CVE-2017-13718 (GCVE-0-2017-13718)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2019-06-10 21:31 – Updated: 2024-08-05 19:05
VLAI
Summary
The HTTP API supported by Starry Station (aka Starry Router) allows brute forcing the PIN setup by the user on the device, and this allows an attacker to change the Wi-Fi settings and PIN, as well as port forward and expose any internal device's port to the Internet. It was identified that the device uses custom Python code called "rodman" that allows the mobile appication to interact with the device. The APIs that are a part of this rodman Python file allow the mobile application to interact with the device using a secret, which is a uuid4 based session identifier generated by the device the first time it is set up. However, in some cases, these APIs can also use a security code. This security code is nothing but the PIN number set by the user to interact with the device when using the touch interface on the router. This allows an attacker on the Internet to interact with the router's HTTP interface when a user navigates to the attacker's website, and brute force the credentials. Also, since the device's server sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header to "*", an attacker can easily interact with the JSON payload returned by the device and steal sensitive information about the device.
Severity
8.0 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE
  • n/a
Assigner
mitre CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard E 29/100 over 2158 records in the last 180 days details
References
Date Public
2019-06-07 00:00
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2024-08-05T19:05:19.921Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
          "shortName": "CVE"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "name": "20190609 Newly releases IoT security issues",
            "tags": [
              "mailing-list",
              "x_refsource_BUGTRAQ",
              "x_transferred"
            ],
            "url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Jun/8"
          },
          {
            "tags": [
              "x_refsource_MISC",
              "x_transferred"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/ethanhunnt/IoT_vulnerabilities/blob/master/Starry_sec_issues.pdf"
          },
          {
            "tags": [
              "x_refsource_MISC",
              "x_transferred"
            ],
            "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153240/Starry-Router-Camera-PIN-Brute-Force-CORS-Incorrect.html"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "n/a",
          "vendor": "n/a",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "n/a"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2019-06-07T00:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "The HTTP API supported by Starry Station (aka Starry Router) allows brute forcing the PIN setup by the user on the device, and this allows an attacker to change the Wi-Fi settings and PIN, as well as port forward and expose any internal device\u0027s port to the Internet. It was identified that the device uses custom Python code called \"rodman\" that allows the mobile appication to interact with the device. The APIs that are a part of this rodman Python file allow the mobile application to interact with the device using a secret, which is a uuid4 based session identifier generated by the device the first time it is set up. However, in some cases, these APIs can also use a security code. This security code is nothing but the PIN number set by the user to interact with the device when using the touch interface on the router. This allows an attacker on the Internet to interact with the router\u0027s HTTP interface when a user navigates to the attacker\u0027s website, and brute force the credentials. Also, since the device\u0027s server sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header to \"*\", an attacker can easily interact with the JSON payload returned by the device and steal sensitive information about the device."
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "description": "n/a",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "text"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2019-06-10T22:06:06.000Z",
        "orgId": "8254265b-2729-46b6-b9e3-3dfca2d5bfca",
        "shortName": "mitre"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "20190609 Newly releases IoT security issues",
          "tags": [
            "mailing-list",
            "x_refsource_BUGTRAQ"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Jun/8"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ethanhunnt/IoT_vulnerabilities/blob/master/Starry_sec_issues.pdf"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153240/Starry-Router-Camera-PIN-Brute-Force-CORS-Incorrect.html"
        }
      ],
      "x_legacyV4Record": {
        "CVE_data_meta": {
          "ASSIGNER": "cve@mitre.org",
          "ID": "CVE-2017-13718",
          "STATE": "PUBLIC"
        },
        "affects": {
          "vendor": {
            "vendor_data": [
              {
                "product": {
                  "product_data": [
                    {
                      "product_name": "n/a",
                      "version": {
                        "version_data": [
                          {
                            "version_value": "n/a"
                          }
                        ]
                      }
                    }
                  ]
                },
                "vendor_name": "n/a"
              }
            ]
          }
        },
        "data_format": "MITRE",
        "data_type": "CVE",
        "data_version": "4.0",
        "description": {
          "description_data": [
            {
              "lang": "eng",
              "value": "The HTTP API supported by Starry Station (aka Starry Router) allows brute forcing the PIN setup by the user on the device, and this allows an attacker to change the Wi-Fi settings and PIN, as well as port forward and expose any internal device\u0027s port to the Internet. It was identified that the device uses custom Python code called \"rodman\" that allows the mobile appication to interact with the device. The APIs that are a part of this rodman Python file allow the mobile application to interact with the device using a secret, which is a uuid4 based session identifier generated by the device the first time it is set up. However, in some cases, these APIs can also use a security code. This security code is nothing but the PIN number set by the user to interact with the device when using the touch interface on the router. This allows an attacker on the Internet to interact with the router\u0027s HTTP interface when a user navigates to the attacker\u0027s website, and brute force the credentials. Also, since the device\u0027s server sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header to \"*\", an attacker can easily interact with the JSON payload returned by the device and steal sensitive information about the device."
