CWE-209
AllowedGeneration of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.
983 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-HR32-MGPM-QF2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-03 23:41 – Updated: 2021-06-03 23:33A flaw was found in RESTEasy client in all versions of RESTEasy up to 4.5.6.Final. It may allow client users to obtain the server's potentially sensitive information when the server got WebApplicationException from the RESTEasy client call. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.6.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-client"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.7.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.6.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-client-microprofile"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.7.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.13.2.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-client"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.14.0.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.13.2.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-client-microprofile"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.14.0.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-25633"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-03T23:33:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in RESTEasy client in all versions of RESTEasy up to 4.5.6.Final. It may allow client users to obtain the server\u0027s potentially sensitive information when the server got WebApplicationException from the RESTEasy client call. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality.",
"id": "GHSA-hr32-mgpm-qf2f",
"modified": "2021-06-03T23:33:32Z",
"published": "2021-06-03T23:41:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25633"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/resteasy/Resteasy/pull/2665/commits/13c808b5967242eec1e877edbc0014a84dcd6eb0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2020-25633"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RESTEASY-2820"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information in RESTEasy client"
}
GHSA-HRMJ-7RVJ-4HG8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:37 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:37Summary
The LightRAG API server passes raw Python exception messages directly into HTTP error responses across 30+ error handlers in every router. When combined with the default unauthenticated configuration (see companion report on CWE-306), any network-reachable client can trigger exceptions whose raw text discloses internal infrastructure — server filesystem paths, database host/port/user, LLM provider error details, and Python library internals. No global exception handler sanitizes error messages before they reach the client.
Details
Throughout the API route handlers, exceptions are caught and their string
representation is returned verbatim via detail=str(e) / detail=str(exc)
(and f-string variants such as detail=f"...: {str(e)}"). This occurs in every
router file. Location breakdown on the current main branch:
HTTP 500 — raw exception passthrough (except Exception as e):
- document_routes.py — 13
- graph_routes.py — 12 (mix of detail=f"...{str(e)}" and detail=error_msg)
- query_routes.py — 3
- ollama_api.py — 2
- lightrag_server.py — 1 (health endpoint)
HTTP 422 — raw exception passthrough (except ValueError as exc):
- document_routes.py — 2 (chunking-config validation)
Total: ~33 raw-exception-to-HTTP-response locations. The only pre-existing
custom exception handler in lightrag_server.py is specific to
RequestValidationError for /query/data; it does not cover the generic
Exception handlers in route code.
Example pattern (document_routes.py, upload handler):
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error /documents/upload: {file.filename}: {str(e)}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
Categories of sensitive information that can leak through these responses:
-
Server filesystem paths. File-I/O errors from the default JSON storage backend expose the server's directory layout (e.g.
[Errno 13] Permission denied: '/app/data/rag_storage/default/kv_store_full_docs.json'), aiding path-traversal or targeted attacks. (Verified — see PoC Step 1.) -
Database host / port / user / database name. Connection errors from the PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Redis, or Neo4j backends surface the target the driver was trying to reach — e.g. asyncpg raises
password authentication failed for user "lightrag"(username) or a socket error naming the unreachable host and port. Note on credentials: the PostgreSQL backend usesasyncpg, which is built from keyword parameters and does not echo the password in its exception strings — so a raw asyncpg error leaks host/port/user/db, not the password. URI-configured backends behave differently: the MongoDB backend is built withAsyncMongoClient(MONGO_URI, ...), and a malformed-URI / configuration error from pymongo can surface the connection string itself, which may embed credentials (mongodb://user:password@host:port/). The leak surface is therefore backend- and error-type-dependent. -
LLM provider error details. Errors from OpenAI / Gemini / Bedrock and other providers may include model names, organization ids, or partial API error context that reveal the deployment.
-
Python library internals. Unexpected exceptions expose class names, library-internal messages, and stack fragments that fingerprint the server stack and version.
