Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2026-03-27 17:45
Modified
2026-03-27 18:14
Summary
NATS has mTLS verify_and_map authentication bypass via incorrect Subject DN matching
Details

NATS-Server is a High-Performance server for NATS.io, a cloud and edge native messaging system. Prior to versions 2.11.15 and 2.12.6, when using mTLS for client identity, with verify_and_map to derive a NATS identity from the client certificate's Subject DN, certain patterns of RDN would not be correctly enforced, allowing for authentication bypass. This does require a valid certificate from a CA already trusted for client certificates, and DN naming patterns which the NATS maintainers consider highly unlikely. So this is an unlikely attack. Nonetheless, administrators who have been very sophisticated in their DN construction patterns might conceivably be impacted. Versions 2.11.15 and 2.12.6 contain a fix. As a workaround, developers should review their CA issuing practices.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "nats",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/nats"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.15"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "2.12.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.12.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33248"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:nats:nats_server:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "NATS-Server is a High-Performance server for NATS.io, a cloud and edge native messaging system. Prior to versions 2.11.15 and 2.12.6, when using mTLS for client identity, with `verify_and_map` to derive a NATS identity from the client certificate\u0027s Subject DN, certain patterns of RDN would not be correctly enforced, allowing for authentication bypass. This does require a valid certificate from a CA already trusted for client certificates, and `DN` naming patterns which the NATS maintainers consider highly unlikely. So this is an unlikely attack. Nonetheless, administrators who have been very sophisticated in their `DN` construction patterns might conceivably be impacted. Versions 2.11.15 and 2.12.6 contain a fix. As a workaround, developers should review their CA issuing practices.",
  "id": "BIT-nats-2026-33248",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T18:14:10.313Z",
  "published": "2026-03-27T17:45:26.680Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://advisories.nats.io/CVE/secnote-2026-13.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nats-io/nats-server/security/advisories/GHSA-3f24-pcvm-5jqc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33248"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.6.2",
  "summary": "NATS has mTLS verify_and_map authentication bypass via incorrect Subject DN matching"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…