Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2024-03-06 11:01
Modified
2026-09-08 08:34
Summary
Details

Istio through 1.5.1 and Envoy through 1.14.1 have a data-leak issue. If there is a TCP connection (negotiated with SNI over HTTPS) to .example.com, a request for a domain concurrently configured explicitly (e.g., abc.example.com) is sent to the server(s) listening behind .example.com. The outcome should instead be 421 Misdirected Request. Imagine a shared caching forward proxy re-using an HTTP/2 connection for a large subnet with many users. If a victim is interacting with abc.example.com, and a server (for abc.example.com) recycles the TCP connection to the forward proxy, the victim's browser may suddenly start sending sensitive data to a *.example.com server. This occurs because the forward proxy between the victim and the origin server reuses connections (which obeys the specification), but neither Istio nor Envoy corrects this by sending a 421 error. Similarly, this behavior voids the security model browsers have put in place between domains.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "envoy",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/envoy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-11767"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:envoyproxy:envoy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "Low"
  },
  "details": "Istio through 1.5.1 and Envoy through 1.14.1 have a data-leak issue. If there is a TCP connection (negotiated with SNI over HTTPS) to *.example.com, a request for a domain concurrently configured explicitly (e.g., abc.example.com) is sent to the server(s) listening behind *.example.com. The outcome should instead be 421 Misdirected Request. Imagine a shared caching forward proxy re-using an HTTP/2 connection for a large subnet with many users. If a victim is interacting with abc.example.com, and a server (for abc.example.com) recycles the TCP connection to the forward proxy, the victim\u0027s browser may suddenly start sending sensitive data to a *.example.com server. This occurs because the forward proxy between the victim and the origin server reuses connections (which obeys the specification), but neither Istio nor Envoy corrects this by sending a 421 error. Similarly, this behavior voids the security model browsers have put in place between domains.",
  "id": "BIT-envoy-2020-11767",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T08:34:36.952Z",
  "published": "2024-03-06T11:01:15.092Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=954160#c5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/issues/6767"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/istio/istio/issues/13589"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/istio/istio/issues/9429"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11767"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.5.0"
}



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