Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306

Allowed

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

3493 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-C995-4FW3-J39M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-07 15:31 – Updated: 2025-06-17 20:13
VLAI
Summary
Duplicate Advisory: Langflow Vulnerable to Code Injection via the `/api/v1/validate/code` endpoint
Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-rvqx-wpfh-mfx7. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

Langflow versions prior to 1.3.0 are susceptible to code injection in the /api/v1/validate/code endpoint. A remote and unauthenticated attacker can send crafted HTTP requests to execute arbitrary code.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-07T21:13:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-07T15:15:44Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-rvqx-wpfh-mfx7. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\n\nLangflow versions prior to 1.3.0 are susceptible to code injection in the `/api/v1/validate/code` endpoint. A remote and unauthenticated attacker can send crafted HTTP requests to execute arbitrary code.",
  "id": "GHSA-c995-4fw3-j39m",
  "modified": "2025-06-17T20:13:58Z",
  "published": "2025-04-07T15:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3248"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/6911"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/1.3.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.horizon3.ai/attack-research/disclosures/unsafe-at-any-speed-abusing-python-exec-for-unauth-rce-in-langflow-ai"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Langflow Vulnerable to Code Injection via the `/api/v1/validate/code` endpoint",
  "withdrawn": "2025-06-17T20:13:58Z"
}

GHSA-CC6X-8CC7-9953

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-05 15:08 – Updated: 2025-01-21 17:56
VLAI
Summary
OctoPrint has API key access in settings without reauthentication
Details

Impact

OctoPrint versions up until and including 1.10.2 contain a vulnerability that allows an attacker that has gained temporary control over an authenticated victim's OctoPrint browser session to retrieve/recreate/delete the user's or - if the victim has admin permissions - the global API key without having to reauthenticate by re-entering the user account's password.

An attacker could use a stolen API key to access OctoPrint through its API, or disrupt workflows depending on the API key they deleted.

Patches

The vulnerability will be patched in version 1.10.3.

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by Jacopo Tediosi.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
4.8 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.10.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "OctoPrint"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-51493"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-620"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-05T15:08:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-05T19:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nOctoPrint versions up until and including 1.10.2 contain a vulnerability that allows an attacker that has gained temporary control over an authenticated victim\u0027s OctoPrint browser session to retrieve/recreate/delete the user\u0027s or - if the victim has admin permissions - the global API key without having to reauthenticate by re-entering the user account\u0027s password. \n\nAn attacker could use a stolen API key to access OctoPrint through its API, or disrupt workflows depending on the API key they deleted.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability will be patched in version 1.10.3.\n\n### Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by Jacopo Tediosi.",
  "id": "GHSA-cc6x-8cc7-9953",
  "modified": "2025-01-21T17:56:26Z",
  "published": "2024-11-05T15:08:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OctoPrint/OctoPrint/security/advisories/GHSA-cc6x-8cc7-9953"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51493"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OctoPrint/OctoPrint/commit/9bc80d782d72881b16e20873dcd0b8314324c70c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OctoPrint/OctoPrint"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/octoprint/PYSEC-2024-202.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OctoPrint has API key access in settings without reauthentication"
}

GHSA-CC9W-F4C6-7C7R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-11 21:31 – Updated: 2024-10-16 00:30
VLAI
Details

An issue in almaodo GmbH appinventor.ai_google.almando_control 2.3.1 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the firmware update process

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-48768"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-11T20:15:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue in almaodo GmbH appinventor.ai_google.almando_control 2.3.1 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the firmware update process",
  "id": "GHSA-cc9w-f4c6-7c7r",
  "modified": "2024-10-16T00:30:58Z",
  "published": "2024-10-11T21:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48768"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HankJames/Vul-Reports/blob/main/FirmwareLeakage/appinventor.ai_google.almando_control/appinventor.ai_google.almando_control.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.almando.com/media/firmware/almando.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://appinventoraigooglealmandocontrol.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.almando.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CCXC-X975-4HH9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 22:07 – Updated: 2026-06-08 19:48
VLAI
Summary
pyload-ng: non-admin SETTINGS users can disable outbound TLS peer verification via unrestricted `ssl_verify` config (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33509 / -35463 / -35464 / -35586)
Details

