MAL-2026-3777
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Full C2 implant disguised as vue-template-compiler fork. postinstall-run.cjs loads tooling-bootstrap.cjs which contains base64-encoded C2 agent. Decoded payload: registers victim (hostname, username, OS) to Cloudflare tunnel C2 at maiden-apply-looks-education.trycloudflare.com, beacons for tasks, reports results, uploads files. Persists agent ID in ~/.gradle-cache/.aid. Has C2_TLS_INSECURE env var bypass. Package mirrors vue-template-compiler version 2.7.16 and claims to be an 'API-compatible fork with postinstall hooks' — social engineering for npm override/alias substitution.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (de772e4b79f4da4ae64ea768f8ddc74bd6cd5d5c41f971d30de12ca0c8ed70c1)
This package impersonates the legitimate vue-template-compiler (same version 2.7.18, framed as an "API-compatible fork"), and its package.json description instructs consumers to alias the real name to this one via npm overrides or resolve.alias. On install, the postinstall hook (postinstall-run.cjs) loads tooling-bootstrap.cjs, which assembles ~80 base64 string fragments in BOOTSTRAP_B64, Buffer.from-decodes them, writes the result to ~/.gradle/daemon/tooling-api-runtime.mjs (a cover-story path mimicking a Gradle cache), and then spawns node on that file with detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true, and child.unref() so the process survives npm install. The decoded payload is a remote-access trojan that polls https://maiden-apply-looks-education.trycloudflare.com/ for commands, executes arbitrary shell commands on the installer's host, and exfiltrates files. Three independent block signals: (1) typosquat-with-divergent-API against a top-tier Vue package, (2) obfuscated base64-chunked executable payload decoded and exec'd at install, (3) persistent detached RAT beaconing to an attacker-controlled Cloudflare quick-tunnel.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "tooling-bootstrap.cjs",
"sha256": "c59e160a8c9712a28201a6ac89fc9f322d678c2f77c6504c826ea0e4c5a2fa5e",
"tlsh": "6c82d5a7ce8b2d548760464226de5ac9184e43872c92b8ec776e868d1f0f83f91f11ed"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "da31f9bf893f17a852542b11918c1f380c6ca55bc199019805950128a9c4077e",
"tlsh": "9821f868c43c9e531bf816e8aa550007e626b8034e54ad1632d342188a8f7bf41ff06e"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "vue-template-compiler-plugin-2.7.18.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "fd056dcb2e16c8f5bc04e9ed74267b7d07813425",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-k+LxuKgfH3XcoEAN1nsfogt/IuH1xJsQuPuOW477QR+Lz2waarZ+x+UN2M6cn9EOwMOoc4fA08/hD7JzaS3R2A=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vue-template-compiler-plugin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.7.18"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"actran@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://safedep.io"
],
"name": "SafeDep",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-002723",
"import_time": "2026-05-15T07:37:18.18038023Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-14T19:25:25Z",
"sha256": "de772e4b79f4da4ae64ea768f8ddc74bd6cd5d5c41f971d30de12ca0c8ed70c1",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"2.7.18"
]
}
]
},
"details": "Full C2 implant disguised as vue-template-compiler fork. postinstall-run.cjs loads tooling-bootstrap.cjs which contains base64-encoded C2 agent. Decoded payload: registers victim (hostname, username, OS) to Cloudflare tunnel C2 at maiden-apply-looks-education.trycloudflare.com, beacons for tasks, reports results, uploads files. Persists agent ID in ~/.gradle-cache/.aid. Has C2_TLS_INSECURE env var bypass. Package mirrors vue-template-compiler version 2.7.16 and claims to be an \u0027API-compatible fork with postinstall hooks\u0027 \u2014 social engineering for npm override/alias substitution.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (de772e4b79f4da4ae64ea768f8ddc74bd6cd5d5c41f971d30de12ca0c8ed70c1)\nThis package impersonates the legitimate vue-template-compiler (same version 2.7.18, framed as an \"API-compatible fork\"), and its package.json description instructs consumers to alias the real name to this one via npm overrides or resolve.alias. On install, the postinstall hook (postinstall-run.cjs) loads tooling-bootstrap.cjs, which assembles ~80 base64 string fragments in BOOTSTRAP_B64, Buffer.from-decodes them, writes the result to ~/.gradle/daemon/tooling-api-runtime.mjs (a cover-story path mimicking a Gradle cache), and then spawns node on that file with detached: true, stdio: \u0027ignore\u0027, windowsHide: true, and child.unref() so the process survives npm install. The decoded payload is a remote-access trojan that polls https://maiden-apply-looks-education.trycloudflare.com/ for commands, executes arbitrary shell commands on the installer\u0027s host, and exfiltrates files. Three independent block signals: (1) typosquat-with-divergent-API against a top-tier Vue package, (2) obfuscated base64-chunked executable payload decoded and exec\u0027d at install, (3) persistent detached RAT beaconing to an attacker-controlled Cloudflare quick-tunnel.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-3777",
"modified": "2026-05-18T01:34:28Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T11:26:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/vue-template-compiler-plugin/v/2.7.18"
},
{
"type": "REPORT",
"url": "https://app.safedep.io/community/malysis/01KRG9A28GEBVA4BBGNAVPY7V8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in vue-template-compiler-plugin (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.