            }
          ]
        },
        "problemtype": {
          "problemtype_data": [
            {
              "description": [
                {
                  "lang": "eng",
                  "value": "n/a"
                }
              ]
            }
          ]
        },
        "references": {
          "reference_data": [
            {
              "name": "20190609 Newly releases IoT security issues",
              "refsource": "BUGTRAQ",
              "url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Jun/8"
            },
            {
              "name": "https://github.com/ethanhunnt/IoT_vulnerabilities/blob/master/Starry_sec_issues.pdf",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "url": "https://github.com/ethanhunnt/IoT_vulnerabilities/blob/master/Starry_sec_issues.pdf"
            },
            {
              "name": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153240/Starry-Router-Camera-PIN-Brute-Force-CORS-Incorrect.html",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153240/Starry-Router-Camera-PIN-Brute-Force-CORS-Incorrect.html"
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "8254265b-2729-46b6-b9e3-3dfca2d5bfca",
    "assignerShortName": "mitre",
    "cveId": "CVE-2017-13718",
    "datePublished": "2019-06-10T21:31:30.000Z",
    "dateReserved": "2017-08-28T00:00:00.000Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2024-08-05T19:05:19.921Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2017-13718",
      "date": "2026-11-12",
      "epss": "0.02021",
      "percentile": "0.81247"
    },
    "nvd": {
      "cve": {
        "configurations": [
          {
            "nodes": [
              {
                "cpeMatch": [
                  {
                    "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:starry:s00111_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                    "matchCriteriaId": "1B525E59-1A21-495E-9272-8D2BBD0D1C4B",
                    "vulnerable": true
                  }
                ],
                "negate": false,
                "operator": "OR"
              },
              {
                "cpeMatch": [
                  {
                    "criteria": "cpe:2.3:h:starry:s00111:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                    "matchCriteriaId": "F23DA127-C508-4BA1-A87D-237D5E395E83",
                    "vulnerable": false
                  }
                ],
                "negate": false,
                "operator": "OR"
              }
            ],
            "operator": "AND"
          }
        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "The HTTP API supported by Starry Station (aka Starry Router) allows brute forcing the PIN setup by the user on the device, and this allows an attacker to change the Wi-Fi settings and PIN, as well as port forward and expose any internal device\u0027s port to the Internet. It was identified that the device uses custom Python code called \"rodman\" that allows the mobile appication to interact with the device. The APIs that are a part of this rodman Python file allow the mobile application to interact with the device using a secret, which is a uuid4 based session identifier generated by the device the first time it is set up. However, in some cases, these APIs can also use a security code. This security code is nothing but the PIN number set by the user to interact with the device when using the touch interface on the router. This allows an attacker on the Internet to interact with the router\u0027s HTTP interface when a user navigates to the attacker\u0027s website, and brute force the credentials. Also, since the device\u0027s server sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header to \"*\", an attacker can easily interact with the JSON payload returned by the device and steal sensitive information about the device."
