarantees that privileged user ID `1` exists ahead of time, so there is always an account to claim.\n\nThe public-key bootstrap does not add authentication. `api/crypto/router.go:5-9` exposes `POST /api/crypto/public_key` publicly, `api/crypto/crypto.go:12-32` returns a server public key to any caller, `internal/crypto/crypto.go:44-61` stores a shared keypair in cache, and `internal/middleware/encrypted_params.go:25-50` only decrypts `encrypted_params` before passing the request to the install handler. No request ID, local-only restriction, bootstrap secret, or prior trust check is enforced.\n\nThis was verified locally in an isolated lab instance. A fresh instance returned `{\"lock\":false,\"timeout\":false}`, an unauthenticated `POST /api/install` returned `{\"message\":\"ok\"}`, the instance then flipped to `{\"lock\":true,\"timeout\":false}`, and the on-disk SQLite database showed user ID `1` renamed to the attacker-controlled username with a non-empty password hash.\n\n### PoC\nThe quickest local verification path is the helper script created during validation:\n\n```bash\nATTACKER_EMAIL=\u0027attacker@example.com\u0027 ATTACKER_USER=\u0027attacker\u0027 ATTACKER_PASS=\u0027Password12345\u0027 \\\n\u0027/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/nginx-ui/output/verify/verify_fresh_install_takeover.sh\u0027\n```\n\nExpected proof points:\n\n```text\n[1/6] Fresh-instance status:\n{\n  \"lock\": false,\n  \"timeout\": false\n}\n\n[3/6] Claiming the initial administrator account...\n{\n  \"message\": \"ok\"\n}\n\n[4/6] Verifying install is now locked...\n{\n  \"lock\": true,\n  \"timeout\": false\n}\n\n[5/6] Verifying the on-disk admin record was overwritten...\n{\n  \"id\": 1,\n  \"name\": \"attacker\",\n  \"password_len\": 60\n}\n```\n\nTo confirm the final state manually:\n\n```bash\nsqlite3 \u0027/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/nginx-ui/tmp/poc-install-takeover/database.db\u0027 \\\n\u0027select id,name,length(password) from users where id=1;\u0027\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```text\n1|attacker|60\n```\n\nManual HTTP reproduction is also straightforward:\n\n1. Request `GET /api/install` and confirm `lock=false` and `timeout=false`.\n2. Request `POST /api/crypto/public_key` to obtain the public RSA key.\n3. Encrypt `{\"email\":\"attacker@example.com\",\"username\":\"attacker\",\"password\":\"Password12345\"}` with that public key and base64-encode the ciphertext.\n4. Submit the ciphertext to `POST /api/install` as `{\"encrypted_params\":\"...\"}`.\n5. Re-request `GET /api/install` and observe that `lock=true`.\n6. Inspect the backing database and confirm user ID `1` now belongs to the attacker-controlled username.\n\n### Impact\nThis is an authentication bypass / initial admin claim vulnerability affecting fresh, uninitialized instances that are reachable over the network during the installation window. Any attacker able to reach the service before the legitimate operator can permanently take ownership of the first administrator account and thereby seize control of the application. Because `nginx-ui` is an administrative interface for Nginx and related host-management features, compromise of the initial admin account can lead to unauthorized configuration changes, certificate management abuse, backup manipulation, service disruption, and broader operational takeover of the managed environment.\n\n### Remediation\n1. Require a single-use bootstrap secret for installation. Generate the token locally on first start, print it only to the server console or write it to a root-owned local file, and require it on `POST /api/install`.\n2. Restrict installation endpoints to loopback by default until setup completes. Remote setup should require an explicit opt-in configuration flag, not be enabled automatically on all interfaces.\n3. Make installer claim atomic and explicitly stateful. Persist a dedicated installation state record, consume the bootstrap token exactly once, and refuse concurrent or repeated initialization attempts even within the startup window.",
  "id": "GHSA-h27v-ph7w-m9fp",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T16:59:00Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T16:59:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-h27v-ph7w-m9fp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42221"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nginx-UI: Unauthenticated First-Run Installer Allows Remote Initial Admin Claim"
}

