GHSA-Q6CR-HCHJ-9QVC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-14 18:30 – Updated: 2026-02-14 18:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/dmem: fix NULL pointer dereference when setting max
An issue was triggered:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 658 Comm: bash Tainted: 6.19.0-rc6-next-2026012 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), RIP: 0010:strcmp+0x10/0x30 RSP: 0018:ffffc900017f7dc0 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888107cd4358 RDX: 0000000019f73907 RSI: ffffffff82cc381a RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8881016bef0d R08: 000000006c0e7145 R09: 0000000056c0e714 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff888107cd4358 R12: 0007ffffffffffff R13: ffff888101399200 R14: ffff888100fcb360 R15: 0007ffffffffffff CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000105c79000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: dmemcg_limit_write.constprop.0+0x16d/0x390 ? __pfx_set_resource_max+0x10/0x10 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x14e/0x200 vfs_write+0x367/0x510 ksys_write+0x66/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x390 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f42697e1887
It was trriggered setting max without limitation, the command is like: "echo test/region0 > dmem.max". To fix this issue, add check whether options is valid after parsing the region_name.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23183"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-14T17:15:56Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncgroup/dmem: fix NULL pointer dereference when setting max\n\nAn issue was triggered:\n\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n PGD 0 P4D 0\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 658 Comm: bash Tainted: 6.19.0-rc6-next-2026012\n Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),\n RIP: 0010:strcmp+0x10/0x30\n RSP: 0018:ffffc900017f7dc0 EFLAGS: 00000246\n RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888107cd4358\n RDX: 0000000019f73907 RSI: ffffffff82cc381a RDI: 0000000000000000\n RBP: ffff8881016bef0d R08: 000000006c0e7145 R09: 0000000056c0e714\n R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff888107cd4358 R12: 0007ffffffffffff\n R13: ffff888101399200 R14: ffff888100fcb360 R15: 0007ffffffffffff\n CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000105c79000 CR4: 00000000000006f0\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dmemcg_limit_write.constprop.0+0x16d/0x390\n ? __pfx_set_resource_max+0x10/0x10\n kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x14e/0x200\n vfs_write+0x367/0x510\n ksys_write+0x66/0xe0\n do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x390\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n RIP: 0033:0x7f42697e1887\n\nIt was trriggered setting max without limitation, the command is like:\n\"echo test/region0 \u003e dmem.max\". To fix this issue, add check whether\noptions is valid after parsing the region_name.",
"id": "GHSA-q6cr-hchj-9qvc",
"modified": "2026-02-14T18:30:16Z",
"published": "2026-02-14T18:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23183"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43151f812886be1855d2cba059f9c93e4729460b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c13816e8fa23deec6a8d7465d9e637fd02683b5c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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