Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-209

Allowed

Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.

900 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-F5V8-V6Q3-Q4H6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 22:50 – Updated: 2026-04-16 22:50
VLAI
Summary
Meridian: Multiple defense-in-depth gaps (collection/depth caps, telemetry, retry, fan-out)
Details

Summary

Meridian v2.1.0 (Meridian.Mapping and Meridian.Mediator) shipped with nine defense-in-depth gaps reachable through its public APIs. Two are HIGH severity — the advertised DefaultMaxCollectionItems and DefaultMaxDepth safety caps are silently bypassed on the IMapper.Map(source, destination) overload and anywhere .UseDestinationValue() is configured on a collection-typed property. Four are MEDIUM (constructor invariant bypass, OpenTelemetry stack-trace info disclosure, retry amplification, notification fan-out amplification). Three are LOW (exception message disclosure, dictionary duplicate-key echo, static mediator cache growth under closed-generic types).

All nine are patched in v2.1.1. Upgrade is a drop-in NuGet bump; see the v2.1.1 CHANGELOG for the four behavioural changes (constructor selection, OTel default, publisher fan-out cap, retry caps).

Severity Matrix

# Severity CWE Finding Fix
1 HIGH CWE-770 MappingEngine.TryMapCollectionOntoExisting enumerated the source without enforcing DefaultMaxCollectionItems. Reachable via Mapper.Map<TSrc,TDst>(src, dst) and any .ForMember(..., o => o.UseDestinationValue()) on a collection member through a plain Map(src) call. Shared cap enforcement helper between MapCollection and TryMapCollectionOntoExisting.
2 HIGH CWE-674 Collection-item recursion in the existing-destination path did not increment ResolutionContext.Depth, so self-referential collection graphs could reach stack overflow before DefaultMaxDepth fired. Depth increments at every collection-item boundary.
3 MEDIUM CWE-665 ObjectCreator.CreateWithConstructorMapping always invoked the widest public constructor, silently filling unresolved parameters with default(T) and bypassing narrower-ctor invariants. Widest-ctor selection now requires every parameter to be bound via explicit ctor mapping, source-name match, or a C# optional default.
4 MEDIUM CWE-532 Mediator.MarkActivityFailure emitted the full ex.ToString() (stack + inner chain) to the OpenTelemetry exception.stacktrace activity tag by default, leaking context to any shared trace sink. Gated on MediatorTelemetryOptions.RecordExceptionStackTrace — opt-in, default false.
5 MEDIUM CWE-400 RetryBehavior retried every exception type with unbounded MaxRetries; the exponential-backoff delay overflowed TimeSpan at ~30 attempts. No cancellation exclusion. Server-side MaxRetriesCap = 10, MaxBackoff = 5 min, OperationCanceledException short-circuit, recommended RetryPolicy.TransientOnly helper.
6 MEDIUM CWE-400 TaskWhenAllPublisher started every registered handler concurrently with no bound on fan-out. New constructor parameter maxDegreeOfParallelism (default 16; -1 restores legacy unbounded).
7 LOW CWE-209 Public mapping exceptions leaked FullName of source/destination types and concatenated inner exception messages into top-level property-mapping errors. Scrubbed to type Name; inner details only via InnerException chain.
8 LOW CWE-209 Dictionary materialization threw ArgumentException on duplicate keys, echoing the attacker-supplied key's .ToString(). Last-write-wins indexer semantics.
9 LOW CWE-1325 Static mediator handler caches grow monotonically under closed-generic request types. Doc-only mitigation; no code change — consumers must not allow attacker-controlled runtime type materialization to reach Send, Publish, or CreateStream. Documented in docs/security-model.md.

Exploitation

Finding 1 / 2 (headline): A consumer that maps user-supplied collection payloads onto an existing destination list via mapper.Map(userCollection, existingList) — a documented and commonly used AutoMapper-style idiom — processes the full attacker-supplied collection with no size cap and no depth cap. An attacker sending a single request with a large (or self-referential) collection payload can block the worker thread for seconds and exhaust the managed heap or the call stack. Equivalent exposure through .UseDestinationValue() on a collection-typed destination member, reachable via a plain Map(src) call whose destination type default-initializes that member.