GHSA-H2C7-FWWM-R6W8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-10 15:31
VLAI
Details

The iDirect iQ200 exposes the /api/identity and /api/ REST API endpoints without authentication. An unauthenticated attacker with network access can retrieve sensitive device information including the serial number, Device ID (DID), Terminal Private Key identifier (TPK), MAC address, and exact firmware version. The DID and TPK are used for satellite network authentication in the iDirect platform, potentially enabling terminal impersonation and network reconnaissance.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-38059"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T15:16:39Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The iDirect iQ200 exposes the /api/identity and /api/ REST API endpoints without authentication. An unauthenticated attacker with network access can retrieve sensitive device information including the serial number, Device ID (DID), Terminal Private Key identifier (TPK), MAC address, and exact firmware version. The DID and TPK are used for satellite network authentication in the iDirect platform, potentially enabling terminal impersonation and network reconnaissance.",
  "id": "GHSA-h2c7-fwwm-r6w8",
  "modified": "2026-07-10T15:31:39Z",
  "published": "2026-07-10T15:31:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-38059"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-183-01.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.idirect.net/s/login"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-183-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H2CC-VM9P-M74C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-31 21:30 – Updated: 2025-12-31 21:30
VLAI
Details

Selea CarPlateServer 4.0.1.6 contains a remote program execution vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary Windows binaries by manipulating the NO_LIST_EXE_PATH configuration parameter. Attackers can bypass authentication through the /cps/ endpoint and modify server configuration, including changing admin passwords and executing system commands.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-36904"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-31T19:15:41Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Selea CarPlateServer 4.0.1.6 contains a remote program execution vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary Windows binaries by manipulating the NO_LIST_EXE_PATH configuration parameter. Attackers can bypass authentication through the /cps/ endpoint and modify server configuration, including changing admin passwords and executing system commands.",
  "id": "GHSA-h2cc-vm9p-m74c",
  "modified": "2025-12-31T21:30:57Z",
  "published": "2025-12-31T21:30:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36904"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49452"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.selea.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/selea-carplateserver-remote-program-execution-via-configuration-endpoint"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2021-5622.php"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H2GQ-4XQF-CCQF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-24 21:30 – Updated: 2025-12-24 21:30
VLAI
Details

FLIR thermal traffic cameras contain an unauthenticated device manipulation vulnerability in their WebSocket implementation that allows attackers to bypass authentication and authorization controls. Attackers can directly modify device configurations, access system information, and potentially initiate denial of service by sending crafted WebSocket messages without authentication.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-25140"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-24T20:15:48Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "FLIR thermal traffic cameras contain an unauthenticated device manipulation vulnerability in their WebSocket implementation that allows attackers to bypass authentication and authorization controls. Attackers can directly modify device configurations, access system information, and potentially initiate denial of service by sending crafted WebSocket messages without authentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-h2gq-4xqf-ccqf",
  "modified": "2025-12-24T21:30:31Z",
  "published": "2025-12-24T21:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-25140"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45539"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.flir.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2018-5490.php"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H2WX-VFX5-XWJ8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-21 21:31
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle Advanced Inbound Telephony product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Setup and Administration). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Advanced Inbound Telephony. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Advanced Inbound Telephony. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34275"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T21:16:31Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Advanced Inbound Telephony product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Setup and Administration).  Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Advanced Inbound Telephony.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Advanced Inbound Telephony. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-h2wx-vfx5-xwj8",
  "modified": "2026-04-21T21:31:25Z",
  "published": "2026-04-21T21:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34275"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2026.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H3GG-7VCJ-V4M8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-27 06:31 – Updated: 2026-03-27 06:31
VLAI
Details

Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in BUFFALO Wi-Fi router products may allow an attacker to forcibly reboot the product without authentication.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33366"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T06:16:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in BUFFALO Wi-Fi router products may allow an attacker to forcibly reboot the product without authentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-h3gg-7vcj-v4m8",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T06:31:43Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T06:31:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33366"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN83788689"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.buffalo.jp/news/detail/20260323-01.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H47G-G6MJ-GH39

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-17 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-29 00:01
VLAI
Details

