Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-204

Allowed

Observable Response Discrepancy

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product provides different responses to incoming requests in a way that reveals internal state information to an unauthorized actor outside of the intended control sphere.

326 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-989F-FH5X-8JW4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-31 18:32 – Updated: 2025-07-31 18:32
VLAI
Details

OPEXUS FOIAXpress Public Access Link (PAL) version v11.1.0 allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to query the /App/CreateRequest.aspx endpoint to check for the existence of valid usernames. There are no rate-limiting mechanisms in place.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-54834"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-204"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-31T18:15:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "OPEXUS FOIAXpress Public Access Link (PAL) version v11.1.0 allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to query the /App/CreateRequest.aspx endpoint to check for the existence of valid usernames. There are no rate-limiting mechanisms in place.",
  "id": "GHSA-989f-fh5x-8jw4",
  "modified": "2025-07-31T18:32:04Z",
  "published": "2025-07-31T18:32:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54834"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.opexustech.com/docs/foiaxpress/11.12.0/FOIAXpress_Release_notes_11.12.3.0.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/CSAF/develop/csaf_files/IT/white/2025/va-25-174-01.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-54834"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9HX9-Q6RP-5GWC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-30 09:32 – Updated: 2024-09-07 00:31
VLAI
Details

Matrix Tafnit v8

CWE-204: Observable Response Discrepancy

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-38431"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-203",
      "CWE-204"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-30T09:15:03Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Matrix\u00a0Tafnit v8\n\n - \n\nCWE-204: Observable Response Discrepancy",
  "id": "GHSA-9hx9-q6rp-5gwc",
  "modified": "2024-09-07T00:31:28Z",
  "published": "2024-07-30T09:32:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38431"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/faq/cve_advisories"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9QRW-6V85-2PPR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-19 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:44
VLAI
Details

User enumeration vulnerability in Arconte Áurea 1.5.0.0 version. The exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to obtain a list of registered users in the application, obtaining the necessary information to perform more complex attacks on the platform.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-4095"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-203",
      "CWE-204"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-09-19T14:15:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "User enumeration vulnerability in Arconte \u00c1urea 1.5.0.0 version. The exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to obtain a list of registered users in the application, obtaining the necessary information to perform more complex attacks on the platform.",
  "id": "GHSA-9qrw-6v85-2ppr",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T07:44:04Z",
  "published": "2023-09-19T15:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4095"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-fujitsu-arconte-aurea"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-C22H-WWM4-7X2J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-29 21:30 – Updated: 2025-11-11 21:30
VLAI
Details

Trivision NC-227WF firmware 5.80 (build 20141010) login mechanism reveals whether a username exists or not by returning different error messages ("Unknown user" vs. "Wrong password"), allowing an attacker to enumerate valid usernames.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-56764"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-204",
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-29T20:15:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Trivision NC-227WF firmware 5.80 (build 20141010) login mechanism reveals whether a username exists or not by returning different error messages (\"Unknown user\" vs. \"Wrong password\"), allowing an attacker to enumerate valid usernames.",
  "id": "GHSA-c22h-wwm4-7x2j",
  "modified": "2025-11-11T21:30:27Z",
  "published": "2025-09-29T21:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56764"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Remenis/CVE-2025-56764"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Remenis/CVE-2025-56764-trivision-nc227wf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-C27J-76XG-6X4F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-18 21:16 – Updated: 2022-10-18 21:16
VLAI
Summary
Kirby CMS vulnerable to user enumeration in the brute force protection
Details

TL;DR

This vulnerability affects all Kirby sites with user accounts (unless Kirby's API and Panel are disabled in the config). It can only be exploited for targeted attacks because the attack does not scale to brute force.

Introduction

User enumeration is a type of vulnerability that allows attackers to confirm which users are registered in a Kirby installation. This information can be abused for social engineering attacks against users of the site or to find out the organizational structure of the company.

User enumeration attacks are performed by entering an existing and a non-existing user into the email address field of the login form. If the system returns a different response or behaves differently depending on whether the user exists, the attacker can enter unknown email addresses and use the different behavior as a clue for the (non-)existing user.

Impact

Kirby comes with a built-in brute force protection. By default, it will prevent further login attempts after 10 failed logins from a single IP address or of a single existing user. After every failed login attempt, Kirby inserts a random delay between one millisecond and two seconds to make automated attacks harder and to avoid leaking whether the user exists. Unfortunately, this random delay was not inserted after the brute force limit was reached.

