https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent sightings. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 01 May 2026 20:55:36 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/sighting/c16f88ac-d25c-4e01-aec3-c44eab7fbcec/export {"uuid": "c16f88ac-d25c-4e01-aec3-c44eab7fbcec", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "2a075640-a300-48a4-bb44-bc6130783b9b", "vulnerability": "CVE-2024-45311", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/cvedetector/4646", "content": "{\n \"Source\": \"CVE FEED\",\n \"Title\": \"CVE-2024-45311 - Quinn QUIC Protocol Remote Panic Vulnerability\", \n \"Content\": \"CVE ID : CVE-2024-45311 \nPublished : Sept. 2, 2024, 6:15 p.m. | 42\u00a0minutes ago \nDescription : Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical. \nSeverity: 7.5 | HIGH \nVisit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...\",\n \"Detection Date\": \"02 Sep 2024\",\n \"Type\": \"Vulnerability\"\n}\n\ud83d\udd39 t.me/cvedetector \ud83d\udd39", "creation_timestamp": "2024-09-02T21:24:18.000000Z"} {"uuid": "c16f88ac-d25c-4e01-aec3-c44eab7fbcec", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "2a075640-a300-48a4-bb44-bc6130783b9b", "vulnerability": "CVE-2024-45311", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/cvedetector/4646", "content": "{\n \"Source\": \"CVE FEED\",\n \"Title\": \"CVE-2024-45311 - Quinn QUIC Protocol Remote Panic Vulnerability\", \n \"Content\": \"CVE ID : CVE-2024-45311 \nPublished : Sept. 2, 2024, 6:15 p.m. | 42\u00a0minutes ago \nDescription : Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical. \nSeverity: 7.5 | HIGH \nVisit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...\",\n \"Detection Date\": \"02 Sep 2024\",\n \"Type\": \"Vulnerability\"\n}\n\ud83d\udd39 t.me/cvedetector \ud83d\udd39", "creation_timestamp": "2024-09-02T21:24:18.000000Z"} https://db.gcve.eu/sighting/c16f88ac-d25c-4e01-aec3-c44eab7fbcec/export Mon, 02 Sep 2024 21:24:18 +0000