{"uuid": "acaa73cb-0fc9-43c0-910a-6f76b94db527", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "2a075640-a300-48a4-bb44-bc6130783b9b", "vulnerability": "CVE-2022-48925", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/cvedetector/3851", "content": "{\n  \"Source\": \"CVE FEED\",\n  \"Title\": \"CVE-2022-48925 - Iberr Corrupts Global State in RDMA/cma\", \n  \"Content\": \"CVE ID : CVE-2022-48925 \nPublished : Aug. 22, 2024, 2:15 a.m. | 37\u00a0minutes ago \nDescription : In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  \n  \nRDMA/cma: Do not change route.addr.src_addr outside state checks  \n  \nIf the state is not idle then resolve_prepare_src() should immediately  \nfail and no change to global state should happen. However, it  \nunconditionally overwrites the src_addr trying to build a temporary any  \naddress.  \n  \nFor instance if the state is already RDMA_CM_LISTEN then this will corrupt  \nthe src_addr and would cause the test in cma_cancel_operation():  \n  \n           if (cma_any_addr(cma_src_addr(id_priv)) && !id_priv->cma_dev)  \n  \nWhich would manifest as this trace from syzkaller:  \n  \n  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26  \n  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881546491e0 by task syz-executor.1/32204  \n  \n  CPU: 1 PID: 32204 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-syzkaller #0  \n  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011  \n  Call Trace:  \n   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]  \n   dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120  \n   print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:232  \n   __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:399 [inline]  \n   kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 mm/kasan/report.c:416  \n   __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26  \n   __list_add include/linux/list.h:67 [inline]  \n   list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:100 [inline]  \n   cma_listen_on_all drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:2557 [inline]  \n   rdma_listen+0x787/0xe00 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3751  \n   ucma_listen+0x16a/0x210 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1102  \n   ucma_write+0x259/0x350 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1732  \n   vfs_write+0x28e/0xa30 fs/read_write.c:603  \n   ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:658  \n   do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46  \n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae  \n  \nThis is indicating that an rdma_id_private was destroyed without doing  \ncma_cancel_listens().  \n  \nInstead of trying to re-use the src_addr memory to indirectly create an  \nany address derived from the dst build one explicitly on the stack and  \nbind to that as any other normal flow would do. rdma_bind_addr() will copy  \nit over the src_addr once it knows the state is valid.  \n  \nThis is similar to commit bc0bdc5afaa7 (\"RDMA/cma: Do not change  \nroute.addr.src_addr.ss_family\") \nSeverity: 0.0 | NA \nVisit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...\",\n  \"Detection Date\": \"22 Aug 2024\",\n  \"Type\": \"Vulnerability\"\n}\n\ud83d\udd39 t.me/cvedetector \ud83d\udd39", "creation_timestamp": "2024-08-22T05:07:51.000000Z"}