CVE-2026-72860 (GCVE-0-2026-72860)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-20 21:35 – Updated: 2026-09-24 14:19
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
9router Server-Side Request Forgery via /api/provider-nodes/validate Because the IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Denylist Check Is Unreachable
Summary
The POST /api/provider-nodes/validate route in 9router takes a caller-supplied baseUrl and issues server-side HTTP requests to it, guarding the destination with assertPublicUrl from src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js. That guard compares hostname strings only: it resolves no DNS, does not revalidate after a redirect, and its IPv4-mapped IPv6 branch is unreachable. The branch matches ^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$, but the WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes such literals to hextets before the guard runs, so new URL("http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/").hostname yields [::ffff:7f00:1] and the pattern is tested against a string it is never handed. Every IPv4-mapped address therefore passes, and http://[::ffff:7f00:1] and http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] reach loopback and link-local metadata addresses; a hostname whose A record points at an internal address passes as well because no resolution occurs. In the custom-embedding branch the upstream response body is truncated to 200 bytes and returned to the caller whenever the upstream status is neither 2xx nor 401 nor 403, which discloses the beginning of internal responses, and the other validation types remain usable for blind internal port scanning through status and timing differences. The caller-supplied apiKey is forwarded to the internal destination as an Authorization Bearer header. A dashboard session is required by default, and none is required when requireLogin is disabled.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-25 15:26 UTC
Assigner
References
6 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/decolua/9router/issues/3293 | issue-tracking |
| https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/sr… | technical-description |
| https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/sr… | technical-description |
| https://github.com/decolua/9router/pull/3370 | issue-tracking |
| https://github.com/decolua/9router | product |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/9router-serv… | third-party-advisory |
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-08-14 00:00
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{
"name": "VulnCheck Advisory: 9router Server-Side Request Forgery via /api/provider-nodes/validate Because the IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Denylist Check Is Unreachable",
"tags": [
"third-party-advisory"
],
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/9router-server-side-request-forgery-via-api-provider-nodes-validate-because-the-ipv4-mapped-ipv6-denylist-check-is-unreachable"
}
],
"title": "9router Server-Side Request Forgery via /api/provider-nodes/validate Because the IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Denylist Check Is Unreachable",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "vulncheck-endgame"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
"assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-72860",
"datePublished": "2026-08-20T21:35:14.677Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-10T15:16:31.372Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-24T14:19:04.082Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.