Finding 3: A destination type with multiple public constructors that differ only in their parameter-binding invariants (e.g., new UserAccount(string name, Email email) enforcing a non-default Email) could be instantiated with the narrower ctor's invariants silently bypassed if any source field was absent — the widest ctor was always picked, with unbound parameters replaced by default(T).

Findings 4 / 5 / 6: Amplification / information-disclosure vectors described in the matrix above. Each requires moderate integration context (telemetry sink trust, handler count, retry policy) to weaponize, but each is reachable through public APIs without authentication.

Patches

  • Meridian.Mapping 2.1.1 (published 2026-04-16)
  • Meridian.Mediator 2.1.1 (published 2026-04-16)

Verified via: - GitHub Release assets at https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/releases/tag/v2.1.1 - Sigstore attestation (actions/attest-build-provenance@v2 → gh attestation verify green on both .nupkg from the GitHub Release) - NuGet.org indexed both packages within the release workflow run

Workarounds

Users who cannot upgrade immediately may: 1. Avoid mapper.Map(src, dst) and .UseDestinationValue() on collection-typed destination members. 2. Wrap input collection deserialization with an explicit size limit before handing the payload to Meridian. 3. Register TaskWhenAllPublisher with maxDegreeOfParallelism ≤ 16 manually (v2.1.1+ only). 4. Disable OpenTelemetry exception.stacktrace tag emission at the trace exporter level if your trace sink is less trusted than your application.

These are defense-in-depth; the only complete mitigation is upgrading to 2.1.1.

Supported Versions

As of this advisory the supported security branch is 2.1.x. The 2.0.x line (published 2026-04-15) is not receiving the Phase 1 safety-defaults infrastructure needed to carry the HIGH-severity fixes, so 2.0.x is deprecated in favor of 2.1.x. See SECURITY.md for the updated supported-versions table.

Credits

  • UmutKorkmaz (reporter and maintainer)

