CVE-2025-15574 (GCVE-0-2025-15574)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-12 10:58 – Updated: 2026-02-12 15:15
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Insecure Credential Generation for Solax Power Pocket WiFi models MQTT Cloud Connection
Summary
When connecting to the Solax Cloud MQTT server the username is the "registration number", which is the 10 character string printed on the SolaX Power Pocket device / the QR code on the device. The password is derived from the "registration number" using a proprietary XOR/transposition algorithm. Attackers with the knowledge of the registration numbers can connect to the MQTT server and impersonate the dongle / inverters.
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-02-12 15:15 UTC
CWE
- CWE-330 - Use of Insufficiently Random Values
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://r.sec-consult.com/solax |
Impacted products
5 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SolaX Power | Pocket WiFi 3.0 |
Affected:
<3.022.03
|
guessed | |
| SolaX Power | Pocket WiFi+LAN |
Affected:
<1.009.02
|
guessed | |
| SolaX Power | Pocket WiFi+4GM |
Affected:
<1.005.05
|
guessed | |
| SolaX Power | Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0 |
Affected:
<006.06
|
guessed | |
| SolaX Power | Pocket WiFi 4.0 |
Affected:
<003.03
|
guessed |
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They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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