Axeda agent (All versions) and Axeda Desktop Server for Windows (All versions) may allow an attacker to send certain commands to a specific port without authentication. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to obtain full file-system access and remote code execution.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-25247"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-16T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Axeda agent (All versions) and Axeda Desktop Server for Windows (All versions) may allow an attacker to send certain commands to a specific port without authentication. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to obtain full file-system access and remote code execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-h47g-g6mj-gh39",
  "modified": "2022-03-29T00:01:39Z",
  "published": "2022-03-17T00:00:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25247"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-067-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ptc.com/en/support/article/CS363561"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H4FJ-XHPC-C3PM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-29 21:30 – Updated: 2025-10-09 21:31
VLAI
Details

Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 25.1.102 and Application prior to version 25.1.1413 (VA/SaaS deployments) contain a blind server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability reachable via the /var/www/app/console_release/lexmark/dellCheck.php script that can be exploited by an unauthenticated user. When a printer is registered, the software stores the printer’s host name in the variable $printer_vo->str_host_address. The code later builds a URL like 'http://:80/DevMgmt/DiscoveryTree.xml' and sends the request with curl. No validation, whitelist, or private‑network filtering is performed before the request is made. Because the request is blind, an attacker cannot see the data directly, but can still: probe internal services, trigger internal actions, or gather other intelligence. This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-34232"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-29T21:15:37Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 25.1.102 and Application prior to version 25.1.1413 (VA/SaaS deployments) contain a blind server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability reachable via the /var/www/app/console_release/lexmark/dellCheck.php script that can be exploited by an unauthenticated user. When a printer is registered, the software stores the printer\u2019s host name in the variable\u202f$printer_vo-\u003estr_host_address. The code later builds a URL like \u0027http://\u003chost\u2011address\u003e:80/DevMgmt/DiscoveryTree.xml\u0027 and sends the request with curl. No validation, whitelist, or private\u2011network filtering is performed before the request is made.\u00a0Because the request is blind, an attacker cannot see the data directly, but can still: probe internal services, trigger internal actions, or gather other intelligence. This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced.",
  "id": "GHSA-h4fj-xhpc-c3pm",
  "modified": "2025-10-09T21:31:10Z",
  "published": "2025-09-29T21:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34232"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/saas/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/va/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2025-04-08-vasion-printerlogic-83-vulnerabilities.html#va-ssrf-08"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vasion-print-printerlogic-blind-ssrf-via-lexmark-dellcheck-php-script"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-H4G2-XFMW-Q2C9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 20:37 – Updated: 2026-07-10 20:37
VLAI
Summary
Clauster: Non-loopback deployments can serve the dashboard unauthenticated when auth.enabled is unset
Details

Summary

A Clauster instance bound to a non-loopback address (e.g. 0.0.0.0 or a LAN IP) can serve the entire dashboard and its API without any authentication — even when the operator has configured a password — if auth.enabled is left at its default (false). The operator believes the instance is password-protected; in reality every request is served unauthenticated.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the instance gains full control of the dashboard: list projects, spawn/stop claude remote-control bridges in any project directory, edit CLAUDE.md, read bridge logs, and (where configured) clone repositories. Because bridges run Claude Code against the host's project directories, this is effectively remote code execution in those projects.

Loopback (127.0.0.1) deployments need no auth by design and are not affected.

Affected configurations

All released versions (≤ 0.2.1) where all of the following hold: - host is a non-loopback address, and - auth.password_required: true and/or auth.reverse_proxy.enabled: true is set, and - auth.enabled is left at its default false.

Docker deployments are affected: the image binds 0.0.0.0, and the previously-documented docker run command did not set auth.enabled.

Root cause

Two layers checked different flags: - The runtime auth guard enforces authentication only when config.auth.enabled is true; when false it passes every request through unauthenticated. - The config validator, for a non-loopback bind, required only one of auth.password_required / auth.reverse_proxy.enabled / auth.allow_unauthenticated_network — not auth.enabled. So a config with a password but enabled=false validated, started, and enforced nothing.

