{"uuid": "fc6c0874-f937-4f9d-8422-d0e6d836f3e9", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "2a075640-a300-48a4-bb44-bc6130783b9b", "vulnerability": "CVE-2020-25685", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/cibsecurity/22350", "content": "\u203c CVE-2020-25685 \u203c\n\nA flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. When getting a reply from a forwarded query, dnsmasq checks in forward.c:reply_query(), which is the forwarded query that matches the reply, by only using a weak hash of the query name. Due to the weak hash (CRC32 when dnsmasq is compiled without DNSSEC, SHA-1 when it is) this flaw allows an off-path attacker to find several different domains all having the same hash, substantially reducing the number of attempts they would have to perform to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq. This is in contrast with RFC5452, which specifies that the query name is one of the attributes of a query that must be used to match a reply. This flaw could be abused to perform a DNS Cache Poisoning attack. If chained with CVE-2020-25684 the attack complexity of a successful attack is reduced. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity.\n\n\ud83d\udcd6 Read\n\nvia \"National Vulnerability Database\".", "creation_timestamp": "2021-01-20T18:27:29.000000Z"}