-
Configuration details. Errors during configuration/parsing may reveal storage backend types and other configuration values.
The risk is amplified by the default unauthenticated configuration (CWE-306, companion report), which lets any network client trigger and read these errors without credentials.
PoC
Tested on a clean checkout with the [api] extras installed and the server run
via lightrag-server.
Step 1 — Filesystem path disclosure (default JSON storage)
With the default storage backend, a file-permission error is returned verbatim:
# Make a storage file unreadable to force an I/O error.
chmod 000 ./rag_storage/default/kv_store_full_docs.json
curl -s http://localhost:9621/documents | python3 -m json.tool
Vulnerable response — the full server-side path is disclosed:
{
"detail": "[Errno 13] Permission denied: '/app/data/rag_storage/default/kv_store_full_docs.json'"
}
Step 2 — Database infrastructure disclosure (PostgreSQL backend)
Configure a PostgreSQL KV backend pointed at an unreachable / misconfigured host:
LIGHTRAG_KV_STORAGE=PGKVStorage
POSTGRES_HOST=nonexistent-host-12345.example.com
POSTGRES_PORT=5432
POSTGRES_USER=lightrag
POSTGRES_DATABASE=lightrag
A request that touches storage returns the raw connection error, disclosing the host / port / user the server is configured to reach (the asyncpg password is not echoed — see the credentials note above):
{
"detail": "[Errno -2] Name or service not known"
}
For a URI-configured backend such as MongoDB (MONGO_URI=mongodb://user:pass@host:port/db),
a malformed-URI / configuration error can instead surface the connection string
itself, including any embedded credentials.
Impact
Error-message information exposure. A client able to reach the LightRAG server can extract:
- Confidentiality (C:L): server filesystem paths, database host/port/user/db, LLM provider configuration hints, and Python stack internals from raw exception messages; for URI-configured backends, potentially the connection string (with embedded credentials).
- Escalation risk: leaked hosts/paths aid follow-on attacks; a leaked connection URI could enable direct database access if the database is network-reachable.
When combined with the default unauthenticated configuration, any
network client can trigger and read these responses without authentication,
which is why this is scored PR:N.
Suggested remediation
- Replace every
detail=str(e)/detail=str(exc)pattern with a generic client message. Log the full exception server-side (message + traceback) and return only a generic message plus a correlation id:
python
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error /documents/upload: {file.filename}: {e!r}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
- Register a last-resort global handler as defense-in-depth so any exception that escapes a route is sanitized identically:
python
@app.exception_handler(Exception)
async def unhandled_exception_handler(request, exc):
logger.error(f"Unhandled exception: {exc!r}", exc_info=True)
return JSONResponse(status_code=500, content={"detail": "Internal server error"})
- Preserve genuine client-input validation feedback. The two HTTP 422 chunking-config validators emit controlled, non-sensitive messages; keep them as 422 feedback rather than genericizing to 500 — but wrap the raw exception so it is never a bare passthrough.
Fix status: implemented in HKUDS/LightRAG#3422 — a shared
internal_server_error() helper routes all 500 handlers through a generic body
carrying a correlation id (full detail logged server-side), a global
@app.exception_handler(Exception) is registered in create_app, and the two
422 validators are wrapped.
Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
- Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "lightrag-hku"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85709"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:37:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T17:17:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe LightRAG API server passes raw Python exception messages directly into HTTP\nerror responses across 30+ error handlers in every router. When combined with\nthe default unauthenticated configuration (see companion report on CWE-306), any\nnetwork-reachable client can trigger exceptions whose raw text discloses\ninternal infrastructure \u2014 server filesystem paths, database host/port/user, LLM\nprovider error details, and Python library internals. No global exception\nhandler sanitizes error messages before they reach the client.\n\n### Details\n\nThroughout the API route handlers, exceptions are caught and their string\nrepresentation is returned verbatim via `detail=str(e)` / `detail=str(exc)`\n(and f-string variants such as `detail=f\"...: {str(e)}\"`). This occurs in every\nrouter file. Location breakdown on the current `main` branch:\n\n**HTTP 500 \u2014 raw exception passthrough (`except Exception as e`):**\n- `document_routes.py` \u2014 13\n- `graph_routes.py` \u2014 12 (mix of `detail=f\"...{str(e)}\"` and `detail=error_msg`)\n- `query_routes.py` \u2014 3\n- `ollama_api.py` \u2014 2\n- `lightrag_server.py` \u2014 1 (health endpoint)\n\n**HTTP 422 \u2014 raw exception passthrough (`except ValueError as exc`):**\n- `document_routes.py` \u2014 2 (chunking-config validation)\n\n**Total: ~33 raw-exception-to-HTTP-response locations.** The only pre-existing\ncustom exception handler in `lightrag_server.py` is specific to\n`RequestValidationError` for `/query/data`; it does not cover the generic\n`Exception` handlers in route code.\n\nExample pattern (`document_routes.py`, upload handler):\n\n```python\nexcept Exception as e:\n logger.error(f\"Error /documents/upload: {file.filename}: {str(e)}\")\n raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))\n```\n\n**Categories of sensitive information that can leak through these responses:**\n\n1. **Server filesystem paths.** File-I/O errors from the default JSON storage\n backend expose the server\u0027s directory layout\n (e.g. `[Errno 13] Permission denied: \u0027/app/data/rag_storage/default/kv_store_full_docs.json\u0027`),\n aiding path-traversal or targeted attacks. *(Verified \u2014 see PoC Step 1.)*\n\n2. **Database host / port / user / database name.** Connection errors from the\n PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Redis, or Neo4j backends surface the target the driver\n was trying to reach \u2014 e.g. asyncpg raises\n `password authentication failed for user \"lightrag\"` (username) or a socket\n error naming the unreachable host and port.\n **Note on credentials:** the PostgreSQL backend uses `asyncpg`, which is\n built from keyword parameters and does **not** echo the password in its\n exception strings \u2014 so a raw asyncpg error leaks host/port/user/db, not the\n password. URI-configured backends behave differently: the MongoDB backend is\n built with `AsyncMongoClient(MONGO_URI, ...)`, and a malformed-URI /\n configuration error from pymongo can surface the connection string itself,\n which may embed credentials (`mongodb://user:password@host:port/`). The leak\n surface is therefore backend- and error-type-dependent.\n\n3. **LLM provider error details.** Errors from OpenAI / Gemini / Bedrock and\n other providers may include model names, organization ids, or partial API\n error context that reveal the deployment.\n\n4. **Python library internals.** Unexpected exceptions expose class names,\n library-internal messages, and stack fragments that fingerprint the server\n stack and version.\n\n5. **Configuration details.** Errors during configuration/parsing may reveal\n storage backend types and other configuration values.\n\nThe risk is amplified by the default unauthenticated configuration (CWE-306,\ncompanion report), which lets any network client trigger and read these errors\nwithout credentials.\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on a clean checkout with the `[api]` extras installed and the server run\nvia `lightrag-server`.\n\n#### Step 1 \u2014 Filesystem path disclosure (default JSON storage)\n\nWith the default storage backend, a file-permission error is returned verbatim:\n\n```bash\n# Make a storage file unreadable to force an I/O error.