Summary

The set_config_value() API method (@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)) in src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py gates security-sensitive options behind a hand-maintained allowlist ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS. The option ("general", "ssl_verify") is not on that allowlist. Any authenticated user with the non-admin SETTINGS permission can set general.ssl_verify = off, and every subsequent outbound pycurl request is made with SSL_VERIFYPEER=0 and SSL_VERIFYHOST=0 — TLS peer and hostname verification are fully disabled. An on-path attacker can then present forged certificates for any hostname pyload fetches.

This is a direct continuation of the fix family CVE-2026-33509 / CVE-2026-35463 / CVE-2026-35464 / CVE-2026-35586, each of which patched a different missed option in the same allowlist.

Details

Writer — src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py, set_config_value() (around lines 215–290). The function is decorated with @permission(Perms.SETTINGS) and only rejects writes when (category, option) appears in ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS:

ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS = {
    ("general", "storage_folder"),
    ("log", "syslog_host"), ("log", "syslog_port"),
    ("proxy", "password"), ("proxy", "username"),
    ("reconnect", "script"),
    ("webui", "host"),
    ("webui", "ssl_certfile"), ("webui", "ssl_keyfile"), ("webui", "ssl_certchain"),
    ("webui", "use_ssl"),
}
...
if (category, option) in ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS and not is_admin:
    self.pyload.log.error(...); return
self.pyload.config.set(category, option, value)

("general", "ssl_verify") is absent. config.set() in src/pyload/core/config/parser.py:329 calls cast() which has no branch for enum-string types — "off" is stored verbatim and persisted to disk via self.save().

Reader — src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:109-110:

def get_options(self):
    return {
        "interface": self.iface(),
        "proxies":   self.get_proxies(),
        "ipv6":      self.pyload.config.get("download", "ipv6"),
        "ssl_verify": self.pyload.config.get("general", "ssl_verify"),
        ...
    }

Sink — src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:193-206:

if "ssl_verify" in options:
    aiachaser_on = b"on (using aia-chaser)"
    if options["ssl_verify"] in [True, b"on", aiachaser_on]:
        ...
        ssl_verify = 1
    else:
        ssl_verify = 0
    self.c.setopt(pycurl.SSL_VERIFYPEER, ssl_verify)
    self.c.setopt(pycurl.SSL_VERIFYHOST, ssl_verify * 2)

Because get_options() is invoked every time a new pycurl handle is built, the new config value takes effect on the very next outbound request — no pyload restart required.

PoC

Authenticated as any user who has Perms.SETTINGS but is not admin (e.g. a user with Role.USER + the SETTINGS permission bit):

# 1) Log in as the SETTINGS (non-admin) user.
curl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/login \
    -d 'username=settings_user&password=<password>'

# 2) Disable TLS verification for all outbound downloads.
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/setConfigValue \
    -d 'category=general&option=ssl_verify&value=off&section=core'
# -> 200 OK. Config persisted.

# 3) Enqueue any HTTPS download. An on-path attacker (shared LAN,
#    compromised upstream router, DNS hijack, or a malicious proxy
#    enabled via the sibling advisory on the proxy.* options) can
#    now present a forged cert for any target — pyload accepts it.

Verification: observe pycurl SSL_VERIFYPEER=0 in a debug build, or confirm that a download from an HTTPS endpoint served with a self-signed / mismatched cert succeeds after step 2 and fails before it.

