Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-295

Allowed

Improper Certificate Validation

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.

1912 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-C5CJ-HMH6-45PV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-20 06:31 – Updated: 2025-03-11 15:30
VLAI
Details

IBM OpenPages with Watson 8.3 and 9.0 

could allow a remote attacker to spoof mail server identity when using SSL/TLS security. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to gain access to sensitive information disclosed through email notifications generated by OpenPages or disrupt notification delivery.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-49782"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295",
      "CWE-297"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-20T04:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM OpenPages with Watson 8.3 and 9.0\u00a0\n\n\n\ncould allow a remote attacker to spoof mail server identity when using SSL/TLS security. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to gain access to sensitive information disclosed through email notifications generated by OpenPages or disrupt notification delivery.",
  "id": "GHSA-c5cj-hmh6-45pv",
  "modified": "2025-03-11T15:30:57Z",
  "published": "2025-02-20T06:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49782"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7183541"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-C5FP-X2H5-VJV7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-25 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-30 00:00
VLAI
Summary
Apache Pulsar Java Client vulnerable to Improper Certificate Validation
Details

Delayed TLS hostname verification in the Pulsar Java Client and the Pulsar Proxy make each client vulnerable to a man in the middle attack. Connections from the Pulsar Java Client to the Pulsar Broker/Proxy and connections from the Pulsar Proxy to the Pulsar Broker are vulnerable. Authentication data is sent before verifying the server’s TLS certificate matches the hostname, which means authentication data could be exposed to an attacker. An attacker can only take advantage of this vulnerability by taking control of a machine 'between' the client and the server. The attacker must then actively manipulate traffic to perform the attack by providing the client with a cryptographically valid certificate for an unrelated host. Because the client sends authentication data before performing hostname verification, an attacker could gain access to the client’s authentication data. The client eventually closes the connection when it verifies the hostname and identifies the targeted hostname does not match a hostname on the certificate. Because the client eventually closes the connection, the value of the intercepted authentication data depends on the authentication method used by the client. Token based authentication and username/password authentication methods are vulnerable because the authentication data can be used to impersonate the client in a separate session. This issue affects Apache Pulsar Java Client versions 2.7.0 to 2.7.4; 2.8.0 to 2.8.3; 2.9.0 to 2.9.2; 2.10.0; 2.6.4 and earlier.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.pulsar:pulsar-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.pulsar:pulsar-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.pulsar:pulsar-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.9.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.pulsar:pulsar-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.10.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.10.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-33681"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-30T00:00:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-23T10:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Delayed TLS hostname verification in the Pulsar Java Client and the Pulsar Proxy make each client vulnerable to a man in the middle attack. Connections from the Pulsar Java Client to the Pulsar Broker/Proxy and connections from the Pulsar Proxy to the Pulsar Broker are vulnerable. Authentication data is sent before verifying the server\u2019s TLS certificate matches the hostname, which means authentication data could be exposed to an attacker. An attacker can only take advantage of this vulnerability by taking control of a machine \u0027between\u0027 the client and the server. The attacker must then actively manipulate traffic to perform the attack by providing the client with a cryptographically valid certificate for an unrelated host. Because the client sends authentication data before performing hostname verification, an attacker could gain access to the client\u2019s authentication data. The client eventually closes the connection when it verifies the hostname and identifies the targeted hostname does not match a hostname on the certificate. Because the client eventually closes the connection, the value of the intercepted authentication data depends on the authentication method used by the client. Token based authentication and username/password authentication methods are vulnerable because the authentication data can be used to impersonate the client in a separate session. This issue affects Apache Pulsar Java Client versions 2.7.0 to 2.7.4; 2.8.0 to 2.8.3; 2.9.0 to 2.9.2; 2.10.0; 2.6.4 and earlier.",
  "id": "GHSA-c5fp-x2h5-vjv7",
  "modified": "2022-09-30T00:00:47Z",
  "published": "2022-09-25T00:00:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-33681"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/pulsar/tree/db26073728bf86fc80deecaece2dc02b50bbb9b5/pulsar-client"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/fpo6x10trvn20hlk0dmnr5vlz5v4kl3d"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache Pulsar Java Client vulnerable to Improper Certificate Validation"
}