\nchmod 000 ./rag_storage/default/kv_store_full_docs.json\ncurl -s http://localhost:9621/documents | python3 -m json.tool\n```\n\nVulnerable response \u2014 the full server-side path is disclosed:\n\n```json\n{\n \"detail\": \"[Errno 13] Permission denied: \u0027/app/data/rag_storage/default/kv_store_full_docs.json\u0027\"\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 2 \u2014 Database infrastructure disclosure (PostgreSQL backend)\n\nConfigure a PostgreSQL KV backend pointed at an unreachable / misconfigured host:\n\n```\nLIGHTRAG_KV_STORAGE=PGKVStorage\nPOSTGRES_HOST=nonexistent-host-12345.example.com\nPOSTGRES_PORT=5432\nPOSTGRES_USER=lightrag\nPOSTGRES_DATABASE=lightrag\n```\n\nA request that touches storage returns the raw connection error, disclosing the\nhost / port / user the server is configured to reach (the asyncpg password is\nnot echoed \u2014 see the credentials note above):\n\n```json\n{\n \"detail\": \"[Errno -2] Name or service not known\"\n}\n```\n\nFor a URI-configured backend such as MongoDB (`MONGO_URI=mongodb://user:pass@host:port/db`),\na malformed-URI / configuration error can instead surface the connection string\nitself, including any embedded credentials.\n\n### Impact\n\nError-message information exposure. A client able to reach the LightRAG\nserver can extract:\n\n- **Confidentiality (C:L):** server filesystem paths, database host/port/user/db,\n LLM provider configuration hints, and Python stack internals from raw\n exception messages; for URI-configured backends, potentially the connection\n string (with embedded credentials).\n- **Escalation risk:** leaked hosts/paths aid follow-on attacks; a leaked\n connection URI could enable direct database access if the database is\n network-reachable.\n\nWhen combined with the default unauthenticated configuration, any\nnetwork client can trigger and read these responses without authentication,\nwhich is why this is scored `PR:N`.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\n1. **Replace every `detail=str(e)` / `detail=str(exc)` pattern** with a generic\n client message. Log the full exception server-side (message + traceback) and\n return only a generic message plus a correlation id:\n\n ```python\n except Exception as e:\n logger.error(f\"Error /documents/upload: {file.filename}: {e!r}\")\n raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=\"Internal server error\")\n ```\n\n2. **Register a last-resort global handler** as defense-in-depth so any\n exception that escapes a route is sanitized identically:\n\n ```python\n @app.exception_handler(Exception)\n async def unhandled_exception_handler(request, exc):\n logger.error(f\"Unhandled exception: {exc!r}\", exc_info=True)\n return JSONResponse(status_code=500, content={\"detail\": \"Internal server error\"})\n ```\n\n3. **Preserve genuine client-input validation feedback.** The two HTTP 422\n chunking-config validators emit controlled, non-sensitive messages; keep them\n as 422 feedback rather than genericizing to 500 \u2014 but wrap the raw exception\n so it is never a bare passthrough.\n\n**Fix status:** implemented in HKUDS/LightRAG#3422 \u2014 a shared\n`internal_server_error()` helper routes all 500 handlers through a generic body\ncarrying a correlation id (full detail logged server-side), a global\n`@app.exception_handler(Exception)` is registered in `create_app`, and the two\n422 validators are wrapped.\n\n### Credits\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)\n- Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)",
"id": "GHSA-hrmj-7rvj-4hg8",
"modified": "2026-09-22T20:37:36Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T20:37:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/security/advisories/GHSA-hrmj-7rvj-4hg8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85709"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/pull/3422"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/commit/4d90a0eb35d40b45f3a9045e308ec126897a3364"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/commit/dcab315d7dc1eea682e9b2c4fcb1b06474484c47"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/HKUDS/LightRAG/releases/tag/v1.5.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "lightrag-hku: Sensitive Information Exposure Through Raw Exception Messages in API Error Responses"
}
GHSA-HRVG-RQ28-FJF5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 21:30 – Updated: 2026-03-25 21:30IBM InfoSphere Information Server 11.7.0.0 through 11.7.1.6 is affected by an information disclosure vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-1262"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T21:16:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM InfoSphere Information Server 11.7.0.0 through 11.7.1.6 is affected by an information disclosure vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-hrvg-rq28-fjf5",