Impact

  • Who: any authenticated user whose role was granted Perms.SETTINGS. In multi-user pyload deployments that delegate settings administration to non-admins, this is an unintended privilege escalation from "can change UI/download settings" to "can silently disable TLS cert validation for all outbound fetches".
  • What:
    1. Man-in-the-middle on all HTTPS downloads, captcha fetches, update checks, and plugin HTTP calls.
    2. Extends the impact of the already-published SSRF chain (CVE-2026-33992 / CVE-2026-35459). The URL-hostname validation those patches added is only meaningful if the TLS channel authenticates the endpoint; with ssl_verify=off, an on-path attacker can present forged certs for already-validated hosts — so HTTPS cloud-metadata endpoints and internal HTTPS services behind the host allowlist become reachable again.
    3. Silent to the admin. Every adjacent security-critical option (proxy.password, SSL certfile/keyfile/certchain, use_ssl) is already admin-only, so the admin's mental model is that TLS policy cannot be weakened by a non-admin.
  • Not impacted: unauthenticated attackers; users holding only DOWNLOAD / LIST roles.
Severity
6.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.0b3.dev99"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pyload-ng"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.0b3.dev100"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42312"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T22:07:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T18:16:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `set_config_value()` API method (`@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)`) in `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py` gates security-sensitive options behind a hand-maintained allowlist `ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS`. The option `(\"general\", \"ssl_verify\")` is **not** on that allowlist. Any authenticated user with the non-admin `SETTINGS` permission can set `general.ssl_verify = off`, and every subsequent outbound pycurl request is made with `SSL_VERIFYPEER=0` and `SSL_VERIFYHOST=0` \u2014 TLS peer and hostname verification are fully disabled. An on-path attacker can then present forged certificates for any hostname pyload fetches.\n\nThis is a direct continuation of the fix family CVE-2026-33509 / CVE-2026-35463 / CVE-2026-35464 / CVE-2026-35586, each of which patched a different missed option in the same allowlist.\n\n### Details\n\n**Writer** \u2014 `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py`, `set_config_value()` (around lines 215\u2013290). The function is decorated with `@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)` and only rejects writes when `(category, option)` appears in `ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS`:\n\n```python\nADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS = {\n    (\"general\", \"storage_folder\"),\n    (\"log\", \"syslog_host\"), (\"log\", \"syslog_port\"),\n    (\"proxy\", \"password\"), (\"proxy\", \"username\"),\n    (\"reconnect\", \"script\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"host\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"ssl_certfile\"), (\"webui\", \"ssl_keyfile\"), (\"webui\", \"ssl_certchain\"),\n    (\"webui\", \"use_ssl\"),\n}\n...\nif (category, option) in ADMIN_ONLY_CORE_OPTIONS and not is_admin:\n    self.pyload.log.error(...); return\nself.pyload.config.set(category, option, value)\n```\n\n`(\"general\", \"ssl_verify\")` is absent. `config.set()` in `src/pyload/core/config/parser.py:329` calls `cast()` which has no branch for enum-string types \u2014 `\"off\"` is stored verbatim and persisted to disk via `self.save()`.\n\n**Reader** \u2014 `src/pyload/core/network/request_factory.py:109-110`:\n\n```python\ndef get_options(self):\n    return {\n        \"interface\": self.iface(),\n        \"proxies\":   self.get_proxies(),\n        \"ipv6\":      self.pyload.config.get(\"download\", \"ipv6\"),\n        \"ssl_verify\": self.pyload.config.get(\"general\", \"ssl_verify\"),\n        ...