References

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Meridian.Mapping"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Meridian.Mediator"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1325",
      "CWE-209",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-532",
      "CWE-665",
      "CWE-674",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T22:50:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nMeridian v2.1.0 (`Meridian.Mapping` and `Meridian.Mediator`) shipped with nine defense-in-depth gaps reachable through its public APIs. Two are HIGH severity \u2014 the advertised `DefaultMaxCollectionItems` and `DefaultMaxDepth` safety caps are silently bypassed on the `IMapper.Map(source, destination)` overload and anywhere `.UseDestinationValue()` is configured on a collection-typed property. Four are MEDIUM (constructor invariant bypass, OpenTelemetry stack-trace info disclosure, retry amplification, notification fan-out amplification). Three are LOW (exception message disclosure, dictionary duplicate-key echo, static mediator cache growth under closed-generic types).\n\nAll nine are patched in **v2.1.1**. Upgrade is a drop-in NuGet bump; see the v2.1.1 CHANGELOG for the four behavioural changes (constructor selection, OTel default, publisher fan-out cap, retry caps).\n\n## Severity Matrix\n\n| # | Severity | CWE | Finding | Fix |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | **HIGH** | CWE-770 | `MappingEngine.TryMapCollectionOntoExisting` enumerated the source without enforcing `DefaultMaxCollectionItems`. Reachable via `Mapper.Map\u003cTSrc,TDst\u003e(src, dst)` and any `.ForMember(..., o =\u003e o.UseDestinationValue())` on a collection member through a plain `Map(src)` call. | Shared cap enforcement helper between `MapCollection` and `TryMapCollectionOntoExisting`. |\n| 2 | **HIGH** | CWE-674 | Collection-item recursion in the existing-destination path did not increment `ResolutionContext.Depth`, so self-referential collection graphs could reach stack overflow before `DefaultMaxDepth` fired. | Depth increments at every collection-item boundary. |\n| 3 | MEDIUM | CWE-665 | `ObjectCreator.CreateWithConstructorMapping` always invoked the widest public constructor, silently filling unresolved parameters with `default(T)` and bypassing narrower-ctor invariants. | Widest-ctor selection now requires every parameter to be bound via explicit ctor mapping, source-name match, or a C# optional default. |\n| 4 | MEDIUM | CWE-532 | `Mediator.MarkActivityFailure` emitted the full `ex.ToString()` (stack + inner chain) to the OpenTelemetry `exception.stacktrace` activity tag by default, leaking context to any shared trace sink. | Gated on `MediatorTelemetryOptions.RecordExceptionStackTrace` \u2014 opt-in, default `false`. |\n| 5 | MEDIUM | CWE-400 | `RetryBehavior` retried every exception type with unbounded `MaxRetries`; the exponential-backoff delay overflowed `TimeSpan` at ~30 attempts. No cancellation exclusion. | Server-side `MaxRetriesCap = 10`, `MaxBackoff = 5 min`, `OperationCanceledException` short-circuit, recommended `RetryPolicy.TransientOnly` helper. |\n| 6 | MEDIUM | CWE-400 | `TaskWhenAllPublisher` started every registered handler concurrently with no bound on fan-out. | New constructor parameter `maxDegreeOfParallelism` (default 16; `-1` restores legacy unbounded). |\n| 7 | LOW | CWE-209 | Public mapping exceptions leaked `FullName` of source/destination types and concatenated inner exception messages into top-level property-mapping errors. | Scrubbed to type `Name`; inner details only via `InnerException` chain. |\n| 8 | LOW | CWE-209 | Dictionary materialization threw `ArgumentException` on duplicate keys, echoing the attacker-supplied key\u0027s `.ToString()`. | Last-write-wins indexer semantics. |\n| 9 | LOW | CWE-1325 | Static mediator handler caches grow monotonically under closed-generic request types. **Doc-only mitigation**; no code change \u2014 consumers must not allow attacker-controlled runtime type materialization to reach `Send`, `Publish`, or `CreateStream`. | Documented in `docs/security-model.md`. |\n\n## Exploitation\n\n**Finding 1 / 2 (headline):** A consumer that maps user-supplied collection payloads onto an existing destination list via `mapper.Map(userCollection, existingList)` \u2014 a documented and commonly used AutoMapper-style idiom \u2014 processes the full attacker-supplied collection with no size cap and no depth cap. An attacker sending a single request with a large (or self-referential) collection payload can block the worker thread for seconds and exhaust the managed heap or the call stack. Equivalent exposure through `.UseDestinationValue()` on a collection-typed destination member, reachable via a plain `Map(src)` call whose destination type default-initializes that member.\n\n**Finding 3:** A destination type with multiple public constructors that differ only in their parameter-binding invariants (e.g., `new UserAccount(string name, Email email)` enforcing a non-default `Email`) could be instantiated with the narrower ctor\u0027s invariants silently bypassed if any source field was absent \u2014 the widest ctor was always picked, with unbound parameters replaced by `default(T)`.\n\n**Findings 4 / 5 / 6:** Amplification / information-disclosure vectors described in the matrix above. Each requires moderate integration context (telemetry sink trust, handler count, retry policy) to weaponize, but each is reachable through public APIs without authentication.\n\n## Patches\n\n- `Meridian.Mapping` **2.1.1** (published 2026-04-16)\n- `Meridian.Mediator` **2.1.1** (published 2026-04-16)\n\nVerified via:\n- GitHub Release assets at \u003chttps://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/releases/tag/v2.1.1\u003e\n- Sigstore attestation (`actions/attest-build-provenance@v2` \u2192 `gh attestation verify` green on both `.nupkg` from the GitHub Release)\n- NuGet.org indexed both packages within the release workflow run\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately may:\n1. Avoid `mapper.Map(src, dst)` and `.UseDestinationValue()` on collection-typed destination members.\n2. Wrap input collection deserialization with an explicit size limit before handing the payload to Meridian.\n3. Register `TaskWhenAllPublisher` with `maxDegreeOfParallelism` \u2264 16 manually (v2.1.1+ only).\n4. Disable OpenTelemetry `exception.stacktrace` tag emission at the trace exporter level if your trace sink is less trusted than your application.\n\nThese are defense-in-depth; the only complete mitigation is upgrading to 2.1.1.\n\n## Supported Versions\n\nAs of this advisory the supported security branch is **2.1.x**. The 2.0.x line (published 2026-04-15) is not receiving the Phase 1 safety-defaults infrastructure needed to carry the HIGH-severity fixes, so 2.0.x is deprecated in favor of 2.1.x. See `SECURITY.md` for the updated supported-versions table.\n\n## Credits\n\n- UmutKorkmaz (reporter and maintainer)\n\n## References\n\n- v2.1.1 CHANGELOG section: \u003chttps://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#211---2026-04-16\u003e\n- `docs/security-model.md` threat model: \u003chttps://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/blob/main/docs/security-model.md\u003e\n- `SECURITY.md` disclosure policy: \u003chttps://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/blob/main/SECURITY.md\u003e\n- AutoMapper CVE-2026-32933 (motivating precedent for Meridian\u0027s safety-defaults)",
  "id": "GHSA-f5v8-v6q3-q4h6",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T22:50:37Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T22:50:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/security/advisories/GHSA-f5v8-v6q3-q4h6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#211---2026-04-16"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/releases/tag/v2.1.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Meridian: Multiple defense-in-depth gaps (collection/depth caps, telemetry, retry, fan-out)"
}