"modified": "2026-03-25T21:30:36Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T21:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7266748"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HWGP-86HH-XVG8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-20 00:32 – Updated: 2023-12-20 00:32IBM UrbanCode Deploy (UCD) 7.1 through 7.1.2.14, 7.2 through 7.2.3.7, and 7.3 through 7.3.2.2 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the browser. This information could be used in further attacks against the system. IBM X-Force ID: 265510.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-42013"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-20T00:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM UrbanCode Deploy (UCD) 7.1 through 7.1.2.14, 7.2 through 7.2.3.7, and 7.3 through 7.3.2.2 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the browser. This information could be used in further attacks against the system. IBM X-Force ID: 265510.",
"id": "GHSA-hwgp-86hh-xvg8",
"modified": "2023-12-20T00:32:45Z",
"published": "2023-12-20T00:32:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-42013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/265510"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7096547"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HWRM-C4CX-RF4J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 21:36 – Updated: 2026-09-04 21:36Summary
When the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic RequestValidationError. The validation_exception_handler in vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py converts this exception to a string via str(exc), which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function. The existing sanitize_message() function in vllm/entrypoints/utils.py strips memory addresses (e.g., 0x7f...) but does not strip File "...", line X patterns. The result is a user-facing HTTP response that leaks internal system information.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can extract the following with a single malformed request:
- OS username running the vLLM process (e.g.,
ubuntu) - Home directory path (e.g.,
/home/ubuntu/) - Virtual environment path (e.g.,
vllm-env/) - Python version (e.g.,
3.12) - Internal package structure and line numbers (e.g.,
vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/api_router.py) - Handler function names per endpoint, enabling precise version fingerprinting
This information aids attackers in constructing targeted exploits: environment paths narrow the attack surface, and handler function names + line numbers enable exact version identification even when the /version endpoint is disabled.
All POST endpoints that accept JSON bodies are affected, including /v1/chat/completions, /v1/completions, /tokenize, and /detokenize.
Workarounds
Deploying vLLM behind a reverse proxy that rewrites error response bodies to strip file paths would mitigate this, though it is fragile.
Remediation Recommendation
Two possible fixes (either suffices):
Option A — Fix validation_exception_handler: Construct the error message from exc.errors() (the structured Pydantic error list) rather than str(exc). This avoids the traceback-style string entirely.
Option B — Fix sanitize_message: Add a regex to strip File "...", line \d+ patterns, similar to how memory addresses are already stripped:
import re
msg = re.sub(r'File ".*?", line \d+, in \w+', '[internal]', msg)
Option A is preferred as it addresses the root cause rather than filtering symptoms.
Environment Tested
- vLLM 0.20.1 (pip install, latest stable as of May 2026)
- Python 3.12
- Ubuntu 22.04
- Model: Qwen/Qwen2-0.5B (text-only; bug is model-independent)
This was fixed here: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/e87521626f
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vllm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73555"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T21:36:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T15:20:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic `RequestValidationError`. The `validation_exception_handler` in `vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py` converts this exception to a string via `str(exc)`, which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function. The existing `sanitize_message()` function in `vllm/entrypoints/utils.py` strips memory addresses (e.g., `0x7f...`) but does not strip `File \"...\", line X` patterns. The result is a user-facing HTTP response that leaks internal system information.