GHSA-C5WM-WJMG-6V8P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-07 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-15 00:00
VLAI
Details

A insecure configuration for certificate verification (http.verify_mode = OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE) may lead to verification bypass in Red Hat CloudForms 5.x.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-8164"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-07-06T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A insecure configuration for certificate verification (http.verify_mode = OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE) may lead to verification bypass in Red Hat CloudForms 5.x.",
  "id": "GHSA-c5wm-wjmg-6v8p",
  "modified": "2022-07-15T00:00:23Z",
  "published": "2022-07-07T00:00:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-8164"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1151208"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-C69W-JJ56-834W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-16 14:12 – Updated: 2022-01-04 19:09
VLAI
Summary
Improper Certificate Validation and Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch in Apache Sling Commons Messaging Mail
Details

Apache Sling Commons Messaging Mail provides a simple layer on top of JavaMail/Jakarta Mail for OSGi to send mails via SMTPS. To reduce the risk of "man in the middle" attacks additional server identity checks must be performed when accessing mail servers. For compatibility reasons these additional checks are disabled by default in JavaMail/Jakarta Mail. The SimpleMailService in Apache Sling Commons Messaging Mail 1.0 lacks an option to enable these checks for the shared mail session. A user could enable these checks nevertheless by accessing the session via the message created by SimpleMessageBuilder and setting the property mail.smtps.ssl.checkserveridentity to true. Apache Sling Commons Messaging Mail 2.0 adds support for enabling server identity checks and these checks are enabled by default. - https://javaee.github.io/javamail/docs/SSLNOTES.txt - https://javaee.github.io/javamail/docs/api/com/sun/mail/smtp/package-summary.html - https://github.com/eclipse-ee4j/mail/issues/429

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.sling:org.apache.sling.commons.messaging.mail"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-44549"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295",
      "CWE-297"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-12-15T15:15:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-12-14T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Apache Sling Commons Messaging Mail provides a simple layer on top of JavaMail/Jakarta Mail for OSGi to send mails via SMTPS. To reduce the risk of \"man in the middle\" attacks additional server identity checks must be performed when accessing mail servers. For compatibility reasons these additional checks are disabled by default in JavaMail/Jakarta Mail. The SimpleMailService in Apache Sling Commons Messaging Mail 1.0 lacks an option to enable these checks for the shared mail session. A user could enable these checks nevertheless by accessing the session via the message created by SimpleMessageBuilder and setting the property mail.smtps.ssl.checkserveridentity to true. Apache Sling Commons Messaging Mail 2.0 adds support for enabling server identity checks and these checks are enabled by default. - https://javaee.github.io/javamail/docs/SSLNOTES.txt - https://javaee.github.io/javamail/docs/api/com/sun/mail/smtp/package-summary.html - https://github.com/eclipse-ee4j/mail/issues/429",
  "id": "GHSA-c69w-jj56-834w",
  "modified": "2022-01-04T19:09:34Z",
  "published": "2021-12-16T14:12:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44549"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-ee4j/mail/issues/429"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-ee4j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://javaee.github.io/javamail/docs/SSLNOTES.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://javaee.github.io/javamail/docs/api/com/sun/mail/smtp/package-summary.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/l8p9h2bqvkj6rhv4w8kzctb817415b7f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Improper Certificate Validation and Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch in Apache Sling Commons Messaging Mail"
}

GHSA-C78C-FX8F-9542

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:32 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:32
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in the Bosch Smart Camera App before 1.3.1 for Android. Due to improperly implemented TLS certificate checks, a malicious actor could potentially succeed in executing a man-in-the-middle attack for some connections. (The Bosch Smart Home App is not affected. iOS Apps are not affected.)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-7728"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-02-22T13:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in the Bosch Smart Camera App before 1.3.1 for Android. Due to improperly implemented TLS certificate checks, a malicious actor could potentially succeed in executing a man-in-the-middle attack for some connections. (The Bosch Smart Home App is not affected. iOS Apps are not affected.)",
  "id": "GHSA-c78c-fx8f-9542",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T01:32:42Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T01:32:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7728"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://psirt.bosch.com/Advisory/BOSCH-2019-0202.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-C7CX-RFW4-4W69