\n    }\n```\n\n**Sink** \u2014 `src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:193-206`:\n\n```python\nif \"ssl_verify\" in options:\n    aiachaser_on = b\"on (using aia-chaser)\"\n    if options[\"ssl_verify\"] in [True, b\"on\", aiachaser_on]:\n        ...\n        ssl_verify = 1\n    else:\n        ssl_verify = 0\n    self.c.setopt(pycurl.SSL_VERIFYPEER, ssl_verify)\n    self.c.setopt(pycurl.SSL_VERIFYHOST, ssl_verify * 2)\n```\n\nBecause `get_options()` is invoked every time a new pycurl handle is built, the new config value takes effect on the very next outbound request \u2014 no pyload restart required.\n\n### PoC\n\nAuthenticated as any user who has `Perms.SETTINGS` but is **not** admin (e.g. a user with `Role.USER` + the SETTINGS permission bit):\n\n```bash\n# 1) Log in as the SETTINGS (non-admin) user.\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/login \\\n    -d \u0027username=settings_user\u0026password=\u003cpassword\u003e\u0027\n\n# 2) Disable TLS verification for all outbound downloads.\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://pyload.example:8000/api/setConfigValue \\\n    -d \u0027category=general\u0026option=ssl_verify\u0026value=off\u0026section=core\u0027\n# -\u003e 200 OK. Config persisted.\n\n# 3) Enqueue any HTTPS download. An on-path attacker (shared LAN,\n#    compromised upstream router, DNS hijack, or a malicious proxy\n#    enabled via the sibling advisory on the proxy.* options) can\n#    now present a forged cert for any target \u2014 pyload accepts it.\n```\n\nVerification: observe pycurl `SSL_VERIFYPEER=0` in a debug build, or confirm that a download from an HTTPS endpoint served with a self-signed / mismatched cert succeeds after step 2 and fails before it.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Who**: any authenticated user whose role was granted `Perms.SETTINGS`. In multi-user pyload deployments that delegate settings administration to non-admins, this is an unintended privilege escalation from \"can change UI/download settings\" to \"can silently disable TLS cert validation for all outbound fetches\".\n- **What**:\n    1. Man-in-the-middle on all HTTPS downloads, captcha fetches, update checks, and plugin HTTP calls.\n    2. Extends the impact of the already-published SSRF chain (CVE-2026-33992 / CVE-2026-35459). The URL-hostname validation those patches added is only meaningful if the TLS channel authenticates the endpoint; with `ssl_verify=off`, an on-path attacker can present forged certs for already-validated hosts \u2014 so HTTPS cloud-metadata endpoints and internal HTTPS services behind the host allowlist become reachable again.\n    3. Silent to the admin. Every adjacent security-critical option (`proxy.password`, SSL certfile/keyfile/certchain, `use_ssl`) is already admin-only, so the admin\u0027s mental model is that TLS policy cannot be weakened by a non-admin.\n- **Not impacted**: unauthenticated attackers; users holding only `DOWNLOAD` / `LIST` roles.",
  "id": "GHSA-ccxc-x975-4hh9",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T19:48:07Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T22:07:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-ccxc-x975-4hh9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42312"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4744-96p5-mp2j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ppvx-rwh9-7rj7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w48f-wwwf-f5fr"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pyload-ng/PYSEC-2026-126.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pyload-ng: non-admin SETTINGS users can disable outbound TLS peer verification via unrestricted `ssl_verify` config (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33509 / -35463 / -35464 / -35586)"
}