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can extract the following with a single malformed request:\n\n- **OS username** running the vLLM process (e.g., `ubuntu`)\n- **Home directory path** (e.g., `/home/ubuntu/`)\n- **Virtual environment path** (e.g., `vllm-env/`)\n- **Python version** (e.g., `3.12`)\n- **Internal package structure and line numbers** (e.g., `vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/api_router.py`)\n- **Handler function names per endpoint**, enabling precise version fingerprinting\n\nThis information aids attackers in constructing targeted exploits: environment paths narrow the attack surface, and handler function names + line numbers enable exact version identification even when the `/version` endpoint is disabled.\n\nAll POST endpoints that accept JSON bodies are affected, including `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/completions`, `/tokenize`, and `/detokenize`.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nDeploying vLLM behind a reverse proxy that rewrites error response bodies to strip file paths would mitigate this, though it is fragile.\n\n## Remediation Recommendation\n\nTwo possible fixes (either suffices):\n\n**Option A \u2014 Fix `validation_exception_handler`:** Construct the error message from `exc.errors()` (the structured Pydantic error list) rather than `str(exc)`. This avoids the traceback-style string entirely.\n\n**Option B \u2014 Fix `sanitize_message`:** Add a regex to strip `File \"...\", line \\d+` patterns, similar to how memory addresses are already stripped:\n\n```python\nimport re\nmsg = re.sub(r\u0027File \".*?\", line \\d+, in \\w+\u0027, \u0027[internal]\u0027, msg)\n```\n\nOption A is preferred as it addresses the root cause rather than filtering symptoms.\n\n## Environment Tested\n\n- vLLM 0.20.1 (pip install, latest stable as of May 2026)\n- Python 3.12\n- Ubuntu 22.04\n- Model: Qwen/Qwen2-0.5B (text-only; bug is model-independent)\n\nThis was fixed here: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/e87521626f",
"id": "GHSA-hwrm-c4cx-rf4j",
"modified": "2026-09-04T21:36:33Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T21:36:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-hwrm-c4cx-rf4j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73555"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/46415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/e87521626febe2763f997691d1599de4175f4324"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.26.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "vLLM: Unauthenticated Internal Path and Username Disclosure via Validation Error Messages"
}
GHSA-HWRR-QGGH-2777
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-11 00:30 – Updated: 2024-11-11 00:30The BGP daemon in Extreme Networks ExtremeXOS (aka EXOS) 30.7.1.1 allows an attacker (who is not on a directly connected network) to cause a denial of service (BGP session reset) because of BGP attribute error mishandling (for attribute 21 and 25). NOTE: the vendor disputes this because it is "evaluating support for RFC 7606 as a future feature" and believes that "customers that have chosen to not require or implement RFC 7606 have done so willingly and with knowledge of what is needed to defend against these types of attacks."
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-40457"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-11T00:15:13Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "The BGP daemon in Extreme Networks ExtremeXOS (aka EXOS) 30.7.1.1 allows an attacker (who is not on a directly connected network) to cause a denial of service (BGP session reset) because of BGP attribute error mishandling (for attribute 21 and 25). NOTE: the vendor disputes this because it is \"evaluating support for RFC 7606 as a future feature\" and believes that \"customers that have chosen to not require or implement RFC 7606 have done so willingly and with knowledge of what is needed to defend against these types of attacks.\"",
"id": "GHSA-hwrr-qggh-2777",
"modified": "2024-11-11T00:30:44Z",
"published": "2024-11-11T00:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40457"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/asset/JgH8G5duO1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/post/bgp-path-attributes-grave-error-handling"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://supportdocs.extremenetworks.com/support/documentation/extremexos-32-5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-HWXF-QXJ7-7RFJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-30 15:18 – Updated: 2023-10-30 15:21Impact
If an error or exception occurs in CodeIgniter4 v4.4.2 and earlier, a detailed error report is displayed even if in the production environment. As a result, confidential information may be leaked.
Patches
Upgrade to v4.4.3 or later. See upgrading guide.