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:50 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:50
VLAI
Details

A spoofing vulnerability exists for the Azure IoT Device Provisioning for the C SDK library using the HTTP protocol on Windows platform, aka "Azure IoT SDK Spoofing Vulnerability." This affects C SDK.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-8479"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-09-13T00:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A spoofing vulnerability exists for the Azure IoT Device Provisioning for the C SDK library using the HTTP protocol on Windows platform, aka \"Azure IoT SDK Spoofing Vulnerability.\" This affects C SDK.",
  "id": "GHSA-c7cx-rfw4-4w69",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T01:50:06Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T01:50:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8479"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2018-8479"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/105323"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-C839-4QXR-J4X3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 19:08 – Updated: 2026-05-08 19:26
VLAI
Summary
Incus has an OVN TLS Verification that Accepts Peer-Supplied Roots
Details

Summary

Broken TLS validation logic in the OVN database connection logic could allow connections to an attacker's OVN database.

OVN uses mTLS for authentication, so the attacker cannot actually perform a full man in the middle attack as they won't be able to authenticated with the real OVN deployment. At best they can provide a replacement empty database which Incus will briefly interact with before hitting errors due to the rest of the OVN stack not reacting to the committed changes.

Also worth noting that the OVN control plane is typically run on the same servers that run Incus, there is typically no routing involved between an Incus server and the OVN control plane, making such an attack extremely difficult to pull off in the first place.

Details

The OVN client implementations within Incus disable Go standard TLS server verification (InsecureSkipVerify: true) and replace it with custom peer-certificate verification logic. That replacement verifier does not anchor trust in the configured CA certificate. Instead, it constructs the verification root set from certificates supplied by the peer during the handshake. As a result, the configured CA is parsed but not used as the trust anchor for the final verification decision.

Although a configured CA certificate (tlsCAcert) is parsed and added to a client CA pool, that pool is not used during the final verification decision. Instead, the callback creates a fresh roots pool from the raw certificates received over the wire and verifies the presented leaf certificate against those attacker-influenced roots. No endpoint identity validation is visible in the provided verification logic.

In OVN-enabled Incus deployments that use these SSL database connection paths, this affects authenticated connections from Incus to the OVN northbound and southbound databases. Incus documents clustered OVN deployments in which the OVN distributed database runs across multiple servers, and upstream OVN documentation describes the northbound database as the interface used by the cloud management system and the southbound database as the central coordination point for logical and physical network state.

Because the custom verifier accepts peer-supplied trust anchors, an attacker able to impersonate or intercept the OVN endpoint on the management network can present a rogue self-signed certificate chain. Incus will accept this certificate as valid, collapsing the configured CA-based trust model. Because Incus exposes dedicated OVN TLS settings for a CA certificate, client certificate, and client key, the implementation clearly intends to authenticate OVN database connections using operator-supplied trust material rather than peer-supplied certificates. By abandoning the configured CA pool and instead trusting peer-supplied roots, the implementation defeats the intended authentication boundary on OVN database connections and permits endpoint impersonation by an active attacker able to intercept or stand in for the OVN database service.

In clustered OVN-backed Incus deployments, this flaw reduces CA-anchored authentication of OVN database connections to endpoint impersonation for an attacker with a suitable position on the management or control-plane network. This is especially significant because OVN northbound and southbound databases are the authoritative control-plane interfaces for logical network configuration, translation, and distribution to hypervisors and gateways. As a result, the issue is best understood as a control-plane authentication failure with potentially broad networking impact, not merely as generic TLS misconfiguration.