GHSA-F65C-G26C-WPQ5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:05 – Updated: 2022-06-29 00:00
VLAI
Details

White Shark System (WSS) 1.3.2 has web site physical path leakage vulnerability.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-20470"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-209"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-21T05:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "White Shark System (WSS) 1.3.2 has web site physical path leakage vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-f65c-g26c-wpq5",
  "modified": "2022-06-29T00:00:30Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:05:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-20470"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/209.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/itodaro/WhiteSharkSystem_cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-F7M2-V72X-HHC4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-28 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:14
VLAI
Details

User enumeration is found in in PHPJabbers Make an Offer Widget v1.0. This issue occurs during password recovery, where a difference in messages could allow an attacker to determine if the user is valid or not, enabling a brute force attack with valid users.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-40767"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-28T13:15:10Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "User enumeration is found in in PHPJabbers Make an Offer Widget v1.0. This issue occurs during password recovery, where a difference in messages could allow an attacker to determine if the user is valid or not, enabling a brute force attack with valid users.",
  "id": "GHSA-f7m2-v72x-hhc4",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T07:14:33Z",
  "published": "2023-08-28T15:30:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40767"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://medium.com/%40mfortinsec/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-phpjabbers-part-3-40fc3565982f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://medium.com/@mfortinsec/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-phpjabbers-part-3-40fc3565982f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.phpjabbers.com/make-an-offer-widget"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-F7WF-V2VW-MPCX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 19:23 – Updated: 2026-07-17 19:23
VLAI
Summary
mcp-memory-keeper: Arbitrary local file read in context_import via unvalidated filePath
Details

Impact

context_import passed the caller-supplied filePath directly to fs.readFileSync with no path confinement. A malicious MCP client — or an LLM agent that is prompt-injected into calling the tool — could point filePath at any file readable by the server process, outside any session or export directory:

  • Full disclosure (JSON files): a valid-JSON target (e.g. another user's exported session, or a *.json credential / service-account file) is parsed and imported into the caller's session, then retrievable verbatim via context_get / context_export.
  • Partial disclosure (any file): for a non-JSON target (e.g. /etc/passwd, an SSH key, a .env), JSON.parse throws and V8 includes a snippet of the file's leading bytes in the SyntaxError message, which was returned verbatim to the caller.

Both ../ traversal and absolute paths worked — there was no path confinement of any kind.

In a typical MCP deployment the server runs on the developer's machine, so the reachable set includes other users' exported memory sessions, JSON credential/config files, and (in leading-bytes form) .env files, SSH keys, and /etc/passwd. The trigger is a tool argument, so the realistic threat model is an LLM agent prompt-injected into calling context_import, or any MCP client connected to the server.

Patches

Fixed in 0.13.0 (PR #36):

  • Imports are confined to a server-owned exports directory (<DATA_DIR>/exports, overridable via MEMORY_KEEPER_EXPORT_DIR), resolved with realpathSync. ../ traversal, absolute paths outside the directory, and symlink escapes are all rejected.
  • File read and JSON.parse are separate operations; read/parse failures return a generic message and never echo file bytes (the SyntaxError-message leak is gone). The database-write path is likewise generic.
  • An E2E security regression suite covers the reported arbitrary-read and traversal vectors, plus symlink escape, the directory-prefix boundary, and a no-existence-oracle check.