Because Kirby only tracks failed login attempts per email address for existing users but always tracks failed login attempts per IP address, this behavior could be abused by attackers for user enumeration. For this to work, an attacker would need to create login requests beyond the trials limit (which is 10 by default) from two or more IP addresses. After the trials limit was reached, the login form immediately blocked further requests for existing users, but not for invalid users.

This exploit does not scale to brute force attacks because of the delay during the first 10 requests per user, the faint difference between the responses for valid and invalid users and the fact that code-based logins would send an email for every login attempt, which makes the attack easy to spot. The vulnerability is therefore only relevant for targeted attacks.

Patches

The problem has been patched in Kirby 3.5.8.2, Kirby 3.6.6.2, Kirby 3.7.5.1 and Kirby 3.8.1. Please update to one of these or a later version to fix the vulnerability.

In all of the mentioned releases, we have rewritten the affected code so that the delay is also inserted after the brute force limit is reached.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getkirby/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.5.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getkirby/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.6.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getkirby/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.5.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getkirby/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "3.8.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-39315"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-204",
      "CWE-209",
      "CWE-668"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-18T21:16:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-10-25T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### TL;DR\n\nThis vulnerability affects all Kirby sites with user accounts (unless Kirby\u0027s API and Panel are disabled in the config). It can only be exploited for targeted attacks because the attack does not scale to brute force.\n\n----\n\n### Introduction\n\nUser enumeration is a type of vulnerability that allows attackers to confirm which users are registered in a Kirby installation. This information can be abused for social engineering attacks against users of the site or to find out the organizational structure of the company.\n\nUser enumeration attacks are performed by entering an existing and a non-existing user into the email address field of the login form. If the system returns a different response or behaves differently depending on whether the user exists, the attacker can enter unknown email addresses and use the different behavior as a clue for the (non-)existing user.\n\n### Impact\n\nKirby comes with a built-in brute force protection. By default, it will prevent further login attempts after 10 failed logins from a single IP address or of a single existing user. After every failed login attempt, Kirby inserts a random delay between one millisecond and two seconds to make automated attacks harder and to avoid leaking whether the user exists. Unfortunately, this random delay was not inserted after the brute force limit was reached.\n\nBecause Kirby only tracks failed login attempts per email address for existing users but always tracks failed login attempts per IP address, this behavior could be abused by attackers for user enumeration. For this to work, an attacker would need to create login requests beyond the trials limit (which is 10 by default) from two or more IP addresses. After the trials limit was reached, the login form immediately blocked further requests for existing users, but not for invalid users.\n\nThis exploit does not scale to brute force attacks because of the delay during the first 10 requests per user, the faint difference between the responses for valid and invalid users and the fact that code-based logins would send an email for every login attempt, which makes the attack easy to spot. The vulnerability is therefore only relevant for targeted attacks.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem has been patched in [Kirby 3.5.8.2](https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/3.5.8.2), [Kirby 3.6.6.2](https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/3.6.6.2), [Kirby 3.7.5.1](https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/3.7.5.1) and [Kirby 3.8.1](https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/3.8.1). Please update to one of these or a [later version](https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases) to fix the vulnerability.\n\nIn all of the mentioned releases, we have rewritten the affected code so that the delay is also inserted after the brute force limit is reached.",
  "id": "GHSA-c27j-76xg-6x4f",
  "modified": "2022-10-18T21:16:27Z",
  "published": "2022-10-18T21:16:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/security/advisories/GHSA-c27j-76xg-6x4f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39315"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getkirby/kirby"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/3.5.8.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/3.6.6.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/3.7.5.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/3.8.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kirby CMS vulnerable to user enumeration in the brute force protection"
}

GHSA-C55Q-HCV9-5P27

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-02 18:30 – Updated: 2025-04-02 18:30
VLAI
Details

IBM TXSeries for Multiplatforms 9.1 and 11.1 could allow an attacker to enumerate usernames due to an observable login attempt response discrepancy.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-56476"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-204"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-02T16:17:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM TXSeries for Multiplatforms 9.1 and 11.1 could allow an attacker to enumerate usernames due to an observable login attempt response discrepancy.",
  "id": "GHSA-c55q-hcv9-5p27",
  "modified": "2025-04-02T18:30:51Z",
  "published": "2025-04-02T18:30:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56476"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7229880"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-C967-2652-GFJM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-06 15:23 – Updated: 2024-03-14 21:43
VLAI
Summary
CasaOS Username Enumeration
Details

Summary

The Casa OS Login page has disclosed the username enumeration vulnerability in the login page.