Affected Files: https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_nb.go https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_sb.go https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_icnb.go https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_icsb.go

Affected Code:

func NewNB(dbAddr string, sslCACert string, sslClientCert string, sslClientKey string) (*NB, error) {
    [...]
    if strings.Contains(dbAddr, "ssl:") {
        [...]
        tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
            Certificates:       []tls.Certificate{clientCert},
            InsecureSkipVerify: true,
        }

        if sslCACert != "" {
            [...]
            tlsCAcert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(tlsCAder.Bytes)
            if err != nil {
                return nil, err
            }

            tlsCAcert.IsCA = true
            tlsCAcert.KeyUsage = x509.KeyUsageCertSign

            clientCAPool := x509.NewCertPool()
            clientCAPool.AddCert(tlsCAcert)

            tlsConfig.VerifyPeerCertificate = func(rawCerts [][]byte, chains [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
                if len(rawCerts) < 1 {
                    return errors.New("Missing server certificate")
                }

                roots := x509.NewCertPool()
                for _, rawCert := range rawCerts {
                    cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCert)
                    if cert != nil {
                        roots.AddCert(cert)
                    }
                }

                cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCerts[0])
                if cert == nil {
                    return errors.New("Bad server certificate")
                }

                opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
                    Roots: roots,
                }

                _, err := cert.Verify(opts)
                return err
            }
        }

        options = append(options, ovsdbClient.WithTLSConfig(tlsConfig))
    }
    [...]
}

The same verification pattern is duplicated in the other affected files listed above.

Verification-Logic Proof of Concept

Because the vulnerability resides entirely in the certificate-verification logic, it can be demonstrated in isolation without a live interception lab. The following Go harness reproduces the effective OVN client verification logic, generates a rogue self-signed certificate, and demonstrates that the implemented trust decision accepts peer-supplied roots instead of the configured CA pool.

Commands:

cat <<'EOF' > poc_ovn_tls_roots.go
package main

import (
    "crypto/ed25519"
    "crypto/rand"
    "crypto/x509"
    "crypto/x509/pkix"
    "fmt"
    "math/big"
    "time"
)

func main() {
    pub, priv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)

    template := x509.Certificate{
        SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
        Subject: pkix.Name{
            Organization: []string{"Attacker Corp MITM"},
        },
        NotBefore:             time.Now(),
        NotAfter:              time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
        KeyUsage:              x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
        ExtKeyUsage:           []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
        BasicConstraintsValid: true,
        IsCA:                  true,
    }

    rogueCertBytes, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, &template, &template, pub, priv)

    verifyPeerCertificate := func(rawCerts [][]byte) error {
        if len(rawCerts) < 1 {
            return fmt.Errorf("missing server certificate")
        }

        roots := x509.NewCertPool()
        for _, rawCert := range rawCerts {
            cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCert)
            if cert != nil {
                roots.AddCert(cert)
            }
        }

        cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCerts[0])
        if cert == nil {
            return fmt.Errorf("bad server certificate")
        }

        opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
            Roots: roots,
        }

        _, err := cert.Verify(opts)
        return err
    }

    err := verifyPeerCertificate([][]byte{rogueCertBytes})
    if err == nil {
        fmt.Println("[!] VULNERABLE: The reproduced OVN client verification logic accepted the rogue attacker certificate.")
    } else {
        fmt.Printf("Safe: Rejected with error: %v\n", err)
    }
}
EOF

go run poc_ovn_tls_roots.go

Result:

[!] VULNERABLE: The reproduced OVN client verification logic accepted the rogue attacker certificate.

It is recommended to verify peer certificates against the configured CA pool rather than against roots synthesized from untrusted peer input. The safest fix is to remove the custom VerifyPeerCertificate logic and rely on Go standard TLS verification with tls.Config.RootCAs set to the configured CA pool and, where applicable, ServerName set appropriately for identity validation.