          },
          {
            "lang": "es",
            "value": "la HTTP API apoyada por Stary Station (conocido como (Starry Router) permite el uso brusco de la configuraci\u00f3n de PIN por parte del usuario en el dispositivo, y esto permite que un atacante cambie la configuraci\u00f3n de Wi-Fi y el PIN, as\u00ed como el puerto hacia adelante y exponga cualquier dispositivo interno. puerto a internet. Se identific\u00f3 que el dispositivo utiliza un c\u00f3digo Python personalizado llamado \"rodman\" que permite que la aplicaci\u00f3n m\u00f3vil interact\u00fae con el dispositivo. Las API que forman parte de este archivo rodman Python permiten que la aplicaci\u00f3n m\u00f3vil interact\u00fae con el dispositivo mediante un secreto, que es un identificador de sesi\u00f3n basado en uuid4 generado por el dispositivo la primera vez que se configura. Sin embargo, en algunos casos, estas API tambi\u00e9n pueden usar un c\u00f3digo de seguridad. Este c\u00f3digo de seguridad no es m\u00e1s que el n\u00famero de PIN establecido por el usuario para interactuar con el dispositivo cuando se utiliza la interfaz t\u00e1ctil en el enrutador. Esto permite que un atacante en Internet interact\u00fae con la interfaz HTTP del enrutador cuando un usuario navega al sitio web del atacante y fuerza bruta de las credenciales. Adem\u00e1s, dado que el servidor del dispositivo establece el encabezado de Access-Control-Allow-Origin en \"*\", un atacante puede interactuar f\u00e1cilmente con la carga JSON devuelta por el dispositivo y robar informaci\u00f3n confidencial sobre el dispositivo."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2017-13718",
        "lastModified": "2024-11-21T03:11:30.210",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV2": [
            {
              "acInsufInfo": false,
              "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
              "cvssData": {
                "accessComplexity": "MEDIUM",
                "accessVector": "NETWORK",
                "authentication": "SINGLE",
                "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL",
                "baseScore": 6.0,
                "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL",
                "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
                "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P",
                "version": "2.0"
              },
              "exploitabilityScore": 6.8,
              "impactScore": 6.4,
              "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
              "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
              "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
              "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
              "type": "Primary",
              "userInteractionRequired": true
            }
          ],
          "cvssMetricV30": [
            {
              "cvssData": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
                "baseScore": 8.0,
                "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
                "version": "3.0"
              },
              "exploitabilityScore": 2.1,
              "impactScore": 5.9,
              "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
              "type": "Primary"
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2019-06-10T22:29:00.327",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "cve@mitre.org",
            "tags": [
              "Third Party Advisory",
              "VDB Entry"
            ],
            "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153240/Starry-Router-Camera-PIN-Brute-Force-CORS-Incorrect.html"
          },
          {
            "source": "cve@mitre.org",
            "tags": [
              "Exploit",
              "Third Party Advisory"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/ethanhunnt/IoT_vulnerabilities/blob/master/Starry_sec_issues.pdf"
          },
          {
            "source": "cve@mitre.org",
            "tags": [
              "Mailing List",
              "Third Party Advisory"
            ],
            "url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Jun/8"
          },
          {
            "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
            "tags": [
              "Third Party Advisory",
              "VDB Entry"
            ],
            "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153240/Starry-Router-Camera-PIN-Brute-Force-CORS-Incorrect.html"
          },
          {
            "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
            "tags": [
              "Exploit",
              "Third Party Advisory"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/ethanhunnt/IoT_vulnerabilities/blob/master/Starry_sec_issues.pdf"
          },
          {
            "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
            "tags": [
              "Mailing List",
              "Third Party Advisory"
            ],
            "url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Jun/8"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
        "vulnStatus": "Modified",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-254"
              }
            ],
            "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
            "type": "Primary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.