Details

It is observed that the attacker can enumerate the CasaOS username using the application response. If the username is incorrect application gives the error "User does not exist", If the password is incorrect application gives the error "Invalid password".

PoC

Capture the login request in a tool like Burp Suit and use the intruder tab for trying multiple usernames. Keep checking the response of each request if the response says Invalid password then the username is right.

Impact

Using this error attacker can enumerate the username of CasaOS.

The logic behind the issue

If the username is incorrect, then throw an error "User does not exist" else throw an error "Invalid password".

This condition can be vice versa like:

If the password is incorrect, then throw an error "Invalid password" else throw an error "User does not exist".

Mitigation

Since this is the condition we have to implement a single error which can be "Username/Password is Incorrect!!!"

Severity
6.2 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/IceWhaleTech/CasaOS-UserService"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.4.4.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-24766"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-204"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-06T15:23:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-06T19:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Casa OS Login page has disclosed the username enumeration vulnerability in the login page.\n\n### Details\n\nIt is observed that the attacker can enumerate the CasaOS username using the application response. If the username is incorrect application gives the error \"**User does not exist**\",  If the password is incorrect application gives the error \"**Invalid password**\". \n\n### PoC\n\nCapture the login request in a tool like Burp Suit and use the intruder tab for trying multiple usernames. \nKeep checking the response of each request if the response says **Invalid password** then the username is right.\n\n### Impact\n\nUsing this error attacker can enumerate the username of CasaOS. \n\n### The logic behind the issue\n\nIf the username is incorrect, then throw an error \"User does not exist\" else throw an error \"Invalid password\".\n\nThis condition can be vice versa like:\n\nIf the password is incorrect, then throw an error \"Invalid password\" else throw an error \"User does not exist\".\n\n### Mitigation\n\nSince this is the condition we have to implement a single error which can be \"Username/Password is Incorrect!!!\"\n\n\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-c967-2652-gfjm",
  "modified": "2024-03-14T21:43:21Z",
  "published": "2024-03-06T15:23:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/IceWhaleTech/CasaOS-UserService/security/advisories/GHSA-c967-2652-gfjm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24766"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/IceWhaleTech/CasaOS-UserService/commit/c75063d7ca5800948e9c09c0a6efe9809b5d39f7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/IceWhaleTech/CasaOS-UserService"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/IceWhaleTech/CasaOS-UserService/releases/tag/v0.4.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CasaOS Username Enumeration"
}

GHSA-CHGM-3698-JM42

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 21:56 – Updated: 2026-08-04 21:56
VLAI
Summary
Ghost: Member existence leak via magic link sign-in response
Details

Impact

A discrepancy in responses from the members signin endpoints made it possible for an unauthenticated attacker to determine whether a given email address belongs to a registered member of a Ghost site.

Vulnerable versions

This vulnerability is present in Ghost from v5.18.0 up to v6.21.0.

Patches

v6.21.1 contains a fix for this issue.

How to update

For self-hosters using Docker, find Docker's official Ghost image here. Updating a Docker-based Ghost instance is documented here.

If your Ghost is a Ghost-CLI install see our documentation on updating it to the latest version here.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Ghost at security@ghost.org.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 6.21.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ghost"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.18.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.21.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53947"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-204"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-04T21:56:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T19:17:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA discrepancy in responses from the members signin endpoints made it possible for an unauthenticated attacker to determine whether a given email address belongs to a registered member of a Ghost site.\n\n### Vulnerable versions\n\nThis vulnerability is present in Ghost from v5.18.0 up to v6.21.0.\n\n### Patches\n\nv6.21.1 contains a fix for this issue.\n\n### How to update\n\nFor self-hosters using Docker, find [Docker\u0027s official Ghost image here](https://hub.docker.com/_/ghost). Updating a Docker-based Ghost instance [is documented here](https://docs.ghost.org/install/docker#updating-ghost). \n\nIf your Ghost is a Ghost-CLI install see our documentation on [updating it to the latest version here](https://docs.ghost.org/update). \n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Ghost at [security@ghost.org](mailto:security@ghost.org).",
  "id": "GHSA-chgm-3698-jm42",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T21:56:13Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T21:56:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/security/advisories/GHSA-chgm-3698-jm42"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53947"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/pull/26752"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/commit/fb2bb634653d99de68fc42d415721d755284fe30"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/releases/tag/v6.21.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ghost: Member existence leak via magic link sign-in response"
}

