CVE-2014-3648 (GCVE-0-2014-3648)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2022-07-01 13:16 – Updated: 2024-08-06 10:50| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://issues.redhat.com/browse/AEROGEAR-6091 | x_refsource_MISC |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| n/a | Jboss Aerogear |
Affected:
Jboss Aerogear 1.0.0.final
|
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2024-08-06T10:50:18.312Z",
"orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"shortName": "CVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC",
"x_transferred"
],
"url": "https://issues.redhat.com/browse/AEROGEAR-6091"
}
],
"title": "CVE Program Container"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Jboss Aerogear",
"vendor": "n/a",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "Jboss Aerogear 1.0.0.final"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The simplepush server iterates through the application installations and pushes a notification to the server provided by deviceToken. But this is user controlled. If a bogus applications is registered with bad deviceTokens, one can generate endless exceptions when those endpoints can\u0027t be reached or can slow the server down by purposefully wasting it\u0027s time with slow endpoints. Similarly, one can provide whatever HTTP end point they want. This turns the server into a DDOS vector or an anonymizer for the posting of malware and so on."
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-400",
"description": "CWE-400",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2022-07-01T13:16:16.000Z",
"orgId": "53f830b8-0a3f-465b-8143-3b8a9948e749",
"shortName": "redhat"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"x_refsource_MISC"
],
"url": "https://issues.redhat.com/browse/AEROGEAR-6091"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "53f830b8-0a3f-465b-8143-3b8a9948e749",
"assignerShortName": "redhat",
"cveId": "CVE-2014-3648",
"datePublished": "2022-07-01T13:16:16.000Z",
"dateReserved": "2014-05-14T00:00:00.000Z",
"dateUpdated": "2024-08-06T10:50:18.312Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.1",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2014-3648",
"date": "2026-11-19",
"epss": "0.01005",
"percentile": "0.63689"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:redhat:jboss_aerogear:1.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "8241631C-9E1A-4612-82F5-92BDFFB73167",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The simplepush server iterates through the application installations and pushes a notification to the server provided by deviceToken. But this is user controlled. If a bogus applications is registered with bad deviceTokens, one can generate endless exceptions when those endpoints can\u0027t be reached or can slow the server down by purposefully wasting it\u0027s time with slow endpoints. Similarly, one can provide whatever HTTP end point they want. This turns the server into a DDOS vector or an anonymizer for the posting of malware and so on."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El servidor simplepush itera mediante de las instalaciones de la aplicaci\u00f3n y empuja una notificaci\u00f3n al servidor proporcionado por deviceToken. Pero esto es controlado por el usuario. Si una aplicaci\u00f3n falsa es registrada con malos deviceTokens, uno puede generar un sinf\u00edn de excepciones cuando esos endpoints no pueden ser alcanzados o puede ralentizar el servidor haci\u00e9ndole perder el tiempo a prop\u00f3sito con endpoints lentos. Del mismo modo, uno puede proporcionar cualquier punto final HTTP que quiera. Esto convierte al servidor en un vector DDOS o en un anonimizador para la publicaci\u00f3n de malware, etc"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2014-3648",
"lastModified": "2024-11-21T02:08:34.710",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV2": [
{
"acInsufInfo": false,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"cvssData": {
"accessComplexity": "LOW",
"accessVector": "NETWORK",
"authentication": "NONE",
"availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL",
"baseScore": 5.0,
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P",
"version": "2.0"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
"impactScore": 2.9,
"obtainAllPrivilege": false,
"obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
"obtainUserPrivilege": false,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary",
"userInteractionRequired": false
}
],
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2022-07-01T14:15:08.107",
"references": [
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Permissions Required",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://issues.redhat.com/browse/AEROGEAR-6091"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Permissions Required",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://issues.redhat.com/browse/AEROGEAR-6091"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "secalert@redhat.com",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-400"
}
],
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-400"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.