GHSA-CF4W-JR22-49M6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-14 18:30 – Updated: 2023-12-14 18:30
VLAI
Details

In WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2023.1, an API endpoint was found to be missing an authentication mechanism. It is possible for an unauthenticated attacker to enumerate information related to a registered device being monitored by WhatsUp Gold.

Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-6368"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-14T16:15:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "\nIn WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2023.1, an API endpoint was found to be missing an authentication mechanism. It is possible for an unauthenticated attacker to enumerate information related to a registered device being monitored by WhatsUp Gold.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-cf4w-jr22-49m6",
  "modified": "2023-12-14T18:30:21Z",
  "published": "2023-12-14T18:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6368"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/WhatsUp-Gold-Security-Bulletin-December-2023"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.progress.com/network-monitoring"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CF6P-6FQM-MPW5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-10 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-17 00:00
VLAI
Details

The Baxter Spectrum WBM does not perform mutual authentication with the gateway server host. This may allow an attacker to perform a man in the middle attack that modifies parameters making the network connection fail.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-26394"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-09T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Baxter Spectrum WBM does not perform mutual authentication with the gateway server host. This may allow an attacker to perform a man in the middle attack that modifies parameters making the network connection fail.",
  "id": "GHSA-cf6p-6fqm-mpw5",
  "modified": "2022-09-17T00:00:36Z",
  "published": "2022-09-10T00:00:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26394"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsma-22-251-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/icsma-22-xxx-xx"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CFCP-527J-53HF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-05 09:31 – Updated: 2025-05-05 09:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been found in TOTOLINK A720R 4.1.5cu.374 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi. The manipulation of the argument topicurl with the input RebootSystem leads to missing authentication. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-4268"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-05T07:15:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been found in TOTOLINK A720R 4.1.5cu.374 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi. The manipulation of the argument topicurl with the input RebootSystem leads to missing authentication. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
  "id": "GHSA-cfcp-527j-53hf",
  "modified": "2025-05-05T09:31:09Z",
  "published": "2025-05-05T09:31:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4268"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/at0de/my_vulns/blob/main/TOTOLINK/A720R/RebootSystem.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.307372"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.307372"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.563429"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.totolink.net"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CFH6-VR3J-QC3G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 23:28 – Updated: 2026-04-06 22:54
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI Has Missing Authentication in WebSocket Gateway
Details

Summary

The PraisonAI Gateway server accepts WebSocket connections at /ws and serves agent topology at /info with no authentication. Any network client can connect, enumerate registered agents, and send arbitrary messages to agents and their tool sets.

Details

gateway/server.py:242 (source) -> gateway/server.py:250 (sink)

# source -- /info leaks all agent IDs with no auth
async def info(request):
    return JSONResponse({
        "agents": list(self._agents.keys()),
        "sessions": len(self._sessions),
        "clients": len(self._clients),
    })

# sink -- WebSocket accepted unconditionally, no token check
async def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket):
    await websocket.accept()
    client_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
    self._clients[client_id] = websocket
    # processes any message from any client

PoC

# tested on: praisonai==4.5.87 (source install)
# install: pip install -e src/praisonai
# start server:
# python3 -c "import asyncio; from praisonai.gateway.server import WebSocketGateway; asyncio.run(WebSocketGateway(host='127.0.0.1', port=8765).start())" &

# Step 1 - enumerate agents, no auth
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8765/info
# expected output: {"name":"PraisonAI Gateway","version":"1.0.0","agents":[...],"sessions":0,"clients":0}

# Step 2 - connect to WebSocket, no token
python3 -c "
import asyncio, websockets, json
async def run():
    async with websockets.connect('ws://127.0.0.1:8765/ws') as ws:
        print('Connected with no auth')
        await ws.send(json.dumps({'type': 'join', 'agent_id': 'assistant'}))
        print(await asyncio.wait_for(ws.recv(), timeout=3))
asyncio.run(run())
"
# expected output: Connected with no auth
# {"type": ...} -- server responds, connection accepted

Impact

Any unauthenticated attacker with network access can connect to the WebSocket gateway, enumerate all registered agents via /info, and send arbitrary messages to agents including tool execution, file reads, and API calls. GatewayConfig has an auth_token field that is never enforced in the handler.