Workarounds
Replace ini_set('display_errors', '0') with ini_set('display_errors', 'Off') in app/Config/Boot/production.php.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4 * Email us at SECURITY.md
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.4.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "codeigniter4/framework"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46240"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-30T15:18:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-31T16:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nIf an error or exception occurs in CodeIgniter4 v4.4.2 and earlier, a detailed error report is displayed even if in the production environment. As a result, confidential information may be leaked.\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to v4.4.3 or later. See [upgrading guide](https://codeigniter4.github.io/userguide/installation/upgrade_443.html).\n\n### Workarounds\nReplace `ini_set(\u0027display_errors\u0027, \u00270\u0027)` with `ini_set(\u0027display_errors\u0027, \u0027Off\u0027)` in `app/Config/Boot/production.php`.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4](https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4/issues)\n* Email us at [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4/blob/develop/SECURITY.md)",
"id": "GHSA-hwxf-qxj7-7rfj",
"modified": "2023-10-30T15:21:32Z",
"published": "2023-10-30T15:18:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4/security/advisories/GHSA-hwxf-qxj7-7rfj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46240"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4/commit/423569fc31e29f51635a2e59c89770333f0e7563"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://codeigniter4.github.io/userguide/general/errors.html#error-reporting"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CodeIgniter4 vulnerable to information disclosure when detailed error report is displayed in production environment "
}
GHSA-HXJ5-VPRR-W32X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-11 00:01 – Updated: 2022-01-14 00:02IBM Security Verify 10.0.0, 10.0.1.0, and 10.0.2.0 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the browser. This information could be used in further attacks against the system. IBM X-Force ID: 209515.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38894"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-10T14:10:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Security Verify 10.0.0, 10.0.1.0, and 10.0.2.0 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the browser. This information could be used in further attacks against the system. IBM X-Force ID: 209515.",
"id": "GHSA-hxj5-vprr-w32x",
"modified": "2022-01-14T00:02:59Z",
"published": "2022-01-11T00:01:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38894"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/209515"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6538418"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-J24G-GM76-J829
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:54 – Updated: 2024-11-19 16:05The password reset form in Weblate before 2.10.1 provides different error messages depending on whether the email address is associated with an account, which allows remote attackers to enumerate user accounts via a series of requests.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "weblate"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-5537"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-04T21:55:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2017-03-15T15:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The password reset form in Weblate before 2.10.1 provides different error messages depending on whether the email address is associated with an account, which allows remote attackers to enumerate user accounts via a series of requests.",
"id": "GHSA-j24g-gm76-j829",
"modified": "2024-11-19T16:05:15Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:54:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5537"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/issues/1317"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/commit/abe0d2a29a1d8e896bfe829c8461bf8b391f1079"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/blob/weblate-2.10.1/docs/changes.rst"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/weblate/PYSEC-2017-42.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/01/18/11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/01/20/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/95676"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Weblate user account enumeration via reset password form"
}
GHSA-J2VX-CXFW-66VJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-06 06:31 – Updated: 2025-02-06 06:31IBM ApplinX 11.1 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the browser. This information could be used in further attacks against the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-49798"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-06T00:15:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM ApplinX 11.1 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the browser. This information could be used in further attacks against the system.",
"id": "GHSA-j2vx-cxfw-66vj",
"modified": "2025-02-06T06:31:26Z",
"published": "2025-02-06T06:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49798"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7182522"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
Mitigation
Handle exceptions internally and do not display errors containing potentially sensitive information to a user.
Mitigation MIT-33
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.
Mitigation MIT-40
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
Mitigation MIT-40
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
Mitigation
Where available, configure the environment to use less verbose error messages. For example, in PHP, disable the display_errors setting during configuration, or at runtime using the error_reporting() function.
Mitigation
Create default error pages or messages that do not leak any information.
CAPEC-215: Fuzzing for application mapping
An attacker sends random, malformed, or otherwise unexpected messages to a target application and observes the application's log or error messages returned. The attacker does not initially know how a target will respond to individual messages but by attempting a large number of message variants they may find a variant that trigger's desired behavior. In this attack, the purpose of the fuzzing is to observe the application's log and error messages, although fuzzing a target can also sometimes cause the target to enter an unstable state, causing a crash.
CAPEC-463: Padding Oracle Crypto Attack
An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.
CAPEC-54: Query System for Information
An adversary, aware of an application's location (and possibly authorized to use the application), probes an application's structure and evaluates its robustness by submitting requests and examining responses. Often, this is accomplished by sending variants of expected queries in the hope that these modified queries might return information beyond what the expected set of queries would provide.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.