https://db.gcve.eu/sightings/feed 2026-05-04T11:04:05.468059+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@gcve.eu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent sightings. https://db.gcve.eu/sighting/cd65a364-49e3-472e-a5a7-8e78f6d02783/export 2026-05-04T11:04:06.027328+00:00 cedric http://db.gcve.eu/user/cedric {"uuid": "cd65a364-49e3-472e-a5a7-8e78f6d02783", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "2a075640-a300-48a4-bb44-bc6130783b9b", "vulnerability": "GHSA-c7w4-9wv8-7x7c", "type": "seen", "source": "https://infosec.exchange/users/cve/statuses/113958415500125710", "content": "", "creation_timestamp": "2025-02-06T18:43:44.547514Z"} 2025-02-06T18:43:44.547514+00:00 https://db.gcve.eu/sighting/b7f6a5fb-436d-4164-91ae-0b74285d6e1e/export 2026-05-04T11:04:06.027254+00:00 cedric http://db.gcve.eu/user/cedric {"uuid": "b7f6a5fb-436d-4164-91ae-0b74285d6e1e", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "2a075640-a300-48a4-bb44-bc6130783b9b", "vulnerability": "GHSA-C7W4-9WV8-7X7C", "type": "published-proof-of-concept", "source": "Telegram/62ADuuFkUh-GLH8SzGnVJ7_7GwT3veD_kQ_-knb1-PeB1sA", "content": "", "creation_timestamp": "2025-02-06T21:00:33.000000Z"} 2025-02-06T21:00:33+00:00 https://db.gcve.eu/sighting/bb286cfc-5dfb-429a-adee-f94bc18c6984/export 2026-05-04T11:04:06.025645+00:00 cedric http://db.gcve.eu/user/cedric {"uuid": "bb286cfc-5dfb-429a-adee-f94bc18c6984", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "2a075640-a300-48a4-bb44-bc6130783b9b", "vulnerability": "GHSA-C7W4-9WV8-7X7C", "type": "published-proof-of-concept", "source": "https://t.me/DarkWebInformer_CVEAlerts/3802", "content": "\ud83d\udd17 DarkWebInformer.com - Cyber Threat Intelligence\n\ud83d\udccc CVE ID: CVE-2025-24787\n\ud83d\udd25 CVSS Score: 8.7 (CVSS_V3)\n\ud83d\udd39 Description: ### Summary\n\nThe application is vulnerable to parameter injection in database connection strings, which allows an attacker to read local files on the machine the application is running on.\n\n### Details\n\nThe application uses string concatenation to build database connection URIs which are then passed to corresponding libraries responsible for setting up the database connections.\n\nThis string concatenation is done unsafely and without escaping or encoding the user input. This allows an user, in many cases, to inject arbitrary parameters into the URI string. These parameters can be potentially dangerous depending on the libraries used.\n\nOne of these dangerous parameters is `allowAllFiles` in the library `github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql`. Should this be set to `true`, the library enables running the `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` query on any file on the host machine (in this case, the machine that WhoDB is running on). Source: https://github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql/blob/7403860363ca112af503b4612568c3096fecb466/infile.go#L128\n\nBy injecting `&allowAllFiles=true` into the connection URI and connecting to any MySQL server (such as an attacker-controlled one), the attacker is able to read local files.\n\n### PoC\n\nAs this vulnerability does not require sending requests manually and can all be done using the WhoDB UI, screenshots are provided instead of HTTP requests.\n\nFor this proof-of-concept, a clean instance of WhoDB and MySQL were set up using podman (docker is a suitable alternative):\n\n```\npodman network create whodb-poc\npodman run -d -p 8080:8080 --network whodb-poc docker.io/clidey/whodb\npodman run -d --name mysql -e MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=password --network whodb-poc docker.io/mysql:9\n```\n\nThe attacker connects to the database via WhoDB. Note that in the `Loc` field, the string `&allowAllFiles=true` is inserted:\n\n\n\nAfter connecting, the attacker navigates to the scratchpad in `/scratchpad`.\n\nThe attacker first creates a demo table:\n```sql\nCREATE TABLE poc (\n line TEXT\n);\n```\n\nThe attacker then enables loading files from the server side. For the sake of clarity, do note that while this is required, the file is not being read from the remote server where MySQL is running, but the local machine that WhoDB is running on.\n```sql\nSET GLOBAL local_infile=1;\n```\n\nThe attacker then uses the `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` statement to read the contents of `/etc/passwd` (in this case from inside the container where WhoDB is running) into the previously created table:\n```sql\nLOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE '/etc/passwd'\nINTO TABLE poc\nFIELDS TERMINATED BY '\\0'\nLINES TERMINATED BY '\\n';\n```\n\nThe attacker then navigates to the `poc` table in the _Tables_ view and observes that the file has been read successfully:\n\n\n\n### Impact\n\nWhile this proof-of-concept demonstrates local file inclusion, the root cause of the issue is the unsafe construction of database connection URIs from user input. Not all database connector libraries used in WhoDB were inspected; there may be libraries which allow for even more impactful parameters.\n\nThe attack requires no user authentication to WhoDB (only authentication to any database server, such as an attacker-controlled one) and no special configuration - the default configuration of the application is vulnerable.\n\ud83d\udccf Published: 2025-02-06T19:58:37Z\n\ud83d\udccf Modified: 2025-02-07T17:35:21Z\n\ud83d\udd17 References:\n1. https://github.com/clidey/whodb/security/advisories/GHSA-c7w4-9wv8-7x7c\n2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24787\n3. https://github.com/clidey/whodb/commit/8d67b767e00552e5eba2b1537179b74bfa662ee1\n4. https://github.com/clidey/whodb\n5. https://github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql/blob/7403860363ca112af503b4612568c3096fecb466/infile.go#L128", "creation_timestamp": "2025-02-07T18:03:02.000000Z"} 2025-02-07T18:03:02+00:00