Workarounds

Upgrade to >= 0.13.0. There is no configuration-only workaround for affected versions.

Resources

  • Report: GitHub issue #35
  • Fix: PR #36

Credit

Reported by Zhihao Zhang (@mcfly-zzh).

Severity
6.2 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mcp-memory-keeper"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.13.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54561"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`context_import` passed the caller-supplied `filePath` directly to `fs.readFileSync` with no path confinement. A malicious MCP client \u2014 or an LLM agent that is prompt-injected into calling the tool \u2014 could point `filePath` at **any file readable by the server process**, outside any session or export directory:\n\n- **Full disclosure (JSON files):** a valid-JSON target (e.g. another user\u0027s exported session, or a `*.json` credential / service-account file) is parsed and imported into the caller\u0027s session, then retrievable verbatim via `context_get` / `context_export`.\n- **Partial disclosure (any file):** for a non-JSON target (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, an SSH key, a `.env`), `JSON.parse` throws and V8 includes a snippet of the file\u0027s leading bytes in the `SyntaxError` message, which was returned verbatim to the caller.\n\nBoth `../` traversal and absolute paths worked \u2014 there was no path confinement of any kind.\n\nIn a typical MCP deployment the server runs on the developer\u0027s machine, so the reachable set includes other users\u0027 exported memory sessions, JSON credential/config files, and (in leading-bytes form) `.env` files, SSH keys, and `/etc/passwd`. The trigger is a tool argument, so the realistic threat model is an LLM agent prompt-injected into calling `context_import`, or any MCP client connected to the server.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **0.13.0** (PR #36):\n\n- Imports are confined to a server-owned exports directory (`\u003cDATA_DIR\u003e/exports`, overridable via `MEMORY_KEEPER_EXPORT_DIR`), resolved with `realpathSync`. `../` traversal, absolute paths outside the directory, and symlink escapes are all rejected.\n- File read and `JSON.parse` are separate operations; read/parse failures return a generic message and never echo file bytes (the `SyntaxError`-message leak is gone). The database-write path is likewise generic.\n- An E2E security regression suite covers the reported arbitrary-read and traversal vectors, plus symlink escape, the directory-prefix boundary, and a no-existence-oracle check.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to **`\u003e= 0.13.0`**. There is no configuration-only workaround for affected versions.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Report: GitHub issue #35\n- Fix: PR #36\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Zhihao Zhang ([@mcfly-zzh](https://github.com/mcfly-zzh)).",
  "id": "GHSA-f7wf-v2vw-mpcx",
  "modified": "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
  "published": "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/security/advisories/GHSA-f7wf-v2vw-mpcx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/issues/35"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/pull/36"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/commit/84f6dfa692736a34ff36e2d2cf2188b71facf73b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/releases/tag/v0.13.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "mcp-memory-keeper: Arbitrary local file read in context_import via unvalidated filePath"
}

GHSA-F82G-WM67-P9RW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-04 21:32 – Updated: 2025-02-04 21:32
VLAI
Details

IBM Security Verify Access Appliance and Container 10.0.0 through 10.0.8 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned. This information could be used in further attacks against the system.

Severity
2.7 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-45658"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-04T21:15:26Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "IBM Security Verify Access Appliance and Container 10.0.0 through 10.0.8 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned. This information could be used in further attacks against the system.",
  "id": "GHSA-f82g-wm67-p9rw",
  "modified": "2025-02-04T21:32:29Z",
  "published": "2025-02-04T21:32:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45658"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7182386"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FC5F-GC6J-GFHF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-16 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:42
VLAI
Details

The Vrm 360 3D Model Viewer WordPress plugin through 1.2.1 exposes the full path of a file when putting in a non-existent file in a parameter of the shortcode.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-5177"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-16T20:15:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Vrm 360 3D Model Viewer WordPress plugin through 1.2.1 exposes the full path of a file when putting in a non-existent file in a parameter of the shortcode.",
  "id": "GHSA-fc5f-gc6j-gfhf",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T08:42:04Z",
  "published": "2023-10-16T21:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5177"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/a67b9c21-a35a-4cdb-9627-a5932334e5f0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FC8R-R2V5-2W2V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-17 15:32
VLAI
Details

