{"uuid": "f4c871d4-b7a5-4601-9484-3c932121369a", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "2a075640-a300-48a4-bb44-bc6130783b9b", "vulnerability": "CVE-2024-58237", "type": "published-proof-of-concept", "source": "https://t.me/DarkWebInformer_CVEAlerts/15703", "content": "\ud83d\udd17 DarkWebInformer.com - Cyber Threat Intelligence\n\ud83d\udccc CVE ID: CVE-2024-58237\n\ud83d\udd25 CVSS Score: N/A\n\ud83d\udd39 Description: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: consider that tail calls invalidate packet pointers\n\nTail-called programs could execute any of the helpers that invalidate\npacket pointers. Hence, conservatively assume that each tail call\ninvalidates packet pointers.\n\nMaking the change in bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() automatically makes\nuse of check_cfg() logic that computes 'changes_pkt_data' effect for\nglobal sub-programs, such that the following program could be\nrejected:\n\n    int tail_call(struct __sk_buff *sk)\n    {\n     bpf_tail_call_static(sk, &jmp_table, 0);\n     return 0;\n    }\n\n    SEC(\"tc\")\n    int not_safe(struct __sk_buff *sk)\n    {\n     int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data;\n     ... make p valid ...\n     tail_call(sk);\n     *p = 42; /* this is unsafe */\n     ...\n    }\n\nThe tc_bpf2bpf.c:subprog_tc() needs change: mark it as a function that\ncan invalidate packet pointers. Otherwise, it can't be freplaced with\ntailcall_freplace.c:entry_freplace() that does a tail call.\n\ud83d\udccf Published: 2025-05-05T14:53:34.153Z\n\ud83d\udccf Modified: 2025-05-09T08:06:10.185Z\n\ud83d\udd17 References:\n1. https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1692ee23dcaaddc24ba407b269707ee5df1301f\n2. https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c2244437f9ad3dd91215f920401a14f2542dbfc\n3. https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a4607ffba35bf2a630aab299e34dd3f6e658d70", "creation_timestamp": "2025-05-09T08:25:23.000000Z"}