Suggested Fix

async def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket):
    token = websocket.query_params.get("token") or \
            websocket.headers.get("Authorization", "").removeprefix("Bearer ")
    if self._config.auth_token and token != self._config.auth_token:
        await websocket.close(code=4001, reason="Unauthorized")
        return
    await websocket.accept()
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.96"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.97"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34952"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T23:28:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-03T23:17:06Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe PraisonAI Gateway server accepts WebSocket connections at `/ws` and serves agent topology at `/info` with no authentication. Any network client can connect, enumerate registered agents, and send arbitrary messages to agents and their tool sets.\n\n### Details\n\n`gateway/server.py:242` (source) -\u003e `gateway/server.py:250` (sink)\n```python\n# source -- /info leaks all agent IDs with no auth\nasync def info(request):\n    return JSONResponse({\n        \"agents\": list(self._agents.keys()),\n        \"sessions\": len(self._sessions),\n        \"clients\": len(self._clients),\n    })\n\n# sink -- WebSocket accepted unconditionally, no token check\nasync def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket):\n    await websocket.accept()\n    client_id = str(uuid.uuid4())\n    self._clients[client_id] = websocket\n    # processes any message from any client\n```\n\n### PoC\n```bash\n# tested on: praisonai==4.5.87 (source install)\n# install: pip install -e src/praisonai\n# start server:\n# python3 -c \"import asyncio; from praisonai.gateway.server import WebSocketGateway; asyncio.run(WebSocketGateway(host=\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, port=8765).start())\" \u0026\n\n# Step 1 - enumerate agents, no auth\ncurl -s http://127.0.0.1:8765/info\n# expected output: {\"name\":\"PraisonAI Gateway\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\",\"agents\":[...],\"sessions\":0,\"clients\":0}\n\n# Step 2 - connect to WebSocket, no token\npython3 -c \"\nimport asyncio, websockets, json\nasync def run():\n    async with websockets.connect(\u0027ws://127.0.0.1:8765/ws\u0027) as ws:\n        print(\u0027Connected with no auth\u0027)\n        await ws.send(json.dumps({\u0027type\u0027: \u0027join\u0027, \u0027agent_id\u0027: \u0027assistant\u0027}))\n        print(await asyncio.wait_for(ws.recv(), timeout=3))\nasyncio.run(run())\n\"\n# expected output: Connected with no auth\n# {\"type\": ...} -- server responds, connection accepted\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated attacker with network access can connect to the WebSocket gateway, enumerate all registered agents via `/info`, and send arbitrary messages to agents including tool execution, file reads, and API calls. `GatewayConfig` has an `auth_token` field that is never enforced in the handler.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n```python\nasync def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket):\n    token = websocket.query_params.get(\"token\") or \\\n            websocket.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\").removeprefix(\"Bearer \")\n    if self._config.auth_token and token != self._config.auth_token:\n        await websocket.close(code=4001, reason=\"Unauthorized\")\n        return\n    await websocket.accept()\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-cfh6-vr3j-qc3g",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T22:54:21Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T23:28:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-cfh6-vr3j-qc3g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34952"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI Has Missing Authentication in WebSocket Gateway"
}

GHSA-CFRG-HC6V-824G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-14 12:31
VLAI
Details

In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.1.13757, 2025.3.148033, 2025.2.148048, 2025.1.148120, 2024.3.148430, 2024.2.148429 authentication bypass via direct database access leading to administrative access was possible

Severity
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62422"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T11:16:48Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.1.13757,\n2025.3.148033,\n2025.2.148048,\n2025.1.148120,\n2024.3.148430,\n2024.2.148429 authentication bypass via direct database access leading to administrative access was possible",
  "id": "GHSA-cfrg-hc6v-824g",
  "modified": "2026-07-14T12:31:15Z",
  "published": "2026-07-14T12:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62422"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jetbrains.com/privacy-security/issues-fixed"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CFX5-6PQ2-969R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-19 09:30 – Updated: 2025-08-19 09:30
VLAI
Details

An unauthenticated remote attacker can grant access without password protection to the affected device. This enables the unprotected read-only access to the stored measurement data.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-41689"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-19T09:15:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An unauthenticated remote attacker can grant access without password protection to the affected device. This enables the unprotected read-only access to the stored measurement data.",
  "id": "GHSA-cfx5-6pq2-969r",
  "modified": "2025-08-19T09:30:31Z",
  "published": "2025-08-19T09:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41689"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2025-067"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
  • Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
  • In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
  • In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.

CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation

An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.

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