Credit

This issue was discovered and reported by the team at 7asecurity (https://7asecurity.com/)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40243"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T19:08:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T21:16:01Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nBroken TLS validation logic in the OVN database connection logic could allow connections to an attacker\u0027s OVN database.\n\nOVN uses mTLS for authentication, so the attacker cannot actually perform a full man in the middle attack as they won\u0027t be able to authenticated with the real OVN deployment. At best they can provide a replacement empty database which Incus will briefly interact with before hitting errors due to the rest of the OVN stack not reacting to the committed changes.\n\nAlso worth noting that the OVN control plane is typically run on the same servers that run Incus, there is typically no routing involved between an Incus server and the OVN control plane, making such an attack extremely difficult to pull off in the first place.\n\n### Details\nThe OVN client implementations within Incus disable Go standard TLS server verification (InsecureSkipVerify: true) and replace it with custom peer-certificate verification logic. That replacement verifier does not anchor trust in the configured CA certificate. Instead, it constructs the verification root set from certificates supplied by the peer during the handshake. As a result, the configured CA is parsed but not used as the trust anchor for the final verification decision.\n\nAlthough a configured CA certificate (tlsCAcert) is parsed and added to a client CA pool, that pool is not used during the final verification decision. Instead, the callback creates a fresh roots pool from the raw certificates received over the wire and verifies the presented leaf certificate against those attacker-influenced roots. No endpoint identity validation is visible in the provided verification logic.\n\nIn OVN-enabled Incus deployments that use these SSL database connection paths, this affects authenticated connections from Incus to the OVN northbound and southbound databases. Incus documents clustered OVN deployments in which the OVN distributed database runs across multiple servers, and upstream OVN documentation describes the northbound database as the interface used by the cloud management system and the southbound database as the central coordination point for logical and physical network state.\n\nBecause the custom verifier accepts peer-supplied trust anchors, an attacker able to impersonate or intercept the OVN endpoint on the management network can present a rogue self-signed certificate chain. Incus will accept this certificate as valid, collapsing the configured CA-based trust model. Because Incus exposes dedicated OVN TLS settings for a CA certificate, client certificate, and client key, the implementation clearly intends to authenticate OVN database connections using operator-supplied trust material rather than peer-supplied certificates. By abandoning the configured CA pool and instead trusting peer-supplied roots, the implementation defeats the intended authentication boundary on OVN database connections and permits endpoint impersonation by an active attacker able to intercept or stand in for the OVN database service.\n\nIn clustered OVN-backed Incus deployments, this flaw reduces CA-anchored authentication of OVN database connections to endpoint impersonation for an attacker with a suitable position on the management or control-plane network. This is especially significant because OVN northbound and southbound databases are the authoritative control-plane interfaces for logical network configuration, translation, and distribution to hypervisors and gateways. As a result, the issue is best understood as a control-plane authentication failure with potentially broad networking impact, not merely as generic TLS misconfiguration.\n\nAffected Files:\nhttps://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_nb.go \nhttps://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_sb.go \nhttps://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_icnb.go \nhttps://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_icsb.go \n\nAffected Code:\n```\nfunc NewNB(dbAddr string, sslCACert string, sslClientCert string, sslClientKey string) (*NB, error) {\n    [...]\n    if strings.Contains(dbAddr, \"ssl:\") {\n        [...]\n        tlsConfig := \u0026tls.Config{\n            Certificates:       []tls.Certificate{clientCert},\n            InsecureSkipVerify: true,\n        }\n\n        if sslCACert != \"\" {\n            [...]