GHSA-CJR5-M69M-F39C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-10 12:31
VLAI
Details

A user enumeration vulnerability in bluewave-labs/Checkmate through 2.1.0 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to determine whether a given email address is registered. The POST /api/v1/auth/recovery/request endpoint returns HTTP 200 for registered email addresses and a different status code for unregistered ones, enabling attackers to enumerate valid user accounts.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72588"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-204"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T11:17:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A user enumeration vulnerability in bluewave-labs/Checkmate through 2.1.0 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to determine whether a given email address is registered. The POST /api/v1/auth/recovery/request endpoint returns HTTP 200 for registered email addresses and a different status code for unregistered ones, enabling attackers to enumerate valid user accounts.",
  "id": "GHSA-cjr5-m69m-f39c",
  "modified": "2026-08-10T12:31:53Z",
  "published": "2026-08-10T12:31:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72588"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bluewave-labs/Checkmate"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CR7P-CR3Q-H5CM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:43 – Updated: 2026-08-12 18:56
VLAI
Summary
Budibase: Account Enumeration via Login Lockout Response Differential
Details

Summary

The login lockout mechanism in Budibase creates an observable response discrepancy that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid email addresses. When an existing user's account is locked after 5 failed login attempts, the server returns a distinct 403 response with X-Account-Locked: 1 and Retry-After: 900 headers plus the message "Account temporarily locked." For non-existing users, the response is always a generic 403 "Unauthorized" regardless of attempt count, because the lockout counter is never incremented.

Details

The vulnerability exists in two files that implement the login lockout feature:

packages/worker/src/middleware/lockout.ts:18-36 — The lockout middleware only blocks requests for users that exist in the database AND are locked:

export default async (ctx: Ctx, next: Next) => {
  const email = ctx.request.body.username
  if (!email) {
    return await next()
  }
  const dbUser = await userSdk.db.getUserByEmail(email)
  if (dbUser && (await isLocked(email))) {  // line 26: non-existing users skip this entirely
    ctx.set("X-Account-Locked", "1")
    ctx.set("Retry-After", String(env.LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS))
    ctx.throw(403, "Account temporarily locked. Try again later.")
  }
  return await next()
}

packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts:127-141 — The login handler only increments the failure counter for existing users:

if (err || !user) {
  if (dbUser) {          // line 129: non-existing users never trigger onFailed()
    await onFailed(email)
  }
  if (await isLocked(email)) {
    return handleLockoutResponse(ctx, email)
  }
  // ...
  return passportCallback(ctx, user as any, err, info)
}

Execution flow for existing users (after 5 failed attempts): 1. lockout middleware → getUserByEmail returns user → isLocked returns true → 403 + X-Account-Locked: 1 + Retry-After: 900 + "Account temporarily locked"

Execution flow for non-existing users (any number of attempts): 1. lockout middleware → getUserByEmail returns null → dbUser && isLocked is false → passes through 2. Login handler → passport fails → if (dbUser) is false → onFailed() never called → lock never set 3. Always returns 403 "Unauthorized"

No IP-based rate limiting exists on the login endpoint (POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login). The route is registered via loggedInRoutes which applies no authentication middleware. The password reset endpoint has proper IP-based rate limiting, but the login endpoint does not.

PoC

# Test against a known-existing email and a non-existing email
# Replace 'default' with the target tenant ID

# Step 1: Send 6 login attempts for an existing user
echo "=== Testing existing user ==="
for i in $(seq 1 6); do
  echo "--- Attempt $i ---"
  curl -s -D - -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"username":"local@budibase.com","password":"wrongpassword"}' 2>&1 \
    | grep -E 'HTTP/|X-Account-Locked|Retry-After|locked|Unauthorized'
  echo ""
done

# Expected: Attempts 1-5 return "Unauthorized"
# Attempt 6 returns: "Account temporarily locked" + X-Account-Locked: 1 + Retry-After: 900

# Step 2: Send 6 login attempts for a non-existing user
echo "=== Testing non-existing user ==="
for i in $(seq 1 6); do
  echo "--- Attempt $i ---"
  curl -s -D - -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"username":"nonexistent@example.com","password":"wrongpassword"}' 2>&1 \
    | grep -E 'HTTP/|X-Account-Locked|Retry-After|locked|Unauthorized'
  echo ""
done

# Expected: All 6 attempts return "Unauthorized" — no lockout ever triggers

# The difference in behavior after 5 attempts confirms whether the email exists.

Impact

  • Account enumeration: An unauthenticated attacker can determine whether any email address is registered on a Budibase tenant by sending 5-6 login requests and observing whether the response changes to "Account temporarily locked" with the X-Account-Locked header.
  • No rate limiting: The login endpoint has no IP-based rate limiting, allowing an attacker to enumerate emails at high speed from a single IP address (~5 requests per email).
  • Denial of service side-effect: Each enumerated existing email is locked out for 15 minutes (900 seconds), preventing legitimate users from logging in during that window.
  • Enables further attacks: Confirmed valid emails can be used for targeted phishing, credential stuffing against other services, or social engineering.