HCL Aftermarket EPC is vulnerable to attack since the application returns detailed error messages that leak information about the processing on the server. An attacker may use the contents of error messages to help launch another ,more focused attack.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-23575"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T14:17:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "HCL Aftermarket EPC is vulnerable to attack since the application returns detailed error messages that leak information about the processing on the server. An attacker may use the contents of error messages to help launch another ,more focused attack.",
  "id": "GHSA-fc8r-r2v5-2w2v",
  "modified": "2026-07-17T15:32:30Z",
  "published": "2026-07-17T15:32:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23575"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.hcl-software.com/csm?id=kb_article\u0026sysparm_article=KB0132294"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FFPX-JJRF-CQGH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-08 12:31 – Updated: 2025-10-18 03:30
VLAI
Details

Improper error handling vulnerability in versions prior to 4.7.0 of Quiter Gateway by Quiter. This vulnerability allows an attacker to send malformed payloads to generate error messages containing sensitive information.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-40718"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-08T12:15:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper error handling vulnerability in versions prior to 4.7.0 of Quiter Gateway by Quiter. This vulnerability allows an attacker to send malformed payloads to generate error messages containing sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-ffpx-jjrf-cqgh",
  "modified": "2025-10-18T03:30:24Z",
  "published": "2025-07-08T12:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40718"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-quiterweb-autoweb-quiter"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FGP2-H88C-M594

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-16 21:32 – Updated: 2024-08-16 21:32
VLAI
Details

IBM QRadar Suite Software 1.10.12.0 through 1.10.22.0 and IBM Cloud Pak for Security 1.10.0.0 through 1.10.11.0 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the request. This information could be used in further attacks against the system. IBM X-Force ID: 272201.

Severity
4.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-47728"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-16T20:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM QRadar Suite Software 1.10.12.0 through 1.10.22.0 and IBM Cloud Pak for Security 1.10.0.0 through 1.10.11.0 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the request.  This information could be used in further attacks against the system.  IBM X-Force ID:  272201.",
  "id": "GHSA-fgp2-h88c-m594",
  "modified": "2024-08-16T21:32:36Z",
  "published": "2024-08-16T21:32:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47728"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/272201"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7161427"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FH26-FRGR-HXXC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-10 15:31 – Updated: 2025-07-10 15:31
VLAI
Details

IBM Analytics Content Hub 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the browser.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-37524"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-10T15:15:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Analytics Content Hub 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the browser.",
  "id": "GHSA-fh26-frgr-hxxc",
  "modified": "2025-07-10T15:31:28Z",
  "published": "2025-07-10T15:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37524"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7234122"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
Mitigation
Implementation

Handle exceptions internally and do not display errors containing potentially sensitive information to a user.

Mitigation MIT-33
Implementation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.

Mitigation MIT-40
Implementation Build and Compilation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.

Mitigation MIT-40
Implementation Build and Compilation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.

Mitigation
System Configuration

Where available, configure the environment to use less verbose error messages. For example, in PHP, disable the display_errors setting during configuration, or at runtime using the error_reporting() function.

Mitigation
System Configuration

Create default error pages or messages that do not leak any information.

CAPEC-215: Fuzzing for application mapping

An attacker sends random, malformed, or otherwise unexpected messages to a target application and observes the application's log or error messages returned. The attacker does not initially know how a target will respond to individual messages but by attempting a large number of message variants they may find a variant that trigger's desired behavior. In this attack, the purpose of the fuzzing is to observe the application's log and error messages, although fuzzing a target can also sometimes cause the target to enter an unstable state, causing a crash.

CAPEC-463: Padding Oracle Crypto Attack

An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.

CAPEC-54: Query System for Information

An adversary, aware of an application's location (and possibly authorized to use the application), probes an application's structure and evaluates its robustness by submitting requests and examining responses. Often, this is accomplished by sending variants of expected queries in the hope that these modified queries might return information beyond what the expected set of queries would provide.

CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection

Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.

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