\n            tlsCAcert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(tlsCAder.Bytes)\n            if err != nil {\n                return nil, err\n            }\n\n            tlsCAcert.IsCA = true\n            tlsCAcert.KeyUsage = x509.KeyUsageCertSign\n\n            clientCAPool := x509.NewCertPool()\n            clientCAPool.AddCert(tlsCAcert)\n\n            tlsConfig.VerifyPeerCertificate = func(rawCerts [][]byte, chains [][]*x509.Certificate) error {\n                if len(rawCerts) \u003c 1 {\n                    return errors.New(\"Missing server certificate\")\n                }\n\n                roots := x509.NewCertPool()\n                for _, rawCert := range rawCerts {\n                    cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCert)\n                    if cert != nil {\n                        roots.AddCert(cert)\n                    }\n                }\n\n                cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCerts[0])\n                if cert == nil {\n                    return errors.New(\"Bad server certificate\")\n                }\n\n                opts := x509.VerifyOptions{\n                    Roots: roots,\n                }\n\n                _, err := cert.Verify(opts)\n                return err\n            }\n        }\n\n        options = append(options, ovsdbClient.WithTLSConfig(tlsConfig))\n    }\n    [...]\n}\n```\n\nThe same verification pattern is duplicated in the other affected files listed above.\n\nVerification-Logic Proof of Concept\n\nBecause the vulnerability resides entirely in the certificate-verification logic, it can be demonstrated in isolation without a live interception lab. The following Go harness reproduces the effective OVN client verification logic, generates a rogue self-signed certificate, and demonstrates that the implemented trust decision accepts peer-supplied roots instead of the configured CA pool.\n\nCommands:\n```\ncat \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027 \u003e poc_ovn_tls_roots.go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"crypto/ed25519\"\n    \"crypto/rand\"\n    \"crypto/x509\"\n    \"crypto/x509/pkix\"\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"math/big\"\n    \"time\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n    pub, priv, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)\n\n    template := x509.Certificate{\n        SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),\n        Subject: pkix.Name{\n            Organization: []string{\"Attacker Corp MITM\"},\n        },\n        NotBefore:             time.Now(),\n        NotAfter:              time.Now().Add(time.Hour),\n        KeyUsage:              x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageCertSign,\n        ExtKeyUsage:           []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},\n        BasicConstraintsValid: true,\n        IsCA:                  true,\n    }\n\n    rogueCertBytes, _ := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, \u0026template, \u0026template, pub, priv)\n\n    verifyPeerCertificate := func(rawCerts [][]byte) error {\n        if len(rawCerts) \u003c 1 {\n            return fmt.Errorf(\"missing server certificate\")\n        }\n\n        roots := x509.NewCertPool()\n        for _, rawCert := range rawCerts {\n            cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCert)\n            if cert != nil {\n                roots.AddCert(cert)\n            }\n        }\n\n        cert, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCerts[0])\n        if cert == nil {\n            return fmt.Errorf(\"bad server certificate\")\n        }\n\n        opts := x509.VerifyOptions{\n            Roots: roots,\n        }\n\n        _, err := cert.Verify(opts)\n        return err\n    }\n\n    err := verifyPeerCertificate([][]byte{rogueCertBytes})\n    if err == nil {\n        fmt.Println(\"[!] VULNERABLE: The reproduced OVN client verification logic accepted the rogue attacker certificate.\")\n    } else {\n        fmt.Printf(\"Safe: Rejected with error: %v\\n\", err)\n    }\n}\nEOF\n\ngo run poc_ovn_tls_roots.go\n```\n\nResult:\n```\n[!] VULNERABLE: The reproduced OVN client verification logic accepted the rogue attacker certificate.\n```\n\nIt is recommended to verify peer certificates against the configured CA pool rather than against roots synthesized from untrusted peer input. The safest fix is to remove the custom VerifyPeerCertificate logic and rely on Go standard TLS verification with tls.Config.RootCAs set to the configured CA pool and, where applicable, ServerName set appropriately for identity validation.\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was discovered and reported by the team at 7asecurity (https://7asecurity.com/)",
  "id": "GHSA-c839-4qxr-j4x3",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T19:26:41Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T19:08:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-c839-4qxr-j4x3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40243"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_icnb.go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_icsb.go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_nb.go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/network/ovn/ovn_sb.go"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Incus has an OVN TLS Verification that Accepts Peer-Supplied Roots"
}