Recommended Fix

The lockout behavior should be identical regardless of whether the user exists. Apply lockout tracking based on the email string itself, not conditioned on database user existence:

packages/worker/src/middleware/lockout.ts — Remove the dbUser check:

export default async (ctx: Ctx, next: Next) => {
  const email = ctx.request.body.username
  if (!email) {
    return await next()
  }
  // Check lock status based on email alone, not user existence
  if (await isLocked(email)) {
    ctx.set("X-Account-Locked", "1")
    ctx.set("Retry-After", String(env.LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS))
    ctx.throw(403, "Account temporarily locked. Try again later.")
  }
  return await next()
}

packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts — Remove the dbUser guard around onFailed:

if (err || !user) {
  // Always increment failure counter regardless of user existence
  await onFailed(email)
  if (await isLocked(email)) {
    return handleLockoutResponse(ctx, email)
  }
  // ...
}

Additionally, consider adding IP-based rate limiting to the login endpoint (similar to what already exists on the password reset endpoint) to limit enumeration throughput.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.38.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73306"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-204"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:43:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe login lockout mechanism in Budibase creates an observable response discrepancy that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid email addresses. When an existing user\u0027s account is locked after 5 failed login attempts, the server returns a distinct `403` response with `X-Account-Locked: 1` and `Retry-After: 900` headers plus the message \"Account temporarily locked.\" For non-existing users, the response is always a generic `403 \"Unauthorized\"` regardless of attempt count, because the lockout counter is never incremented.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in two files that implement the login lockout feature:\n\n**`packages/worker/src/middleware/lockout.ts:18-36`** \u2014 The lockout middleware only blocks requests for users that exist in the database AND are locked:\n\n```typescript\nexport default async (ctx: Ctx, next: Next) =\u003e {\n  const email = ctx.request.body.username\n  if (!email) {\n    return await next()\n  }\n  const dbUser = await userSdk.db.getUserByEmail(email)\n  if (dbUser \u0026\u0026 (await isLocked(email))) {  // line 26: non-existing users skip this entirely\n    ctx.set(\"X-Account-Locked\", \"1\")\n    ctx.set(\"Retry-After\", String(env.LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS))\n    ctx.throw(403, \"Account temporarily locked. Try again later.\")\n  }\n  return await next()\n}\n```\n\n**`packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts:127-141`** \u2014 The login handler only increments the failure counter for existing users:\n\n```typescript\nif (err || !user) {\n  if (dbUser) {          // line 129: non-existing users never trigger onFailed()\n    await onFailed(email)\n  }\n  if (await isLocked(email)) {\n    return handleLockoutResponse(ctx, email)\n  }\n  // ...\n  return passportCallback(ctx, user as any, err, info)\n}\n```\n\n**Execution flow for existing users (after 5 failed attempts):**\n1. `lockout` middleware \u2192 `getUserByEmail` returns user \u2192 `isLocked` returns true \u2192 403 + `X-Account-Locked: 1` + `Retry-After: 900` + \"Account temporarily locked\"\n\n**Execution flow for non-existing users (any number of attempts):**\n1. `lockout` middleware \u2192 `getUserByEmail` returns null \u2192 `dbUser \u0026\u0026 isLocked` is false \u2192 passes through\n2. Login handler \u2192 passport fails \u2192 `if (dbUser)` is false \u2192 `onFailed()` never called \u2192 lock never set\n3. Always returns 403 \"Unauthorized\"\n\nNo IP-based rate limiting exists on the login endpoint (`POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login`). The route is registered via `loggedInRoutes` which applies no authentication middleware. The password reset endpoint has proper IP-based rate limiting, but the login endpoint does not.