Proof of concept

With host: 0.0.0.0, auth.password_required: true, a valid auth.password_hash, and auth.enabled unset:

curl http://<host>:7621/api/instances

returns 200 with the full instance list and no credentials. Setting auth.enabled: true returns 401.

Patches

An upcoming patch release makes the config validator fail closed: a non-loopback bind is refused unless authentication is actually enforced — auth.enabled: true together with auth.password_required (+ a hash) or auth.reverse_proxy.enabled, or the explicit auth.allow_unauthenticated_network opt-out. The README, clauster.yml.example, and Docker docs were corrected to match.

Workaround

On any non-loopback deployment, set auth.enabled: true in clauster.yml (or CLAUSTER_AUTH_ENABLED=true) alongside your existing auth.password_required + hash (or reverse-proxy) settings. Alternatively, bind to loopback only and reach it via an SSH tunnel or a trusted authenticating reverse proxy.

Credit

Found during an internal security review.

Severity
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "clauster"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T20:37:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA Clauster instance bound to a **non-loopback** address (e.g. `0.0.0.0` or a LAN IP) can serve the entire dashboard and its API **without any authentication** \u2014 even when the operator has configured a password \u2014 if `auth.enabled` is left at its default (`false`). The operator believes the instance is password-protected; in reality every request is served unauthenticated.\n\n### Impact\nAn unauthenticated attacker with network access to the instance gains full control of the dashboard: list projects, **spawn/stop `claude remote-control` bridges in any project directory**, edit `CLAUDE.md`, read bridge logs, and (where configured) clone repositories. Because bridges run Claude Code against the host\u0027s project directories, this is effectively remote code execution in those projects.\n\nLoopback (`127.0.0.1`) deployments need no auth by design and are **not** affected.\n\n### Affected configurations\nAll released versions (\u2264 0.2.1) where **all** of the following hold:\n- `host` is a non-loopback address, **and**\n- `auth.password_required: true` and/or `auth.reverse_proxy.enabled: true` is set, **and**\n- `auth.enabled` is left at its default `false`.\n\nDocker deployments are affected: the image binds `0.0.0.0`, and the previously-documented `docker run` command did not set `auth.enabled`.\n\n### Root cause\nTwo layers checked different flags:\n- The runtime auth guard enforces authentication only when `config.auth.enabled` is true; when false it passes **every** request through unauthenticated.\n- The config validator, for a non-loopback bind, required only one of `auth.password_required` / `auth.reverse_proxy.enabled` / `auth.allow_unauthenticated_network` \u2014 **not** `auth.enabled`. So a config with a password but `enabled=false` validated, started, and enforced nothing.\n\n### Proof of concept\nWith `host: 0.0.0.0`, `auth.password_required: true`, a valid `auth.password_hash`, and `auth.enabled` unset:\n\n```\ncurl http://\u003chost\u003e:7621/api/instances\n```\n\nreturns `200` with the full instance list and **no credentials**. Setting `auth.enabled: true` returns `401`.\n\n### Patches\nAn upcoming patch release makes the config validator **fail closed**: a non-loopback bind is refused unless authentication is actually enforced \u2014 `auth.enabled: true` together with `auth.password_required` (+ a hash) or `auth.reverse_proxy.enabled`, or the explicit `auth.allow_unauthenticated_network` opt-out. The README, `clauster.yml.example`, and Docker docs were corrected to match.\n\n### Workaround\nOn any non-loopback deployment, set `auth.enabled: true` in `clauster.yml` (or `CLAUSTER_AUTH_ENABLED=true`) alongside your existing `auth.password_required` + hash (or reverse-proxy) settings. Alternatively, bind to loopback only and reach it via an SSH tunnel or a trusted authenticating reverse proxy.\n\n### Credit\nFound during an internal security review.",
  "id": "GHSA-h4g2-xfmw-q2c9",
  "modified": "2026-07-10T20:37:23Z",
  "published": "2026-07-10T20:37:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/schubydoo/clauster/security/advisories/GHSA-h4g2-xfmw-q2c9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/schubydoo/clauster"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Clauster: Non-loopback deployments can serve the dashboard unauthenticated when auth.enabled is unset"
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
  • Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
  • In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
  • In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.

CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation

An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.

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