GHSA-C892-CWQ6-QRQF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-26 18:30 – Updated: 2023-06-30 20:30
VLAI
Summary
Duplicate Advisory: Keycloak vulnerable to untrusted certificate validation
Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-5cc8-pgp5-7mpm. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Advisory

A flaw was found in Keycloak. This flaw depends on a non-default configuration "Revalidate Client Certificate" to be enabled and the reverse proxy is not validating the certificate before Keycloak. Using this method an attacker may choose the certificate which will be validated by the server. If this happens and the KC_SPI_TRUSTSTORE_FILE_FILE variable is missing/misconfigured, any trustfile may be accepted with the logging information of "Cannot validate client certificate trust: Truststore not available". This may not impact availability as the attacker would have no access to the server, but consumer applications Integrity or Confidentiality may be impacted considering a possible access to them. Considering the environment is correctly set to use "Revalidate Client Certificate" this flaw is avoidable.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "21.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-05-26T21:24:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-26T18:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-5cc8-pgp5-7mpm. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Advisory\nA flaw was found in Keycloak. This flaw depends on a non-default configuration \"Revalidate Client Certificate\" to be enabled and the reverse proxy is not validating the certificate before Keycloak. Using this method an attacker may choose the certificate which will be validated by the server. If this happens and the KC_SPI_TRUSTSTORE_FILE_FILE variable is missing/misconfigured, any trustfile may be accepted with the logging information of \"Cannot validate client certificate trust: Truststore not available\". This may not impact availability as the attacker would have no access to the server, but consumer applications Integrity or Confidentiality may be impacted considering a possible access to them. Considering the environment is correctly set to use \"Revalidate Client Certificate\" this flaw is avoidable.",
  "id": "GHSA-c892-cwq6-qrqf",
  "modified": "2023-06-30T20:30:22Z",
  "published": "2023-05-26T18:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1664"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-1664"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2182196\u0026comment#0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Keycloak vulnerable to untrusted certificate validation",
  "withdrawn": "2023-06-30T20:30:22Z"
}

GHSA-C89C-PVM7-33WJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:17 – Updated: 2022-12-16 22:48
VLAI
Summary
Lack of SSL/TLS certificate and hostname validation in Amazon EC2 Plugin
Details

Amazon EC2 Plugin connects to Windows agents via HTTPS.

Amazon EC2 Plugin 1.50.1 and earlier unconditionally accepts self-signed HTTPS certificates and does not perform hostname validation when connecting to Windows agents. This lack of validation could be abused using a man-in-the-middle attack to intercept these connections to build agents.

Amazon EC2 Plugin 1.50.2 by default no longer accepts self-signed HTTPS certificates and performs hostname validation. A new configuration option allows restoring the previous, unsafe behavior. For more information see the plugin documentation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.50.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:ec2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.50.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-2187"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-16T22:48:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-05-06T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Amazon EC2 Plugin connects to Windows agents via HTTPS.\n\nAmazon EC2 Plugin 1.50.1 and earlier unconditionally accepts self-signed HTTPS certificates and does not perform hostname validation when connecting to Windows agents. This lack of validation could be abused using a man-in-the-middle attack to intercept these connections to build agents.\n\nAmazon EC2 Plugin 1.50.2 by default no longer accepts self-signed HTTPS certificates and performs hostname validation. A new configuration option allows restoring the previous, unsafe behavior. For more information see [the plugin documentation](https://github.com/jenkinsci/ec2-plugin/#securing-the-connection-to-windows-amis).",
  "id": "GHSA-c89c-pvm7-33wj",
  "modified": "2022-12-16T22:48:49Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:17:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2187"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/ec2-plugin/commit/4c9f03ae202e4730fd54eda40771fa4d3873e358"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/ec2-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2020-05-06/#SECURITY-1528"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/05/06/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Lack of SSL/TLS certificate and hostname validation in Amazon EC2 Plugin"
}

GHSA-C8GV-X3R9-Q7P4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-28 15:30 – Updated: 2025-09-23 18:30
VLAI
Details

Improper Certificate Validation in Checkmk Exchange plugin VMware vSAN allows attackers in MitM position to intercept traffic.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-58126"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-28T13:16:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper Certificate Validation in Checkmk Exchange plugin VMware vSAN allows attackers in MitM position to intercept traffic.",
  "id": "GHSA-c8gv-x3r9-q7p4",
  "modified": "2025-09-23T18:30:21Z",
  "published": "2025-08-28T15:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58126"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.checkmk.com/p/vsan"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Certificates should be carefully managed and checked to assure that data are encrypted with the intended owner's public key.

Mitigation
Implementation

If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the hostname.

CAPEC-459: Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate

An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority.

CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation

An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.