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Test against a known-existing email and a non-existing email\n# Replace \u0027default\u0027 with the target tenant ID\n\n# Step 1: Send 6 login attempts for an existing user\necho \"=== Testing existing user ===\"\nfor i in $(seq 1 6); do\n  echo \"--- Attempt $i ---\"\n  curl -s -D - -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \\\n    -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \u0027{\"username\":\"local@budibase.com\",\"password\":\"wrongpassword\"}\u0027 2\u003e\u00261 \\\n    | grep -E \u0027HTTP/|X-Account-Locked|Retry-After|locked|Unauthorized\u0027\n  echo \"\"\ndone\n\n# Expected: Attempts 1-5 return \"Unauthorized\"\n# Attempt 6 returns: \"Account temporarily locked\" + X-Account-Locked: 1 + Retry-After: 900\n\n# Step 2: Send 6 login attempts for a non-existing user\necho \"=== Testing non-existing user ===\"\nfor i in $(seq 1 6); do\n  echo \"--- Attempt $i ---\"\n  curl -s -D - -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \\\n    -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \u0027{\"username\":\"nonexistent@example.com\",\"password\":\"wrongpassword\"}\u0027 2\u003e\u00261 \\\n    | grep -E \u0027HTTP/|X-Account-Locked|Retry-After|locked|Unauthorized\u0027\n  echo \"\"\ndone\n\n# Expected: All 6 attempts return \"Unauthorized\" \u2014 no lockout ever triggers\n\n# The difference in behavior after 5 attempts confirms whether the email exists.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Account enumeration**: An unauthenticated attacker can determine whether any email address is registered on a Budibase tenant by sending 5-6 login requests and observing whether the response changes to \"Account temporarily locked\" with the `X-Account-Locked` header.\n- **No rate limiting**: The login endpoint has no IP-based rate limiting, allowing an attacker to enumerate emails at high speed from a single IP address (~5 requests per email).\n- **Denial of service side-effect**: Each enumerated existing email is locked out for 15 minutes (900 seconds), preventing legitimate users from logging in during that window.\n- **Enables further attacks**: Confirmed valid emails can be used for targeted phishing, credential stuffing against other services, or social engineering.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nThe lockout behavior should be identical regardless of whether the user exists. Apply lockout tracking based on the email string itself, not conditioned on database user existence:\n\n**`packages/worker/src/middleware/lockout.ts`** \u2014 Remove the `dbUser` check:\n\n```typescript\nexport default async (ctx: Ctx, next: Next) =\u003e {\n  const email = ctx.request.body.username\n  if (!email) {\n    return await next()\n  }\n  // Check lock status based on email alone, not user existence\n  if (await isLocked(email)) {\n    ctx.set(\"X-Account-Locked\", \"1\")\n    ctx.set(\"Retry-After\", String(env.LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS))\n    ctx.throw(403, \"Account temporarily locked. Try again later.\")\n  }\n  return await next()\n}\n```\n\n**`packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts`** \u2014 Remove the `dbUser` guard around `onFailed`:\n\n```typescript\nif (err || !user) {\n  // Always increment failure counter regardless of user existence\n  await onFailed(email)\n  if (await isLocked(email)) {\n    return handleLockoutResponse(ctx, email)\n  }\n  // ...\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, consider adding IP-based rate limiting to the login endpoint (similar to what already exists on the password reset endpoint) to limit enumeration throughput.",
  "id": "GHSA-cr7p-cr3q-h5cm",
  "modified": "2026-08-12T18:56:22Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T21:43:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-cr7p-cr3q-h5cm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19108"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/eaae816ab81615c07eb10e4619af078d00e2a706"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.25"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": " Budibase: Account Enumeration via Login Lockout Response Differential"
}
Mitigation MIT-46
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

  • Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
  • Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
CAPEC-331: ICMP IP Total Length Field Probe

An adversary sends a UDP packet to a closed port on the target machine to solicit an IP Header's total length field value within the echoed 'Port Unreachable" error message. This type of behavior is useful for building a signature-base of operating system responses, particularly when error messages contain other types of information that is useful identifying specific operating system responses.

CAPEC-332: ICMP IP 'ID' Field Error Message Probe

An adversary sends a UDP datagram having an assigned value to its internet identification field (ID) to a closed port on a target to observe the manner in which this bit is echoed back in the ICMP error message. This allows the attacker to construct a fingerprint of specific OS behaviors.

CAPEC-541: Application Fingerprinting

An adversary engages in fingerprinting activities to determine the type or version of an application installed on a remote target.

CAPEC-580: System Footprinting

An adversary engages in active probing and exploration activities to determine security information about a remote target system. Often times adversaries will rely on remote applications that can be probed for system configurations.

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